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Foreword
Microinsurance is a rapidly evolving 
development strategy to extend effi-
cient risk management solutions to 
low-income households and small 
businesses. As noted by Amartya Sen, 
the Nobel Prize-winning economist, 
crisis has a “class-dependent char-
acter”. Lower socioeconomic classes, 
many of whom work in the informal 
economy, are more vulnerable to risks 
than others, and yet they are the least 
able to cope when crises occur. Micro-
insurance holds the promise of break-
ing this perpetuating cycle of vulner-
ability and poverty whilst making 
important development contributions, 
not just at the household level, but also 
within the community and across the 
country. 
At the household level, microinsur-
ance can potentially help to break the 
cycle of poverty through both protec-
tive and productive contributions. On 
the protective side, insurance can 
shield policyholders from the financial 
consequences of various risks. Small, 
regular premium payments are more 
affordable than the large expenses 
that accompany crises. On the produc-
tive side, through life insurance poli-
cies, the poor can amass savings and 
build assets. Alternatively, insurance 
can help facilitate access to produc-
tive inputs such as credit, by covering 
risks that lenders do not want to carry. 
There is also the peace-of-mind effect 
where the working poor may feel less 
compelled to set aside unproductive 
contingency funds “under the mat-
tress” if they are insured, and may 
make investments in higher-risk, 
higher-return activities.
Beyond the household level, stud-
ies have demonstrated a causal link 
between the development of the insur-
ance industry in general – not specifi-
cally microinsurance – and national 
economic development. This is accom-
plished, for example, by stimulating 
entrepreneurship and enabling busi-
nesses to operate with less volatility. 
Since insurers and reinsurers have an 
incentive to reduce claims, they also 
contribute to development by promot-
ing risk reduction measures. And by 
mobilising long-term savings, insurers 
are an important source of long-term 
finance that can be invested in initia-
tives such as infrastructure improve-
ments, as well as acting as a signifi-
cant stimulator for the development of 
debt and equity markets.
But in many countries, the insurance 
industry is not achieving its develop-
ment potential. The insurance sectors 
in many developing economies evolved 
in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and focused largely on corporate 
clients, with little effort expended to 
build the infrastructure required for 
personal lines. The emergence of 
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microinsurance provides the insur-
ance industry with an opportunity to 
build from the bottom up and create 
a foundation of retail insurance, ulti-
mately making a stronger contribu-
tion to the country’s general economic 
development. 
The contribution of microinsurance to 
a community and a country extends 
beyond its involvement in deepening the 
insurance industry. As microinsurance 
lies at the intersection between social 
protection and financial inclusion, the 
contribution to social and economic 
development will be greatest where 
these forces are well coordinated. For 
example, public private partnerships 
seem to be an important way to lever-
age market expertise to achieve pub-
lic policy objectives. By fusing social 
protection with financial inclusion, it is 
possible to increase the effectiveness 
of both, enhancing the ability of work-
ers in the informal economy to cope 
with the costs associated with illness 
or death of breadwinners, the theft of 
productive assets, and the destruction 
wrought by disasters.
All of these advantages of microinsur-
ance should be clearly articulated as 
potential benefits. In theory, insurance 
is an efficient way for the poor to man-
age certain risks, and there is con-
siderable anecdotal evidence to sup-
port the theory. Moving from theory 
into practice, we now need evidence 
from rigorous research to ensure that 
microinsurance actually benefits poor 
households – and what design features 
of microinsurance are likely to yield the 
largest impact to those it protects. 
Microinsurance is not easy, and signifi-
cant innovations are required to over-
come the challenges of viably extend-
ing valuable insurance coverage to 
large numbers of low-income house-
holds. During the early days of micro-
insurance, the focus was primarily 
on understanding how it worked, the 
operational tricks of the trade, and 
improving access. Now that we are 
seeing significant outreach, and per-
haps half a billion low-income persons 
have some coverage, more attention 
is being paid to assessing whether the 
poor actually benefit from insurance or 
not. 
This impact question is not just of 
interest to academics, although a 
growing number of academics appear 
to be interested in trying to answer 
it. The expansion of academic inter-
est in microinsurance can be partly 
attributed to the powerful public policy 
implications if insurance is proven to 
be a cost effective means of reducing 
the vulnerability of low-income house-
holds. Indeed, donors and policy mak-
ers are keen to understand impact. If, 
for example, they are going to provide 
subsidies, they want to know whether 
these interventions really benefit 
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those most in need of protection. Fur-
ther, they might want to know whether 
investing in microinsurance is more 
efficient than investing in other forms 
of risk protection.
Impact is also of great interest to 
microinsurance providers. This may 
seem obvious for microinsurers with a 
development agenda, like non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) and com-
munity groups, but even commercially 
oriented insurers are keen to under-
stand how, and to what extent, their 
policyholders benefit from their prod-
ucts. The interest of insurance com-
panies to understand impact has two 
dimensions. Firstly, such research can 
be built into a process of continuous 
improvement and enable insurers to 
identify ways in which they can improve 
their products, and expand market 
share, by enhancing the value that 
their clients derive from insurance. 
Secondly, many companies take their 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
obligations seriously and are there-
fore interested in evidence to validate 
their efforts. In that same line of think-
ing, social investors are also keen for 
impact evidence to justify their invest-
ments in microinsurance.
However, it is certainly not easy or 
straightforward to demonstrate the 
impact of insurance. It is not possi-
ble to look at the social and economic 
characteristics of policyholders before 
and after insurance to assess the 
impact because if there are improve-
ments, for example to their incomes or 
health status, they could be attributed 
to many causes. To produce credible 
results, it is necessary to follow cer-
tain research standards and norms. 
To advance these efforts, the Micro-
insurance Network’s Impact Working 
Group has developed these guidelines, 
sometimes known as the impact cook-
book, to provide clear guidance on how 
to conduct impact studies properly, 
using both qualitative and quantita-
tive research methods. We expect that 
these guidelines will lead not only to 
more valid studies, but also promote 
common frameworks, facilitating 
meta-analyses across studies so that 
we will be better positioned to demon-
strate whether microinsurance theory 
really does translate into practice. 
I believe this publication will make an 
indispensable contribution to the cam-
paign to prove and improve the value of 
insurance for low-income households 
and small businesses.
Craig Churchill, 
ILO’s Microinsurance Innovation Facility
Introduction to Impact 
Assessments in Microinsurance
I
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In a nutshell: 
impact assessments in 
microinsurance
Ralf Radermacher and Katja Roth
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1.1. Introduction
Everyone is confronted with various 
risks in life – but the consequences 
of such risks are often more severe 
for the poor than for better-off house-
holds. When confronted with the finan-
cial consequences of calamities like 
illness, accidents, death, or loss of 
agricultural or other produce, poor 
households often have to take actions 
that harm their productivity and pros-
perity prospects. These actions could 
include: borrowing at high interest 
rates, selling productive assets, taking 
children out of school or sending them 
to labour, compromising on a balanced 
diet, or leaving illnesses untreated. 
Such responses to risk impede house-
holds on their way out of poverty or may 
even force them deeper into poverty.
Over the past 15 years, microinsurance 
has increasingly been seen as an alter-
native and potentially more efficient 
way for the poor to manage their risks. 
Stated simply, microinsurance is insur-
ance targeting the poor. It is meant to 
be offered at an affordable price, and 
so comes with some limitations in 
risk coverage. Microinsurance can be 
offered for all kinds of risks and by all 
kinds of providers. Often, communi-
ties or non-government organisations 
(NGOs) arrange these programmes 
themselves, but commercial insurers 
are increasingly engaging in the provi-
sion of microinsurance (see chapter 2 
“What is microinsurance?”). They 
recognise that the largest untapped 
insurance market in terms of clients 
is amongst the poor, with an estimated 
market size of four billion people (Swiss 
Re 2010). Governments can also be 
providers of microinsurance – or take 
an interest in the promotion and regu-
lation of the market, either as part of a 
financial sector development or as part 
of a social protection approach. 
It is essential to learn more about the 
effects of insurance on the insured and 
the communities in which they live. 
This is particularly true for many gov-
ernments and funders of development, 
for whom the provision of insurance is 
not an end in itself, but rather a tool to 
achieve certain development objectives 
like, for example, reduction of poverty, 
improved access to health care and, 
through this, fewer maternal and infant 
deaths. 
The effect microinsurance has on the 
lives of the poor or the larger society is 
what we call its impact. These changes 
can be positive or negative, direct or 
indirect, and intended or unintended. 
Furthermore, they can happen before 
(i.e., ex-ante) or after (i.e., ex-post) 
the occurrence of insured events and 
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can affect not only the insured, but 
also their household members, their 
communities, or other populations 
(Radermacher et al. 2012; OECD 2002). 
Hence, microinsurance can change the 
life of people even if they never make 
a claim or – even more – the lives of 
people that are not even insured. 
Regarding these effects, one needs 
to differentiate between impacts and 
outcomes. Impacts are an end in itself, 
whilst outcomes are the bridge expected 
to lead to the desired impacts. Impacts 
are usually expected to be long-
term effects of an intervention, whilst 
outcomes are normally achievable in a 
short term (OECD 2002).
Measuring the impact of a single 
microinsurance scheme can provide 
information about its absolute impact 
or its effectiveness, i.e., whether the 
insurance makes a difference for those 
covered and whether these differences 
meet the objectives one was aiming 
at with the insurance. It is, however, 
also of key interest to know whether 
one approach to microinsurance has 
a larger or different kind of impact 
than another approach – or how 
microinsurance compares to other 
risk management techniques. Such 
comparative information, called 
relative impact or efficiency, can be 
immensely helpful for the design of 
future microinsurance programmes 
and investment decisions of donors and 
governments. Furthermore, collecting 
information on the costs of the 
implementation can provide insights 
into the cost-efficiency of programmes 
with similar goals.
However, to use the information to com-
pare cost-efficiency between different 
schemes or microinsurance and other 
risk management approaches, it is im-
portant that the programmes are at a 
similar stage of implementation. On one 
hand, pilot projects may be compara-
tively more expensive than larger roll-
outs, as economies of scale and learn-
ing effects are likely to reduce costs per 
insured. On the other hand, the quality 
of implementation is usually higher in 
the pilot, potentially leading to higher 
impacts per insured compared to pro-
grammes taken to scale. Generally, ef-
fects of scale and scope need to be con-
sidered when comparing programmes 
with regard to their efficiency.
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When examining the effects of 
microinsurance, it is useful to 
understand the effect on the insured. 
Sometimes information on the whole 
community offered the insurance, no 
matter whether they chose to enrol or 
not, is also helpful. Moreover, effects 
can differ for different subgroups of a 
sample, such as women versus men, 
children versus adults, or extremely 
poor versus better-off households. 
Understanding these differences can 
provide insight on equity and equality 
effects, which might also be the desired 
effects of an insurance programme. 
Donor organisations might particularly 
aim to improve the well-being of 
specific vulnerable subgroups. Hence, 
their prosperity compared to other 
subgroups might be in their focus. 
For example, it might be of interest 
to know how a health microinsurance 
programme helps to improve the health 
of girls compared to that of boys, since 
boys often get better access to care.
Understanding the impact of microin-
surance is useful and necessary. The 
big question, however, is how to mea-
sure this impact.
1.2. Measuring impact
Microinsurance can have various effects 
on its clients and their community. 
Defining the aspects of interest is the 
first step in measuring impact. A core set 
of topics will be derived from the initial 
objectives for which a microinsurance 
scheme was set up. This set of topics 
should also include potential effects 
that are unintended or negative. A 
causal chain is established to describe 
how the insurance is expected to unfold 
the impact in focus. Such a causal 
chain is called theory of change and is 
described in more detail in chapter 3 
“Why and how does impact happen?” 
Formulating such a theory should be 
based on a detailed understanding of the 
context and functioning of the insurance 
scheme. Not only do potential – intended 
and unintended – outcomes and impacts 
need to be included, but also the inputs 
and outputs of the scheme, specifically 
on aspects of insurance processes and 
the insurance product, as these are likely 
to influence the kind and magnitude of 
the impact seen. 
Take, for example, a health microin-
surance scheme aimed at reducing 
maternal and infant deaths by promot-
ing institutional deliveries. A theory of 
change for this scheme should take into 
account as its inputs: all scheme design 
decisions with respect to benefits cov-
ered, educational activities, and how 
the scheme is delivered (and to whom). 
The output of this is then the particu-
lar insurance scheme with a benefit 
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package taken up by a certain number 
of women in a particular region. It is 
assumed that women understand the 
scheme. As direct financial barriers for 
accessing these services are removed 
or lowered by the scheme, the utilisa-
tion of these services is expected to 
go up (outcome), which assumes that 
health services are available and ser-
vice providers work with the insurance 
agency as required. This higher utilisa-
tion is expected to lead to a reduction 
in maternal and infant deaths (impact), 
which assumes the health services are 
provided in a timely manner and are of 
sufficient quality. Differences in the in-
put, i.e., scheme design and execution, 
might lead to different output, outcome, 
and impact. For example, including the 
women’s spouses into an information 
campaign on the importance of ob-
stetric care might lead to much bet-
ter outputs, outcomes, and impacts 
as compared to targeting the informa-
tion campaign on the women alone. 
Processes thus matter a lot for under-
standing impact and must be consid-
ered in a good impact assessment.
Some outputs and outcomes measur-
able on the day-to-day level are 
captured in social performance 
indicators (Sandmark 2013), which 
complement the financially oriented 
key performance indicators (Wipf and 
Garand 2010). With their detailed and 
comparable information on scheme 
design and results, such indicators 
can be very helpful in impact research 
design and interpretation of results. 
Particularly in comparative studies they 
can provide a set of structured criteria 
for comparing observed differences in 
outcomes and impact. 
 
When it has been decided what to mea-
sure, a careful research design needs 
to ensure that the impact of insurance 
is actually captured, separating it from 
impact of other interventions or external 
events. This cannot be done with 
simple before and after comparisons. 
Instead, the situation (of the insured 
households, the communities, etc.) with 
microinsurance needs to be compared 
to the counterfactual, i.e., how the 
situation would be for the same persons 
(or households, communities, etc.) 
without microinsurance. Since the same 
household cannot be simultaneously 
insured and uninsured, a comparison 
group, as similar to the treatment group 
as possible, needs to be established. 
Chapter 4 “What can we learn from 
impact assessments?” elaborates these 
research design aspects in more depth. 
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Several approaches are possible 
for obtaining a reliable comparison 
group. Ideally, impact evaluations of 
programmes should be planned before 
the programme implementation starts. 
This can allow for the use of randomised 
controlled trials, described in detail in 
chapter 5 “Experimental designs”. In 
such a design, the insurance is offered 
to a randomly selected set of households 
or individuals and not offered to a control 
group of comparative nature. Based on 
the assumption that observable and 
unobservable differences between 
individuals in these groups are equally 
distributed, the effects observed after 
the insurance implementation can be at-
tributed to the insurance itself. However, 
such a randomised trial, considered 
the most robust evaluation approach, 
requires not only planning the evaluation 
before the rollout of the insurance, but 
also requires close cooperation between 
evaluator and implementer – and often 
more management and coordination 
effort for the implementer. This might not 
be possible in every case, and frequently 
evaluations are also commissioned 
when a project is already running for 
several years. Hence, a randomised 
trial is not possible in all situations, or 
may not be the solution of choice. Other 
statistical methods can also be used to 
enhance comparability of data on the 
insured and uninsured. Chapter 6 “Non-
experimental design methodologies for 
quantitative analysis” explains these 
approaches. 
In their core nature, the techniques 
described above are mainly built 
on quantitative data. Such data are 
crucial for making any statement 
about the magnitude of effects. 
However, quantitative approaches 
alone frequently fall short of explaining 
some of the phenomena observed and 
confirming the causal chain described 
in the theory of change or in exploring 
aspects which might have escaped the 
attention of the researchers. Qualitative 
research approaches, described in 
chapter 7 “Qualitative designs”, can fill 
these gaps and contribute to answering 
questions on why (explanatory) and 
what (explorative). An ideal impact 
evaluation would combine both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques 
and is thus referred to as “mixed 
methods” (see chapter 8 “The case of 
mixed methods for impact evaluation in 
microinsurance”).
With the research focus and method 
decided, the evaluation can be further 
operationalised. A key question here is 
how to measure the research aspects 
of interest, i.e., defining indicators 
that adequately describe the aspects 
of interest. All indicators need to be 
precisely described and understand-
able to respondents to ensure that the 
collected information can be useful. 
Chapter 9 “Defining indicators for im-
pact assessments” explains aspects 
linked to the choice of indicators and pro-
vides examples of indicators commonly 
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used. As the number of evaluations 
of microinsurance schemes is still 
limited, the indicators used to date may 
not necessarily correspond to the main 
areas of interest in the microinsurance 
space. Yet, including these indicators 
in the evaluation makes it easier to 
compare studies. Agreeing on core in-
dicators for the microinsurance space 
is thus of key importance, so that fu-
ture studies can include these indica-
tors and enhance the body of evidence 
on topics considered of key importance. 
Chapter 10 “Core outcomes, impacts 
and indicators for microinsurance” 
suggests a number of core indicators, 
based on a Delphi study amongst mi-
croinsurance experts. 
The selected indicators constitute 
the basis for the questions to be 
included in data collection instruments 
(also chapter 10). Transforming 
indicators into questions includes 
careful consideration of the targeted 
respondents, the precise formulation 
of the question, and a balancing of 
what eventually can be included in the 
research. The design of the research 
tool and selection of the respondents 
has direct influence on the planning 
of field work. For certain respondents, 
seasonality will affect availability, e.g., 
due to harvest or temporal migration. 
Further, social and cultural norms must 
be taken into account when selecting 
the research team and planning a 
smooth entry into the target area. 
The amount of training and capacity 
building will need to be decided to 
ensure the research tools are properly 
administered – and we recommend 
planning for close supervision, 
enabling the evaluator to react to any 
problems encountered. Such close 
involvement and supervision can help 
increase data quality, which is essential 
for obtaining reliable answers to the 
research aspects in focus. Chapter 11 
“Operationalising impact evaluation: 
from theory to practice” develops these 
aspects further. 
The primary answer provided by any 
given study is whether the specific 
insurance scheme under scrutiny has 
resulted in a certain impact. As chapter 
12 “Drawing conclusions” describes, 
the data needs to be checked for validity 
and related back to the theory of change. 
Also, conclusions should include prac-
tical recommendations for the specific 
scheme. However, generalisation of the 
insights or their transferability to other 
settings, like other regions or target 
22
groups, is often intended as well. High 
external validity is required for this. It 
is also desirable to make the insights 
of the evaluation available publicly, to 
allow others to learn from a scheme’s 
results—regardless of whether the 
results are desirable or undesirable. 
To allow such learning, information 
on the context in which the scheme 
operates and how the evaluation was 
conducted is essential. A common 
reporting standard can help in achiev-
ing this, as described in chapter 13 
“Reporting and disseminating find-
ings”, which also provides an overview 
about dissemination options. 
A growing body of evidence increases 
the reliability of insights gained by 
different studies, providing a basis 
for systematic reviews. When these 
studies use common indicators and 
provide a comparable set of background 
information, conclusions on what works 
and why can be derived from an analysis 
across studies. Such analyses are called 
systematic reviews, which may include 
a statistical synthesis using meta-
analyses (see chapter 14 “Systematic 
reviews”). Reviews provide answers on 
specific questions by drawing on the 
entire body of evidence available. They 
can be a key tool for providing reliable 
guidance for the development of the 
microinsurance sector, but need robust 
studies as a foundation. 
This book is written to support 
the creation of more and better 
quality evidence on the impact of 
microinsurance – evidence which in 
turn should then be used to create an 
even more impactful microinsurance 
sector. 
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2.1. Introduction
Latest estimates suggest that there are 
some 500 million microinsurance cli-
ents throughout the developing world. 
According to Craig Churchill, this could 
pass the one billion mark by the end of 
the decade (Microinsurance Network 
2013). The reason for this large growth 
has been the increasing activity of gov-
ernments, insurance companies, and 
providers worldwide broadening the 
geographic scope and range of insur-
ance services available to low-income 
people.
About 70% of microinsurance schemes 
are operated in Asia. For historical 
reasons, schemes have been con-
centrated in India and West Africa. In 
West Africa, “mutuelles” (i.e., commu-
nity-based microinsurance schemes) 
developed after some governments 
instituted user fees for health care 
services during structural adjustment 
programmes. In India, microinsurance 
schemes arose after implementing 
the obligations of insurers to rural and 
social sectors by the Indian Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority 
(IRDA) in 2002. But recently, microin-
surance has expanded to all the devel-
oping countries and also to many affin-
ity sections of developed nations. 
A range of products cover a variety of 
risk including health, life/funeral, disa-
bility, agriculture (crop-based weather 
index and livestock), property, credit 
life, and disaster (natural and man-
made)1. The prevalence of each type 
of product varies to some extent by 
geography and by available technology. 
According to local risks and cultural 
norms, for example, funeral coverage 
is widespread in South Africa. In terms 
of the technology and expertise avail-
able, for example, weather index cov-
erage require data that is usually col-
lected by meteorological equipment, 
and in some cases microinsurance 
projects include a component to install 
such equipment (e.g., Zambia, Malawi, 
etc.). 
2.2. What is microinsurance?
The definition of microinsurance can 
be split into its two aspects: Firstly, 
what constitutes insurance and sec-
ondly, what is micro in microinsurance. 
2.2.1. Definition of insurance 
Insurance is a concept involving a con-
tract under which an insurer shall pay 
specific pre-defined compensation 
when financial damages are caused 
by pre-defined cost-generating events, 
in exchange for up-front payments of 
a premium by the insured. In principle, 
1 There are also developments in the catastrophe landscape 
where numerous public private partnerships are in place 
for natural disaster protection. A catastrophe joint venture, 
“MICRO”, is underway in Haiti for earthquake cover and 
the Philippines has set up an earthquake insurance pool 
via the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
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the premium should reflect the fair cost 
of the risk transferred from insured to 
insurer, and the calculation should be 
based on the frequency and severity. 
According to theory, insurance offers 
a  trade-off between an unafford-
able (or large) loss, which is uncer-
tain, and an affordable loss, which is 
certain (the premium). This theorem 
dates back to Friedman and Savage 
(1948). The net effect of this trade-
off is to “smooth” fluctuations in the 
income of the insured that are caused 
by exogenous changes, such as differ-
ent “states of nature”2 rather than by 
autonomous explanations, such as bad 
choices of consumption in a given set 
of supply and demand, or bad behav-
iour in risky situations. The assump-
tion underlying this smoothing is that 
the insured gains utility from experi-
encing two years of average consump-
tion rather than experiencing one year 
of starvation plus one year of excessive 
consumption. A  common explanation 
for the utility gain is that excessive 
consumption does not increase hap-
piness, or what economists call utility, 
as much as starvation lowers it (Gru-
ber 2007, 317). 
In most high-income countries, where 
the public at large could be required 
to cover the costs of large-scale unin-
sured events, governments often 
2 A finite set of alternatives that might occur, of which only 
one actually occurs, e.g., real world outcomes like health 
vs. sickness, abundant harvest vs. bad harvest, normal 
rainfall vs. drought, etc.
require all persons to be insured, and 
such mandatory insurance is imple-
mented through deductions either 
from income at source, or inseparably 
attached to the most common activities 
of daily life. Examples include: gainful 
employment with mandatory insur-
ance covering several risks like health, 
unemployment, old-age pension, or 
workman’s compensation; owning or 
driving a  car with mandatory third-
party liability insurance; and financ-
ing of a  house with credit life insur-
ance of the borrower and earthquake 
insurance of the house. In low-income 
countries, where, on the one hand, 
governments rarely provide compre-
hensive disaster relief, and, on the 
other hand, are often unable to identify 
all the population or to apply universal 
tax collection or mandatory insurance 
to all, the decision to insure is mostly 
voluntary and individual. When affilia-
tion to insurance is voluntary and indi-
vidual, the theory suggests that peo-
ple who estimate their risk exposure 
to be higher than average would be 
more likely to insure (adverse selec-
tion), whilst those estimating their risk 
exposure to be lower than average 
would be less likely to insure. The flip 
side of this phenomenon is when an 
insurance company agrees to insure 
only those individuals that it estimates 
to be exposed to the risk below aver-
age (“cherry picking” or “cream skim-
ming”). Both these phenomena affect 
the insurance market negatively. 
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Moreover, in many low-income coun-
tries, the three basic conditions for the 
creation of an insurance market are 
absent: solvent demand, relevant sup-
ply, and reliable governance ensuring 
that contracts will be enforced. Due 
to these factors, regular commercial 
insurance, as is common in indus-
trial countries, is difficult to establish 
in low-income countries. Therefore, 
other approaches are needed. 
2.2.2. Defining the micro in 
microinsurance
There are different approaches about 
how the term micro in microinsurance 
can be understood.3 Firstly, micro can 
be understood as a characteristic of the 
financial situation of the clientele, i.e., 
an insurance targeted at low-income 
(and financially marginalised) people in 
developing countries. Secondly, micro 
can be understood as characteristic of 
the product, i.e., an insurance offering 
limited benefits for small premiums. 
Thirdly, micro can be understood as 
characteristic of the process by which 
the schemes are created and adminis-
tered. All three ways of interpreting the 
term micro lead to different definitions 
of microinsurance and to different 
answers about what microinsurance is.4
3 For comparison and further explanation, see Churchill and 
McCord (2012, 9-10) who use a similar (although not fully 
identical) description of ways of defining microinsurance.
4 For further distinctions, compare also Ingram and Mc-
Cord (2011).
2.2.2.1. Micro as characteristic of the 
target group
Churchill (2006, 12-13) defines micro-
insurance as follows: 
Microinsurance is the protection of 
low-income people against specific 
perils in exchange for regular pre-
mium payments proportionate to the 
likelihood and cost of the risk involved. 
This definition is essentially the same 
as one might use for regular insur-
ance except for the clearly prescribed 
target market: low-income people. 
However, as is demonstrated in this 
chapter and throughout this book, 
those three words make a big differ-
ence. How poor do people have to be 
for their insurance protection to be 
considered micro? The answer varies 
by country, but generally microinsur-
ance is for persons ignored by main-
stream commercial and social insur-
ance schemes, persons who have not 
had access to appropriate products. 
Of particular interest is the provision 
of cover to persons working in the 
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informal economy who do not have 
access to commercial insurance nor 
social protection benefits provided by 
employers directly, or by the govern-
ment through employers.
Churchill’s definition clearly draws 
upon the financial situation of the cli-
entele (low-income people). So does 
the definition of the insurance indus-
try in the Philippines when it defines 
microinsurance as 
providing the poor access to a bas-
ket of insurance products, support 
and services in pursuit of poverty 
reduction and to provide holistic 
insurance protection to the stake-
holders of the microfinance indus-
try (Martinez 2012). 
Although targeting low-income people 
is usually considered a core character-
istic of microinsurance, in practice, this 
feature raises operational problems. 
Measuring the household’s income (and 
defining it as low) is not only complex, but 
also costly and, moreover, not required 
per se for establishing a  microinsur-
ance scheme, particularly if the scheme 
is not subsidised (Dror 2014).
2.2.2.2. Micro as characteristic of the 
product
Since microinsurance products and 
related services are aimed at meet-
ing the risk protection needs for the 
low-income and financially-excluded 
sector, affordability of the premium 
payments is a  paramount considera-
tion for defining microinsurance. The 
resulting approved microinsurance 
products are the solution that meets 
the needs of the target group. Hence 
the micro in microinsurance can also 
be understood as characteristic of the 
product, i.e., of the premiums and the 
benefits. 
India was the first country to seriously 
define microinsurance products within 
its regulatory framework, referring to 
microinsurance as insurance offer-
ings with claim payments less than Rs 
50,000 (IRDA 2005). Although targeted 
towards low-income (and informal sec-
tor) people in India, this definition ref-
erenced the product offering, not the 
targeted sector. Based on small pre-
miums and proportionately small ben-
efits, microinsurance products have 
emerged in India with low-cost premi-
ums that are underwritten in advance.
This approach references regulatory 
microinsurance definitions as they 
are expressed in terms of regulatory 
frameworks or charters. These types 
of frameworks are growing in number 
across developing countries.
The International Association of Insur-
ance Supervisors (IAIS) and Microin-
surance Network combine aspects of 
the target group and the regulations 
associated with the product in their 
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definition of microinsurance (IAIS and 
Microinsurance Network 2007, 10):
Microinsurance is insurance that 
is accessed by low-income popula-
tion, provided by a variety of differ-
ent entities, but run in accordance 
with generally accepted insurance 
practices (which should include 
the Insurance Core Principles). 
Importantly this means that the risk 
insured under a  microinsurance 
policy is managed based on insur-
ance principles and funded by pre-
miums. The microinsurance activity 
itself should therefore fall within 
the purview of the relevant domes-
tic insurance regulator/ supervisor 
or any other competent body under 
the national laws of any jurisdiction.
2.2.2.3. Micro as characteristic of the 
process 
The micro in microinsurance may 
also relate to the process of design-
ing, introducing, and administering the 
insurance schemes. In their paper first 
introducing the term “microinsurance”, 
Dror and Jacquier (1999) characterise 
it as voluntary, group-based, self-help 
insurance. Consequently, the micro 
in this definition relates to the locus 
of decisions. With this definition, the 
main feature of microinsurance is that 
the schemes are governed directly to 
some degree by the insured members, 
who are somewhat involved in operat-
ing the insurance locally. 
Stated differently, if an entire country 
could be described as the macro level 
of society, and a  province or district 
would be meso, then the group, vil-
lage, or neighbourhood would be the 
micro level. This does not mean that 
microinsurance units (MIUs) cannot 
have a  large outreach. Consequently, 
micro does not imply that it cannot be 
replicated to very large numbers, but it 
does imply the application of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity.5 
At their inception, MIUs are typically 
launched, designed, implemented, and 
administered by and for groups of peo-
ple without “access to the resources 
and financial techniques of commer-
cial insurance” (Vaté and Dror 2002, 
126), yet they have access to the target 
population, and can adapt the insur-
ance business process to prevailing, 
often intricate, informal methods of 
risk management and financial inter-
mediation. According to this descrip-
tion, successful microinsurance pro-
grammes are structured and managed 
in several fundamentally different ways 
5 Subsidiarity is an organising principle whereby matters 
ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest, or least cen-
tralised competent authority. Subsidiarity conveys the idea 
that a central authority should have a subsidiary function, 
performing only those tasks which cannot be performed 
effectively at a more immediate or local level. Subsidiarity 
is, ideally or in principle, one of the features of federalism, 
where it asserts the rights of the parts over the whole. The 
concept is applicable in the fields of government, political 
science, management, military, and, metaphorically, in the 
context of microinsurance as well.
29What is microinsurance? 
from commercial insurance offerings, 
or from social insurance schemes 
organised by the government in some 
countries.
Main requirements for MIUs, as under-
stood in this sense, are that they are 
simple, affordable, and located close to 
its members. 
Dror (2014, 420) builds upon these 
characteristics whilst taking into 
account characteristics of the target 
group and the product when defining 
health microinsurance as
insurance contextualized to the 
WTP [willingness to pay], needs 
and priorities of people in the infor-
mal sector who are excluded from 
other forms of [...] insurance. The 
schemes are voluntary, with pre-
miums suited to people with low 
incomes. Although [...] microinsur-
ance is independent of the size of 
the insurer, the scope of the risk 
covered, and the delivery chan-
nel, it is essential that the scheme 
is designed to benefit the insured. 
For practical intents and purposes, 
this definition implies a central role 
for the community in at least the 
design of the scheme, and possibly 
its operation and governance.
Although originally established for 
health microinsurance, this definition 
can be easily adapted to other fields of 
microinsurance.
It may be tempting to argue that micro-
insurance organisations can achieve 
better renewal rates than commer-
cial insurers because they are driven 
by demand, not profit, and are based 
on the needs of the community. In fair-
ness, the evidence for this is, for the 
time being, still not sufficiently con-
clusive in low-income countries. How-
ever, with extremely low penetration of 
for-profit commercial insurance, the 
prospect of delivering microinsurance 
as a  low-cost and low-value product 
seems even less promising. 
2.2.2.4. What micro is not
Regardless of the definition used, 
experts agree that micro does not refer 
to the size of a scheme’s membership 
or the total value of premiums amassed 
or assets insured. Larger microinsur-
ers, including India’s Yeshasvini, have 
millions of clients and collect millions 
of dollars in premium payments annu-
ally (Yeshasvini 2011). 
2.2.2.5. Common characteristics of 
microinsurance definitions
Although the described definitions are 
very different in their basic approach to 
microinsurance, they have important 
characteristics in common. As Dror 
(2014) describes, the most common 
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features of microinsurance definitions 
include: 
• Microinsurance is insurance and 
applies principles of risk pooling
• Microinsurance is suited for people 
on low incomes
• Microinsurance targets people in 
the informal sector
• Microinsurance is independent of 
the class of risk (life, health, crop, 
livestock, assets, etc.)
Moreover, in most understandings, 
coverage is always contributory, i.e., 
never fully subsidised, and, as will be 
described in detail below, microin-
surance can be delivered by different 
channels, including community-based 
schemes, insurance companies, or 
service providers (Dror 2014). 
2.3. Business models for 
microinsurance
To date, there exist at least four oper-
ating business models to deliver 
microinsurance.6 
Partner-agent model. Whilst in this 
model the insurance company, i.e., the 
partner, takes responsibility for design-
ing, pricing, and underwriting of prod-
ucts as well as for the scheme’s sol-
vency in the long-term. An intermediary, 
i.e., the agent, takes over certain local 
6 Compare for this and the following explanations Dror 
2014, amongst others.
tasks like distribution and marketing, 
premium collection, and product ser-
vicing. These responsibilities are dele-
gated to the agent by the partner, i.e., 
by the insurance company. In rural 
settings where it is usually costly and 
time-intensive to assess potential cus-
tomers, the role of the agent is often 
taken over by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) or microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), which, on one hand, 
are already in contact with the popula-
tion and, on the other hand, might have 
identified a  need for microinsurance 
and are thus willing to cooperate. Act-
ing not only as agents of the insurance 
agency, but also as counsel of the pop-
ulation, they can help in designing suit-
able products and pressuring the pro-
viders for reasonable prices and 
services. 
Provider-driven model. In this model, 
the policyholders pay premiums 
directly to the service provider, which, 
for example, in health microinsurance 
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may be a  hospital or certain physi-
cians. They are, in turn, allowed to use 
the services of this provider according 
to the conditions that have been agreed 
upon in the insurance policy for free or 
with a copayment.
Charitable insurance model. In this 
model, an external charitable organi-
sation is supplementing the scheme 
financially and, moreover, takes over 
basically all responsibilities of the 
“insurer”. By subsidising the scheme, 
its long-term sustainability is granted, 
at least as long as the charitable 
organisation is supporting this. 
Mutual/cooperative insurance model. In 
this model, the community of mem-
bers is responsible for all aspects 
of the scheme, hence taking over the 
role of the insurer mutually. Herewith, 
the insured are at the same time the 
insurer. By this, the needs of the mem-
bers can better be mirrored in the ben-
efit package. Often, mutual societies 
are not only cooperating in the field 
of insurance, but also in other fields 
of interest, functioning as broader 
mutual-interest organisations.
In reality, microinsurance schemes are 
often built as combinations of these 
models and can also change over time. 
For example, Yeshasvini Trust in India 
was originally founded by health-care 
providers. It was provider-driven, but 
is currently receiving subsidies and, 
thus, is also run as a charitable insur-
ance model, having features of both 
models (Dror 2014).
2.4. Why is microinsurance 
important? 
Microinsurance is potentially an 
important new risk management tool 
for low-income people in developing 
countries for several reasons. Vulner-
ability inordinately affects poor people 
and reinforces or exacerbates their 
poverty. Regarding susceptibility to 
risk, for example, poor people
• typically live and work under more 
crowded, unsanitary, stressful, or 
unsafe conditions
• suffer from higher rates of malnu-
trition (which make them more sus-
ceptible to illness and injury) 
• lack the education necessary to 
make informed preventative or 
reactive choices (or the money to 
implement those choices), and 
• frequently hold beliefs (for instance, 
in the importance of dowries or 
ostracising widows) that aggravate 
their situations when risks (like 
the death of the breadwinner of 
a household) actually materialise 
When these risks materialise, low-
income people are, furthermore, 
frequently less able to cope. Regu-
lar solutions (like medical care) 
are, for example, often inaccessible 
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(particularly given the general short-
age of facilities in rural areas), unaf-
fordable (considering the costs of 
treatment, transportation, bribes, 
medicines, waiting, aftercare, and 
missed work), or of terrible quality 
(with provider absenteeism, poor staff 
training, corruption, patient abuse, and 
chronic shortages of equipment, sup-
plies and medicine endemic in health-
care facilities which predominantly 
serve low-income clients in develop-
ing countries). Social safety nets (like 
national health insurance schemes) 
are — due to narrow tax bases, cor-
ruption, inefficiency, and other gov-
ernment priorities like indebtedness 
— commonly weak or non-existent. 
Moreover, the low-income people’s 
plentiful and creative array of infor-
mal risk mitigation techniques is often 
insufficient, particularly when risks 
covary or repeatedly occur over a short 
period. 
These informal arrangements, which 
are classified into self-insurance and 
shared insurance, bear examination 
because of their prevalence within 
poor communities (Morduch 2003). Of 
these, self-insurance is the most wide-
spread and significant form of infor-
mal risk mitigation. It consists of ex-
ante and ex-post approaches, which 
are implemented before and after the 
hazards in question occur. The pre-
dominant ex-ante approach is savings. 
Because appropriate savings facilities 
and products are typically unavailable 
in low-income areas, however — and 
because monetary savings are vulner-
able to inflation — asset build-up and 
drawn-down are particularly popular 
means of self-insuring. However, low 
and volatile incomes (and threats to the 
accumulated assets themselves) make 
it difficult to amass large enough sums 
to adequately militate against shocks. 
Other ex-ante strategies include calcu-
lated, and often conservative, employ-
ment, production, and social-familial 
strategies, such as 
• diversifying occupations and crops
• working for less, but under more 
secure arrangements (such as “tied 
labour”) using less effective, but 
cheaper combinations of production 
inputs (such as less high-cost ferti-
lisers and more low-cost labour)
• migrating to places with uncorre-
lated income patterns, and 
• tactically selecting marriage part-
ners, fostering children, and culti-
vating friends 
Whilst lowering uncertainty, many of 
these approaches lead to inefficient 
outcomes through which people sacri-
fice more profitable, but riskier activi-
ties and the adaptation of potentially 
valuable new technologies to achieve 
some degree of income with certainty 
and “limit exposure only to… shocks 
that can be handled with the means 
available” (Morduch 1995, 104). For 
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example, Walker and Ryan estimate 
that households sacrifice up to 25% of 
their average income to reduce expo-
sure to shocks in certain parts of India 
(1990, 197).
In contrast, ex-post approaches 
include borrowing (though constraints 
often exist on the availability and cost 
of credit), changing consumption pat-
terns (for example, eating less or 
withdrawing children from school) 
and adjusting labour supply (working 
longer hours or employing children). 
Because these strategies are imple-
mented reactively by households under 
duress, they typically have less favora-
ble terms and prove more exacting on 
family finances.
Shared insurance, on the other hand, 
includes reciprocal loan- and gift-giv-
ing practices and participation in rotat-
ing savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs), through which a  group’s 
members regularly contribute equal 
sums of money and sequentially 
receive the proceeds. Shared insur-
ance schemes are typically organised 
amongst families, neighbours, or other 
groups of people with the ties neces-
sary to identify and curb moral haz-
ard amongst participants. Informa-
tion asymmetries and enforcement 
problems may exist even amongst 
close-knit people (Morduch 1999, 
189). Moreover, the financial capac-
ity of intra-family lending within poor 
families is in any case limited. There-
fore, borrowing with interest from 
professional lenders and liquidating 
saving are more important coping 
mechanisms than shared insurance 
approaches (Morduch 1999, 189; Bin-
nendijk et al. 2012). 
Whilst these risk mitigation instru-
ments collectively enable real and sig-
nificant consumption-smoothing, they 
do not provide complete coverage — 
and ironically prove costly for house-
holds in terms of everything from 
foregone profits to intensified gender 
problems, since very often women bear 
the brunt of strategies like migration, 
fostering, and strategically-arranged 
marriages. Besides bridging the gap, 
microinsurance schemes can be cre-
ated to complement or crowd out the 
best and worst of these approaches 
whilst enabling low-income people to 
pursue more profitable income-gen-
erating activities and more gratifying 
personal relationships.
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2.5. Challenges to 
microinsurance
The success of the microinsurance 
sector is based on the three guiding 
principles of outreach, sustainability, 
and proving benefits for all. In order 
to achieve these milestones and to 
increase the penetration, a  combina-
tion of regulation, technology, and risk 
management is required. 
When there is market and demand 
identified, distribution diversity is 
one of the key factors to success. In 
South America, microinsurance has 
successfully increased penetration, 
as well as enlarged into the middle 
class, by using a  variety of retail dis-
tribution channels across Columbia, 
Mexico, Peru, Guatemala, Bolivia, and 
especially Brasil. Across Asia, retail 
distribution has not been facilitated to 
a similar degree. However, this seems 
to be changing as new approaches are 
developing. These include, for exam-
ple a  dengue fever insurance sold 
in supermarkets in Indonesia, vari-
ous microinsurance products in 7/11 
stores in Thailand, and multi-level 
marketing schemes in the Philippines, 
just to name a few. Cooperative selling 
of insurance is a  large portion of the 
distribution market for microinsurance 
and well illustrated in the microtakaful 
sector, which distributes Islamic Sha-
riah-compliant insurance to the low-
income sectors in the Islamic regions 
of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 
encompassing a charitable component 
by Shariah law.
It can be argued that one of the reasons 
the penetration of microinsurance over 
the past decade has not been as fast as 
many hoped, is that many of the assets 
in the sector are deemed intangible, 
non-liquid assets embedded in pro-
jects and internal processes, and are, 
therefore, invisible to boards of large 
corporations and government organi-
sations. These assets are employee 
skills, information technology infra-
structure, corporate culture, and inno-
vative ideas, and can be viewed in the 
future as the new intellectual property 
and patents of the organisation. Meas-
uring the value of these intangible 
assets is an accounting function and 
moves the asset value to the balance 
sheet, and, therefore, to the atten-
tion of stakeholders, where the avail-
ability of financial support depends. As 
the intangibles are an important part 
of a  new business, this increases the 
chance of new ideas becoming reality. 
Models that only value physical assets 
are less able to take advantage of new 
markets (Dror 2012). 
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Expanding the discussion of the impor-
tance of embedded intangible assets 
may be out of scope in this book, but 
the way projects are viewed in terms 
of value creation from the base of the 
pyramid will have a  correlation with 
impact assessments of the sector. 
These assets are the distillate of dec-
ades and centuries of social and fiscal 
investment by developed societies. 
2.5.1. Regulation 
Microinsurance is a commercially via-
ble market with 2.6 billion people liv-
ing in the range between Int$1.25 and 
Int$4 per day7, giving rise to a US$33 
billion market. Coupled with that is the 
government and aid-supported micro-
insurance market with 1.4 billion peo-
ple on less than Int$1.25 per day7, giv-
ing rise to a US$7 billion market (Swiss 
Re 2010, 9). The principles of good gov-
ernance apply to microinsurance the 
same way as other sectors. Regulation 
is required and will have an impact on 
how insurance is sold, bought, and dis-
tributed at base of the pyramid. A bal-
ance needs to be sought, as too little 
or too much regulation can negatively 
impact the sector. The ability of gov-
ernments to move from constitution to 
charter to commercial implementation 
and to create adequate legal frame-
works will greatly facilitate the prac-
7 An international dollar has the same purchasing power as 
a U.S. dollar has in the United States. The Int$ is adjusted 
over time by reference to gross national income and ex-
change rates of local currencies to US$.
tice of microinsurance. Recent suc-
cess in this area has been seen in the 
Philippines as they published a charter 
based on their constitution.
2.5.2. Technology
Technology is the key, because without 
it there is no outreach to rural areas 
and no capability to adequately analyse, 
on a macroeconomic and risk manage-
ment basis, the sustainability and prof-
itability of the schemes designed to 
help the base of the pyramid. It is these 
automated techniques that will allow 
the value creation of assets to appear 
on balance sheets and raise attention 
to the right stakeholders in public and 
private partnerships required to edu-
cate and finance the microinsurance 
sector. These would be simple proce-
dures allowed by regulation. Good data 
is vital to successful impact measure-
ment at all levels. The microinsurance 
sector needs to leverage the advent of 
the global cloud computing networks 
and the security of data offered within 
them. The rise of Internet and mobile 
technology is a game changer. 
2.5.3. Risk management
Regulation and technology capabili-
ties dovetail with the importance of 
risk management and risk transfer in 
the microinsurance sector. Insurance 
is the risk industry and risk transfer 
is a trodden path that has enabled the 
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industry to survive in over 300 years 
of trading. Reinsurance is one of the 
risk transfer mechanisms used in the 
industry and is vital to the microinsur-
ance sector as a  capital base can be 
offered to primary insurers or, indeed, 
direct to communities to handle their 
risk transfer affairs. Evaluating and 
measuring the assets identified will 
greatly assist the flow of capital from 
reinsurance and capital markets 
(alternate risk transfer) to microinsur-
ance projects. A very important aspect 
is to show that the internal processes 
that handle claims have a  tangible 
value for impact assessments. 
Regulation needs to allow for lower 
capitalisation as an entry point for 
the microinsurance sector and allow 
the additional premium assets to be 
included in an impact assessment for 
the computation of solvency on micro-
insurance schemes. This is especially 
important as more complex health, 
weather index, and innovative cli-
mate change (linked to food shortage) 
products are introduced in the mar-
ket place. There is a need to measure 
the key indicators around the solvency 
ratio and the expense ratio, which is 
the cost of distribution and the cost per 
transaction. This, in turn, generates 
a set of official performance standards 
established by regulatory authorities 
for effective delivery of microinsur-
ance and impact analysis. 
The next stage of this process leads 
to the stochastic — or actuarial  — 
measurement of microinsurance, 
using Dynamic Financial Analysis, or 
measuring risk mathematically using 
probability theory, which needs good 
historical data to achieve (Piesse, in 
preparation). This process will align 
the intangible assets to the company 
strategy and align to the regulator 
strategy. A key alignment here is that 
of literacy, health care, financial inclu-
sion, and risk transfer, thereby liquefy-
ing the intangible assets and appear-
ing on a balance sheet. This includes 
risk from non-cost effective informa-
tion technology projects whose costs 
prohibit microinsurance schemes and 
prevents them from going into pro-
duction. However, impact models and 
good data are not sufficient in isolation. 
There is a  need for independent risk 
quantification that is capable of bring-
ing stakeholders together for sustain-
able risk transfer solutions based on 
the increase in natural disasters and 
climate change that mostly affect 
newly penetrated microinsurance 
bases. This is an important correla-
tion of catastrophe risk with market, 
credit, underwriting, macroeconomic, 
and insurance risk combined in one 
holistic risk analysis. The develop-
ment of effective catastrophe micro-
insurance needs reinsurers, catastro-
phe modelers, insurers, governments 
(public private partnerships), regula-
tors, World Bank/United Nations/ADB, 
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and development rural banks to step 
up to form alliances to protect peo-
ple from natural disasters and other 
mega risks. There is no such thing as 
micromodeling, and microinsurance 
is subject to the same scenario simu-
lation as other insurances. Pioneer 
work has been done in two pilot loca-
tions in India by the Micro Insurance 
Academy (MIA) in collaboration with 
the Asia Risk Center (ARC), an affiliate 
of Risk Management Solutions (RMS), 
the world’s leading risk modeling 
company, on crops risk assessment 
and quantification of climate change 
contributions. A  climate-vulnerability 
mapping program, based on an exten-
sive household survey and weather 
data, has been established (Sharma 
and Jangle 2012; Sharma 2012). 
In summary, sustainability of micro-
insurance, or the ability to create long 
lasting renewable products in the 
sector that leads to benefits for all, is 
achievable by a confluence of regula-
tion, technology and impact analy-
sis, and the various methods of risk 
management that lead to that impact 
analysis. We must look at the holistic 
picture and not risks in isolation. Right 
now, microinsurance and its differ-
ing models make it a  younger cousin 
of the larger insurance industry. As 
microinsurance grows and more peo-
ple become included, microinsurance 
and its differing models will become 
the status quo. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated three 
ways of how to approach microinsur-
ance: one focuses on the target group, 
another on the product, and the third 
one on the processes. All approaches 
involve the potential input of reinsur-
ance capacity and the approach taken 
will have a  different impact on the 
assessment process. There is a  big 
difference for policyholders paying 
a fixed premium set by the industry in 
contrast to willingness to pay, which 
is the community approach. What-
ever the approach, the guiding prin-
ciples of outreach and sustainability 
remain the same, as access needs 
to be gained to remote areas and the 
programmes that are created must be 
renewable over time to make sure sus-
tainable access to insurance coverage 
is received. These guiding principles, 
along with technology, good product 
design, and flexibility are required for 
microinsurance schemes to fit their 
community. 
In order to assess the impact of catas-
trophe, market, credit, insurance, 
underwriting, and operational risk on 
microinsurance projects and commu-
nities, scenario analyses are required 
with a definite shift in the direction of 
dynamic financial analysis, where the 
whole process is managed mathemati-
cally through actuarial models. This 
process requires good historical data, 
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such as claims history and weather 
pattern data from weather stations, 
and measurable indices. In weather-
based indices, the impact of basis risk 
needs to be understood to make sure 
that the right claims are paid to the 
right claimants. 
Barriers to penetration are the lack of 
available capital pointed at microin-
surance projects and the governmen-
tal support on education. We identified 
that this required a  set of committed 
and willing stakeholders who have 
a business interest in the project cre-
ating a  tangible asset of the project 
and move it to the corporate balance 
sheet for recognition. This step should 
assist in providing adequate risk trans-
fer facilities to the microinsurance 
schemes. 
Natural catastrophes and non-cor-
related risks are major threats to the 
success of microinsurance, as it is the 
policyholders of these schemes that 
are most exposed to these risks. Rein-
surance catastrophe pools established 
via public private partnerships would 
mitigate this threat. 
Finally, there is infrastructure and 
political will. Without that will and bal-
anced regulation, microinsurance will 
not live up to its full potential.
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3.1. Risk and its implications 
for poverty1 
When we think of risk, we often think 
of poor outcomes – for example, a failed 
harvest, or the death of a family bread-
winner, or falling victim to a  crime. 
However, the welfare costs of risk arise 
even if such outcomes do not hap-
pen; the costs of risk are greater than 
merely the possibility of a  poor out-
come. This is the sense in which risk 
itself – rather than merely the realisa-
tion of poor outcomes – deserves rec-
ognition as a policy priority.
Specifically, risk can affect decisions 
and welfare in two distinct ways:
Firstly, poor households incur costs 
through the adoption of ex-ante risk 
management strategies. 
Secondly, households suffering nega-
tive shocks incur costs through ex-post 
risk coping strategies.
1 The discussion here draws upon the review in Dercon and 
Kirchberger (2008).
The distinction is summarised in the 
following diagram, from Dercon and 
Kirchberger (2008).
Ex-ante risk management strategies
Ex-ante risk management strategies 
are strategies adopted by poor house-
holds in order to reduce their exposure 
to future risk. Such strategies gener-
ally involve trading off higher average 
consumption in order to reduce the 
likely variability in consumption. This 
can be done, for example, by limit-
ing specialisation in production or by 
building up precautionary savings.
There is a useful analogy here between 
risk management strategies and the 
Diagram: Risk and outcomes
UNINSURED 
RISK
sources of 
risk
à Risk management 
decisions
à
Implications 
for WELFARE 
OUTCOMES in 
the short run 
and in the long 
run
à SHOCKrealisation 
of the state 
of the world
à Risk coping 
actions
à
Implications for 
WELFARE  
OUTCOMES
in the short run 
and in the long run
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problem of self-sufficiency. In gen-
eral, economists view self-sufficiency 
as an inefficient objective, because 
a household trying to be self-sufficient 
must engage in economic behaviours 
for which it does not have a compara-
tive advantage. For example, a  house-
hold whose members are skilled at 
making clothing should not generally 
try to grow all of its own food; con-
versely, a household that owns a small 
farm should not generally try to pro-
duce its own clothing. So it is with risk 
management: quite obviously, a  poor 
household has no comparative advan-
tage in providing insurance products, 
and it is particularly costly for such 
a household to be forced to do so. But 
this is precisely what happens when 
poor households have limited access 
to microinsurance: households are 
forced to diversify away from their pre-
ferred activities in order to minimise 
risk. So, for example, farmers facing 
higher risks may plant a variety of less 
productive crops in order to limit the 
consequences of any single crop’s fail-
ure; similarly, households may under-
invest in their children’s education in 
order that the children’s labour may 
generate precautionary savings.2 In 
2 The discussion here has characterised the poor as “risk 
averse”. In cases of extreme poverty, we may expect to 
find “risk-loving” behaviours, where poor households 
effectively choose to “gamble for resurrection”. For ex-
ample, there were reports from rural Zimbabwe in 2009 
that starving Zimbabweans were panning for gold. How-
ever, this kind of behaviour is generally limited to cases 
of extreme poverty—that is, cases in which the immediate 
policy response would likely be emergency aid rather than 
the introduction of a microinsurance product.
this sense a lack of adequate insurance 
facilities is a missing market problem, 
and microinsurance products can be 
understood as helping markets work 
better for the poor.
Ex-post risk coping strategies
Ex-post risk coping strategies are 
strategies adopted by poor households 
in order to mitigate the effects of poor 
outcomes after they have occurred. 
That is, risk coping strategies are strat-
egies for coping with the aftermath of 
a risk that occurred, rather than cop-
ing with the risk itself. Nonetheless, 
the strategies require households to 
incur costs that could be reduced if 
risks were better insured. Risk coping 
strategies typically involve smoothing 
the consequences of costly events – 
and this typically occurs both over time 
and over a network of other economic 
actors. For example, a household suf-
fering the death of a breadwinner will 
typically respond by drawing upon 
household savings, whilst reducing its 
own future consumption and by receiv-
ing transfers from other households in 
its community. Even though both strat-
egies are described as ex-post, both 
typically require substantial ex-ante 
planning, and incur substantial ex-ante 
costs. For example, a household must 
build up precautionary savings before 
a breadwinner’s death. Similarly, infor-
mal insurance arrangements amongst 
a network of households can generally 
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only be implemented as an agreement 
to insure future shocks.
These kinds of strategies serve to 
limit the consequences of risk for poor 
households. Certainly, it would be 
a mistake to describe any poor house-
hold as uninsured merely because the 
household does not hold any formal 
insurance products. In insurance, as 
in most aspects of life, poor house-
holds can use a remarkable variety of 
strategies in order to deal with difficult 
circumstances. However, risk coping 
strategies are far from perfect. House-
holds may be dissuaded from amass-
ing adequate precautionary savings, 
for example, because of sharing norms 
that demand such wealth to be distrib-
uted amongst a  family or community 
network. Similarly, informal insur-
ance arrangements may be difficult to 
implement because their participants 
may lack a  formal or credible way of 
committing to a  contract. Addition-
ally, participants may worry that other 
members may join only if they antici-
pate making a  claim (adverse selec-
tion), and may then have inadequate 
incentives to mitigate risks themselves 
(moral hazard). Further, community 
insurance arrangements may be use-
less in responding to highly correlated 
shocks – for example, the risk that an 
entire village may lose its harvest in 
the same season.
For these reasons and more, empiri-
cal studies tend to find that informal 
risk coping mechanisms achieve only 
partial insurance; negative shocks 
do cause reductions in household 
wealth and household consumption, 
even if risk coping and risk manage-
ment strategies dampen the shocks’ 
effects.
From poor outcomes to poverty
There is a  difference between having 
a  bad harvest and living in poverty: 
a bad harvest is a particular outcome 
from a  particular process, whereas 
poverty is a  prolonged way of life. 
There are several reasons that expo-
sure to risk in poor communities may 
push households into poverty. The 
most obvious reason that a temporary 
negative shock might cause a  per-
manent welfare loss is that a  shock 
may be so severe that a household is 
unable to return to its previous cir-
cumstances. This might be the case, 
for example, for a  household fac-
ing a  prolonged drought. But there is 
a  more subtle reason, too: many of 
the risk management and risk cop-
ing strategies discussed earlier are 
relatively more costly for households 
that are poorer. For example, it may 
be the case that poorer and wealthier 
households both choose to accrue pre-
cautionary savings, but that only the 
poorer households need to withdraw 
their children from education in order 
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to do so. For this reason, exposure to 
risk may be a cause for poverty traps, 
meaning that poor households may 
face a vicious cycle precisely because 
of the particularly high costs that they 
incur for risk management and risk 
coping strategies.
In summary, on one hand, we should 
expect an effective microinsurance 
product to bring substantial benefits 
to poor households – not only by miti-
gating the consequences of poor out-
comes, but also by shifting behaviour 
away from costly risk coping and risk 
management strategies. We should 
expect important short-term gains, 
but may even anticipate permanent 
gains in welfare for households other-
wise facing a risk induced poverty trap. 
However, there are likely to be several 
mechanisms by which these benefits 
accrue – and those mechanisms may 
vary in their importance across differ-
ent contexts. On the other hand, insur-
ance, as any intervention, can also have 
unintended effects that can reduce the 
welfare of insured members or others 
from the same communities. It may 
not be an effective mechanism for all 
groups under all circumstances. For 
these reasons, it is important that 
both the development and the evalu-
ation of microinsurance products rely 
upon a clear framework for a theory of 
change.
3.2. Theory of change
The importance of means and 
mechanisms
This section discusses some of the 
likely mechanisms by which micro-
insurance may operate; that is, the 
section considers not only what kind 
of final impacts we might expect from 
microinsurance, but also the inter-
mediate steps by which these impacts 
may come about. There are at least 
two reasons why it is important to con-
sider such mechanisms:
• Firstly, any microinsurance product 
is likely to be refined and improved 
over time. In order to understand 
what kinds of refinements are 
likely to be valuable, a  researcher 
needs to understand not only what 
the average effect of a  particular 
product is, but also how that effect 
occurs. For example, suppose that 
a  particular microinsurance prod-
uct is found to be effective, but only 
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amongst a small number of house-
holds choosing to adopt it. This 
could, for example, be the result of 
insufficient advertising and promo-
tion, or of households not under-
standing the product, or of house-
holds understanding the product 
well, but deciding that its costs are 
too great. Any policy maker wishing 
to improve the product would need 
to understand not only the average 
effect of the product, but also the 
mechanisms determining its adop-
tion and implementation.
• Secondly, successful microinsur-
ance products are likely to be imple-
mented in different communities 
and different contexts. For example, 
suppose that a  particular microin-
surance product is found to work 
well in rural western Kenya. With-
out understanding how and why it 
has been successful, it is difficult to 
have any confidence that the prod-
uct’s success could be replicated in, 
for example, urban India.
This point has been noted several 
times by microinsurance researchers. 
For example, Radermacher et al. said 
this about the notion of impact in the 
microinsurance context:
Impact encompasses the changes 
that microinsurance makes to the 
economic or social circumstances of 
insured people or their households, 
enterprises or communities. It can 
be positive or negative, affect both 
insured and uninsured populations, 
occur either before, ex-ante, or after, 
ex-post, insured events happen, and 
have micro-, meso- and macro-level 
implications, often in ways that are 
linked. For example, livestock cover 
can provide payouts that smooth 
household consumption ex-post 
after animals become sick or die, but 
can also pre-emptively encourage 
households to reallocate money they 
may have saved for such emergen-
cies to other more profitable ends 
ex-ante, before any problems occur. 
Similarly, health microinsurance 
can improve policyholders’ health 
through increased access to care, 
which can additionally reduce local 
disease burdens and thus improve 
the health of nearby uninsured peo-
ple too. As impact is multifaceted and 
manifests itself in different ways, we 
need to be aware of each intervention’s 
myriad potential effects and their rela-
tionships to each other.” (2012, 59-60, 
emphasis added)
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In short, one size does not fit all and 
a  careful analysis of mechanisms is 
important to ensure that policy mak-
ers learn effectively from past prac-
tices. This section structures a  basic 
theory of change for microinsurance, 
in order to identify some of the impor-
tant mechanisms by which microinsur-
ance products may affect the welfare 
of poor communities.
Level of analysis
Risk is a phenomenon that operates at 
many levels of community structure. 
Typically, the primary unit of analy-
sis is the poor household. As noted, 
negative shocks are likely to be felt 
most directly by the household col-
lectively – for example, through the 
destruction of a  household’s crop or 
the death of a household breadwinner. 
Similarly, the household may respond 
to risk collectively – for example, by 
withdrawing children from school as 
part of a  risk management strategy 
to build precautionary savings. How-
ever, the household is not the only 
useful level for analysis. Research in 
development economics increasingly 
emphasises the divergent interests of 
different decision makers within the 
household; it may be that different 
household members respond in dif-
ferent ways to particular risks (this is 
sometimes termed the “non-unitary 
model of the household”). Conversely, 
risk may have consequences that apply 
to the local community as a  whole – 
either because the community faces 
the same negative shock or because, 
as noted, individual households may 
rely upon the community for support in 
times of need.
For these reasons, any theory of 
change framework for the analysis of 
microinsurance must be sufficiently 
flexible to embrace several distinct 
levels of analysis – in particular, analy-
sis at the levels of the individual, the 
household, and the community. Simi-
larly, any empirical analysis of a micro-
insurance product should consider the 
possible role of spill-overs, allowing 
the possibility that the consequences 
of microinsurance adoption are felt 
even by those not directly involved.
A framework for a theory of change
Any analysis of microinsurance – 
whether theoretical or empirical – 
must consider at least four key steps:
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• Firstly, some provider – whether 
a government, an NGO, or a private 
company – must offer some kind 
of microinsurance product. This 
can be framed as the input3 to the 
microinsurance process.
• Secondly, the target community must 
decide whether to adopt the product. 
Depending upon the product and the 
context, this may be either an individ-
ual decision (for example, in the case 
of a household agreeing to a health 
insurance plan), or a decision for an 
entire community (for example, in the 
case of a group of farmers agreeing 
to adopt index insurance for rainfall). 
This decision may involve considera-
tion of the demand for the product 
from prospective clients, the costs 
involved in the product to both to 
the provider and the clients, and the 
subsequent use of the product. All 
of these aspects can be considered 
part of the output of the microinsur-
ance process.
• Thirdly, the adoption of microinsur-
ance may change the types of ser-
vices available to poor communities, 
and the types of behaviour that mem-
bers of those communities choose. 
For example, microinsurance clients 
typically receive a bundle of contrac-
tual rights, often accompanied by new 
information and new services (for 
3 There are many other definitions of the terms input, out-
put, outcome, and impact. See, for example, the classifi-
cation proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC).
example, rights to claim specific sums 
in case of particular losses); clients 
may respond to this by changing their 
financial planning and their manage-
ment of risk. As Radermacher et al. 
(2012, 59) have argued: “Insurance is 
not an end in itself. Households pur-
chase (and donors support the devel-
opment of) microinsurance because 
they want to manage risks better.” 
This process of changing available 
services and client behaviour can 
be considered as the outcome of the 
microinsurance process.
• Fourthly, the outcomes of micro-
insurance may ultimately improve 
client welfare. If a  microinsurance 
product is working, this should 
occur through a  reduced exposure 
to risk. However, this may have long-
term benefits (the earlier discus-
sion noted the possibility of a  risk 
induced poverty trap), and it may 
be that a well-designed microinsur-
ance product reduces a household’s 
general vulnerability to poverty and 
even breaks a  poverty cycle. All of 
these consequences should be con-
sidered as microinsurance impact. 
One of the main reasons for using 
a  comprehensive theory of change 
framework is to avoid wasting 
resources on evaluating outcomes or 
impacts of badly designed schemes. 
Hence, the analysis of inputs is cru-
cial to select the right scheme to be 
evaluated. The Product, Access, Cost 
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and Experience (PACE) tool, presented 
later in this chapter, can be used to 
conduct this initial assessment. 
The table below illustrates the four 
steps used to consider the mechanisms 
by which health microinsurance may 
improve households’ welfare. The table 
shows how potential innovations may 
contribute to the process input, how 
pragmatic implementation and careful 
advertising or information lead to rational 
client adoption (the process output), how 
adoption of such a product may improve 
health services, as well as clients’ risk 
management practices and the general 
health of their community (the process 
outcome) and, finally, how such a product 
may lower vulnerability to poverty and, 
potentially, break a risk induced poverty 
trap: a valuable microinsurance impact. 
This example also highlights some 
potential unintended, negative outcomes. 
Outcomes: what should we look for?
The theory of change framework com-
plements the earlier discussion by sug-
gesting several specific ways in which 
microinsurance may shift the behav-
iour of clients and their communities. 
It suggests several important potential 
outcomes that we should look for in 
empirical analysis. The following dis-
cussion flags several important poten-
tial outcomes. Of course, the lists of 
outcomes (and impacts) provided here 
are indicative rather than exhaustive.
Better risk management practices 
As mentioned earlier, informal meth-
ods are not sufficient and often costly 
in helping low-income households to 
manage risks. Selling assets or tak-
ing high-interest loans from money-
lenders can have devastating conse-
quences on household welfare in the 
long-term. Microinsurance promises 
to provide a more cost-effective solu-
tion for certain risks and for certain 
groups. However, by relying on formal 
insurance products that cover only 
certain risks, insured individuals might 
invest too little in other risk manage-
ment strategies (e.g., savings or the 
social network) to deal with the risks 
not covered by the formal insurance. 
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This can leave them more vulnerable 
than before.
Additionally, if many people from 
a  community take insurance (and 
invest less in informal risk sharing), 
it can weaken the reciprocal social 
networks to the extent that individu-
als without insurance might be worse 
off than before. But one can also argue 
that in the event of covariant risk that 
affects the entire community, premium 
payouts can financially strengthen the 
community’s social networks. 
Table:  Example of a four-step theory of change framework for health 
microinsurance
Input Output Outcome Impact
1. Expanded beneits  
(product innovations)
a. Comprehensive
b.  Outpatient to comple-
ment inpatient
c. Drugs
d. Deined beneit, incl. 
maternity
e. Beneits to 
non-claimants, incl. 
free health checkups
f. Prevention campaigns
2. Alternative inancing 
mechanisms
a. Savings accounts
b. Subsidies
c. Conditional cash 
transfers (CCT),  
remittances
d. Credit
3. Process innovations
a. Third party adminis-
trator (TPA) and other 
back-end
b. Front-end
c. Smart controls for 
moral hazard, ad-
verse selection, fraud; 
managing provider 
networks
d. Consumer education / 
marketing
4. Business models
a. Public private  
partnership (PPP)
b. Managed care model
c. Insurer-led model
d. Hybrid model
e. Mutual
1. Higher appeal to 
clients, higher 
client satisfaction, 
higher demand 
and renewals 
(demand/scale)
2. Trimmed supply 
costs and better 
control over costs 
(costs)
3. Clients and their 
families use in-
surance payouts 
and health-care 
services in a ra-
tional way (use)
1. Access to health 
microinsurance im-
proves health-seek-
ing behaviours
2. Access to health 
microinsurance 
improves quality of 
health services
3. Access to formal 
microinsurance 
products improves 
clients’ inancial ca-
pabilities and makes 
their risk manage-
ment behaviours 
more cost-effective 
(e.g., less high-inter-
est borrowing, re-
duced out-of-pocket 
expenses)
4. Upper poor and vul-
nerable non-poor 
beneit more from 
microinsurance than 
other groups 
5. Access to microin-
surance has positive 
or negative spill-over 
effects on non-cli-
ents living in the 
same communities 
(e.g., improved qual-
ity of health care 
for all or weakened 
informal risk sharing 
networks for unin-
sured members).
1. Use of microin-
surance products 
leads to improved 
well-being at 
household / indi-
vidual level; lowers 
vulnerability to 
poverty and breaks 
the poverty cycle
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More investment in productive 
activities
The earlier discussion noted that poor 
households facing risk are likely to 
shift their efforts towards less produc-
tive activities in order to reduce their 
expected variation in consumption; 
that is, risk management strategies 
are likely to discourage households 
from specialising in the most produc-
tive activities possible. It follows that 
an effective microinsurance product is 
likely to induce households to shift time 
and resources towards more produc-
tive activities. For example, we might 
expect a  farming household to plant 
crops with higher expected yields, 
even if those yields may be more vari-
able. We might expect urban house-
holds to consider starting new enter-
prises, even if such an enterprise may 
be a risky undertaking. And, we might 
expect poor households generally to 
invest more in their children’s educa-
tion, even if they therefore forego some 
opportunities to accrue precautionary 
savings. On the flip side, the peace of 
mind triggered by being insured can 
push some households into taking 
more uninsured risk than before. 
Changes health-seeking behaviours 
and access to health care
Many microinsurance products are 
designed to protect clients against the 
costs of health shocks. Self-evidently, 
any evaluation of such a product must 
measure its effects upon clients’ 
standard of health. However, there is 
a  more subtle way in which microin-
surance may improve health: it may 
encourage clients to place greater 
value on their health. This would be the 
case if, for example, a microinsurance 
product was to increase the effective-
ness of households’ own health invest-
ments. For example, a  client may 
be less likely to smoke if he or she 
expects to live longer. In some health 
microinsurance schemes, clients are 
also “forced” to change their health-
seeking behaviours through a specific 
scheme design, such as obligatory free 
health checkup every year or distribut-
ing mosquito nets for malaria preven-
tion. Health microinsurance can also 
create distortions. For example, when 
implemented without good controls to 
manage providers’ networks, it can 
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contribute to an increase in health-care 
prices, which can make it more expen-
sive to use the services by uninsured 
members of the community. Or, if the 
local health-care system has limited 
capacity, the health microinsurance 
can make it even more difficult for 
uninsured members to access health 
care when insured patients are served 
first. Through these sample channels, 
the equity of accessing health care can 
be lowered at the community level, 
because the poorest rarely can afford 
insurance.
Improved financial capability
There are several reasons that we 
might expect microinsurance products 
to improve clients’ capability to man-
age financial decisions and the assess-
ment of risk. Firstly, the very process 
of considering, negotiating, and agree-
ing to a microinsurance contract may 
improve clients’ financial capability. 
For example, a  household saving for 
a rainy day may consider why it saves 
so much, and how a  microinsurance 
product may reduce that savings 
incentive. Secondly, microinsurance 
may actually serve to shift households’ 
preferences over risk and over deci-
sions about future events. Research 
in economics has increasingly empha-
sised the importance of behavioural 
biases, by which – for example – house-
holds may have inconsistent prefer-
ences over future events (weighing 
present events too highly relative to 
the future) and inconsistent prefer-
ences over risky outcomes (weighing 
tiny risks too highly relative to larger 
risks).4 Microinsurance may help to 
overcome these biases by attaching 
a  specific price to a  particular set of 
future risky outcomes. Microinsurance 
clients may weigh future – and risky 
– events differently if they can weigh 
those events by using a  price that is 
immediate and certain.
Impacts: what should we look for?
Reductions in vulnerability
The most important potential impact 
of microinsurance is a reduction in the 
variability of income and consumption 
– and, therefore, a reduction in clients’ 
vulnerability. If a microinsurance prod-
uct can achieve this result, most cli-
ents will surely consider it a success; 
if it does not achieve this result, any 
other benefits will likely seem inciden-
tal at best. It follows that any evalua-
tion of a microinsurance product must 
evaluate whether the product has 
reduced clients’ vulnerability and how 
it impacted vulnerability of non-clients 
living in the same community. Ideally, 
this should be measured both in terms 
of actual changes in the variability of 
consumption and income, and whether 
clients perceive any such changes.
4 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) for more on prospect theory. 
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Changes in asset accumulation
Asset accumulation may or may not be 
a  desirable outcome of a  microinsur-
ance programme. The earlier discus-
sion noted that precautionary saving 
– a  form of asset accumulation – is 
one of several inefficient risk coping 
strategies that poor households use. If 
a  particular community or household 
retains an inefficiently high level of sav-
ings for precautionary purposes – for 
example, by placing children into work 
rather than into school, or by passing 
up valuable opportunities to open new 
enterprises – then microinsurance 
may lower the rate of asset accumu-
lation, and this may represent a  wel-
fare gain. Conversely, it may be that 
a community holds inadequate savings 
because of a high risk of loss or appro-
priation. In that case, we might hope 
that microinsurance would encour-
age asset accumulation. For these 
reasons, the effect of microinsurance 
upon asset holdings is a critical ques-
tion for any future empirical research; 
however, it is also a question that must 
be intimately linked to other impacts – 
for example, whether households are 
more likely to open a microenterprise, 
or whether households are more likely 
to invest in their children’s education.
Changes in educational levels5
There is a critical relationship between 
risk and education, as noted earlier. 
Because education is a  costly invest-
ment in future welfare, it is particu-
larly vulnerable to be purloined to off-
set present risk. Households adopting 
such a  strategy are likely to forego 
substantial future earnings; further, 
this kind of strategy may be one rea-
son for a risk induced poverty trap. For 
these reasons, households’ investment 
in education and subsequent change in 
educational levels is a  critical impact 
that any evaluation of microinsurance 
should cover. Further, such an evalua-
tion should measure the progress and 
effects of the children’s education at 
different stages. It may be, for exam-
ple, that microinsurance has limited 
effect upon whether children attend 
primary school, but a  critical effect 
upon their attendance at secondary 
school (i.e., when they reach an age 
where their labour becomes more 
valuable, and hence a more attractive 
alternative option).
5 One can classify health and education impacts as out-
comes if just the investment in education or health is 
considered. For example, investing more in health seems 
like changing behaviours (outcome) that will lead to bet-
ter health status (impact). The distinction between out-
comes and impacts is somewhat fluid. We have decided to 
keep them under impacts because they involve long-term 
changes in behaviour (i.e., in the sense of a  permanent 
shift in the value placed upon health, or a permanent shift 
in human capital, etc.). 
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Changes in health status
The earlier discussion of microinsur-
ance outcomes noted two important 
pathways by which a  microinsurance 
product may improve health invest-
ment: by insuring some health costs 
directly, and by increasing the relative 
value of good health to poor commu-
nities. These pathways hold obvious 
relevance for any microinsurance pro-
gramme in the area of health; however, 
they are also relevant potential impacts 
for microinsurance in other areas (for 
example, rainfall index insurance). 
Effective microinsurance may free 
funds from inefficient risk coping and 
risk management strategies for higher 
investments in health – even in the 
case of microinsurance products far 
beyond the health sphere. As men-
tioned earlier in the outcome section, 
some undesired outcomes of health 
microinsurance can lead to negative 
impacts at the community level in the 
long-term. For example, the existing 
inequalities in health status can be 
further increased if no mechanisms 
are created for the poorest to access 
microinsurance.
Higher self-reported well-being
Self-reported well-being is certainly 
not a  definitive outcome measure for 
assessing the impact of microinsur-
ance. It is well known, for example, that 
respondents may shift their well-being 
reference point over time. However, it is 
clearly an important impact nonethe-
less. There are at least two reasons for 
this. Firstly, self-reported well-being 
may act as a  useful summary statis-
tic, in order to weight and combine the 
various effects of different impacts. 
For example, suppose that a  rainfall 
insurance product causes households 
to increase their investment in health, 
but somehow causes a  reduction in 
their children’s education. Should this 
be considered an overall improve-
ment in welfare? Self-reported well-
being measures may help to answer 
this question. Secondly, self-reported 
well-being may capture the psycho-
logical effects of risk and its mitiga-
tion – something that standard impact 
measures may overlook. Economic 
policy makers and researchers typi-
cally measure outcomes in terms of 
tangible, economic impacts. This is an 
eminently sensible approach, but may 
overlook – for example – a  general 
sense of stress or helplessness asso-
ciated with living under substantial 
risk. An amelioration of these effects 
may be no less important than tradi-
tional measures for considering the 
value of microinsurance. Carefully 
framed questions on self-reported 
psychological effects may, therefore, 
be extremely valuable in understand-
ing the broader consequences of any 
microinsurance programme.
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One effect does not fit all: different 
impacts on different clients
To this point the discussion has consid-
ered microinsurance clients generally, 
without drawing any explicit distinc-
tions between different types of clients 
or non-clients living in the same com-
munities. However, any given microin-
surance product will likely be adopted 
by clients in quite different circum-
stances – for example, by men and by 
women, by wealthier and by poorer, by 
those with large households and by 
those with small, etc. It is likely that any 
product will affect these clients differ-
ently. There are three key reasons for 
this kind of heterogeneity. 
• Firstly, different clients are likely to 
face different risk – different both in 
its origin and its seriousness. For 
example, the health risks of choos-
ing to have children are obviously 
much greater for women than for 
men; similarly, clients in different 
occupations will likely be exposed 
to different risks. 
• Secondly, different clients are likely 
to have different options available 
for risk coping and risk manage-
ment. For example, wealthier farm-
ers may have more scope to diver-
sify their crop, and households 
with more children may have more 
scope to use their children’s labour 
to build precautionary savings. 
• Thirdly, different prospective clients 
are likely to engage differently with 
the microinsurance product. This 
may be the case at the point of con-
tractual agreement. For example, 
more educated prospective clients 
may take a more nuanced view of the 
terms of any contract, or different 
cultural or religious backgrounds 
may promote different attitudes 
towards issues of risk and interest 
accrual. Additionally, this may be the 
case at the point of insurance pay-
out. For example, different clients 
may use a  microinsurance pay-
out for different purposes, or may 
face different social expectations to 
share their gains (sharing norms).
For all of these reasons, it is critical 
that any analysis of microinsurance 
considers the different ways that dif-
ferent clients are likely to be affected. 
56
This ought to occur throughout the 
microinsurance process – from ini-
tial planning phases to empirical 
evaluation and product refinement. 
Importantly, as the earlier discussion 
has emphasised, it is not enough for 
analysis to consider whether different 
groups are affected differently. In order 
to better design and adapt a product for 
client needs, it is vital to consider the 
means and mechanisms by which such 
heterogeneity may arise. For exam-
ple, suppose that larger families are 
less willing to agree to a  microinsur-
ance product. This could be because 
they have better risk coping and risk 
management options to rely upon, or 
because the specific terms of the con-
tract may penalise larger households 
(for example, if the premium scales lin-
early with household size), or because 
they have a  larger social network that 
would expect to share in any insurance 
payout, or some other reason yet. How-
ever, without understanding why such 
a phenomenon is observed, a microin-
surance provider may struggle to adapt 
and improve its product appropriately.
3.3. Towards a general 
microinsurance theory 
of change
The preceding discussion of likely out-
comes and impacts provides a  set of 
general proposals for relevant vari-
ables of interest: “What we should 
look for?” This section situates those 
proposals within a  suggested frame-
work for a general microinsurance the-
ory of change. The framework builds 
directly upon the theory of change 
just considered, as well as upon the 
International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) Microinsurance Innovation Facil-
ity’s (MIFs) client-value assessment 
framework and tool called PACE (see 
box below).6 A general microinsurance 
theory of change might rely upon the 
following motivating questions.
Input
What is being offered? Analysis of input 
should focus on evaluating added value 
of microinsurance in relation to alter-
natives (i.e., savings, credit, informal 
groups, social security schemes, etc.) 
within the four broad categories below:
• Product - describes appropriate-
ness by reviewing coverage, benefit 
level, eligibility criteria, and avail-
ability of value-added services
• Access - focuses on accessibil-
ity and simplicity by investigating 
choice, enrolment, information, cli-
ent education, premium payment 
method, and proximity
• Cost - measures both affordability 
and value for money, whilst look-
ing at additional costs to keep down 
overall costs of delivery
6 See more at www.ilo.org/microinsurance. Matul, Tatin-
Jaleran, and Kelly (2012) present the tool and main re-
sults from its pilot testing. Matul and Kelly (2012) provide 
a technical guide on how to do PACE analysis.
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• Experience - assesses responsive-
ness and simplicity by looking at 
claims procedures and processing 
time, policy administration, product 
tangibility, and customer care
Other considerations
• What is the subject matter of the 
insurance contract?
• In relation to the relevant subject 
matter, what kinds of specific risks 
do clients want to have insured?
• What specific events trigger the 
insurer’s liability? Does the set of 
triggering events adequately cover 
the main risks related to the rel-
evant subject matter? Does the set 
cover the kinds of specific risks that 
clients want covered?
• What remedies are available to the 
microinsurance provider should the 
client default upon its payments? 
Are these formal legal remedies, or 
informal remedies? 
• What remedies are available to the 
client should the microinsurance 
provider default upon its payments? 
Are these formal legal remedies or 
informal remedies? 
• Would a  prospective client find 
the agreement credible? Would 
the prospective client believe that 
the microinsurance provider will 
be willing and able to payout in 
response to any triggering event?
• What alternative products are avail-
able to prospective clients? What 
strategies for risk coping and risk 
management are likely?
• Has there been a  similar product 
offered before? Why was it suc-
cessful or not successful? Is there 
a general distrust in insurance (e.g., 
badly designed schemes offered 
before in the area)?
Output
• What determines client participa-
tion? How many clients are likely 
to participate? What are their likely 
characteristics? 
• Why do they buy or not buy the 
insurance? (scale)
• What steps can the microinsur-
ance institution take to reduce its 
costs, whilst still ensuring its ability 
to meet the terms of the insurance 
agreement? (costs)
• Do prospective clients clearly 
understand the terms of the insur-
ance agreement? (use)
Outcome
• What are the effects upon client 
behaviour? 
• How do other actors respond to 
those effects?
• Relevant considerations for out-
comes have been discussed in the 
earlier section, “Outcomes: What 
should we look for?”
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Impact
• What are the effects upon client 
well-being?
• Are there spill-over effects for 
the community as a  whole? 
 
• Relevant considerations for impacts 
have also been discussed in an ear-
lier section, “Impacts: What should 
we look for?” 
Box: The ILO’s Microinsurance Innovation Facility client-value framework 
and the theory of change
The ILO’s Microinsurance Innovation Facility has recently developed a  framework for 
defining and assessing the concept of client-value and the process of creating value 
in a microinsurance context. The framework is described by Matul, Tatin-Jaleran, and 
Kelly (2012) as encompassing an iterative process of four distinct steps:
1. Product and process design - “How do products meet client needs in relation to 
alternatives?”
2. Demand - “What factors influence the choices of low-income households?”
3. Product use - “What is client satisfaction, loyalty and feedback to improve products?”
4. Impact - “To what extent and how microinsurance improves risk management and 
reduces vulnerability?”
The general theory of change for microinsurance proposed earlier embraces this client-
value framework at its foundation. For example, issues of product and process design 
are highlighted in considering the demands and desires of likely clients, as are likely 
alternative products and strategies (input). Issues of demand are coincident with the 
discussion in output, and also overlap the contractual issues covered in input. Product 
use and impact together cover the discussion of outcome and impact. As mentioned 
earlier, the PACE tool that the ILO’s Facility developed to analyse and improve client-
value can be used to conduct the input evaluation within the suggested theory of change. 
Finally, note that the entire client-value framework is designed as an iterative process; 
it is designed so that analysis of product impact feeds back naturally into product and 
process design. This iterative structure is inherent in the proposed theory of change, 
which structures a process of impact evaluation; that is, a process designed to allow 
microinsurance products to be developed, refined and improved over time.
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3.4. Defining research 
questions
This chapter concludes by consider-
ing some specific research questions 
to capture outcomes and impacts 
discussed earlier. Dercon and Kirch-
berger (2008,  7) have suggested 
some important questions for further 
research, together designed to allow 
a better evaluation of the overall impact 
on household welfare. The questions 
were:
• To what extent do low-income 
households adopt more efficient 
risk-management strategies when 
they start using microinsurance?
• How do consumers use insurance 
payouts?
• Does insurance coverage promote 
undertaking higher-risk, more 
productive economic activities?
• Does health insurance contribute 
to more efficient health seeking 
behaviours?
The authors went on to acknowledge 
several subsidiary questions:
Any of these impacts will need to be 
unpacked further to address ques-
tions such as which segments of 
low-income households benefit the 
most? What are the intra-house-
hold dynamics? How does insur-
ance impact women, men, other 
household members? How do they 
benefit (e.g. is it through more effi-
cient behaviours, stronger asset or 
human capital position, more asset 
accumulation, etc.)? Are there any 
externalities at the community 
level? For example, does it affect 
local health care provision, does it 
crowd out informal schemes, does it 
affect credit markets? Finally, ques-
tions arise about which products 
provide the highest impact: what is 
the best product for particular risks 
in particular circumstances? Can 
this be related to pricing of products 
(e.g. low premiums with low protec-
tion compared to high premium for 
higher protection)? Or comparing 
the impact of single versus compos-
ite products (for example, combin-
ing health and agriculture insurance 
products, or mandatory versus vol-
untary products)? Product compari-
son should not limit itself to insur-
ance alone: a  key concern when 
studying the impact of insurance will 
have to be more work on comparing 
the impact of insurance with other 
complementary financial services 
(such as savings, consumption or 
emergency credit) as well as safety 
nets and social protection (including 
social security and cash transfers) 
(Dercon and Kirchberger 2008, 7).
This concludes the discussion of what 
is being evaluated and how to develop 
a framework of theory of change. 
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4.1. Introduction
How can we determine that an inter-
vention is making a real difference?
At age 40, Feizal was supporting his 
family in rural northern India. He 
earned a living selling aluminium pots, 
which he strapped on to his bicycle and 
took from village to village. The sales 
provided the lion’s share of his house-
hold’s US$36 average monthly income. 
But one day Feizal had a bad fall from 
his bicycle and broke his leg. Initially, 
he relied on the care given by tradi-
tional doctors – at a  cost of US$33. 
After three months, the leg showed 
no improvement, but Feizal’s family 
could not afford modern treatments. 
It took several more months, and the 
resources of his extended family, to 
pull together US$250 to pay for a hos-
pital treatment. The family had to draw 
on a wage advance from Feizal’s son’s 
employer and deplete the family’s 
savings, which had been reserved for 
Feizal’s daughter’s wedding. In the end, 
Feizal’s leg was treated in a  modern 
hospital and he recovered. But he had 
spent eight months with no income, his 
family’s savings were gone, and the 
family was US$100 in debt.1
1 The story of Feizal and his family is part of the financial di-
aries project collected by Orlanda Ruthven and described 
in Portfolios of the Poor (Collins et al. 2009), in which 
authors provide a  window into the financial lives of 250 
households in India, Bangladesh, and South Africa.
What would Feizal’s situation have been 
if he had access to health insurance? 
Would Feizal have gone to a  modern 
doctor sooner, thereby receiving bet-
ter treatment and minimizing recovery 
time? Could proceeds from an insur-
ance policy have helped him avoid fall-
ing into debt? Would Feizal have been 
able to protect his family’s consump-
tion levels? These questions are at the 
heart of impact evaluations.
With certain assumptions, evalua-
tors can establish that the difference 
between Feizal’s situation and that 
of insured individuals was caused by 
having a microinsurance policy, i.e., it 
is the impact of microinsurance. The 
rough notion of making a difference can 
be translated into a  precise question 
that should be at the heart of every 
impact study: “How have outcomes 
changed with the intervention relative 
to what would have occurred without the 
intervention?”2
2 This approach to impact evaluation, based on a compari-
son with hypothetical outcomes, is often called the Rubin 
Causal Model after its originator, Donald Rubin, a statis-
tician at Harvard. See Rubin (1974) for the very origins of 
this model.
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Yet, even if that question could be 
answered in Feizal’s community in 
northern India, the particular answer 
would likely be different elsewhere— 
and those other places might be of 
even greater interest to policy makers 
or investors. The question about what 
we can learn from one place to under-
stand another place – in technical jar-
gon, the problem is external validity 
– deserves much more attention, and 
we return to it at the end of this chap-
ter. But since we can’t learn from any 
place unless a  study is credible and 
free from important biases, we devote 
most of our attention to the problem 
known as internal validity: Are we actu-
ally measuring what we want to?
4.2. What quantitative impact 
assessments measure
Impact evaluations try to measure and 
understand the change in a  partici-
pant’s life that occurred because of an 
intervention. The intervention could be 
a policy, a project, an insurance prod-
uct, or a specific feature of a product. 
For instance, the intervention could 
relate to a  particular product fea-
ture, such as the extent of coverage, 
a change of pricing structure, or varia-
tions in the distribution channel.
Impact evaluations focus on the out-
comes evaluations. Process evalua-
tions measure programme processes, 
inputs and outputs. They answer 
questions like: How many insurance 
education sessions did trainers con-
duct? How many farmers attended 
the sessions? How many households 
purchased a  given insurance policy? 
These indicators are a measure of the 
efficiency of the intervention. Whilst 
they are useful in estimating the out-
reach of the programme, they give little 
information about how the programme 
affected household well-being.
Impact evaluations, on the other hand, 
look to answer questions like: Did farm-
ers invest in high-grade seeds because 
they had insurance coverage? Did the 
change in investment result in higher 
income? Did insurance make a notable 
difference in coping with a  drought?3 
Sometimes the likely answers seem 
obvious, but well-designed evaluations 
have the power to surprise. During 
droughts, for example, families often 
get help from neighbours or rela-
tives, and sometimes from the state. 
Families borrow, draw from their own 
savings, and many even migrate. The 
impact of insurance might be large for 
some families but not for others.
The focus on outcomes and impacts, 
rather than inputs and outputs, 
3 These questions illustrate individual- or household-level 
outcomes. Possible indicators for such outcomes include 
income, asset ownership, nutrition, education levels, 
health status, or the cost of medical treatment. Micro-
insurance impact evaluations can also focus on institu-
tion-level outcomes.
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distinguishes impact evaluations 
from process and impacts of the 
intervention. 
Impact evaluations are critical in quan-
tifying the intervention’s true value 
and understanding the underlying 
mechanisms.
This chapter is mostly focused on quan-
titative impact evaluations, estimating 
the amount of change caused by an 
intervention for a population of interest. 
Qualitative impact evaluations are also 
used in some settings and are particu-
larly useful for gaining insight into how 
interventions generate impacts. They 
proceed from a  different logic, how-
ever, and it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to explain them in detail.
4.2.1. The greatest challenge of 
quantitative impact evaluations: 
addressing selection bias
The ultimate goal of quantitative 
impact evaluations, and their greatest 
challenge, is to establish credibly that 
the intervention caused a difference in 
the lives of the participants.4
The challenge is to separate the change 
that was caused by the intervention 
from the change that would have hap-
pened anyway without the intervention.
4 Impact evaluations can be improved by exploring how 
differences were caused, sometimes by adopting a mixed 
method approach and conducting qualitative research in 
parallel to the quantitative evaluation.
In other words, how can the evalua-
tor establish that the outcomes have 
been caused by the intervention, and 
not by other concurrent events, under-
lying trends, or characteristics of the 
partici pants? For instance, evidence 
shows that richer and more educated 
households are more likely to sign 
up for health microinsurance (Giné 
and Yang 2007). In other words, these 
households selected themselves into 
this intervention. If insured households 
happen to have good health outcomes, 
is it due to the insurance itself, or to 
their capacity to afford better hospitals 
and better understand doctors’ recom-
mendations, even without health insur-
ance? These characteristics can have 
a significant effect on impact estimates. 
In a  study of microfinance clients, for 
example, McKernan (2002) found that 
not isolating the effect of microcre-
dit from other concurrent effects can 
lead researchers to overestimate the 
impact by 100%. When measuring 
impact in microinsurance, not sepa-
rating the impact of the intervention 
from that of other confounding factors 
could lead to underestimating or over-
estimating the impact of the insurance, 
depending on the situation. It is possi-
ble, for instance, that households that 
suffer from a  preexisting illness are 
more likely to buy health insurance - 
the classic adverse selection problem.5 
5 For further discussion of the adverse selection problem, 
see Churchill (2006) in the context of microinsurance or 
Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) in the context of microfi-
nance generally.
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In this case, an impact evaluation that 
compares health outcomes of these 
households with another set of house-
holds could find a (mistakenly) negative 
impact of microinsurance on health 
condition since the insured individu-
als appear to be in worse health than 
uninsured patients. On the other hand, 
richer farmers are more likely to have 
enough disposable income to contract 
a  rainfall microinsurance product, 
so comparing these farmers to those 
who did not sign up for insurance will 
make it seem like the insurance was 
successful at helping them deal with 
a drought, when part of the measured 
impact is, in fact, due to the better ini-
tial situation of the insured farmers.
This potential bias in the results is 
called selection bias. Disentangling the 
influence of individuals’ characteris-
tics from that of the intervention (i.e., 
addressing the selection bias) is sur-
prisingly difficult to do. Some individual 
characteristics can be observed, mea-
sured, and controlled in a  statistical 
analysis.
For instance, gender, age, and resi-
dence location are likely to influence 
both the decision to contract insurance 
and the outcome from having insur-
ance. Most of these kinds of factors are 
easy to measure and their influence on 
the outcomes can be separated out by 
statistical means.
The big challenge arises with unob-
servable factors. Attributes like an 
individual’s propensity to fall sick, 
organisational ability, or access to 
social networks, are far harder – and 
others are impossible – to measure. 
But they can create big biases. Not all 
hope is lost: certain evaluation meth-
odologies make it possible to recover 
the net impact of the intervention, free 
of selection bias. We highlight their 
principles in the next section.
Impact evaluations of microinsurance 
present a specific challenge. Whilst the 
most fundamental benefit of insurance 
is that it offers households protec-
tion when facing emergencies, having 
access to insurance can also provide 
important benefits in the absence of 
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adverse events. Economic theory sug-
gests, for example, that having insur-
ance can allow farmers to take more 
risk, altering their investment and 
employment strategies, which could 
have an impact on their well-being. 
Impact evaluations of microinsurance 
that capture the impact of these altered 
strategies can help us understand the 
full effect of the access to insurance. 
This is not a methodological consider-
ation, but is a practical challenge when 
designing microinsurance impact 
evaluations.
4.3. Getting credible answers 
(internal validity)
4.3.1. Control groups are essential
Whilst it might seem that researchers 
would spend most of their time trying 
to capture what happens when people 
have insurance, they end up spending 
even more time trying to capture what 
happens when they do not have insur-
ance. This is the counterfactual, and it 
is the key to credible evaluations. The 
question is: What would have hap-
pened to the participants had they not 
received the intervention?
Unfortunately, we cannot ever know 
what would have actually happened to 
an insured individual had she not had 
access to insurance because people 
can only be in one circumstance at 
a  time. But with the right design, an 
impact evaluation can form a  credi-
ble estimate of the counterfactual for 
a group of participants taken together.
The counterfactual is usually estimated 
by measuring impacts for individuals 
who do not participate in the interven-
tion, but who are similar to those who 
do, in as many respects as possible. 
The group of individuals who partici-
pate in the intervention is commonly 
referred to as the treatment group, and 
the group of those not participating is 
referred to as the control group (Shad-
ish et al. 2002).6
6 The methodology has roots in the medical procedures 
used to test the effectiveness of drugs.
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Once treatment and control groups 
are formed correctly, the quantitative 
impact of the intervention is mea-
sured by comparing outcomes in the 
treatment and control groups. Sta-
tistical techniques are typically used 
to increase the confidence that the 
results are not spurious – that is, that 
they would also be likely to occur in 
other samples. The difference in out-
comes between the two groups is 
a good measure of the causal impact 
of the programme if, and only if, the 
groups are truly comparable.
4.3.2. Control groups need to be 
truly comparable
Having a control group is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition, to elim-
inate the selection bias. The way that 
treatment and control groups are con-
stituted is fundamental. Whilst having 
a control group eliminates the effect of 
general trends such as national macro-
economic conditions on the measured 
impact, it does not necessarily elimi-
nate the influence of individuals’ char-
acteristics. In fact, the selection bias 
will always exist when individuals are 
allowed to self- select to participate in 
the intervention. This is because their 
observed and unobserved character-
istics influence both their decision to 
participate and their outcomes. To use 
the same example as above, richer 
households will be more likely to be 
able to afford insurance premiums as 
well as to cope with unexpected finan-
cial shocks.
The only sure way to eliminate the 
selection bias is to let an event or rule 
external to the intervention – an exog-
enous event or rule – determine who 
participates in the intervention. In this 
situation, individuals are assigned to 
the treatment and control groups, they 
do not form the groups themselves.
Two main types of exogenous events 
have been used by evaluators. Firstly, 
a national or state policy that changes 
access to programmes. For exam-
ple, the adoption of a national policy of 
large- scale school building has been 
used to estimate the impact of edu-
cation on wages (Duflo 2001). In this 
methodology, receiving more edu-
cation was decided by the Indonesia 
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legislature, and, as such, was not 
related to any personal characteristic 
of the students benefitting from the 
policy. We are not aware of any such 
study on microinsurance. Secondly, 
an exogenous event could be a  lottery 
that decides who receives microinsur-
ance and who cannot. Here again, the 
assignment to treatment and control 
groups is not related to characteristics 
of the households or individuals who 
are being insured – it is random.7 This 
randomised controlled trial method-
ology has become a  gold standard in 
quantitative impact evaluation (Bauchet 
and Morduch 2010), and can be used to 
estimate the impact of microinsurance.
In addition to these types of events, in 
some cases, exogenous rules can be 
used to eliminate the influence of par-
ticipants’ characteristics on measured 
impacts. In regression discontinuity 
designs, for example, an eligibility rule 
with a clear cutoff point can be used to 
create credible inference.
Some microfinance institutions in Ban-
gladesh, for example, had a  rule that 
they only served households owning 
under a  half-acre of land. A  potential 
study design is to compare the out-
comes of households just below the 
half-acre cutoff (who thus get access 
to the treatment) to households just 
above the cutoff. This method requires 
7 See Bauchet and Morduch (2010) for a more detailed ex-
position of the theory.
additional assumptions. The most crit-
ical assumption is that participants 
ranked just above and just below the 
cutoff are similar in observable and 
unobservable characteristics. 
4.3.3. Control groups need to not 
have access to the intervention 
during the evaluation
Whilst great care must be devoted to 
creating truly comparable groups, even 
greater care is often necessary to main-
tain the separation of the treatment and 
control groups over the course of the 
evaluation. Obviously, allowing partici-
pants to switch group would reintroduce 
the selection bias that the initial exog-
enous assignment aimed to eliminate. 
However, more subtle threats exist.
Households in the control group, for 
example, might have opportunities 
to sign up for microinsurance prod-
ucts, maybe from a competing insurer. 
These households self-select to pur-
chase insurance, which, in addition to 
reducing the estimated impact, would 
reintroduce a selection bias.
Households in the control group might 
also be acquainted with households 
in the treatment group, and benefit 
from their relationships, for example, 
through help in times of need. This 
spill-over of benefits from the treat-
ment to the control group contaminates 
the assignment.
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The threat of spill-overs can be mit-
igated by implementing specific 
designs. The level of assignment is the 
single most powerful way to address 
the threat of contamination. Rather 
than assigning individuals to treatment 
and control groups, families, house-
holds, or entire communities can be 
assigned to each group. In evalua-
tions of microinsurance, for instance, 
members of the same family should be 
assigned together to either treatment 
or control. At the village level, weather 
insurance could encourage some 
farmers to adopt riskier and more pro-
ductive crops and techniques, which 
in turn would have positive impacts on 
the entire community. Recognising this 
possibility, the evaluator might need 
to assign entire communities to treat-
ment or control.8
4.3.4. Studies need to be big 
enough to reveal the impact of 
uncommon events (power)
Since asking all clients how the insur-
ance affected them is generally too 
costly, a sample of clients is surveyed 
and statistical methods are used to 
determine whether conclusions based 
on the sample can be generalised to all 
clients.
How big of a  sample is needed? This 
question is particularly important for 
8 See Bauchet and Morduch (2010) for more details on the 
level of assignment and other responses to spill-overs.
studies investigating risk, such as 
microinsurance impact evaluations, 
because most events are uncommon. 
To observe the effect that microinsur-
ance has on households’ ability to cope 
with adverse events, a sufficient num-
ber of these events need to happen in 
both the treatment and control groups.
The need for big samples also arises 
from the presence of noise in all mea-
surements, due to natural variations 
in the data and measurement errors. 
This noise might even be particularly 
loud when measuring outcomes and 
indicators of social processes, such as 
risk, vulnerability, or income. But with 
a  large enough sample, the impact of 
noise can usually be minimised and 
the impacts of interventions emerge 
clearly. If the sample is too small, the 
noise may mask the intervention’s 
real effects: measured impacts may 
be positive and large, but conventional 
measures of statistical significance 
would not be able to establish that the 
measured impacts are nothing other 
than noise. Intuitively, the larger the 
sample, the more confident one is that 
findings based on that sample are valid 
for all clients. But, when data collec-
tion is required, large samples can be 
expensive. Evaluators are always try-
ing to balance sample size with budget 
constraints.
The statistical concept of power refers 
to the ability to detect the impact of an 
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intervention with statistical methods. 
Power calculations are used to deter-
mine the sample size that is required 
to detect the programme’s effect.9 
Statistical power generally improves 
with larger sample sizes, but it is not 
as simple as that. The design of the 
evaluation matters as well. Power cal-
culations are based on the size and 
variation of the impact, the size of the 
sample that is used to measure the 
impact, and the desired level of statis-
tical significance.
The important point is that impact 
evaluations need to consider sample 
size issues seriously and carefully to 
ensure that the study is able to capture 
the impacts whilst keeping budgets 
under control.
This section has emphasised the need 
to adopt rigorous evaluation designs, 
based on exogenous assignment to 
treatment and control groups, to esti-
mate the causal impact of an interven-
tion in an unbiased manner. Achieving 
a  high degree of internal validity is 
necessary for all impact evaluations, 
and influences the way findings can be 
interpreted.
9 This section focuses on how power calculations are used 
to determine a sample size pre-study. Power calculations 
can also be used post-study to estimate the level of pow-
er obtained with a  given sample size (see Bauchet and 
Morduch (2010) and Duflo et al. (2008) for more technical 
introductions and references).
4.4. Interpreting results and 
understanding the change
Even in evaluations using the design that 
best establishes internal validity (i.e., the 
degree of confidence that impacts are 
caused by the intervention), interpreting 
results requires stepping back and crit-
ically considering the evidence. At least 
four broad questions should be asked: 
What impacts are being measured? 
How did these impacts come to be? How 
cost effective is the intervention at pro-
ducing these impacts? How confidently 
can the evidence from one evaluation be 
extrapolated to other contexts?
Questions of what intermediate steps 
have led to these impacts or what 
pathways theoretically underlie these 
changes are important as well. As we 
will explain in detail below, it is import-
ant to understand the underlying the-
ory of change, in particular when pro-
grammes are planned to be transferred 
to other contexts. Therefore, research-
ers are not only interested in quantify-
ing the impact, but also in knowing why 
and how the impact occurred. To get at 
these kinds of questions, qualitative or 
participative studies can help probe the 
underlying mechanisms.
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4.4.1. Interventions are not 
implemented on a blank slate
Books such as The Poor and Their Money 
(Rutherford 2000) and Portfolios of the 
Poor (Collins et al. 2009) reveal how 
active the financial lives of poor house-
holds are. Households use an array of 
formal and informal saving, loan, and 
insurance products and maintain finan-
cial relationships with their friends 
and relatives in order to manage their 
irregular income, finance large expen-
ditures, and smooth consumption.
Whether evaluating microinsurance 
as a  whole or a  specific feature of 
a  microinsurance product, evaluators 
must carefully define their interven-
tion and place it in a  larger context. 
The impact of introducing a  microin-
surance product in a new market, for 
example, is a  marginal impact, that 
is the impact of adding the product to 
the mix of informal mechanisms and 
formal products already available to 
households. These include the infor-
mal strategies described by Collins et 
al. (2009), as well as insurance prod-
ucts offered by semiformal organisa-
tions such as microfinance institutions, 
social insurance schemes offered by 
the government, and interventions 
that other insurers or their partners 
might be implementing. In most cases, 
the counterfactual is not the absence 
of insurance mechanisms. The new 
insurance product will most likely sup-
plement rather than replace the strat-
egies previously used by households. 
Thus, the challenge is to parse the net 
impact of the new product, and, ideally, 
document its complementarities and 
exclusivities with existing strategies. 
Interpreting impact estimates accu-
rately requires an understanding of the 
intervention’s precise effect.
4.4.2. The intervention needs time 
to produce impacts, but long-
term impacts are more difficult to 
attribute to the intervention
Most impact evaluations measure the 
outcomes of the intervention one or 
two years after it was implemented. 
These (relatively) short-term impacts 
might be smaller than, or different 
from, expected impacts, which often 
require time and multiple exposures to 
the intervention to emerge. In micro-
finance, for example, borrowers may 
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not experience improvements in their 
business and livelihood until after they 
complete several loan cycles. Simi-
larly, the impact of microinsurance 
might appear long after households 
have contracted their first insurance 
product: households might not adopt 
new crops, for example, until they have 
personally benefitted from rainfall 
insurance during a drought.
Moreover, interest in the results of the 
evaluation is often high, particularly 
when the intervention is popular or 
seems promising, and policy makers 
and businesses often can’t wait. Esti-
mating short-term impacts satisfies 
a  rightful desire to learn how policy 
and programmes can be improved. 
But budget permitting, additional sur-
veys should be conducted to estimate 
both short- and long-term impacts.
Ideally, researchers would wait three to 
five years before measuring the impact 
of an intervention. In some cases, more 
time might even be necessary. 
Waiting that long, however, makes it 
very difficult to maintain the separa-
tion of treatment and control groups 
and prevent spill-overs, which is a fun-
damental requirement to be able to 
claim that the intervention caused the 
observed impacts. In addition, the risk 
of attrition, i.e., the drop out of partici-
pants, is higher the longer researchers 
wait before following up to measure 
post-intervention outcomes. At the 
least, attrition requires the evaluation 
to be initiated with a  larger sample, 
but it can also introduce bias in the 
estimate of impact if participants with 
specific characteristics drop out of the 
study.
4.4.3. The impact of access may be 
as important as the impact of use
Evaluators must decide whether they 
plan to estimate the impact of access 
to microinsurance, or the use of micro-
insurance when designing the evalua-
tion. This choice influences the design 
of the evaluation and determines how 
findings should be interpreted.
Insurers, for example, are certainly 
interested in evaluating the impact that 
their products have on the well-being 
of households who sign up for them. 
Concern for insured households’ well- 
being and good business practices 
would also recommend evaluating the 
impact of adding or modifying spe-
cific features of insurance products on 
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households who use these products. 
Finally, evaluating the impact of using 
specific products or features is funda-
mental, since, if they are not effective 
amongst those who use them, they 
should probably not be offered, at least 
in their current form.
Policy makers and funders, however, 
are also particularly interested in the 
impact of offering an intervention such 
as microinsurance, knowing that not all 
households who are eligible for it will 
use it. Many policies, particularly aim-
ing to promote development in a broad 
sense, are interventions offered to indi-
viduals who are not required to partic-
ipate. The impact of having access to 
the intervention, rather than actually 
using it, is, therefore, more relevant to 
policy makers deciding on which policy 
to support, or how to improve a given 
policy.
Evaluations must be designed specifi-
cally to measure the impact of access 
to, or use of, the intervention.10 Intu-
itively, the method of assignment to 
treatment or control groups must mir-
ror the type of impacts in which the 
evaluator is interested. To measure the 
impact of access to an intervention, the 
treatment group must be constituted 
of individuals who are exogenously 
given access to the intervention. Some 
10 Being able to decide which type of impacts is measured 
is most common in randomised experiments. In many 
natural experiments, the exploitable source of exogeneity 
dictates which type of impacts is measured.
of these households will decide not to 
participate. To measure the impact of 
using an intervention, the treatment 
group must be made of individuals 
assigned to use the intervention.
The impact of having access to the 
intervention is typically lower than the 
impact of using the intervention, since 
some of those offered the intervention 
do not participate, but must still be 
considered part of the treatment group. 
The treatment group here is constituted 
from those having access to the inter-
vention (i.e., being offered to partici-
pate), regardless of whether they use it 
or not. In an evaluation of the impact of 
access to an intervention, the internal 
validity provided by a natural or random 
experiment does not extend to compar-
ing only those who use the intervention, 
since individuals or households can 
choose whether to participate or not. 
That reintroduces a selection bias.
4.4.4. The distribution of impacts 
can be (at least) as important as the 
average impact
Impact evaluations, particularly ones 
based on exogenous assignment into 
treatment and control groups, are typ-
ically designed to determine the aver-
age impact of a programme.11 In many 
11 The theory underlying the rigorousness of randomised 
evaluations applies to a comparison of average outcomes 
in the treatment and control groups, but does not extend 
to comparison of medians or other measures of distribu-
tion such as percentiles.
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cases, however, organisations care 
about the distributional impacts of an 
intervention and not just the average 
impact.
Imagine an organisation which offers 
a  microinsurance product to a  ran-
domly-selected group of households 
and temporarily denies access to the 
product to another group. The first 
group is the treatment group and the 
second is the control group. The dif-
ference between the average outcome 
of the treated group and the average 
outcome of the control group is an 
accurate estimate of the intervention’s 
average impact (see, notably, Bauchet 
and Morduch 2010 and Duflo et al. 
2008 for technical details). This is the 
causal impact of the microinsurance 
programme. The average impact is an 
important parameter, and is often what 
social investors and practitioners want 
to know.
But what if half of the treated popu-
lation gains by 100 percent, and the 
other half lose by 100 percent? In this 
case, the average impact is zero. Zero 
is a  clean estimate, but it hides the 
action. Thus, practitioners and inves-
tors might care about who is gaining 
and losing, so that they can target the 
programmes appropriately.
A clean estimate of impact for specific 
subgroups can be estimated through 
clever designs. For example, stratify-
ing the treatment and control groups 
by gender allows one to estimate the 
impact for men and for women sepa-
rately. Stratifying means dividing the 
sample along one or more observable 
characteristics (such as gender), and 
performing the assignment to treat-
ment and control for each subgroup 
separately rather than for the entire 
sample at once. One limitation of this 
method is that dividing into subgroups 
generally requires a  larger sample. 
To have the greatest credibility, sub-
groups should be identified before the 
evaluation is started (based on expec-
tations of the way that impacts are 
likely to vary in different parts of the 
population) and built into the survey 
design.
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4.4.5. Cost-benefit calculations 
are critical companions of impact 
evaluations
Well-designed impact evaluations will 
provide evidence about the difference 
that a given intervention makes in the 
lives of people and/or the performance 
of an organisation. Knowing the impact 
of a specific intervention is not the only 
guide for future action, however.
The costs of producing such impact 
must be factored in recommendations 
for replication or scaling-up.
Cost-benefit analyses are widely used 
tools of public policy and should also 
be systematic companions to impact 
evaluation. They allow policy makers, 
funders, and implementing organisa-
tions to compare different interven-
tions, or different features of an inter-
vention, and implement the one(s) that 
provide the best “bang for the buck”. 
For example, health microinsurers 
might want to know whether establish-
ing a cashless payment system would 
provide additional benefits compared 
to the current mechanism that reim-
burses for health expenses incurred. 
The impact on both households and on 
the insurer of the change in coverage 
needs to be evaluated and compared to 
the increased (or decreased) costs for 
both insured patients and the insuring 
organisation.
4.5. Generalising from one 
place and time to another 
(external validity)
Most impact evaluations aim to improve 
the understanding of what works, both 
to determine whether the investments 
have been effective and to learn about 
possibilities for other places. The abil-
ity to generalise the findings from an 
evaluation is called external validity.
Learning from one context to another 
requires both external validity and 
internal  validity. Some statistics-based 
evaluations exploit data coming from 
large geographical areas, varied con-
texts, and/or diversified populations, 
so their conclusions may be applica-
ble to a wide range of situations (high 
external validity). But if those studies 
lack an exogenous determinant of par-
ticipation into the intervention, such 
as a  random assignment, they may 
perform less well in providing unbi-
ased estimates of impact (low internal 
validity). It is then difficult to draw clear 
lessons.
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Evaluations based on random assign-
ment into treatment and control 
groups, on the other hand, do have high 
internal validity, but they are nearly 
always implemented with a  specific 
partner in a  particular context, which 
can reduce confidence that measured 
impacts would also extend to a differ-
ent setting. For instance, a randomised 
evaluation of flip charts as teacher’s 
aides in schools in Kenya (Glewwe et 
al. 2004) only tells us whether the flip 
charts helped raise test scores for 
these students in these schools in this 
region of Kenya. One could imagine 
that students or schools in other parts 
of Kenya, India, or Peru have different 
educational needs, and would bene-
fit differently (or not at all) from their 
teachers’ using flip charts.
We need to understand the specific 
context of the evaluation before draw-
ing general conclusions. This means 
considering three big questions:
1. How does the population studied 
there differ from the population I’m 
interested in here? Are they better 
educated? Poorer? Healthier? Etc.
2. How do supporting inputs differ? 
Are there critical government pro-
grammes in place? Good roads and 
transport? Community institutions? 
Effective organisations to deliver 
the interventions in question?
3. How do alternative activities dif-
fer? Does the studied interven-
tion mostly substitute for existing 
opportunities? Does it complement 
them? Morduch et al. (2013), for 
example, found that a  very prom-
ising antipoverty programme in 
South India ended up having no net 
impact because alternative options 
were so good (and the control 
group availed themselves of those 
options). The same programme had 
bigger impacts in sites with very 
similar populations, but where, it 
seems, such good alternatives were 
lacking.
Some of these questions can be 
addressed with an eye to understand-
ing how and why the intervention 
worked or not. Combining qualitative 
and participatory research designs 
with rigorous quantitative evaluations 
can be applied to increase the under-
standing of the mechanisms that pro-
duced impacts and to gain external 
validity.
4.6. Conclusion: Using 
evaluations to improve 
operations
It is tempting to view evaluations as 
mainly backward-looking assess-
ments. But their greatest power is 
often as forward-looking guides to 
innovation and improvement. Busi-
nesses, donors, investors, and policy 
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makers often have to select between 
competing programmes when deciding 
how to allocate scarce resources. Rig-
orous impact evaluations are an indis-
pensable tool for strategic planning. 
They inform choices that leaders must 
make. Knowing what difference a spe-
cific intervention makes also calls upon 
all stakeholders to improve the inter-
vention, try alternative – and poten-
tially better or cheaper – methods, and 
share the knowledge gained with other 
individuals and organisations.
Karlan et al. (2009), for example, iden-
tify several ways in which rigorous 
impact evaluations can help microfi-
nance institutions increase both their 
sustainability and social outreach, 
including improving their borrower 
risk assessment techniques and learn-
ing about the impact of the price of the 
loans on demand. In microinsurance, 
impact evaluations can test the effec-
tiveness of two different insurance 
products or test the effect of specific 
elements of the products, such as dif-
ferent marketing techniques, pricing 
structures, or distribution channels. 
Understanding the impact of their 
operations on client participation and 
well-being can enable practitioners to 
design better products and services, 
and thereby increase scale, sustain-
ability, and social impact.
This is an exciting time for the micro-
insurance industry. The past few years 
have seen an influx of interest from 
insurers and investors, and regulators 
are driving new initiatives to broaden 
access. As organisations make new 
investments and test innovations, 
they should pay attention to whether 
their products are having the impacts 
for which they hoped. When done 
right, impact evaluations are a  tool 
to efficiently direct future allocations 
design better products, and improve 
operations.
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5.1. Introduction: What is an 
experimental design?
Does expanded access to health 
insurance improve the health sta-
tus of the poor? How does weather 
insurance affect farm investment 
and output amongst maize farmers? 
These are typical questions asked in 
impact assessments. Implicit in these 
questions is the identification of the 
causal effect of a microinsurance pro-
gramme. We are interested in deter-
mining how the health status of the poor 
changed because of access to health 
insurance, and how much farm invest-
ment and output increased amongst 
maize farmers because of the weather 
insurance. How can we best answer 
these questions and isolate the causal 
impact of a programme? In this chap-
ter, we introduce an evaluation method 
that uses the random assignment of 
an intervention. Programme impact 
is measured by comparing outcomes 
between the intervention and non- 
intervention groups.
The main objective of any impact 
assessment is to isolate the causal 
effect of a  programme. Many micro-
insurance programmes track the 
changes in the well-being of pro-
gramme participants over time and 
call this change “programme impact”. 
However, many factors other than 
access to microinsurance affect the 
lives of programme participants 
during the intervention. New eco-
nomic policies may be implemented, 
more non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) may enter in the area, or 
bad weather may affect farm outputs. 
Thus, this method of mere compari-
son of programme participants before 
and after the intervention is unreliable 
in determining the true impact of the 
programme. If it could, then we would 
find aging as an impact of access to 
microinsurance, since people were 
younger before getting microinsur-
ance than afterwards!
Hence, to evaluate impact, we must 
compare programme participants 
to non-participants, not merely fol-
low participants over time. Compar-
ison with any non-participants, how-
ever, would also be insufficient since 
self-selected programme participants 
are inherently different from non-par-
ticipants. They may  differ in terms 
of their personality, eligibility, or risk 
attitude. If we observed differences 
between programme participants and 
non-participants over time, it would 
still be unknown whether those dif-
ferences were caused by the micro-
insurance programme itself or other 
factors that led them to participate or 
not to participate in the programme. 
This is referred to as the attribution 
problem.
The experimental design offers a sim-
ple solution to the attribution problem: 
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it constructs a valid comparison group 
through a  random assignment of an 
intervention. This chapter discusses 
why and how to evaluate microin-
surance schemes using randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs), also called 
randomised evaluations  (REs). In the 
simplest form of an RCT, we con-
struct a  comparison group that looks 
just like the target population of the 
programme before the intervention 
takes place. This is done by randomly 
assigning individuals from the target 
sample to either a treatment or control 
group. Randomisation ensures that 
the group that receives an intervention 
(the “treatment group”) and the group 
that does not (the “control group”) have 
comparable characteristics; therefore, 
we can confidently conclude that the 
difference in the outcome observed is 
the causal effect of the intervention. 
In section 2, we discuss different types 
of evaluations and their purposes. 
Section 3 explains the key method-
ological issues in programme evalu-
ation and why RCTs are often treated 
as the gold standard for evaluating 
microinsurance schemes. This section 
also reviews ethical considerations in 
designing evaluations. In section 4, we 
discuss the process of designing and 
implementing an RCT. Finally, section 
5 summarises the key points and dis-
cusses external validity. Note that this 
chapter will not elaborate on the sta-
tistical methods and econometrics of 
experiments, but will rather focus on 
the conceptual framework and high-
light issues that need to be considered 
when planning evaluations.
5.2. Why do we evaluate 
microinsurance 
programmes?
5.2.1. Impact evaluation
Microinsurance offers protection 
against risks for low-income house-
holds. There are good reasons to think 
that access to insurance will benefit 
the poor. Firstly, it reduces the vul-
nerability to negative shocks by at 
least partially compensating for the 
economic loss due to uncontrollable 
events, such as bad weather or illness. 
This reduction in vulnerability could, 
consequently, address underinvest-
ment in profitable – but risky – oppor-
tunities and increase individuals’ eco-
nomic capacity. These are lofty goals, 
of course, and the impact of a partic-
ular programme depends on many 
factors, including the insurance prod-
uct design, the targeting, and alterna-
tive mechanisms to cope with risks, 
amongst other things. 
Microinsurance, like any other inter-
vention, may also have unintended con-
sequences. A primary consideration is 
simply thinking about its effect on pre-
existing informal insurance networks.
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Formal insurance may weaken infor-
mal safety nets if it causes some 
individuals to withdraw from infor-
mal insurance arrangements. In addi-
tion, insurance products may simply 
replace other household insurance 
mechanisms, such as savings. Thus, 
whilst microinsurance may increase 
individuals’ economic capacity, its net 
effect is ambiguous. Rigorous evalu-
ations can measure the exact impact 
of an insurance scheme on various 
aspects of the lives of the target pop-
ulation and assess the overall effect of 
insurance. 
The microinsurance industry and 
donors should measure social impact 
to determine whether microinsurance 
schemes are worthy of subsidy, and, 
if so, by how much. It is also import-
ant for for-profit insurance provid-
ers to measure the social impact of 
microinsurance for several reasons. 
Firstly, they often benefit from sub-
sidies indirectly, through subsidised 
microfinance programmes. Many pri-
vate insurance providers partner with 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to dis-
tribute insurance policies and compete 
with subsidised microinsurance pro-
grammes. Secondly, private insurance 
providers attract social investors’ 
money by claiming that microinsur-
ance has a  double bottom line, i.e., 
that it provides benefits both for the 
customers (social bottom line), as 
well as the insurance providers (eco-
nomic bottom line). Investors should 
know whether this claim is true. Third, 
demand for insurance does not neces-
sarily imply that the product is benefi-
cial for consumers. Private insurance 
providers may argue that meeting the 
unmet demand for insurance itself is 
a sign of social impact. However, there 
are many products in high demand that 
do not enhance welfare of consum-
ers. For example, despite the steady 
demand for cigarettes and alcohol, 
they may not be welfare-enhancing 
in the long-term. All of these reasons 
together make a strong case for impact 
evaluations, regardless of whether the 
scheme is subsidized or not. 
It is important to note that social impact 
cannot be measured by programme 
coverage. Practitioners often conflate 
outreach (i.e., take-up of the insurance 
programme) with impact. Although 
outreach is a good intermediate indica-
tor that tells us whether a programme 
has accomplished its operational 
89Experimental designs
activities, it does not provide insight 
into the changes in the well-being of the 
target population. Suppose we observe 
a high take-up of a health microinsur-
ance scheme marketed by a  trusted 
organisation in the local community. 
The take-up may be driven by the rep-
utation of the marketing organisation 
rather than by meeting the needs of the 
people and mitigating their risks. On 
the other hand, even if take-up is low, 
it does not automatically imply that the 
potential impact of the insurance, had 
the households purchased the product, 
is low. They may be credit-constrained 
and unable to purchase the product. 
They may simply lack product informa-
tion. To assess the social impact of the 
programme, we must look at changes 
in household well-being beyond inter-
mediate outcomes, such as household 
expenditures on health and health 
status.
5.2.2. Other benefits of evaluation
5.2.2.1. Product innovation
Well-designed evaluations tell us not 
only whether a  given microinsurance 
programme works, but also why it 
works or does not work.1 By under-
1 For example, Giné and Yang (2009) evaluated a  rainfall 
insurance with credit offered to maize and groundnut 
farmers in Malawi and found that the loan bundled with 
the rainfall insurance saw a lower take-up. The evaluation 
offers suggestive evidence for why the insurance reduced 
the take-up: because farmers have limited liability for 
loans, the insurance premium is effectively an increase in 
the interest rate.
standing which components of the 
microinsurance programme work, we 
are better equipped to modify product 
designs to increase impact. Knowing 
why the programme is beneficial also 
helps us identify settings where the 
programme can be effectively scaled 
up. Even if the insurance product is 
known to be effective, there is always 
room for product innovation that 
increases outreach and impact.
An evaluation can also provide insights 
into how a microinsurance programme 
can be improved. When there is a new 
product idea, an evaluation could 
assess the relative impact of the new 
and existing products. If there are 
competing product ideas, we can eval-
uate all of them concurrently and com-
pare the results to decide which idea 
works best.
5.2.2.2. Process improvement
Rigorous evaluations can also assess 
the effectiveness of the implementa-
tion of microinsurance schemes. Even 
the most effective insurance product 
would fail to bring positive changes in 
the absence of an effective implemen-
tation process. 
Marketing and information dissemi-
nation is a  critical component of any 
programme implementation. Recent 
RCTs suggest that this is particu-
larly important for microinsurance 
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schemes because many poor house-
holds are unfamiliar with the mech-
anisms of formal insurance. Lack of 
information on enrolment process, 
limited trust in insurance providers, 
and high premiums are found to be 
significant barriers to microinsurance 
programmes (Thornton et al. 2010; 
Cole et al. 2013). The importance of 
good marketing is also highlighted 
in a  study in rural India, which found 
that the commission structure for 
insurance marketing agents distorts 
the information provided to potential 
beneficiaries and affects their deci-
sions to purchase insurance (Anagol 
et al. 2013). Evaluations on market-
ing pitches would help us identify the 
effective strategies to provide con-
sumer protection in under-regulated 
markets and to deepen outreach. 
Finally, the lack of information on 
product details and claims procedure 
could not only affect the take-up of the 
insurance product, but also result in 
non-usage of the insurance policy con-
ditional on take-up. Providing insur-
ance education on benefit coverage 
and claims procedures, beyond typical 
marketing campaigns, may affect the 
outreach and utilisation. 
Box 1: FFH microinsurance education in Ghana (Schultz, et al., 2013)
In 2003, the Ghanaian government passed the National Health Insurance Act. This health 
insurance scheme was developed to serve as a core strategy for improving access to 
health care. Since the implementation of the act in March 2004, insurance coverage has 
quickly expanded: according to the World Health Organization (WHO), 55% of the popu-
lation had registered in the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) by 2008. However, 
insurance coverage has been much higher amongst the wealthy than amongst the poor, 
failing to reduce the disparity in access to health care.
To encourage NHIS expansion in low take-up regions, Freedom from Hunger (FFH) 
developed an education module that discusses the mechanics of the NHIS insurance 
scheme and its benefits. If the limited NHIS take-up observed in the Northern region is 
due to a lack of understanding of the insurance scheme, or general knowledge about 
health risks, FFH’s education programme may effectively increase take-up amongst 
poor households. In order to measure the impact of the education programme, a ran-
domised controlled evaluation was implemented in 2010 - 2011. 
In this evaluation, 275 existing client groups, served by a microfinance institution based 
in Tamale, were randomly assigned into three groups: 1) a treatment group in which FFH 
offered the education module in six sessions (“short”); 2) a treatment group in which 
FFH offered the education module in one consolidated session (“consolidated”), and 3) 
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a control group in which no insurance education programme was offered (“control”).2 
The evaluation measured changes in NHIS enrolment and health and financial outcomes 
over 20 months. 
The comparison across treatment and control centers revealed the following: 
• Greater knowledge of the insurance registration process in short and consolidated 
groups than in control groups 
• No significant increase in the insurance registration rate
• No change in the likelihood of health care utilisation or health insurance usage
These results suggest that the low take up of microinsurance products is not simply due 
to the barrier to information on how to enrol and process claims. 
Note that some business processes 
are simpler than others to evaluate 
in an RCT. Customer-facing business 
processes, such as marketing materi-
als, marketing incentives, and pricing, 
can be easily randomised across indi-
vidual customers or marketing agents. 
In contrast, core business processes 
that cannot be randomly varied by indi-
viduals (e.g., enrolment and claims 
procedures) may require a large sam-
ple of insurance offices. 
2 The study also tested the effect of offering a remind-
er session one year after treatment centers received 
the education modules. See Schultz, Metcalfe, and 
Gray (2013) for the full description and results of the 
study.
5.2.2.3. Demand for insurance
Assessing whether or not a  microin-
surance programme reaches its target 
population group is another important 
question. The poor may have a  very 
different willingness to pay for insur-
ance products than those with a regu-
lar flow of income (Siegel et al. 2001). 
A  small increase in the price of the 
insurance policy might result in a large 
drop in demand amongst the poor.3 
3 A  number of randomised evaluations on pricing of 
health products and services suggest that the poor 
are price sensitive to a range of health products, in-
cluding water chlorines, bed nets, and deworming 
pills (Kremer and Glennerster 2012). 
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If the local demand for insurance is 
price sensitive, the choice of premium 
would significantly affect the pro-
gramme adoption and impact. There-
fore, understanding the gradient of 
willingness to pay amongst the target 
population is useful in expanding out-
reach. The existing evidence for rainfall 
index insurance products, for example, 
suggests that the demand structure 
varies widely across contexts. On one 
hand, a study in rural India found the 
demand for the rainfall insurance to 
be low and highly price sensitive: even 
when the premium is set lower than 
the actuarially fair price, the demand 
is way below 50% (Cole et al. 2013). On 
the other hand, a study in Ghana shows 
a relatively high demand — 40-50% of 
farmers purchased the insurance at 
the actuarially fair price and a 50% sub-
sidy increases the take-up rate to 60% 
(Karlan et al. 2012).4 An evaluation of 
pricing strategies could help us under-
stand the local demand structure for 
insurance and determine whether and 
how much premiums should be subsi-
dised to improve targeting and expand 
coverage. 
4 Both of these studies used an RCT design and randomly 
assigned the premiums during the initial marketing. 
Box 2: Price sensitivity for rainfall insurance in Ghana (Karlan et al., 2012)
Underinvestment in agriculture amongst smallholder farmers has been documented 
around the world. In 2009, researchers set out to study the importance of credit con-
straint and vulnerability to weather shocks in farmers’ investment decisions in rural 
Ghana. They developed a rainfall index insurance and randomly assigned 1350 maize 
farmers to receive 1) the rainfall index insurance, 2) capital grant, or 3) the combination 
of both. Amongst those who received the insurance offer, the prices were randomised 
from one eighth of the actuarially fair price (8-9.5 GHC/acre or US$0.2) to the market 
price (14 GHC/acre). Figure 1 shows the declining demand over the offer price.
The demand for insurance is high: 42% of farmers purchased the insurance at the actu-
arially fair price (around 50% discount off of market price) and 67% purchased the insur-
ance at a 75% discount off of market price.
The demand falls quickly over the prices beyond the actuarially fair price: 11% of farm-
ers purchased the insurance at the market price. 
Further analysis reveals that the demand curve looks similar for the wealthy vs. poor 
farmers. This suggests that the lack of liquidity does not explain the steep decline in 
demand over high prices. 
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5.2.3. Take-away messages from 
this section
• Impact evaluations tell us what 
changes a  microinsurance pro-
gramme could bring to the target 
population. 
• Knowing the size and extent of the 
impact of microinsurance pro-
grammes is important for all play-
ers in the microinsurance industry.
• Evaluations of microinsurance 
designs and processes help us 
understand why the programme 
works (or does not work) and iden-
tify opportunities for product and 
process improvement.
5.3. How do we evaluate?
The fundamental question being asked 
by an impact evaluation is: how is the 
well-being of the target population dif-
ferent in the world with the microinsur-
ance programme compared to that in the 
same world without the microinsurance 
programme? This alternative world is 
called the counterfactual and is some-
thing which we do not observe. We 
cannot monitor the same household 
both with and without the microin-
surance scheme over the same time 
period. The key to designing a  good 
evaluation is creating the best possible 
The take-up of the insurance product in the following years shows that the experience 
of farmers within the close social network is an important determinant of the demand 
for insurance. 
Figure 1: Insurance Takeup by Price per Acre (Cedis)
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representation of this counterfactual. If 
we can construct a good representation 
of the counterfactual, we can infer what 
would have happened to the individuals 
and communities in the absence of the 
programme. A randomly assigned con-
trol group gets us this counterfactual.
5.3.1. Why do we need a control 
group?
A well-constructed control group gives 
us our best assessment of what would 
have happened in the absence of the 
programme. We can get a  good esti-
mate of programme impact by compar-
ing the treatment and control groups. 
Without a  control group, we could 
only observe the outcome measures 
for the microinsurance programme 
participants. We could measure out-
come changes over time amongst pro-
gramme participants, but this is prob-
lematic because there could be any 
number of other factors influencing 
their lives at any point in time. There-
fore, we cannot attribute any change 
observed amongst programme par-
ticipants to the microinsurance pro-
gramme. The example below illus-
trates this point. 
Figure 2A & 2B: Change in the proportion of community members with moneylender 
loans before and after the implementation of a microinsurance (MI) scheme
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Example: Suppose that we are interested in measuring the impact of a micro health 
insurance scheme on the likelihood of borrowing from moneylenders for health-care 
expenditures. The borrowing rate before the intervention in the sample communities 
was 45%. Twelve months after the introduction of the insurance scheme, we observed 
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5.3.2. Why do we randomise?
An ideal control group should have 
the same observable and unobserv-
able characteristics as the treatment 
group, with the exception of the pres-
ence of the microinsurance scheme. 
One frequently used approach is to use 
people who decide not to participate 
in the insurance scheme as a control 
group. However, even if the non-par-
ticipants have similar demographic 
characteristics to the programme par-
ticipants, the very fact that they choose 
not to participate in the scheme makes 
non-participants different from the 
participants. They may be exposed 
to lower levels of health risks. They 
may have different attitudes toward 
health risks and value differently the 
the borrowing rate of 30% — a  substantial reduction in the borrowing rate! Without 
a control group, we might conclude that the insurance scheme was effective in reduc-
ing the use of moneylenders. However, we cannot attribute the change in the borrow-
ing rate to the insurance scheme because there are many other things that happened 
to the insurance beneficiaries in the same time period and might have influenced the 
use of moneylenders. The government might have increased its spending on health, 
which made the health care less expensive. New microfinance programmes might 
have improved access to credit, reducing the demand for moneylender loans. Or there 
could have been a steady improvement in health conditions in the communities, which 
resulted in a lower demand for health care. All of these factors could potentially reduce 
the borrowing rate. If we only observe the outcome measures for insurance beneficiar-
ies, the effect of the insurance scheme is unclear.
Now, suppose we had a control group of communities that had similar characteristics 
with the treatment communities but did not receive the microinsurance scheme. The 
baseline borrowing rate in the control group was also 45%. If we observe a  similar 
decrease in the borrowing rate amongst the control communities over the 12-month 
period, the 33% decrease in the borrowing rate in the treatment communities must be 
due to something that affected both treatment and control communities rather than the 
insurance scheme (figure 2A). On the other hand, if we observe no or only little change 
in the borrowing rate of the control communities, we are more certain that the insur-
ance scheme caused the reduction in the borrowing rate, given that the only difference 
between the treatment and control communities was the presence of the microinsur-
ance scheme (figure 2B). 
The presence of a valid control group helps us weed out the non-programme effects and 
isolate the programme impact. Without a control group representing what would have 
happened in the absence of the programme, we cannot disentangle the effect of the 
programme from other concurrent factors affecting programme participants. 
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long-term health benefits. If these 
potential differences exist between 
participants and non-participants, we 
can no longer attribute the observed 
differences in outcomes between the 
treatment and control groups to the 
microinsurance scheme alone.
The advantage of randomised con-
trolled trials is that they can construct 
groups that have no observed or unob-
served differences on average.5 When 
individuals or communities are ran-
domly assigned to treatment and con-
trol groups, so long as we have a rea-
sonably large group of people, we can 
expect the average characteristics 
of both groups (such as income level, 
health risks, and attitude and beliefs 
toward health care) to be similar. We 
can also expect that the two groups 
face an equal probability of encoun-
tering external events (such as policy 
changes and natural disasters). Thus, 
any difference between the two groups 
is then the presence of the microinsur-
ance scheme. Any difference observed 
5 Bauchet and Morduch (2010) provide an analytical frame-
work with more technical details on randomisation. 
over time between the groups can be 
attributed to the insurance scheme.
5.3.3. Ethical considerations
Ethical considerations for evaluations 
are twofold. If we are uncertain about 
the true effect of access to insurance 
on the poor, it could be unethical to 
scale up the insurance programmes. 
After all, those are funds that could 
be used for other interventions that 
are known to have some benefit, so 
there is always an ethical trade-off 
between conducting research to mea-
sure impact and using those funds to 
provide more services. The trade-off 
depends greatly on how much knowl-
edge we already have about the inter-
vention and the alternatives, and how 
many resources will be allocated in 
the future based on the results of the 
research. The only way to ensure that 
a programme has the intended impact 
on the target population is by conduct-
ing a rigorous evaluation. 
There are several other ethical con-
cerns frequently raised with ran-
domised controlled evaluations: 
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• Randomly denying access to microin-
surance scheme is unfair
Microinsurance schemes, and devel-
opment programmes in general, are 
operating under limited-resource set-
tings. Allocation of public programmes 
and selection of beneficiaries are often 
influenced by political factors (e.g., 
national insurance policies may be 
more accessible for politically con-
nected individuals). If the available 
resources permit the programme to 
reach only a  certain number of the 
poor, randomisation may actually be 
the fairest approach for selecting ben-
eficiaries. Clearly this depends on the 
specific context, but one fact is typ-
ically true: firms, government and 
non-profits have limited resources, 
and an evaluation that embraces the 
true constraint of the organisation but 
finds a way to allocate randomly does 
not lead to a  reduction in individuals 
receiving services. Rather, it just allo-
cates the service in a way that allows 
for an evaluation. Naturally this is not 
true when resources or the ability to 
offer a service are truly unconstrained. 
In such situations, RCTs typically use 
encouragement designs (see Section 
5.4.) in order to avoid having to deny 
access to a  service to any individual 
who comes forward and asks for it.
• The need for insurance is urgent: 
holding back the implementation is 
unethical
Holding back the programme imple-
mentation is only unethical when its 
positive impact is known relative to 
other alternatives, and when further 
research will not help direct future 
resources any better.
• RCTs are costly—the money spent on 
the evaluation could be used to serve 
more people 
This is a common misperception. Con-
ducting household surveys is costly, 
but conducting a  randomised con-
trolled trial is not, i.e., the decision to 
randomise versus not randomise is 
not a  costly one. In fact, randomising 
assignment is often cheaper than not 
randomising assignment, holding all 
else constant. The costs of evaluation 
range widely depending on the types of 
outcomes measured, expected effect 
sizes, and other factors related to the 
evaluation design. A  rigorous evalua-
tion should be considered as an invest-
ment for greater impact of future pro-
grammes. It is more costly to continue 
offering an ineffective programme 
than to invest in a rigorous evaluation 
and improve programme impact in the 
long term. 
5.3.4. Take-away messages from 
this section
• To assess the impact of a  pro-
gramme, or a  relative impact of 
two or more programmes, we need 
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to construct a  valid control group 
that would tell us what would have 
happened in the absence of the 
programme.
• The best way to construct a  valid 
control group is to randomly assign 
individuals, households, or com-
munities to treatment and control 
groups. By its construction, ran-
domisation ensures that treatment 
and control groups are statistically 
comparable. 
5.4. Designing randomised 
controlled trials
A common mistake in designing a pro-
gramme evaluation is to consider eval-
uation as an activity that takes place 
after a programme is completed. Plan-
ning an evaluation after programme 
completion is problematic. Firstly, the 
remaining participants at the end of 
the programme are not representative 
of the target population. Secondly, it 
is hard to identify a comparison group 
that looked just like the programme 
participants before the intervention. 
Because these challenges are diffi-
cult to address in the post-intervention 
analysis, the evaluation design needs 
to be built into the programme design. 
In this section, we will go through the 
process of designing a  randomised 
controlled evaluation.
5.4.1. Identifying a problem and 
potential solutions 
Development programmes are typ-
ically designed to address market 
failures. Designs evolve over time 
depending on the response from 
potential beneficiaries and implement-
ing agencies. But how do we iden-
tify the right programme designs and 
potential solutions to improve existing 
programmes?6
Existing knowledge of programme 
design and impact is always a  good 
place to start. There is an increasing 
number of RCTs on microinsurance 
programmes. These evaluations that 
explain why the programme worked 
could provide insight into key features 
of an effective product design. The 
input from the management, the imple-
mentation staff, or expert research-
ers can also help identify problems 
6 Burns and Dalal (2010) document the process of design-
ing an insurance product in India in the aftermath of tsu-
nami in 2004. 
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and potential solutions specific to the 
setting.
In addition, qualitative data can be 
useful when searching for potential 
solutions and brainstorming ideas for 
product innovation. Interviews with 
non-enrolees could help identify exist-
ing barriers to accessing insurance. 
Focus group discussions with enrolees 
can help reveal the needs of the poten-
tial beneficiaries and what they value 
about the insurance. Enrolee satisfac-
tion surveys may also point to product 
features that need reassessment. Note 
that the qualitative data would not give 
you clear answers to the questions 
on the programme impact. However, 
it provides information on how peo-
ple perceive the values of insurance 
and existing products — an important 
insight for product innovation. 
5.4.2. Piloting the intervention 
ideas
Once a potential solution is identified, 
the new programme design needs to 
be tested in a  small-scale pilot. The 
purpose of the pilot test is to ensure 
the operational feasibility of the new 
programme. The pilot phase allows 
the implementer to solve problems 
with the implementation procedure 
and modify it as needed so that the full-
scale evaluation will not be affected by 
unexpected operational glitches. When 
operational problems arise during the 
full-scale implementation, they may 
hinder delivery of the programme as 
designed. As a  result, the evaluation 
may not be able to accurately measure 
the impact of the programme. It is 
therefore critical to work out the kinks 
of the operational details before imple-
menting a full-scale evaluation. 
The length of the pilot phase depends 
on the complexity of the programme 
implementation and operational tar-
get set by the implementing agency. If 
the implementing agency has a target 
to achieve a  certain level of outreach 
within a short period of time, extend-
ing the small-scale pilot may not be 
favorable. However, it is important to 
remember that changing the imple-
mentation procedure or programme 
design after the launch of the full-
scale evaluation could affect the 
scope of the evaluation analysis and 
limit what can be concluded from the 
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evaluation. The evaluators and imple-
menting agency should ensure that all 
operational issues are resolved before 
moving on to the full-scale evaluation 
implementation. 
5.4.3. Selecting impact indicators
After all the operational issues are 
resolved in the programme pilot, 
there are several steps to take before 
launching the full-scale evaluation. 
Firstly, the implementing organisation 
selects a  set of impact indicators as 
main outcome measures. In any devel-
opment programme, the ultimate goal 
is to improve the well-being of pro-
gramme beneficiaries. Ideally, the out-
come measures should capture differ-
ent stages and mechanisms through 
which the intervention works. By 
selecting a set of indicators that reflect 
each of these potential impact mecha-
nisms, the evaluation can assess why 
a  particular insurance product works 
better than others. Piecing out differ-
ent mechanisms of the microinsurance 
scheme can help identify the strong/
weak impact channels and areas for 
product or process innovation in the 
future. 
5.4.4. Selecting a sample frame 
and sample size
For every RCT it is necessary to select 
a sample frame — the pool of all poten-
tial “objects” to be included in the study 
— before implementing the programme. 
These can consist of individuals or an 
entity of units like households and com-
munities. When selecting the evaluation 
sample frame, you should consider the 
following questions: Who is the micro-
insurance scheme designed for? Would 
the impact be different for different pop-
ulation groups (by gender, age, income 
level, or geographic region)? Is there any 
interest in measuring the programme 
impact for a particular segment of pop-
ulation? Donors are often interested in 
measuring programme impact for the 
poorest households. Then, you might 
define the target sample for the evalua-
tion by the poverty status of households 
and communities.
The final sample size (i.e., the number 
of observations to be included in both 
treatment and control group) depends 
on a  number of parameters, including 
the expected effect sizes (i.e., the mag-
nitude of the expected impact) of main 
outcome indicators and take-up rate 
of the insurance product. Statistically, 
smaller impacts are more difficult to 
detect. Suppose we observe a  1% dif-
ference in the household expenditure in 
health between treatment and control 
groups. The probability that this differ-
ence is caused by the programme and 
not by random error or chance would 
be smaller than when we observe 
a 10% difference in the same outcome 
between the same treatment and con-
trol groups. To detect a 1% reduction in 
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household expenditure, the evaluation 
needs a  relatively large sample com-
pared to detecting a 10% reduction. Or 
to put in other words: If we want to be 
sure that very small changes we observe 
have actually been caused by the insur-
ance, we would have to observe the 
same very small change for lots of peo-
ple. Similarly, if the insurance take-up 
is low, the initial sample size needs to 
be large because the number of people 
who will experience the direct impact of 
the insurance scheme is smaller. The 
sample size also depends on how fre-
quently the outcome event occurs. Sup-
pose the insurance benefits only cover 
rare events. There would be few peo-
ple in the sample who face those rare 
events and have the opportunity to use 
the insurance policy during the evalu-
ation period. In such case, the evalua-
tion needs a larger sample size for the 
same reason that the evaluation of a low 
take-up programme needs a large sam-
ple. Once these parameters are esti-
mated, the evaluator can calculate the 
sample size needed to detect a  given 
effect size using statistical methods. 
Similarly, for a  given sample size and 
a defined significance criterion, one can 
calculate the minimum effect size that 
can be measured. All these processes 
are called “power calculation”. 
5.4.5. Randomisation
Many critics of randomised controlled 
evaluations argue that randomly 
assigning programme offers is often 
infeasible in reality. It might be polit-
ically difficult to randomise access 
to the government insurance pro-
grammes. The insurance policy that 
covers families cannot be randomised 
across members within the household. 
Whilst a randomised approach is cer-
tainly not feasible in every setting of 
development programme evaluation, 
there are many randomisation tech-
niques that could resolve operational 
challenges. 
5.4.5.1. Encouragement design
In a basic form of RCT, the treatment 
group receives an intervention and the 
control group is withheld from receiv-
ing the intervention. Under the encour-
agement design, the treatment group 
receives an “encouragement” to enrol 
in a programme. The control group can 
also participate, but does not receive 
any encouragement. The examples of 
an encouragement include additional 
marketing materials, a visit by a mar-
keting agent, or financial incentives 
to enrol in a microinsurance scheme. 
Naturally, we expect the group receiv-
ing the encouragement to have a higher 
enrolment rate in the programme. 
This difference in the programme 
enrolment is used to estimate the pro-
gramme impact. The encouragement 
design is particularly useful when 
withholding the intervention from the 
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control group poses an ethical concern 
or a logistical difficulty.
5.4.5.2. Phase-in design
When the implementing agency has 
a  constraint in rolling out the pro-
gramme at once, the randomisation 
will determine the order of interven-
tion implementation, rather than who 
receives the intervention. The individ-
uals randomised to receive the inter-
vention later in time serve as a  con-
trol group. This method is particularly 
useful when evaluating a nationwide or 
region-wide programme where with-
holding a programme for an undefined 
period of time is not feasible, but the 
capacity for implementation is limited. 
5.4.5.3. Cluster randomisation
There are many evaluation settings in 
which individual-level randomisation is 
not practical. Many insurance schemes 
cover all members of the house-
hold, thus individuals from the same 
household must be assigned to the 
same group. Similarly, when a micro-
insurance scheme is introduced to 
selected households in a  community, 
others often quickly find out, creating 
an operational challenge to keep the 
insurance from control households in 
the same community. The unit of ran-
domisation can be adjusted depending 
on the evaluation setting. Individuals, 
households, communities, and schools 
are some of the most commonly used 
units of randomisation, but any clus-
ter of target individuals can be treated 
as one unit of observation and receive 
the same random assignment as long 
as the number of randomisation units 
satisfies the power calculation. (Power 
calculations must account for the clus-
tered design.)
5.4.6. Things to be considered7
5.4.6.1. Externalities
Externalities (or spillover effects) refer 
to indirect effects of a  programme 
on non-programme participants. For 
example, access to a  microinsurance 
scheme could have unintended con-
sequences for the non-participants. If 
enough number of programme par-
ticipants in the treatment group, start 
withdrawing from informal insurance 
arrangements, the informal insur-
ance mechanism in a community may 
no longer function. Thus, non-par-
ticipants in the control group may 
end up without any insurance — this 
is a  “negative spillover effect” of the 
microinsurance programme. On the 
other hand, a  health microinsurance 
programme might improve the health 
status and capacity for economic activ-
ities amongst the participants. If they 
7 For a  technical discussion of methodological issues 
around randomised evaluations, see Duflo et al. (2008). 
Goldberg and Karlan (2007) also offer a  comprehensive 
discussion on methodological issues of randomised eval-
uations in the context of microfinance.
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remain engaged in the informal insur-
ance arrangements, non-participants 
might benefit from stronger safety 
nets – this would be a “positive spillover 
effect” of the programme. If non-par-
ticipants who are affected by the spill-
over effect (positively or negatively) 
are in the control group, programme 
impact cannot be accurately measured 
by comparing the treatment and con-
trol groups. Take the example given 
above with the informal insurance 
arrangements. If the negative spillover 
effect described above occurred and 
non-participants were not able to use 
informal insurance arrangements any-
more, for both the treatment and con-
trol group the use of informal insur-
ance arrangements would be reduced 
(let us say by 30% for the treatment 
group and by 20 % for the control 
group). For the treatment group, this 
would be due to the use of microinsur-
ance. For the control group, this would 
be due to the breakdown of informal 
insurance structures, a  development 
which is also based on the introduction 
of the microinsurance programme. 
Thus, both effects would be due to the 
microinsurance programme. However, 
when comparing the results of treat-
ment and control group, one would 
only look at the difference between the 
two effects and interpret this as result 
of the mciroinsurance programme for 
the treatment group (i.e., a  reduction 
of 10%). Since the control group is not 
participating in the programme, one 
would assume a  zero effect for this 
group (which is in fact the basis of the 
calculations). But in reality, it would 
have been a  reduction of 30% for the 
treatment group and a reduction of 20 
% for the control group. 
The simplest way to minimise the 
spillover effect amongst the control 
group is to employ cluster randomi-
sation. In the example of informal 
insurance arrangements above, clus-
ter randomisation at the community 
level could prevent the negative spill-
over from affecting the control group 
because everyone in the same com-
munity receives the same assignment. 
More generally, cluster randomisation 
reduces the risk of spillover effect on 
the control group by treating a  group 
of people who may affect each other 
through the intervention as one unit of 
randomisation and give everyone in the 
group the same assignment. 
In some cases, we are also interested 
in measuring spillover effects amongst 
non-participants as part of programme 
impact. Because insurance providers 
in the formal sector would not gener-
ally enrol everyone in the community 
where they enter, how the introduction 
of formal insurance affects vulnera-
bility of non-participants is in itself an 
important question. In a  cluster ran-
domisation design, we can measure 
the spillover effect by comparing the 
outcomes between non-participants 
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in the treatment group and potential 
non-participants in the control group 
— the trick is to identify potential 
non-participants in the control group 
who look just like the non-participants 
in the treatment group. For example, if 
there is a  clear and observable eligi-
bility criteria for the programme, out-
come comparison of non-eligible indi-
viduals between treatment and control 
groups could capture the spillover 
effect. 
We emphasise the importance of iden-
tifying potential spillover effects before 
implementing an evaluation because 
they can cause potential biases on 
impact estimation. A small pilot of the 
intervention could often help identify 
the potential spillover effects and sim-
ple solutions that can be incorporated 
into the evaluation design. 
5.4.6.2. Contamination of random 
assignment
One of the biggest methodological 
threats to RCTs is the potential con-
tamination of random assignment. 
However, sometimes contamination is 
actually a good thing to have, as long 
as one is aware of its possibility and 
measures it. If the contamination is 
natural, i.e., a  result of externalities 
from the intervention, then this is part 
of what one ideally sets up the evalua-
tion to measure. Random assignment 
of the intervention is essential to rig-
orous evaluations because it creates 
statistically comparable groups that 
have on average the same observed 
and unobserved characteristics. When 
this assignment is contaminated (i.e., 
people in the control group receive the 
treatment), our estimate of the effect 
of the programme could no longer 
be accurate if not taken into account. 
Contamination may happen because 
of the information spillover to the con-
trol group. A  lack of supervision and 
operational error could also result in 
contamination. Again, there are ana-
lytical methods that adjust for any 
contamination of random assignment, 
but the estimation would become less 
precise. The evaluators and imple-
menting organisation should make 
every effort to minimise contamina-
tion through proper monitoring of the 
implementation. 
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5.4.6.3. Sample attrition
Sample attrition becomes problem-
atic in RCTs when individuals who drop 
out of the study in the treatment and 
control groups are systematically dif-
ferent. Suppose that the presence of 
a microinsurance programme in rural 
communities discourages migration 
amongst the poor by reducing vulner-
ability to economic shocks. When the 
researchers follow up with the indi-
viduals in the sample after a year, they 
find that a large proportion of the poor 
in the control group has migrated to 
unknown locations and cannot be inter-
viewed. In another case, the sample 
for the follow-up survey in the control 
group could be systematically wealth-
ier than that in the treatment group. 
Because the impact of the microinsur-
ance programme on the wealthy may 
be different from the impact on the 
poor, the comparison between the two 
groups no longer gives an accurate 
estimate of the average programme 
impact. 
The impact estimate can be adjusted 
in the analysis if the factors that 
explain the differential attrition are 
known and measurable. For exam-
ple, if we knew who in the treatment 
group would have migrated away, had 
the microinsurance programme not 
been offered, we could remove them 
from the analysis sample and estimate 
the programme impact amongst those 
who would have stayed in the commu-
nity in the absence of the intervention. 
The estimated impact here is not the 
average effect of the microinsurance 
programme amongst the entire initial 
sample frame. However, it gives us an 
unbiased impact estimate for a partic-
ular population group. 
In reality, explaining the differential 
attrition between treatment and con-
trol groups is not easy. In order to 
minimise the attrition problem, it is 
useful to collect additional contact 
information (on neighbours, relatives 
in the home province, etc.) from the 
study participants before intervention. 
Note that not all sample attritions pose 
a threat to the validity of the evaluation. 
If the intervention does not affect the 
likelihood of remaining in the study at 
the end of the evaluation period, the 
comparison between the treatment 
and control groups gives an accurate 
estimate of the programme effect. 
5.4.6.4. Presence of other NGO and 
government programmes
Whilst random assignment ensures 
that the treatment and control groups 
are balanced before programme 
implementation, there is always 
a small chance that other policies and 
programmes affect treatment and con-
trol groups differently during the pro-
gramme implementation. When these 
external interventions are relevant 
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to the programme being evaluated, it 
threatens the integrity of the evalua-
tion design. For example, other insur-
ance providers may decide to enter 
the market and offer similar insurance 
products to individuals in our evalu-
ation sample. The evaluation can still 
tell us the marginal impact of one addi-
tional insurance provider as long as the 
aggregate insurance coverage in the 
treatment group is higher than the cov-
erage in the control group. In fact, given 
increasing competition in the micro-
insurance market, it is difficult to find 
a setting where there is a large enough 
demand for microinsurance and where 
we can plausibly expect no insurance 
provider, other than the programme 
being evaluated, to enter whilst the 
evaluation takes place. Whilst we need 
to recognise that the interpretation of 
the marginal impact of one additional 
microinsurance programme is dif-
ferent from that of expanding access 
to microinsurance, it is still a  useful 
question for microinsurance providers 
to learn about the marginal impact that 
their programmes can make.
5.4.7. Data collection and analysis
5.4.7.1. Data collection
In a  typical RCT, the evaluator col-
lects both baseline and follow-up data. 
Baseline data, however, is not strictly 
necessary in RCT. The random assign-
ment of intervention ensures that the 
treatment and control groups have 
comparable characteristics — this 
is an assumption we could make as 
long as the proper randomisation was 
carried out. That said, there are three 
advantages to collecting baseline data. 
Firstly, baseline data can be used to 
validate randomisation and ensure the 
balance across treatment and control 
groups. Even though we expect the 
proper randomisation to create com-
parable treatment and control groups, 
there is always a  small chance that 
something goes wrong. It is reassur-
ing to be able to confirm the balance 
between the treatment and control 
groups in the data. Secondly, baseline 
data allows the evaluator to compare 
the change in an outcome measure 
over time, rather than the level of an 
outcome measured after the pro-
gramme implementation. Comparison 
of the change in an outcome captures 
the programme impact more precisely. 
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Finally, baseline data allows the evalu-
ator to explore differential programme 
impacts for various population groups. 
For instance, to compare the pro-
gramme impact amongst the poor and 
non-poor, the evaluator needs the data 
on the poverty status before the pro-
gramme implementation.
Basic outcome measures, such as 
demographic information and insur-
ance take-up, could be collected from 
insurance providers and implement-
ing organisations. When assessing 
the impact of insurance on house-
hold well-being, however, additional 
data may need to be collected through 
field interviews. Ideally, these field 
interviews are conducted by a  third 
party which is not involved in pro-
gramme implementation. Separating 
implementation and survey activities 
ensures that the collected data is not 
affected by people’s expectations on 
what services and products they might 
receive in the future from the imple-
menting organisation. 
5.4.7.2. Analysis
One advantage of RCTs is the simplic-
ity of its analytical framework. When 
there is no methodological issue aris-
ing during programme implementa-
tion (such as contamination of ran-
dom assignment and spillover), the 
programme impact can be measured 
by simple comparisons of outcome 
measures between treatment and con-
trol groups. The statistical test tells us 
the likelihood that we observe the mean 
difference between the treatment and 
control groups by luck (rather than the 
programme). When this likelihood is 
small enough (< 5 - 10%), we call the 
result “statistically significant”. 
Note that this comparison must be 
conducted between everyone in the 
treatment group and everyone in the 
control group regardless of who actu-
ally enroled in the insurance scheme 
and dropped out. The point of random 
assignment was to create two statisti-
cally comparable groups. If we select 
different groups of individuals from the 
treatment and control groups for the 
analysis (e.g., only those who remained 
in the insurance scheme in the treat-
ment group vs. everyone in the control 
group; only those who ever enroled in 
the insurance scheme in the treatment 
group vs. those who never enroled in 
the insurance scheme in the control 
group), the two groups are no longer 
comparable. 
5.4.8. Take-away messages from 
this section
• Evaluations must be planned before 
the programme implementation and 
incorporated in the implementation 
so that the methodological issues 
can be addressed in the implemen-
tation design.
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• Pilot the intervention before con-
ducting the evaluation and resolve 
all operational issues.
• Randomised controlled designs can 
be adjusted to the constraints of 
operational settings and feasibility. 
• Close monitoring of the evaluation 
implementation is critical in mini-
mising the methodological issues 
that may arise during the imple-
mentation and preserving the power 
to detect programme effects.
• Analysis must be conducted with the 
entire evaluation sample regardless 
of the actual intervention outreach.
5.5. Summary
The microinsurance industry contin-
ues to evolve through product inno-
vation and process improvement. 
Rigorous evaluations of existing and 
innovative insurance schemes play an 
important role in guiding the indus-
try to develop schemes that are more 
effective and sustainable. The typi-
cal evaluation method that compares 
the well-being of participants before 
and after enrolment in the insurance 
scheme, has a number of methodolog-
ical problems in accurately measuring 
the programme impact. Randomised 
controlled trials are an effective tool 
to measure the exact impact of micro-
insurance schemes and inform the 
industry about potential product and 
process innovation. RCT designs are 
flexible and adjustable to specific 
operational and budgetary constraints 
as well as ethical concerns. 
Whilst the RCT methodology is increas-
ingly employed in evaluations of devel-
opment projects around the world, 
there have been few RCTs on micro-
insurance schemes. The replication of 
RCTs in various settings is critical to 
accumulate knowledge of what works 
and what doesn’t. Whilst individual 
evaluations provide useful informa-
tion for the microinsurance providers 
whose products are being evaluated, 
the replication of evaluations would 
benefit the microinsurance industry as 
a whole. By testing the impact of insur-
ance products in different contexts, we 
will gain better understanding of effec-
tive product designs and distribution 
mechanisms in various settings, or 
why and when a  particular insurance 
product works. This accumulation of 
knowledge could effectively acceler-
ate the innovation and expansion of 
microinsurance.
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6.1. Introduction
The ultimate objective of quantita-
tive analysis is to establish causality. 
Researchers want to know the causal 
influence of a  factor—the effect that 
can be attributed to this factor and to 
the factor only. Done correctly, quanti-
tative analysis allows both quantifying 
the magnitude of this causal effect and 
computing statistical precision of esti-
mation (confidence intervals). The goal 
of an impact evaluation is to measure 
the causal effect of a policy reform or 
intervention on a  set of well-defined 
outcome variables.
Knowing causal relationships is use-
ful for making predictions about the 
consequences of changing policies or 
circumstances; they answer the ques-
tion of what would happen in alter-
native (counterfactual) worlds. As an 
example, one could try to identify the 
causal effect of introducing a commu-
nity-based health insurance on health 
status or on out-of-pocket spending for 
health of the insured in a specific dis-
trict of a developing country. 
6.2. Selection bias and 
comparison issues
The fundamental problem of impact 
evaluation is the impossibility of 
observing an individual in two states 
at a  moment in time; each individ-
ual is either in the programme under 
consideration or not, but not both. The 
impact of a  development programme 
can only be identified by comparing 
realised outcomes of those who did 
receive and of those who did not receive 
an intervention. Thus, data on non-par-
ticipating individuals needs to be col-
lected as well. The issue of selection 
bias is of central concern in this con-
text: selection bias may arise when 
treated and non-treated individuals 
are different with respect to observed 
and unobserved characteristics. One 
reason could be for example, a  proj-
ect manager who deliberately chooses 
some individuals to be eligible for the 
programme but not others. Another 
important source for selection bias 
is self-selection, i.e., when individuals 
themselves choose to be treated or not. 
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Thus, any impact evaluation should be 
based on a detailed understanding about 
why some individuals or communities 
participated, whilst others did not par-
ticipate in the programme; otherwise, 
results are likely to be biased.
Box 1: Potential outcomes and objects of interest
To make ideas more precise, let  denote the outcome if individual or community i  is 
exposed to development intervention D. Before programme start, each individual (or 
community) has two hypothetical outcomes: a potential outcome  if individual i partici-
pates in the programme, and a potential outcome  if individual i does not participate 
in the programme. The causal effect of the intervention is defined as the difference 
between  and , i.e., the effect of participation in the programme relative to what 
would have happened had individual i not participated in the programme. The individual 
effect of the intervention is usually averaged over the population of interest, defined 
as the average treatment effect . It can be interpreted as the average treat-
ment effect for a person randomly drawn from the population or, alternatively, as the 
expected change in the average outcome if the individual status indicator variable of 
development intervention D were changed from 0 to 1 for every individual (provided that 
no general equilibrium effects occur), where individual i either receives (D=1) or does 
not receive (D=0) the treatment. In a policy evaluation context of particular interest is 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) defined as . It may be 
more informative to know how the programme affected those who chose to participate 
in it than how it affected those who could have participated but decided not to.
One way to avoid selection bias is to 
randomly assign individuals to a treat-
ment and a  control group. We refer 
to randomised trials as methods that 
randomly assign individuals who are 
equally eligible and willing to partici-
pate into distinct groups; they are gen-
erally considered the most robust of all 
evaluation methodologies and some-
times referred to as the gold standard 
(Angrist 2004). Given appropriate sam-
ple sizes, the two groups will have 
approximately the same character-
istics and differ only in terms of the 
treatment status. They will be approx-
imately equal with respect to variables 
like race, sex, and age, and also for 
difficult to measure variables, such as 
lifestyle-related risks, quality of social 
networks, and health awareness.
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In practice, there are several problems 
with randomisation. Firstly, it may be 
unethical to deny access to benefits for 
a  subgroup of individuals.1 Secondly, 
it may be politically unfeasible to ran-
domly deny access to a potentially ben-
eficial intervention. Thirdly, there may 
not be any individuals who are unaf-
fected if the scope of the programme 
is nationwide. Fourthly, problems arise 
when, after randomised assignment, 
individuals cross over to the treatment 
group. For example, people might 
travel to another municipality to buy 
insurance after having learned that 
a microfinance institution offers a new 
life insurance scheme there. Fifthly, 
individuals assigned to the treatment 
1  For a discussion see Burtless and Orr (1986).
group may not take up treatment, or 
individuals assigned to the control 
group may seek similar treatment 
through alternative channels.
Sometimes, randomised trials are 
impractical. However, impact evalua-
tions are most valuable when we use 
data to answer specific causal ques-
tions as if in a  randomised controlled 
trial. In absence of an experiment, we 
may look for a natural or quasi-exper-
iment that mimics a  randomised trial 
in that there is a group affected by the 
programme and some control group 
that is not affected. If it is credible to 
argue that the groups do not differ sys-
tematically, such a natural or quasi-ex-
periment can be used for evaluation 
instead of a  randomised experiment. 
Box 2: How randomisation eliminates selection bias
Randomisation allows a simple interpretation of results: the impact is measured by the 
difference in means between treatment and control group. Why is this so? With ran-
domisation, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be written as
ATT= .
Thus, randomisation allows replacing the expected (unobserved) counterfactual 
outcome, , with the expected observed outcome of the non-participants, 
. Essentially,  is used to mimic the counterfactual. Because of 
randomised assignment, it holds that , i.e., the expected non-
programme participation outcome is the same whether an individual actually partici-
pates or does not participate in the programme. This last equality usually does not hold 
in non-experimental studies. Individuals have, for example, a better non-programme 
participation outcome if there is positive selection into the treatment (“they would have 
done better anyway”). This would lead to upward biased results. 
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Unfortunately, it is often hard to justify 
that programmes that were not ex-ante 
planned as randomised experiments 
do in fact fulfill this criteria. This is why 
it is preferable to think about evalua-
tion and the appropriate design before 
the programme is implemented.
In non-experimental studies, research-
ers often try to approximate a  ran-
domised experiment by using statisti-
cal methods. We will discuss several 
non-experimental methods in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. The issue of selec-
tion bias is of central concern here. 
Rather complex statistical methods are 
required in order to deal with selec-
tion bias when using non-experimental 
data. The methods differ in the way they 
correct for differences in (observed and 
unobserved) characteristics between 
the treatment and the control group 
and by their underlying assumptions.2
Two non-experimental methods—dif-
ferences in means and before-after 
estimation (also called reflexive com-
parisons)—usually do not give a satis-
factory solution to the selection issue 
when using non-experimental data. 
In general, this is because changes in 
the outcomes cannot be attributed to 
the programme. The former method, 
differences in means, is based on 
cross-sectional data using the out-
come of the non-participants to impute 
2 For a more general and accessible introduction to impact 
evaluation see further Leeuw and Vaessen (2009).
the counterfactual outcome for the 
participants. The underlying assump-
tion is that individual characteristics, 
on average, do not play a  role for the 
difference between the treated and 
the non-treated, which is a  strong 
assumption. The latter method, the 
before-after estimator, is based on 
(at least) two cross-sections of data—
one cross-section before programme 
start and one cross-section after the 
programme. It uses the participants’ 
pre-intervention outcome to impute the 
counterfactual outcome for the partici-
pants. The drawback of this method is 
that it is impossible to separate pro-
gramme effects from general effects 
that occurred during the same period. 
Throughout this chapter, a hypothetical 
example will display the different evalu-
ation methods. By use of a microinsur-
ance example for inpatient and outpa-
tient hospital visits, we will explain the 
main concepts to determine the effect of 
this insurance on our outcome variable: 
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number of hospital visits. This example 
can then be generalised to any other 
insurance and outcome of interest.
Figure 1 displays the impact health 
insurance has on the number of hos-
pital visits. At time t=0, the microinsur-
ance for inpatient and outpatient ser-
vices in a nearby hospital is introduced 
in our village. At that point of time the 
villagers visit the hospital 1.5 times 
a  year on average. At time t=1, the 
number of hospital visits has increased 
to 3.5 visits per year (blue line). Without 
the introduction of microinsurance, the 
frequency would have increased to 2.5 
times only (dotted red line). As we will 
explain, the outcome 2.5 constitutes 
the counterfactual outcome. Thus, the 
(true) impact of the microinsurance 
scheme is 1 hospital visit per year.
Figure 1: Real impact of 
microinsurance on hospital visits
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Hypothetical Impact of Microinsurance
The cross-sectional comparison by dif-
ference in means is our starting point 
for the impact evaluation. Hereby, we 
compare two villages at t=1, where it 
so happens that in the treatment vil-
lage microinsurance is available. If the 
inhabitants from this village buy a pol-
icy, they can make claims to the insurer 
after a hospital visit. Inhabitants from 
the control village do not have this 
opportunity and need to pay the total 
hospital bill from their own money. 
In a  cross-sectional comparison we 
directly compare the hospital visits of 
the treated and untreated groups. 
Figure 2 displays the naïve estima-
tor of the treatment effect using 
a  cross-sectional comparison. The 
treatment village has 3.5 hospital visits 
a  year per person on average, where 
village 2 has only two visits per year. 
The naïve estimator is simply the dif-
ference between those two outcomes, 
which is 1.5, a  biased estimate of the 
treatment effect.
It is obvious that the effect might be 
partially attributable to the availability 
of a health insurance, but it cannot be 
ruled out that other reasons have also 
affected this result.
1. Were the two villages different from 
the outset? Different in observables 
like wealth, education, or different 
in unobservables such as trust in 
hospital staff?
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2. Has one of the villages had other 
influences that might affect the 
number of hospital visits? The road 
leading to the hospital might have 
been blocked for village 2, hinder-
ing people from visiting the hospital 
and leading to an overestimation of 
our treatment effect.
Myriad scenarios can be constructed 
to answer these two questions. 
According to our example from figure 
1, however, an actual comparable con-
trol village should have 2.5 hospital 
visits per year in t=1. This shows that 
using cross-sectional comparison, 
the impact evaluator cannot be sure 
whether the effect of microinsurance 
on hospital visits results only from the 
availability of microinsurance or also 
from other confounding factors.
Another naïve estimator would be the 
before-after comparison. Here, we need 
to conduct a baseline survey amongst 
the population of the treatment village 
(shortly) before the microinsurance is 
made available. We would ask explic-
itly how often a  week the inhabitants 
go to the hospital.3 Then the insurance 
is made available and after a  certain 
period of time the same survey ques-
tions are gathered again from the vil-
lage. Of course, the time between the 
introduction of the microinsurance and 
the follow-up survey needs to be long 
enough for certain incidences of sick-
ness and claims to occur. As depicted 
in figure 3, the estimated impact of our 
hypothetical insurance is the differ-
ence between the number of hospital 
3 Of course, it might be more reliable to gather this infor-
mation directly from the hospital: “How many inhabitants 
from village 1 visit the hospital a week?”
Figure 2: Cross-sectional comparison 
village with insurance village without insurance
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
H
o
s
p
it
a
l 
v
is
it
s
 p
e
r 
ye
a
r
118
visits before and after introduction, 
which is two hospital visits per year. 
The interpretation would be that intro-
ducing microinsurance that covers the 
cost of inpatient and outpatient care 
increases the number of hospital visits 
by two visits per year. 
However, this estimator relies on the 
important assumption that, in between 
our two surveys, no other factors have 
occurred that might cause a  change 
in hospital visits. This means that, for 
the before-and-after estimator to pro-
duce reliable results, our researcher 
must be sure no other confounding 
effects have occurred between the 
two surveys. In fact, figure 1 shows 
that without microinsurance there still 
would have been an upwards trend 
in hospital visits and that, therefore, 
our before-after comparison deliv-
ers unreliable results. Reasons for an 
upwards trend in hospital visits inde-
pendent of the treatment could be 
increases in prosperity, decreases in 
transportation costs, and many other 
scenarios.
In sections 6.3 through 6.6 of this chap-
ter, the following four non-experimen-
tal approaches will be explained: 
1. Instrumental variables 
2. Regression discontinuity design 
(RDD)
3. Propensity score matching (PSM) 
4. Difference-in-differences (DID) 
Amongst them, the first two 
approaches, if applicable, usually give 
the most convincing results. We will 
also stress the importance of inter-
nal and external validity in each case. 
Internal validity is the extent to which 
the results are credible for the popu-
lation under consideration. External 
validity is the extent to which this sub-
population is representative for the 
whole population (of interest). Some 
Figure 3: Before-and-after comparison
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methods give results with high internal 
validity, but low external validity, and 
vice versa. We conclude with a discus-
sion of where non-experimental meth-
ods should be applied.
6.3. Instrumental variable
Selection bias occurs when an omitted 
variable has an effect on the outcome 
variable of interest and the treatment. 
It is also called selection on unob-
servables, whereby treatment selec-
tion is affected by a  variable that the 
researcher cannot observe in the data. 
For example, individuals with insurance 
could have had a  higher (unobserved) 
awareness for health issues from the 
outset. Consequently, they would show 
different health behaviour, than those 
without insurance. Figure 4 illustrates 
this simple case with arrows indicating 
directions of influence and dashed lines 
indicating unobserved variables (health 
awareness). The instrument affects 
insurance take-up without being itself 
affected by different levels of aware-
ness about insurance. In the absence 
of a  good instrument, one could not 
tell apart the insurance’s effect and the 
awareness’ effect on hospital visits. 
Instrumental variable methods solve this 
problem of omitted control variables. 
An instrumental variable is a  variable 
which has an effect on whether an 
individual takes up or does not take up 
treatment and at the same time is per-
mitted to affect the outcome variable of 
interest via the treatment variable only. 
This is called the exclusion restriction. In 
other words, individuals with different 
values of the instrument differ in their 
treatment status. But otherwise, these 
individuals are comparable. Often, the 
exclusion restriction will be only valid 
conditionally, that means when con-
trolling for individual characteristics.
Figure 4: Setup with instrumental variable 
Hospital 
visits 
Instrument  Insurance 
Awareness 
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Box 3: How the instrumental variables method solves the problem of 
unobservables
More formally, instrumental variable Z affects treatment status D, but there is no direct 
relationship between Z and the outcome variable Y. Hence Z is allowed to affect Y only 
indirectly via D. Suppose we have 
 where  is the outcome variable,  is the treatment indicator variable, 
 is an unobserved variable that is correlated with , and  is a random error term. 
If we now estimate (since  is unobserved), 
 will be correlated with the residual  because, in effect, we have
.
 and  are correlated, so  and  are correlated as well and, thus,  is endogenous.
The instrument can now be used to get an unbiased estimate of the effect of the endog-
enous variable. Researchers use a method that is called two-stage least squares: in the 
first stage, the instrument(s) Z is used to give estimated values of the endogenous treat-
ment variable D for every individual (or community):4
Then, in the second stage, this new variable is plugged in the equation of interest:
.
The coefficient  gives now an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
Using an instrument for the evaluation 
of microinsurance has not been done 
often and, in general instruments are 
hard to find. We therefore use a hypo-
thetical example to illustrate our point 
in the context of this guide. Suppose 
the government sets up a health insur-
ance programme for the poor. Every-
body who is interested has to register 
4 Note that using predicted values as additional regressors 
in the way presented here only works in linear models.
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and purchase the product at the local 
insurance administration centre of the 
neighbourhood or municipality. Now 
imagine two households that are very 
close, but on different sides of the bor-
der between two neighbourhoods. The 
distance to the administrative centre 
might differ considerably, but other-
wise the two neighbours should be very 
similar. For such pairs, distance to the 
administrative centre could be used 
as a  predictor of insurance take-up 
that is otherwise unrelated to individ-
ual characteristics—in other words, 
a  good instrument. Here, the instru-
ment is correlated with insurance 
take-up but not with awareness. Thus, 
instead of comparing the treated to the 
untreated, we compare those with high 
values and low values of the instru-
ment. This example is analogous to the 
famous distance-to-school instrument 
used by Card (1995) for schooling. Typi-
cally, an instrument requires including 
additional X  variables, e.g., quality of 
the neighbourhood, degree of urbani-
sation, family background, etc. 
We may also generate instrumen-
tal variables ourselves by randomly 
assigning incentives or encourage-
ments to individuals (random encour-
agement design). This approach looks 
very much like a  proper randomised 
experiment, except that we have imper-
fect control over the beneficiaries. An 
encouragement or incentive is given to 
the individuals in the treatment group, 
whilst the individuals in the control 
group do not receive such an encour-
agement or incentive (or receive a dif-
ferent one). It is up to the individuals 
whether they sign up for the actual 
treatment. For example, imagine that 
the price of insurance is varied ran-
domly across communities, creating 
a  random incentive to buy insurance 
for the population facing a lower price. 
The instrumental variable that is gen-
erated here helps resolve the problem 
of selection bias and allows consistent 
estimation of the effect that insurance 
take-up has on health and other out-
come measures. Similarly, we may 
vary the effort related to take-up by, for 
example, varying service hours, density 
of offices in a community, etc., from the 
insurer’s side. If areas or individuals 
cannot be exclusively chosen for a pro-
gramme at random, we may at least 
give them varying incentives to do so.
If there is an instrument that fulfills 
the exclusion restriction as explained 
above, internal validity is high. How-
ever, external validity depends on 
another quality of the instrument. If 
the instrument predicts treatment 
status accurately, external validity is 
also likely to be high. Otherwise the 
instrumental variable results cannot 
be generalised to the whole popula-
tion. The reason is that only those who 
are induced to take up treatment by the 
instrument can be used for the estima-
tion of the treatment effect. 
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6.4. Regression discontinuity 
design 
Although not as rigorous as random 
assignment, the regression disconti-
nuity design (RDD) approach may give 
more convincing results than propen-
sity score matching (PSM) and differ-
ence-in-differences (DID) methods (see 
below). The idea of RDD is to exploit 
some cut-off point that is important 
for selection into treatment and com-
pare people near this cutoff. Thus, this 
approach implicitly compares treated 
subjects to a control group that is very 
similar.
A standard application is when enrol-
ment into treatment is limited and 
selection of participants is conducted 
according to an objective rule. Fre-
quently, such form of targeting is done 
on the basis of a poverty index: individ-
uals above the threshold receive the 
treatment, whilst it is withheld from 
those individuals below the threshold. 
When comparing individuals very close 
to this threshold, their characteristics 
barely differ, except with respect to 
their treatment status. It is basically 
random as to whether an individual is 
below or above the cutoff given that 
the individual is close to the cut-off 
value. However, for this approach to 
be valid, individuals must be unable 
to manipulate their value of the index 
such that they would become eligible 
for the treatment.  To test for the plau-
sibility of this assumption, we can use 
statistical methods. Although disconti-
nuities in evaluation studies are often 
unplanned, they may also be integrated 
ex-ante.
To give an illustrative example, imag-
ine the government wants to introduce 
microinsurance especially for the poor. 
The village administration is respon-
sible for the distribution of the insur-
ance and relies on a  poverty index to 
determine the eligible households. 
Only households that are considered 
poor under this index are eligible and 
can buy the insurance. Such disconti-
nuities do not necessarily have to be 
5 Even if they have some influence, the approach is feasible 
as long as they are unable to manipulate their assignment 
precisely. The solution in this case is the so-called fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design.
5
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planned as part of the intervention 
(even though it is certainly beneficial to 
have it planned beforehand). Instead, 
the evaluator could detect and exploit 
any rule used in practice to determine 
participation in the programme.
Figure 5 shows the number of hos-
pital visits by ranking in the poverty 
index sometime after the programme 
started in our hypothetical village.
We see that the number of hospital vis-
its increases and that there is a  jump 
exactly at the poverty line. This jump 
is a result of the microinsurance pro-
gramme and the restriction that only 
poor people have access to this pro-
gramme. Any household that is above 
the poverty line has no access to the 
insurance product. RDD assumes that 
households just above the poverty line 
are, in fact, similar to those slightly 
below the index in all relevant aspects. 
Therefore, we can use the households 
that are eligible for the insurance and 
very close to the threshold as our treat-
ment group, whilst those slightly above 
the threshold serve as control group. 
The benefit of RDD is that it does not 
need actual randomisation. However, 
the interpretation of the estimated 
impact is limited to the population that 
is close to the threshold. As a  result, 
external validity of this approach is 
rather limited. Further, it usually 
requires a large sample for estimation.
6.5. Propensity score 
matching (PSM)
The basic idea of propensity score 
matching is to match at least one 
non-participant to every participant 
with identical or highly similar values 
of observed characteristics X. The dif-
ference in outcome, Y, between these 
Figure 5: Regression discontinuity design
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two individuals is then averaged over 
the whole population. A practical sim-
plification is to match non-participants 
to participants on the basis of the pro-
pensity score, which is defined as the 
probability of treatment.
Box 4: How matching eliminates selection bias
Using matching, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be defined as 
ATT= . As in the randomised 
trial, the expected counterfactual outcome,  can be replaced by the 
expected observed outcome of the non-participants, , but only conditional 
on a set of observable covariates, X. If treated and non-treated differ in terms of observ-
able characteristics X only and not in terms of unobservables (the so-called selection on 
observables assumption), it holds that . Otherwise, selec-
tion bias will remain an issue.
Instead of matching on X, it suffices to match on the propensity score p(X), i.e., the proba-
bility of treatment defined as p(X)=Pr(D=1|X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). We can there-
fore also write
ATT= .
It is important to include all variables 
in X that affect the outcome and selec-
tion into the programme at the same 
time. Another requirement is that 
the X  variables need to be unaffected 
by the treatment, i.e., they should be 
measured before treatment starts. 
PSM requires both a thorough under-
standing of the selection process and 
a  large data basis. Qualitative inter-
views with local project managers and 
participants may be helpful to deter-
mine which variables to collect in order 
to ensure that all important variables 
are included in X.
Panel data, if available, would allow 
testing for the plausibility of the under-
lying assumptions by conducting 
a pseudo treatment test. The idea is to 
pretend that the participants received 
the treatment before the start of the 
intervention and then to estimate the 
impact. Because the intervention had 
not been in place yet, the estimated 
effect should be zero. If the estima-
tion leads to a  different finding, then 
this should be taken as evidence that 
participants and non-participants dif-
fer with respect to unobserved char-
acteristics. If we are willing to assume 
125Non-experimental methodologies for quantitative analysis
that these differences are time-invari-
ant, then we can use a  DID matching 
approach. If, however, we suspect that 
these differences change over time, 
then we need more or better X  vari-
ables or a better understanding of the 
selection process.
Propensity score matching gives 
rather low internal validity due to its 
reliance on the selection on observ-
ables assumption. In other words, 
the results might be biased if there 
are variables that are correlated with 
insurance take-up and the outcome of 
interest (such as hospital visits), but 
cannot be observed in the data. Exter-
nal validity can be high, except in the 
case that we cannot find sufficiently 
comparable untreated individuals to 
be matched with every treated indi-
vidual (the so-called common support 
requirement). These treated individ-
uals would then need to be excluded 
from the analysis, which would reduce 
external validity.
6.6. Difference-in-differences 
(DID)
Relying on the assumption that selec-
tion is on observables only can be 
difficult to justify. Often we need 
a  method that can also take care of 
confounding variables that are unob-
served. However, as already men-
tioned, good instruments are hard to 
find. Therefore, we would like have 
other tools to deal with unobservables. 
The DID estimator uses data with 
a  time or cohort dimension to con-
trol for unobserved but time-invariant 
variables. It relies on comparing par-
ticipants and non-participants before 
and after the treatment. The minimum 
requirement is to have data on an out-
come variable, Y, and treatment status, 
D, before and after the intervention. 
(It can be carried out with or without 
panel data and with or without con-
trolling for characteristics, X.) In its 
simplest form, we take the difference 
in Y  for the participants before and 
after the treatment and subtract the 
difference in Y for the non-participants 
before and after the treatment. As 
a  result, time-invariant differences in 
characteristics between participants 
and non-participants are eliminated, 
allowing us to identify the treatment 
effect. Consequently, this approach 
accounts for unobserved heterogene-
ity as long as it is time-invariant.
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Panel data are helpful but not strictly 
required. Having cross-sectional data 
before and after the treatment may 
suffice. For instance, if villages partic-
ipate in the intervention entirely, whilst 
other villages do not participate, it will 
suffice to conduct representative sur-
veys in the villages before and after 
the intervention, i.e., interviewing the 
same individuals in the villages is not 
required. Thus, this method allows us 
to avoid problems with attrition com-
monly found in panel surveys.
The simple DID approach eliminates 
time-invariant heterogeneity. However, 
it fails to account for systematic differ-
ences in time trends between partici-
pants and non-participants. Therefore, 
we should include additional control 
variables, X, if we can argue that time 
trends are the same at least for treated 
and non-treated with the same X. This 
can for example be done with PSM. 
Another extension is to use additional 
differences of unaffected comparison 
Box 5: How the DID estimator accounts for time-invariant unobservables
To make ideas more precise, suppose we have 
,
where c is a time-invariant variable.
With observations at time t=0 and t=1 we can take the first difference
.
Importantly, the time-invariant characteristic c drops out. As discussed in box 3, using 
just one cross-section of data will lead to a biased treatment effect  if c is correlated 
with . By using the DID approach we get rid of the problematic unobservable.
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groups. For instance, imagine an 
insurance product applies only to indi-
viduals below the age of 40. We can 
then compare the time trend of individ-
uals above the age of 40 in the treat-
ment villages with the time trend of 
those above 40 in the control villages. 
This difference in time trends can be 
used to eliminate differences in time 
trends of those under 40. A  further 
possibility is to use data for more than 
one point in time before the treatment 
is introduced. This would also allow 
eliminating differences in time trends. 
Having more than one survey after the 
treatment implementation additionally 
allows the estimation of time-varying 
and long-run treatment effects.
In order to apply the DID estimator to 
our hypothetical example, we need 
data at two points in time for two dif-
ferent villages: one village where 
insurance is available and another one 
where it is not. The treatment effect 
is then calculated as the difference in 
hospital visits between the two villages 
after the introduction of our insurance 
in village 1 (t=1) and the difference 
between the two villages before insur-
ance was introduced (t=0). Two scenar-
ios show how this method relies on the 
assumption that time-trends of the two 
villages are equal. In figure 6, the two 
villages have parallel time-trends. This 
means that the counterfactual of the 
village with insurance (red dashed line) 
changes over time in the same way as 
the control village (the green line). In 
this scenario the treatment effect is 
(3.5-2)-(1.5-1)=1. We receive a  reliable 
result for our treatment effect. 
However, the second scenario shows 
that if the time-trends are different the 
DID estimator does not produce reli-
able results: (3.5-1.5)- (1.5-1)=1.5. Here, 
our estimated treatment effect overes-
timates the true treatment effect by 0.5 
hospital visits because the treatment 
and control villages do not have paral-
lel time-trends. Reasons for the differ-
ence in time-trends can be, for exam-
ple, macroeconomic effects that affect 
treatment and control villages differ-
ently or any other confounding factors 
that influence the number of hospital 
visits in one village but not in the other.
Figure 6: Difference-in-differences 
with parallel time-trends
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Internal validity of the DID approach 
hinges on the assumption that partici-
pants’ and non-participants’ outcome 
variables under consideration have the 
same time trend. As explained, there 
are tests to check for the plausibility of 
this assumption. In addition to the com-
mon trend assumption, we require that 
there are no spill-over effects from the 
participants to the non-participants. If 
these assumptions are fulfilled, internal 
validity is high. External validity is high, 
as long as the sample our data is based 
on is representative for the population 
of interest.
6.7. Fields of application of 
non-experimental methods
Non-experimental quantitative impact 
evaluation can be applied to many areas. 
However, the methods described belong 
to the field of microeconometrics, which 
are suited to evaluate interventions on 
the micro- or meso-level. A central ele-
ment is that there exist different units—
individuals, firms, hospitals, water 
works, villages, local administrations, 
neighbourhoods, districts, etc.—some 
of which were exposed by the treat-
ment, whilst others were not. In order 
to evaluate projects on the macro level, 
such as budget support for balancing 
the national budget, other econometric 
methods are more suitable.
Convincing evaluations based on 
non-experimental methods require 
a detailed understanding of the selec-
tion mechanism and comprehensive 
and representative data on the treat-
ment and comparison groups. More-
over, we usually need more than 1000 
observations in order to obtain suffi-
ciently precise estimates of the impact. 
Non-experimental methods are not 
suitable as a  monitoring instrument 
for projects in the phase of introduc-
tion and should only be applied after 
resolving initial problems. Apart from 
initial obstacles, there are often larger 
modifications of the originally planned 
intervention, making a  precise defini-
tion of the treatment more difficult. 
Quantitative methodologies can be 
used to evaluate the impact of an inter-
vention compared to a  situation with-
out. It is more informative, however, to 
Figure 7: Difference-in-differences 
without parallel time trends
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evaluate the impact of an intervention 
relative to other interventions or, alter-
natively, to evaluate different variants 
of an intervention, keeping context and 
data collection procedure constant. 
This, for example, would allow to look 
at the impact of different incentives or 
cost sharing arrangements for subsi-
dised insurance.
Non-experimental methods gener-
ally give less convincing results than 
experimental methods. Moreover, if 
the confidence intervals turn out to 
be very wide, we should not interpret 
these non-significant results as evi-
dence for the absence of an impact. 
This interpretation is only valid if the 
confidence intervals are very narrow. 
The correct interpretation would be 
that the sample size was too small to 
draw reliable conclusions.
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7.1. Why use qualitative 
methods for impact 
assessment 
The terms qualitative and quantitative 
refer to the type of data generated in 
the research process. Quantitative 
research produces data in the form of 
numbers whilst qualitative research 
tends to produce data that are stated 
in prose or textual forms. Whilst quan-
titative methods measure the impact of 
microinsurance in terms of quantitative 
indicators, qualitative methods can be 
used to understand the processes that 
explain this impact or, in the absence of 
quantitative impact studies, to explore 
what kind of impact can be expected. 
For example, quantitative methods may 
be used to measure how much impact 
microinsurance has, e.g., on the finan-
cial situation of the insured house-
holds, whilst qualitative methods ask 
why and how microinsurance impacts 
the financial situation and what the 
underlying processes are. Qualitative 
methods are used to look in depth at 
impacts; the data and analysis gener-
ated is interpreted in context. Contex-
tual methods are applied to a specific 
locality, case or social setting, and 
sacrifice breadth of population cover-
age and statistical generalisability in 
order to explore or understand issues 
in depth (Booth et al. 1998). 
Particularly for a  relatively new field 
like microinsurance research, qual-
itative studies are needed to explore 
potential impacts and processes. 
Results may then be the basis for suc-
ceeding quantitative studies. Without 
knowing what kind of impact micro-
insurance may have, it is difficult to 
measure it using a  research design 
based on theoretical assumptions only. 
Moreover, qualitative research is able 
to use social analytical frameworks 
to interpret observed patterns and 
trends—including analysis of socially 
differentiated outcomes. Without these 
analytical insights into the complex 
missing middle between interventions 
and impacts, researchers and policy 
analysts tend to make interpretive leaps 
of analysis based on what is measured 
(Chambers 1995). 
Due to this iterative relationship, qual-
itative and quantitative methods are 
particularly effective when used in 
combination. However, when consid-
ering ways to combine quantitative 
and qualitative methods and data, it is 
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important to be aware of their compar-
ative advantages and to recognise that 
“strong fences make good neighbours“ 
(Appleton and Booth 2005).
Within this chapter, we firstly sum-
marise the differences of qualitative 
and quantitative impact assessments 
and highlight their specific strengths. 
We will then discuss quality criteria for 
qualitative impact assessments before 
we conclude on possible research 
designs and data collection methods.
7.2. The nature of qualitative 
impact assessment
Though there is increasing dialogue 
between quantitative- and qualita-
tive-oriented research methods and the 
application of mixed methods is becom-
ing more and more popular, a differen-
tiation between both approaches along 
the research process helps in grasp-
ing the distinctive nature of qualitative 
impact assessment. 
Table 1:  Differentiation of quantitative- and qualitative-oriented approaches to 
social science
Research process
Quantitative-oriented  
impact assessment
Qualitative-oriented  
impact assessment
Epistemological 
background and 
forms of knowledge
• Postpositivist: deductive 
procedures, probabilistic law
• Interpretivist: understanding 
subjective and contextual 
knowledge
Research problem 
and research 
question
• What and how much impact for 
whom?
• Hypothesis-testing
• How and why does impact occur/
not occur: mechanisms and 
theories of change
• Discovery-oriented: What 
unintended and unexpected 
impact occurs?
Sampling • Random 
• Large n
• Purposive and stratiied random
• Small n
Data collection • (Quasi)experimental setting
• Tight prescription of research 
design
• Large-scale, standardised surveys
• Naturalistic inquiry
• High lexibility of research design
• In-depth interviews (focus groups, 
key informants), observations and 
participatory methods
• Involvement of researcher in data 
collection
Data analysis • Calculation and statistical 
generalisation
• Assess impact along predeined 
and externally imposed indicators
• Tables and numbers
• Interpretation and 
particularisation / analytical 
generalisation / exploration 
• Understand and represent 
the target group’s perception 
of meaning, existence and 
signiicance of impact
• Rich and thick description
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Epistemological background: Quan-
titative and qualitative approaches to 
impact assessment are based on dif-
ferent philosophies on how the world 
can be perceived and described. Quan-
titative approaches to impact assess-
ments are based on the so-called 
postpositivist school of thought, 
which pursues objectivity and relies 
on deductive procedures and proba-
bilistic laws to understand our world. 
Constructivist and interpretative think-
ing builds the background for quali-
tative research, supporting the view 
that social phenomena can only be 
understood when the perception of the 
world by human beings is taken into 
account. Thus, subjective knowledge 
and specific contexts are of impor-
tance (Della Porta and Keating 2008). 
For the remainder of the chapter, we 
will use only the terms quantitative 
and qualitative to differentiate between 
approaches.
Research problem and research 
question: Whilst quantitative-oriented 
impact assessments are interested 
in what and how much impact has 
occurred for whom, qualitative-ori-
ented impact assessments focus on 
the how and why impact has occurred 
or not occurred. For example, qualita-
tive methods would be suitable for the 
following questions on the impact of 
microinsurance:
• How does the insurance influ-
ence the financial/economic/social 
behaviour of the insured?
• How do the insured perceive the 
value of insurance? Why do some 
perceive value and others do not?
• How does the perception of impact 
influence the insured’s enrolment 
decision?
In some cases, one is not sure whether 
all possible impacts of microinsurance 
have been accounted for. In these sce-
narios, explorative qualitative studies 
can help in identifying impact on areas 
which had not been considered before. 
Qualitative methods can also be useful 
for explaining missing, unexpected, or 
unintended impacts reported in quanti-
tative surveys, e.g., to explore the under-
lying mechanisms when a  quantitative 
impact assessment shows that a health 
microinsurance scheme does not lead 
to a reduction of or to a rise in out-of-
pocket payments. For more examples 
of qualitative method applications, see 
examples 1-11 in section 7.7. 
Change is not always a  linear pro-
cess and, thus, mechanisms and 
causal chains behind impact require 
close examination, for which quali-
tative methods are especially suited 
(Roche 1999; Kabeer 2003, 113; Faust 
2010). Qualitative inquiry and impact 
assessments are discovery-oriented. 
They do not limit possible outcomes of 
their research beforehand and react 
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in a  flexible manner to new discover-
ies, adapting the research process if 
necessary, and are thus better able to 
account for unexpected findings and 
impacts (Patton 2002, 39,44; Creswell 
2009, 176; Kabeer 2003, 113). 
Box 1: Examples of how-questions in qualitative impact assessments 
In a study on a health insurance programme in India, McGuinness (2011) did not only 
intend to study whether the programme had an impact on household’s financial protec-
tion, but also how the programme provided this protection. Additionally, the commu-
nity-managed reimbursement process of the scheme and its influence was assessed. 
McGuinness chose to apply a qualitative approach, combining household case studies 
with claims data. 
Hietalahti and Linden (2006) conducted a study “to gain a better understanding of how 
microcredit projects impact on rural women’s livelihood structures, and how they can 
strengthen women’s welfare”, applying qualitative methods which were “designed to 
encourage respondents to describe their experience in their own words” (Hietalahti and 
Linden 2006, 202-204).
In his study on the impact of a  life microinsurance product in Indonesia, Hintz (2010) 
explains how, due to the field and study situation, he moved to an explorative-qualitative 
approach and how he finally found that the impact of the product under study was not 
linear and mostly unintended.
There can be both theoretical and prac-
tical reasons for choosing a qualitative 
impact assessment design. In some 
cases, qualitative impact assess-
ments are preferred over quantitative 
impact assessments because of lim-
ited resources and difficulties in fulfill-
ing formal requirements (Hulme 2000; 
Copestake et al. 2005). Qualitative 
impact assessments can be less costly 
than quantitative, experimental, or 
quasi-experimental research designs 
since they do not involve large-scale 
surveys and do not necessarily make 
use of a comparison group to investi-
gate causality. 
Sampling: The sample size of qualita-
tive studies is small; its specific size 
depends on the study question and the 
study purpose. As Patton puts it, “The 
validity, meaningfulness, and insights 
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generated from qualitative inquiry 
have more to do with the information 
richness of the cases selected and the 
observational/analytical capabilities of 
the researcher than with sample size” 
(Patton 2002, 245). The sample in a 
qualitative study may be chosen pur-
posively or randomly. Whilst sampling 
purposefully, one should be aware of 
what cases are needed for the ques-
tion under study, i.e., whether the case 
should be typical for the study popu-
lation or display a  certain character-
istic. Typical cases can be defined by 
a  preceding quantitative survey (e.g., 
individuals with more or less the mean 
characteristics of the underlying pop-
ulation). Less typical cases, which are 
insightful for a  certain aspect under 
study (e.g., individuals with a particular 
chronic disease or disability, or house-
holds that have accumulated assets or 
diversified livelihoods in the face of pre-
vailing trends), can be identified from 
survey data, from direct observation, or 
by snowball sampling through referral 
from group discussions and interviews, 
a  sampling technique where initial 
respondents are asked for recommen-
dations on who else to interview. The 
expectation is that persons belonging to 
a particular category already know each 
other and are thus able to provide ref-
erences. For many research situations, 
however, stratified random sampling 
is preferable. For this, the population 
is divided into subpopulations by dif-
ferentiating by characteristics like e.g. 
occupation, income or religion. From 
each of the subpopulations, a certain 
number of elements are then randomly 
selected. This reduces selection bias 
(because of random sampling) whilst at 
the same time allows in-depth qualita-
tive research to capture the variability 
of context (because of stratification).
Data collection: Qualitative impact 
assessments are naturalistic inquiries, 
data is collected “in the field” without 
creating a  lab situation and manipu-
lating the phenomenon under study 
(Creswell 2009, 175; Creswell 2007, 37). 
They can however make use of “natu-
ral experiments” where they are able 
to observe and document a  change in 
the real world and its implications, for 
example when a  new programme is 
implemented and the possibility opens 
up to accompany this process (Patton 
2002, 42). Whilst quantitative-oriented 
approaches make use of large-scale, 
standardised surveys in order to gen-
erate representative findings, quali-
tative-oriented approaches conduct 
semi-standardised, or open interviews, 
and/or observations to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon 
under study. 
Data collection for a  qualitative study 
differs significantly from that in a quan-
titative study. Since the data is gath-
ered through in-depth interviews or 
focus group discussions, the tools for 
data collection, such as guides for the 
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interviews or focus group discussions, 
are open-ended and relatively unstruc-
tured. The investigator needs skills that 
enable him/her to probe along each of 
the topics listed in the guide, to follow 
up on comments or remarks made by 
the respondent, and to bring a conver-
sation back on track if it is going off 
course. For this, the investigator needs 
the requisite skills, which are usually 
much more than those required of an 
investigator filling out a  structured 
questionnaire for a survey.
Data analysis: Quantitative impact 
assessments aim at statistical gen-
eralisation, i.e., they intend to create 
results which can be generalised to 
whole populations. There are differ-
ent opinions about the ability to gen-
eralise from qualitative inquiry: some 
researchers argue that qualitative 
research does not even aim to gener-
alise and that it only means to explain 
the particular case in its specific con-
text. Others want to extrapolate find-
ings for cases with similar contexts 
or to generalise findings to broader 
theories—i.e., aim at analytical gener-
alisation. Qualitative inquiry does not 
analyse its data statistically—though 
sometimes numeric measures can 
be used—but derives patterns and 
themes from the data and thus inter-
prets it (Patton 2002, 460 et seq.). 
The core of analysis is to understand 
mechanisms of impact, and create 
and verify theories of change instead 
of testing hypotheses. For example, 
a  hypothesis on the impact of health 
microinsurance would state that being 
insured with the health microinsur-
ance scheme increases the utilisation 
of health-care services covered by the 
insurance package. The underlying 
theory of change is that the financial 
barriers to accessing health care are 
reduced through prepayment into the 
insurance scheme and, thus, insured 
people do access health care more 
often. Quantitative methods would 
create evidence for or against the 
hypothesised impact, whilst qualitative 
methods would inquire whether the 
mechanisms of the theory of change 
are as expected or not, and why. Whilst 
doing this, the qualitative researcher 
tries to understand the meaning and 
significance given to the phenomenon 
under study, by the study participants 
themselves, instead of applying his/her 
own point of view of what is important 
and what is not (Creswell 2009, 175-
176; Creswell 2007, 147). For example, 
as Oakley et al. (1998) argue, the target 
group of a  certain intervention might 
value not only long-term impact but 
also short-term outcomes of a project, 
which would not be accounted for in 
quantitative impact assessments. 
Qualitative designs
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Box 2: Comparison of quantitative and qualitative approaches to impact 
assessment
In a study on the impact of a microcredit programme in Peru, Copestake et al. (2005) 
compared both quantitative and qualitative approaches to impact assessments and 
their respective advantages and disadvantages, concluding with a call for combining 
both approaches whenever possible. 
Both approaches [the econometric/quantitative and the interpretative/qualitative 
approach] have strengths and weaknesses. The econometric approach was based on 
a larger and more statistically reliable sample. It also offers precise estimates of key 
impact variables, most importantly household income. However, the approach remains 
open to selection bias, arising from unobservable differences between client and non-
client samples. It was also limited in its inclusion of variables, and in the extent to 
which differences in impact between different sorts of clients can could be measured. 
Reliability depended upon good survey management and skilled econometric analysis. 
The interpretative approach was based on a smaller sample, albeit one that was ran-
domly selected from a baseline survey, and cross-analysed against its findings. The 
range of potential variables covered was more open, and a greater range of differences 
in impact were highlighted, albeit less precisely. The reliability of impact attribution 
hinged on the specialist skills of the qualitative researchers, in both interviewing and 
analysis of the data. In the absence of budgetary constraints then, there is a case for 
arguing that the two approaches are complementary… However, this is a luxury that 
most microfinance institutions cannot afford (Copestake et al. 2005, 719).
7.3. Quality criteria 
in qualitative impact 
assessment: validity, 
reliability and generalisability
Because qualitative impact assess-
ments are flexible in their design and 
there are no universal processes to be 
followed, ensuring quality by respond-
ing to certain criteria is important. 
There are different sets of quality cri-
teria, partly competing, which derive 
from different philosophical back-
grounds of qualitative research (Pat-
ton 2002). Traditional scientific criteria 
transfer quality standards from quan-
titative to qualitative research, as does, 
for example, Yin (2003). He describes 
four criteria for quality of research 
designs from all spheres of research 
and explains how these criteria can be 
fulfilled in case study research, but his 
recommendations are applicable to 
other forms of qualitative research as 
well (Yin 2003)1, (see table 2).
1 Other scholars argue that these traditional scientific cri-
teria are not applicable to qualitative research since qual-
itative inquiry comes from a  constructivist/interpretative 
philosophical background and not the traditional postposi-
tivist thinking. For a more extensive discussion see Patton 
(2002, 542), and Marshall and Rossman (2011, 39 et seq.).
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Internal and external validity are prob-
ably the two most contested quality cri-
teria for qualitative impact assessment 
and will thus be discussed more in detail.
Internal validity and reliability 
According to Radermacher, von Arman-
sperg, and Chen (2012, 342) non-exper-
imental impact assessment designs 
have only limited internal validity due 
to the lack of a control or comparison 
group to verify the causal relationship 
between observed impacts and the spe-
cific intervention. However, there are 
qualitative impact approaches involving 
comparison groups for attributing cau-
sality. Roche (1999, 79 et seq.) presents 
alternatives for control groups to over-
come the problem of attribution if these 
are not available, such as including 
2 Compare Yin (2003, 34 et seq.).
non-project respondents, using sec-
ondary data and other key informants, 
and ruling out other explanations than 
the assumed causal effect. Patton 
(2002, 479) argues that potential causal 
linkages should be addressed in quali-
tative evaluation research as long as it 
is made clear that these are only spec-
ulation and hypotheses. Considering 
rival explanations is recommended to 
increase internal validity of qualitative 
research (Patton 2002, 553; Creswell 
2009, 152; Yin 2003, 32).
Another important quality criterion 
of qualitative impact assessment and 
qualitative research in general is the 
triangulation of findings by:
• applying different methods (e.g., 
verifying interviews by direct obser-
vation: do people really do what they 
say they do?);
Table 2: Quality criteria in qualitative impact assessment2
Construct validity
(correct  
operationalisation)
Internal validity
(causal relationship)
External validity
(generalisation  
to domain)
Reliability
(operations can be  
repeated with  
same results)
The phenomenon 
under study has to be 
thoroughly deined 
and indicators for 
operationalisation 
relevant and justiied.
The causal relationship 
(y is caused by x) 
inferred from the data 
has to be thoroughly 
described and justiied.
Qualitative research/
case studies 
aim at analytical 
generalisation, 
i.e., generalising 
results to a broader 
theory. To achieve 
this generalisation, 
a replication of indings 
for different cases is 
necessary and helpful.
Close documentation 
of the research process 
is necessary to achieve 
reliability, each step of 
the formulation of the 
research question, the 
selection of cases, the 
data collection, and 
data analysis has to be 
documented so that 
others can repeat the 
procedure and come to 
the same conclusions.
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• collecting data from more than one 
source (e.g., insurance policyhold-
ers and insurance staff, male and 
female policyholders);
• involving more than one researcher 
in data collection and analysis; or,
• analysing data from different theo-
retical perspectives.
The goal of triangulation is to 
strengthen research findings. When 
results obtained through one method 
are mirrored in the results obtained 
from a different method, the research 
findings get confirmed. It thus offers 
a  more accurate picture of empirical 
reality (Patton 2002, 555 et seq.; Roche 
1999, 86 et seq.; Creswell 2009, 191). 
Contradictions found during this pro-
cess need to be addressed. They might 
reveal bias or specific interests and 
thus might not only strengthen the 
validity of the findings but provide new 
insights into the phenomenon as well 
(Roche 1999, 92). Presenting the find-
ings to the study participants and dis-
cussing conclusions with them is not 
only a  good method to increase the 
validity of the research (Creswell 2009, 
191), but also increases the target 
group’s involvement in the study and 
gives it a voice in the research process 
that is intended to be for its own good. 
The recommendation to the researcher 
is to be transparent about all steps of 
the research process when reporting 
findings and provide any personal or 
professional information that might 
have influenced data collection, anal-
ysis, or interpretation. The researcher 
should not underestimate the effect of 
his/her presence on those under study, 
as well as on his/herself, and consider 
these effects and potential own biases 
when analysing his/her data (Pat-
ton 2002, 566 et seq.; Creswell 2009, 
192). Possible follow-up actions of the 
research and potential consequences 
for the participants (e.g., introduction 
of a new insurance product or adjust-
ments in the existing product) should 
be reported to the participants.
141Qualitative designs
Box 3: Triangulation and documentation strategies applied in a qualitative 
impact assessment study
In their baseline study for an impact assessment of health microinsurance in Pakistan, 
McGuinness and Mandel (2010) adopted a variety of triangulation and documentation 
strategies to ensure the validity and reliability of their results. 
The baseline Outcomes Assessment employed several methods to enhance the reli-
ability and validity of the results. The research:
• included three separate studies covering all relevant aspects of the problem (the 
financial landscape, the health-care landscape and consumer perspectives);
• employed multiple data collection methods including interviews (66 total), focus 
group discussions (32 with a total of 243 participants) and a review of secondary 
data;
• cross-referenced research questions across the discussion and interview guides 
to allow for triangulation;
• employed multiple data sources reflecting diverse perspectives and experiences 
including key informants in various Network agencies, the financial services 
industry, health-care providers, community organisations, and community mem-
bers; and
• used different investigators with specialized expertise for each of the three 
studies.
In addition to this, research procedures included
• using a documented research protocol including the data collection tools; estab-
lishing a  chain of evidence through preliminary key research questions that 
are linked through the documented research protocol to the findings and their 
respective data sources; and
• developing of a research database. 
These measures, which included triangulation of data, methods and investigators, 
establishing a  chain of evidence, and documenting the research protocol and all 
data collected, enhance the study’s construct validity and the reliability of its results 
(McGuinness and Mandel 2010, 26).
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External validity and ability to 
generalise
The ability to generalise qualitative 
research findings is subject to an ongo-
ing debate that is taking place against 
the background on the value of gener-
alisation and particularisation in itself, 
which is seen as a  trade-off between 
the breadth of a  study and its depth 
(Patton 2002, 581). Most qualitative 
researchers accept the limited gen-
eralisability of their findings to whole 
populations, i.e., the lack of statistical 
generalisation, arguing that they do 
not strive for generalisation at all, but 
see the value in the context-specificity 
of qualitative research and its ability 
to investigate a  case in-depth (Cre-
swell 2009, 193). Others aim for a gen-
eralisation to broader theories, i.e., 
to an analytical generalisation in the 
wording of Yin (2003), or—as a middle 
course—an extrapolation of findings to 
cases under similar, but never identi-
cal conditions (Cronbach and Associ-
ates according to Patton (2002, 584)). 
Box 4: Limitations to generalisability for qualitative impact studies
Hietalahti and Linden (2006) are very careful about generalising from their data on the 
impact of a microfinance programme on livelihoods in South Africa, arguing that their 
findings would only be transferable to similar socioeconomic settings and even this only 
in a limited way. 
Although many important economic and social impacts of microcredits have been 
clarified in this study, it is still unable to provide a final answer to the question of the 
total effect of microcredits on local livelihoods, even in this single case observed in 
Tzaneen area.
The results are still related only to a limited area, and the data have been gathered 
within only a limited period of time. It is, however, able to summarise cautiously the 
difficulties and opportunities that are directed towards microfinance in southern 
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Box 5: Example for retrospective, cross-sectional qualitative impact 
assessment 
An example for a  cross-sectional, retrospective qualitative design—though in com-
bination with a preceding quantitative survey—is a study undertaken by Copestake et 
al. (2005) to assess the impact of a microcredit programme (Promuc) in Peru. Here, 
a representative quantitative baseline study was followed one year later by qualitative 
in-depth interviews with a smaller sample of clients, focusing on changes experienced 
during the previous year and reasons for these changes.
7.4. Qualitative impact 
assessment research designs
The research design identifies the tim-
ing and frequency of observations to 
be undertaken in an impact assess-
ment. Basically, we can differentiate 
between cross-sectional and longitu-
dinal research designs for qualitative 
impact assessment. Additionally, we 
will discuss the case study approach. 
Cross-sectional designs
Cross-sectional qualitative impact 
assessment designs collect data only 
at one point in time. Depending on 
whether the intention of the impact 
assessment is to predict or identify 
the impact of a given intervention, the 
data is collected ex-ante or ex-post of 
the intervention. In the case of ex-ante 
assessment, it focuses on the present 
situation and potential changes due 
to a  future intervention; in the case 
of ex-post assessments, it sets out 
to identify the present situation and 
past changes due to an intervention. 
The involvement of a control or com-
parison group is possible to compare 
findings.
Africa, in areas that share a similar socioeconomic setting. In this context it can be 
argued that, when properly designed, microfinance institutions such as The Small 
Enterprise Foundation have an important contribution to make to women’s empow-
erment (Hietalahti and Linden 2006, 210).
Blanchard-Horan (2006, 140) also highlights the importance of the context of her study 
on the impact of a Ugandan health microinsurance on treatment-seeking behaviour for 
malaria, and stresses that “[n]either the intent nor the design of the study involves gen-
eralizing these data to a larger population. Nonetheless, for organizations interested 
in empowering women and improving their health care access this study hopes to raise 
their awareness to the potential value of health microinsurance.” 
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Cross-sectional research designs are 
easy to implement and very cost-effi-
cient since they do not require a long-
term commitment of participants and 
data needs to be collected only once. 
At the same time, they are prone to 
recall bias (e.g., when respondents 
need to assess their financial situation 
from two years before, but either do 
not remember correctly or their per-
ception is influenced by their present 
financial situation, they give inaccu-
rate information) and no direct com-
parison between data from before 
and after the intervention is possible. 
Involving comparison groups is bene-
ficial, but might also create problems: 
e.g., a  lack of commitment, since the 
group does not benefit from the inter-
vention under study, drop out of the 
comparison group when a  similar 
intervention is conducted in their area, 
or spillover effects become apparent 
(Roche 1999, 79).
Longitudinal designs
To understand the impact of an inter-
vention, it is preferable to conduct lon-
gitudinal studies that involve repeated 
observations of the same group. This 
is true for quantitative studies trying to 
quantify the scope and scale of impact, 
as well as for qualitative studies 
addressing theories of change, causal 
chains, and unintended and unexpected 
impacts. Ideally, the first data collec-
tion, often referred to as baseline study, 
should take place before the start of 
the intervention to enable a  compar-
ison of the situation before and after 
the intervention. Again, a  compari-
son group can be involved to allow for 
a double difference comparison. 
…the interviews were designed to elicit from respondents open-ended narrative 
explanations of changes they had experienced during the past year, and reasons for 
those changes, from which an experienced analyst could make a reliable assess-
ment of impact attributable to their interaction with Promuc. An explicit part of the 
research was to pilot a qualitative in-depth interview protocol (referred to as the 
QUIP) for addressing the attribution problem using this interpretative, rather than 
a positivist, approach (Copestake et al. 2005, 717).
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To prepare the ground for the end line 
intervention, the guideline for base-
line intervention should be struc-
tured with end line questions already 
in mind. A  clear theory of change in 
the design process helps in keeping 
all intervention rounds aligned to 
each other. Identical questions posed 
during different rounds facilitate 
comparison.
Such longitudinal designs involving 
more than one round of data collection 
and, in some cases, even a comparison 
group, are substantially more expen-
sive and more difficult to conduct than 
cross-sectional designs. Participants 
need to be approached more than once 
and it might be challenging to main-
tain the comparison group long-term. 
Dropouts from both the study groups 
are possible and the researcher needs 
to consider beforehand how to deal 
with these.
Case study designs
Case studies are in-depth investiga-
tions of selected units (e.g., individ-
uals, households, groups, insurance 
schemes). Different than other qual-
itative inquiry, case study research 
“involves the study of an issue explored 
through one or more cases within 
a bounded system” (Creswell 2007, 73), 
i.e., the case is seen as one example of 
a specific phenomenon. In other quali-
tative designs, information is gathered 
from different sources and then com-
bined and synthesised to answer spe-
cific research questions. In the case 
study approach, each case is regarded 
as an entity and interpreted and ana-
lysed as such, though—of course—
cross-case analysis and comparison is 
also done (Yin 2003).
For impact assessments, case stud-
ies are especially useful to explain 
Box 6: Example of longitudinal qualitative impact assessment design
Hintz (2010) applied a longitudinal qualitative impact assessment design to assess the 
impact of a life microinsurance product in Indonesia. 
Payung Keluarga is a clear development intervention. It was conceived to amelio-
rate the assumed post-mortem financial crisis of low-asset families, and to pre-
vent a drop in their already low-asset base. Through qualitative-explorative field 
research from 2006 until 2008 I  investigated if this developmental intention was 
realized. Research components consisted of a baseline-end line comparison with 
insured customers, beneficiary interviews, and ancilliary [sic] research compo-
nents (Hintz 2010, iii).
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presumed causal links and explore 
what array of impacts an interven-
tion has brought about.3 They can be 
cross-sectional or longitudinal, i.e., 
cases can either be studied at one 
3 Yin (2003, 15) gives case studies a distinctive place in eval-
uation research. 
point of time or over a  period of time 
and can either comprise only one or 
several cases (Gerring 2007, 39). They 
rely on a combination of different data 
sources, such as in-depth interviews, 
observations, and document analysis, 
and do not necessarily exclusively use 
qualitative data (Yin 2003, 85). 
Box 7: Example for case study approach in qualitative impact assessment
McGuinness (2011) chose a case study approach to assess the impact of a health micro-
insurance programme in India and interviewed insured as well as uninsured house-
holds to compare how these coped with serious cases of malaria.
The key research questions addressed include:
• Does Uplift health microinsurance protect households financially? If so, how?
• Are the out-of-pocket (OOP) costs of healthcare lower for Insured households 
than for Uninsured households?
• How does the unique community-managed reimbursement process at Uplift 
influence the financial protection effect of the insurance?
These key questions are addressed in two ways. The first is through a case study 
which compares the specific experiences of 15 Insured households and 10 Unin-
sured households to assess whether Uplift-Insured households are financially pro-
tected when faced with a serious case of malaria. This case study yielded interest-
ing insights into the experiences and coping strategies of low-income households 
faced with a serious, widespread disease, but the sample size was too small to make 
its findings generalizable to the HMF [Health Mutual Fund] population as a whole. 
In addition to the case study, (…) [we] carried out an analysis of Uplift’s claims and 
financial data (McGuinness 2011, 12).
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Table 3: Different qualitative research designs
Research 
design
Data 
collection
Advantages and 
disadvantages
Speciically useful 
for…
Further issues to 
consider
Cross-
sectional
At one point 
in time, 
ex-ante or 
ex-post the 
intervention 
under study
Advantages
• Easy to implement and 
cost-eficient
• Fast results
Disadvantages
• Prone to recall bias 
(in case of ex-post 
intervention)
• No direct comparison 
of data from before 
and after intervention 
possible
• Exploring 
unintended and 
unexpected 
impacts
• Understanding 
impact 
observations from 
other studies or 
data
• Number and type 
of participants
• Type of data 
collection tools to 
use
Longitudinal At least at 
two points 
in time, 
ideally before 
and after 
intervention 
under study
Advantages
• Direct comparison of 
data from before and 
after intervention, less 
recall bias
Disadvantages
• More expensive and 
dificult to conduct
• Long-term commitment 
of study participants 
required
• Understanding 
impacts evolving 
over time, such 
as attitude and 
behavioural 
changes
• Number and type 
of participants
• Type of data 
collection tools to 
use 
• Frequency of data 
collection rounds
• Time between data 
collection rounds
• How to motivate 
participants to 
commit to the 
study
• How to deal with 
dropouts
Case study At one or 
more points 
in time 
(cross-
sectional or 
longitudinal)
See advantages or 
disadvantages of  
cross-sectional and 
longitudinal designs (above)
• Understanding 
the holistic 
impact of an 
intervention 
• Number of cases 
to involve
• Type of cases to 
involve: typical or 
untypical
• Entity to treat 
as a case, such 
as individual, 
household, groups
• Speciically for 
cross-sectional or 
longitudinal case 
studies (above)
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7.5. Tools for data collection 
in qualitative impact 
assessment
In this section, we describe various 
methods of data collection used in qual-
itative research. These include inter-
views, group discussions, observation, 
storytelling, and participatory methods. 
In qualitative research, data collec-
tion methods are semi-structured and 
allow the researcher to explore issues 
in an open-ended manner. Whilst the 
issues  explored are generally around 
a set of domains of enquiry central to 
the research question, the explora-
tion is not limited to predetermined 
themes or topics. These may expand in 
response to findings in the field.
Key informant interviews 
Key informant interviews (KIIs) are 
qualitative, in-depth interviews con-
ducted with individuals who are 
selected on the basis of their superior 
knowledge about the subject being 
investigated. This may be by virtue of 
their position in an organisation, or 
because they are a good representative 
user, or because they are an expert on 
the issue. The purpose of these inter-
views is to collect information from 
people who have a good understanding 
of the research subject. 
In Young’s 2006 exploratory study of 
the impact of microinsurance, KIIs 
were held with experts in the field of 
microinsurance and field officers from 
the two non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) whose programmes were 
being studied. As part of his study 
on understanding the contribution of 
microinsurance to financial protection, 
Hintz (2010) conducted KIIs with 24 
experts from various fields: academ-
ics, religion, insurance, microfinance, 
and politics. These interviews were 
meant to gather background informa-
tion on social, cultural, and religious 
perceptions and behaviours observed 
amongst customers and beneficiar-
ies and to shed light on the relation 
of microinsurance to general social 
changes occurring in Indonesia. 
According to Wright and Copestake 
(2004), more experienced clients can 
be used as key informants for discuss-
ing wider or indirect impact. In order to 
build trust and minimise response bias, 
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respondents in the interviews need to 
understand where the researchers are 
from, what the data is being collected 
for, and how it will be used. This infor-
mation should be given to the respond-
ents at the start of the interview.
The KII guide is semi-structured, and 
the interviewer should probe deeper 
for each of the themes in the guide. 
An example of a  probe is, “Can you 
tell me something more about that?” 
If the interviewer is not clear about 
the respondent’s answer, he/she can 
repeat what she has understood so 
that the respondent can confirm his/
her understanding or correct it. Probes 
can be both planned and spontaneous. 
It is very important to find out local ter-
minology and use that in the interview 
to get good responses. 
A  trade-off exists between ques-
tions that act as prompts and open-
ended questions. In the former, the 
researcher introduces new ele-
ments or invites responses to a spe-
cific topic. Such questions risk not 
allowing the informant to answer 
using their own categories, but 
rather imposing categories based 
on the prejudices of the researcher 
and thus tainting the nature of the 
response. But without some struc-
ture, on the other hand, interviews 
may becoming unacceptably time 
consuming or irrelevant (Wright and 
Copestake 2004, 361).
There is also a  trade-off between 
degree of structure in interview and 
costs and expertise required for data 
collection, analysis, and interpreta-
tion. When an interview schedule is 
more structured, the responses are 
more likely to be comparable than 
when each interview is allowed to flow 
relatively freely. A  less structured 
schedule requires a  more skilled 
interviewer to ensure that all the key 
issues are covered and all the leads 
thrown up by the respondent in the 
course of the interview are followed 
through adequately. 
Another important tip mentioned by 
Wright and Copestake (2004) is to 
be attentive at the end of interviews. 
Informants often reveal the most use-
ful information when the formal inter-
view is declared over. Each key inform-
ant interview is usually conducted in 
one or two sittings. During data collec-
tion, it is best to capture the responses 
of the interviewee/participants verba-
tim without trying to interpret at this 
stage. If possible, it is advisable to 
use an audio to record the interview 
if the respondent permits. Verbatim 
recording also allows the researcher 
to pull out quotations—in the words 
of the respondent—which is an effec-
tive technique to illustrate and explain 
points made in the data analysis and 
adds to the strength of the research-
er’s interpretation. 
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Some Dos and Don’ts for KIIs4
Dos
• Familiarise yourself with your 
questions as much as possible in 
advance
• Listen and pick up on cues 
• Ask follow-up questions based 
on what you are hearing; use the 
participants’ words where possible
• Encourage participants to share 
anecdotes and specific experience—
avoid generalities
• Allow silences and accept pauses 
as natural; break the silence only if 
the respondent seems stuck
• Feel free to laugh and appreciate 
humour
• Monitor body language
• Catch discrepancies and try and 
seek clarification
Don’ts
• Ask leading questions (where the 
question contains hints or leads to 
answers)
• Make judgmental comments
• Interrupt the respondent or try to 
control the conversation
Focus group discussions
A  focus group discussion (FGD) is a 
“… carefully guided discussion to obtain 
4 This section on Dos and Don’ts has been adapted from 
Padgett (2008).
information on a limited number of key 
questions (3 - 4) through the synergy of 
social interaction and discourse among 
participants” (Barnes and Sebstad 
2000, 26).
FGDs are appropriate under a  variety 
of circumstances. These include
• when you want to understand moti-
vations and perceptions of clients;
• when you want to stimulate reflec-
tion and discussion on client satis-
faction or group dynamics; 
• when you need information to inter-
pret quantitative data; and, 
• when you need information quickly 
to address an issue, or participa-
tory principles are a priority for the 
researching organisation. 
An FGD is moderated by an individual 
who asks open-ended questions in 
a  manner that generates discussion 
amongst the participants. The mod-
erator has to be attentive to pick up 
leads and cues from the participants’ 
responses so that the discussion yields 
meaningful depth. The moderator also 
needs to be fully attentive to group 
dynamics and to ensure that the discus-
sion does not get hijacked by the agenda 
of some participants. 
The size of the group should be large 
enough to generate diversity of opin-
ion but small enough to give everyone 
the opportunity to participate in the 
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discussion. Ideally, FGDs should have six 
to eight participants, though FGDs are 
held with as few as three and as many as 
15 participants. 
Successful FGDs depend on equality 
and trust amongst participants. If the 
participants are in hierarchical rela-
tionships of say age, gender, or social 
class, the discussion will be dominated 
by the socially “superior” participants. 
It is therefore important to strike a bal-
ance between the homogeneity and het-
erogeneity of the group. Homogeneity, 
in terms of social class, will ensure that 
hierarchical relations do not prevent 
some people from being inhibited. At the 
same time, the group should comprise 
persons with diverse views and experi-
ences to generate a useful discussion of 
the research issue. 
In terms of procedure, it is useful to 
inform the FGD participants in advance 
about any remuneration they will 
receive in terms of transportation costs, 
a lunch, or compensation for their time 
for participating in the FGD. 
An FGD is primarily a group discussion. 
However, either before the discussion or 
at the end, it is important to collect some 
basic demographic information about 
each of the participants. This is helpful 
in terms of getting a sense of their socio-
economic background and also useful in 
case there is a need to contact the par-
ticipants at a later date. Respondents can 
fill out a simple form for this. If the FGD 
participants have limited literacy skills, 
the forms can be filled out for them. 
During the FGD it is important to ensure 
that all participants are engaged in the 
group discussion and no one is particu-
larly dominant or silent. This requires 
the moderator to be watchful of what 
is happening and of having the skill to 
make corrections without offending any 
of the participants. 
Sometimes FGDs can be the primary 
source of research data. An FGD is 
appropriate when the information being 
sought is not personal or confidential. 
For example, one or two persons begin 
sharing their experience about hav-
ing or not having insurance and it gets 
the others also to begin thinking how 
they are affected by having or not hav-
ing insurance. Thus, one purpose of an 
FGD is to stimulate the thinking of par-
ticipants through group discussion and 
make them come up with views and 
feelings that they may not have made 
explicit even to themselves prior to such 
a focused discussion on the topic.
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The selection of FGD participants 
needs to be determined by the 
researcher based on the research 
question and the study context. One 
common problem that can occur in an 
FGD is when the discussion becomes 
a  series of one-on-one conversations 
between the moderator and each of 
the participants. Instead of facilitating 
a discussion amongst the participants, 
the moderator takes on the role of an 
interviewer and seeks views and expe-
rience from each of the participants in 
turn. This falls short of the objective of 
the FGD, which is to generate a discus-
sion within the group.
Box 8: Example of a qualitative study using focus group discussions
Young (2006) set out to understand the impact of microinsurance and the level of finan-
cial protection it provided to members. Since it was an exploratory study, FGDs were the 
main data source. The two NGOs whose programmes provided the context of the study 
were FINCA Uganda and Save for Health Uganda (SHU). Amongst the FGDs conducted in 
the FINCA areas, there was a mix of current members, ex-members, and non-members 
of the insurance scheme. In the SHU groups, each of the FGDs had persons from dis-
crete categories.
Box 9: Example for a qualitative study using serial individual interviews in 
a group
In a  recent study on the impact of microinsurance, Hintz (2010) consciously used a 
method of serial individual interviews in a group, explicitly mentioning his reason for 
using this strategy. 
I prefer to speak of group questionings rather than focus group discussions because 
different from the classical focus group concept, there was hardly any free or 
loosely moderated discussion amongst the research participants on a given topic 
[...]. Instead the sessions consisted mostly of a systematic question and answering 
process between me and the participants (Hintz 2010, 142). 
He goes on to explain that he used this method “to achieve significant respondent num-
bers in a time-efficient way” (Hintz 2010, 143).
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Storytelling
Storytelling is an analytical narrative 
tool that has been used successfully 
in evaluation over a  range of organi-
sational and program contexts. Dia-
logical, narrative techniques—written, 
acted, and videoed—are powerful tools 
to explain change, identify emergent, 
unpredicted changes, and test organi-
sational assumptions about impact. 
They also provide space for local voices 
to be heard in the project evaluations.
The Most Significant Change (MSC) 
method, for example, is one such 
dialogical, story-based learning 
technique (Davies and Dart 2005). 
Essentially, the process involves the 
collection of significant change stories 
emanating from the field level and the 
systematic selection of the most sig-
nificant of these stories by panels of 
designated stakeholders or staff. The 
designated staff and stakeholders are 
initially involved by searching for pro-
ject impact. Once changes have been 
captured, selected groups of people sit 
down together, read the stories aloud, 
and have regular and, often, in-depth 
discussions about the value of these 
reported changes and which change 
they think is most significant. This 
is especially important in large pro-
grammes where there may be multiple 
levels at which significant change sto-
ries are pooled and then selected.
When the technique is implemented 
successfully, whole teams of people 
begin to focus their attention on pro-
gramme impact. As part of a  mixed-
method approach to learning, MSC can 
generate hypotheses about changes 
that took place, which can subse-
quently be tested using other methods. 
Observation (participant and direct) 
Another method of choice for qualita-
tive field studies, particularly applied 
in social anthropology, is (participa-
tory) observations (Malinowski 1944).5 
Observation as a  data collection 
method is different from KIIs and FGDs 
in that the latter two methods explicitly 
elicit responses from the interviewee 
or the FGD participant around some key 
topics in a short span of time. Both the 
5 The term participatory observation has mainly been coined 
by Malinowski who was one of the first researchers to use 
observations as method for anthropological field studies. 
Compare Malinowski (1944) for more details on the funda-
mentals to participatory observations. 
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researcher and the research subject 
engage in an activity—conversation in 
this case—to generate data. Observa-
tion, in contrast, does not require the 
research subject to do anything other 
than continue with his/her normal rou-
tines. The researcher gathers data 
by observing the research subjects 
in their natural settings. Observation 
yields data that may not be reported in 
interviews and FGDs where respond-
ents may not disclose or recall fully. 
Observation may be participant or 
direct, i.e., non-participant. “When 
one’s concern is the experience of peo-
ple, the way they think, feel and act, the 
most truthful, reliable, complete and 
simple way of getting that information 
is to share their experience (through 
participant observation)” (Douglas 
1976, 112). Participant observation 
involves social interaction between 
the researcher and informants in the 
milieu of the latter. The objective is for 
the researcher to study first-hand the 
day-to-day experiences and behaviour 
of subjects (Waddington 2004). This 
method is usually time consuming and 
needs immersion in the local commu-
nity to gain their acceptance. 
In direct observation, unlike participant 
observation, the researcher may sim-
ply position his/herself as an observer 
of a situation without taking on a spe-
cific role in the research milieu.
Typically, a researcher using observa-
tion follows an inductive strategy for 
generating categories and uses his/
her initial observations to formulate 
a hypotheses. Research ethics require 
that the observer make full disclosure 
about the decision to be an observer. 
As a  research method, observation 
has risk of reactivity—that is, changes 
that occur in the behaviour of the 
observed due to the researcher’s pres-
ence. A related issue is the degree of 
the researcher’s involvement from 
total participation at one end, to sim-
ply observing at the other end. Whilst 
a  high degree of involvement of the 
researcher may yield rich insights, it 
runs the risk of researcher fatigue and 
the researcher becoming so involved 
that sight of the goal is lost—also 
known as “going native”. There are 
hardly any studies in the field of micro-
insurance that have used observation 
as a strategy for data collection. 
Box 10: Example for a qualitative study using observation as a supplemen-
tary technique
In his recent study described above, Hintz (2010) uses observation as a supplementary 
technique. He was actually a functionary in the insurance programme he was studying 
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Participatory data collection methods
In order to avoid or minimise asymmetric 
situations between the researchers and 
and was thus ideally positioned to be in the role of a participant observer, since he had 
a legitimate position in the programme. However, he prefers to call himself an observ-
ing participant. This is perhaps because his research came after he had already started 
working in that context; he did not enter the context as a researcher. Hintz (2010) talks 
of personal observations as something that enriched the other data collection methods 
such as personal interviews and group questionings.
Box 11: Community-based oral testimony approach of the Goldin Institute
One example for a participatory data collection approach related to the method of story-
telling described above is the community-based oral testimony. This strategy, developed 
by the Goldin Institute, a non-profit organisation from Chicago, involves people from 
the community under study in the data collection process (Goldin Institute, n.d.). This 
approach was used in a study on the impact of a microcredit programme in Bangladesh: 
We adopted a strategy known as “oral testimony” which relies on extended semi-
structured interviews to let participants tell their own stories in their own words, 
share their opinions and experiences and convey their own understandings of how 
development and poverty has transformed the history of their lives and villages. 
We wanted to take this approach a step further. Often, oral testimony research is 
coloured by power-dynamics between “researchers” and “subjects”. Within these 
dynamics, answers to questions are often pre-determined by what each party 
expects to hear from the other. We decided to address this by inviting microcredit 
recipients in Arampur, a  village in rural Northern Bangladesh, to interview each 
other about their own experiences with loans. We hoped that the content of these 
interviews would be shaped by mutual dialogue, rather than by top down agendas 
and expectations about what we, as researchers, wanted to hear. In order to do 
this, we trained a group of villagers in basic, qualitative research techniques and 
invited them to interview their peers and neighbours. The result was open-ended, 
conversation-style interviews, recorded using digital-audio recorders, in which 
the interviewees participated in directing the discussion by framing conversations 
through stories, life experiences, and their own personal histories with microcredit 
lending organizations. Using this approach we heard what people had to say about 
microcredit on their own terms (Goldin Institute, n.d.).
the participants, other participatory data 
collection methods can also be used. 
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A participatory method that could be 
easily adopted for impact assess-
ments of microinsurance is the Peer 
Ethnographic Evaluation and Research 
(PEER) (Hawkins and Price 2000). 
Originally developed for monitoring 
the impact of sexual and reproductive 
health programmes, it is a  powerful 
tool for understanding local interpreta-
tions of change and attributing changes 
to external interventions. PEER involves 
training members of a target or benefi-
ciary community to conduct research, 
centred on conversational interviews, 
within their own social network or 
peer group under the supervision of an 
experienced researcher. 
In Jamaica, for example, PEER was 
sequenced with participatory score-
cards in urban and rural communities 
to monitor and evaluate the impact 
that social policy had on relations 
between youths and police officers. 
Whilst the PEER method maintains 
clearly-defined roles of interview-
ers and interviewees, participants in 
the community-based oral testimony 
method (described in box 11) interview 
each other mutually, dissolving the 
distinction between researchers and 
subjects. In both methods, interview-
ers are no longer researchers from 
outside, but consist of members of the 
peer group of the participants.
Social mapping
Mapping of social difference and social 
change by local people became widely 
known and facilitated from the early 
1990s. Chambers (2008, 133) observes 
a “phenomenal spread” in participatory 
mapping, through traditional methods 
as well as through innovations with 
spatial information technologies.
Although—at least to our knowledge—
not yet used for evaluations in the field 
of microinsurance, mapping has been 
used effectively during the past two 
decades for the kinds of social analy-
sis that underpins much qualitative 
research. 
Box 12: Examples for social mapping
Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP) in Malawi 
A participatory evaluation of the Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP) in Malawi, for exam-
ple, aggregated numerical data from group-based mapping of food insecure house-
holds as a standardised subcomponent of a  flexible participatory process (Barahona 
and Levy 2003).
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7.6. Conclusion
Qualitative approaches to impact 
assessment are especially well suited 
when processes of impact should be 
explored, identified, and understood in 
depth. They have the advantage of being 
open to unexpected findings, susceptive 
to perceptions of the study group, and 
flexible in their research design. Never-
theless, qualitative impact designs have 
been pushed into the background by the 
increasing popularity of experimental 
designs (i.e., randomised controlled tri-
als (RCT)).7 However, as shown, qualita-
tive impact studies have a value of their 
6 For more information see http://mapkibera.org.
7 Compare Prowse (2007) and Patton (2008, 440 et seq.) as 
examples of critical voices on the overemphasis of RCTs and 
the lack of involvement of qualitative study parts in RCTs.
own: besides exploring what would be 
valuable to be measured, qualitative 
methods can help to understand what 
is measured in quantitative and experi-
mental approaches and open the black 
box to assess whether the assumed 
theories of change hold. Furthermore, 
they can give insight about impact of 
microinsurance in cases where quan-
titative methods—like RCTs—are diffi-
cult to implement or might not be suf-
ficient (e.g., for cases where the insured 
event has very low probability of occur-
ring). Both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to impact assessment have 
their strengths and weaknesses and 
are appropriate for specific research 
interests. Thus, whenever possible, 
both approaches should be combined 
to obtain a full picture of the impact of 
a microinsurance programme.
Ubudehe in Rwanda
Social mapping has been taken to scale in Rwanda as part of the Ubudehe community 
group activity tradition. Some 15,000 communities across the country have produced 
and analysed social maps as the basis for household poverty categorisation and analy-
sis, community planning and resource allocation (Joseph 2008).
MAP Kibera in Kenya
In Kenya, MAP Kibera is a social mapping project in Nairobi’s largest slum.6 One MAP 
Kibera team, consisting of 13 young people from the community who were trained in 
open source mapping techniques, created a map around security and vulnerability. This 
map contained unsafe spaces (i.e., places where drugs and alcohol are consumed), safe 
spaces (i.e., girl groups, community centres, areas with enhanced lighting), resources 
(i.e., gender-based violence clinics) and more. This data was loaded to an online free 
and open source map, then shared with the community in order to prompt community 
reflection and action and empower community members to engage with local authori-
ties on issues such as street naming and street lighting.
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7.7. Examples of qualitative impact assessments 
in microinsurance and other fields of microfinance
Example 1
Young, P. (2006): “Microinsurance—Exploring Ways to Assess its Impact.” 
Purpose of study
• To explore changes in household financial behaviour and risk coping strategies as 
a result of having insurance
• To identify and refine indicators to assess microinsurance impact
Issues examined
• How do behaviours, knowledge, skills, and attitude differ between the insured and 
uninsured?
• How does microinsurance improve the household’s ability to smooth consumption 
and income?
• How does microinsurance change the ability of households to withstand economic 
shocks?
• How does microinsurance protect asset base and what is the effect of this?
• Does microinsurance have impact at the level of the enterprise?
• The study also attempts to identify indicators to measure impact.
Context
The study wanted to explore the research questions in life and health insurance. They 
selected research sites where FINCA Uganda was operating in urban areas and Save for 
Health Uganda in rural areas.
Research design
Cross-sectional, retrospective
Methods used
Expert interviews with 24 experts
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Example 2
Hintz, M. (2010): “Micro-Impact: Deconstructing the complex impact process of a simple 
microinsurance product in Indonesia.”
Purpose of study
To study the social impact of an obligatory credit life microinsurance product
Issues examined
• What happens when microinsurance enters a community and why does this happen?
• Does credit life insurance ameliorate postmortem financial crisis amongst low-
asset families and prevent further reduction of their asset base?
• Researcher has a holistic and social perspective, seeking to understand the dynam-
ics of impact processes rather than exactly measure them, and takes a  strongly 
localised approach.
Context
A credit life insurance scheme for low-asset families in Indonesia
Research design
Longitudinal (baseline/end line)
Methods used
Qualitative-explorative 
• Baseline/end line comparison of insured members
• Beneficiary interviews
• Group questioning (174 persons in 17 groups for baseline; 139 persons in 19 groups 
for end line)
• Heavy reliance on triangulation
• Researcher as observing participant
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Example 3
Copestake, J., H. Gosnell, D. Musona, G. Masumbu, and W. Mlotshwa (2001): “Impact 
monitoring and assessment of microfinance services provided by CETZAM on the Zam-
bian Copperbelt: 1991–2001.” 
Source: Copestake et al. (2002)
Purpose of study
To understand the causation of impact of microfinance
Issues examined
• Changes in intra-household relations
• Changes at individual, business, household, and community level
Context
Impact assessment in a microfinance organisation on the Copperbelt in Zambia
Research design
Longitudinal (combination of closed questionnaire for baseline and qualitative inter-
views for end line)
Methods used
• In-depth interviews
• Group discussions 
Reliability
• Attribution of impact was based primarily on coherence of respondents’ own accounts 
of causal chains linking their membership of credit groups to issues examined.
• Plausibility of respondents’ accounts was checked with direct observation and dis-
cussions with loan officers and other group members.
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Example 4
Wright, K. (2001): “Women’s participation in microcredit schemes: evidence from 
Cajamarca and Lima, Peru.”
Source: Copestake et al. (2002). 
Purpose of study
To understand the social processes affecting microcredit outcomes
Issues examined
• Microenterprise activities and motivation for taking out credit
• Changes in the family and microenterprise
• Decision making and male and female roles in the household
• Perceptions of and aspirations for the future
Research design
Cross-sectional, retrospective
Context
Microfinance programme in low income settings in urban and rural Peru
Methods used
Detailed interviews in the form of guided conversations
162
Example 5
McGuinness, E. (2011): “A Fine Balance: A Case Study of the Client Value of Health Micro-
insurance — Uplift I.A.”
Purpose of study
To investigate whether the Uplift health microinsurance program created financial 
value for the members.
Issue examined
• Does Uplift health microinsurance protect households financially? 
• If so, how? 
• Are the out-of-pocket payments of insured households lower than those of unin-
sured households?
• How does the unique community-managed reimbursement process at Uplift influ-
ence the financial protection effect of the insurance?
Context
Health microinsurance programme in India
Research design
Household case studies, cross-sectional and retrospective
Methods used
• In-depth interviews
• Short questionnaires
• Documentary analysis (claims data)
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Example 6
McGuinness, E. and J. Mandel (2010): “Assessment of Health Microinsurance Outcomes 
in the Northern Areas, Pakistan - Baseline Report.”
Purpose of study
To assess whether health microinsurance programme reduces vulnerability of house-
holds to risks and how.
Context
Baseline report for impact assessment of health microinsurance programme in 
Pakistan
Research design
Cross-sectional (baseline for later research)
Methods used
• Focus group discussions
• Semi-structured interviews
• Structured interviews
• Key informant interviews
• Secondary data and monitoring reports
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Example 7
Copestake, J. et al. (2005): “Monitoring the Diversity of the Poverty Outreach and Impact 
of Microfinance: A Comparison of Methods Using Data from Peru.”
Purpose of study
To assess poverty outreach and impact of a microcredit programme in Peru (compari-
son of quantitative and qualitative impact assessment methods).
Context
Microcredit programme in Peru
Research design
• Qualitative: cross-sectional (retrospective changes in last year)
• Quantitative: longitudinal with control group
Methods used
• Qualitative: in-depth interviews
• Quantitative: household survey
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Example 8
Hietalahti, J. and M. Linden (2006): “Socio-economic Impacts of Microfinance and Repay-
ment Performance: a Case Study of the Small Enterprise Foundation, South Africa.”
Purpose of study
To gain a better understanding of how microcredit projects impact on rural women’s 
livelihood structures, and how they can strengthen women’s welfare.
Context
Microcredit programme in South Africa
Research design
Case study of microcredit programme
Methods used
Semi-structured interviews
166
Example 9
Solomon, Y. et al. (2002): “Outreach, Impact, and Sustainability of Informal Banking: 
A Case Study of the Ouelessebougou-Utah Alliance Microenterprise Program in Mali.” 
Purpose of study
To determine if this project is truly reaching people traditionally excluded from formal 
financial institutions, namely women and the poor.
Context
Microcredit programme in Mali
Research design
Case study of microcredit programme
Methods Used
• Individual interviews
• Focus group discussions
• Informal discussions and documents
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Example 10
Goldin Institute (n.d.): “Community-Based Oral Testimony: A Different Approach to 
Knowledge.”
Purpose of study
Learn about people’s experiences with microcredit loans.
Context
Microcredit programme in Bangladesh
Research design
Cross-sectional
Methods used
In-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted by local members of the community
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Example 11
Blanchard-Horan, C. (2006): “Malaria Treatment-Seeking Behavior in Kisiizi, Uganda: 
Health Microinsurance among Engozi Groups.”
Purpose of study
To examine how health microinsurance influences malaria treatment-seeking behav-
iour in Uganda.
Context
Health microinsurance programme in Uganda
Research design
Cross sectional household case studies (“case-comparison study”)
Methods used
In-depth, semi-structured interviews with open and closed-ended questions
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8.1. Introduction
The preceding chapters discussed dif-
ferent approaches for assessing the 
impact of microinsurance, ranging 
from experimental and quasi-experi-
mental (i.e., quantitative) approaches 
to qualitative approaches. However, 
these approaches should not be con-
sidered competing methodologies but 
rather complementary. A  combina-
tion of different methods, in particular 
a combination of quantitative methods 
together with qualitative ones, pro-
vides insights strengthening the policy 
relevance of impact assessments.
Qualitative studies are employed as 
exploratory studies, preceding the 
quantitative work in order to explore 
topics to assess with quantitative anal-
ysis. However, there are many other 
ways of mixing methods, as shown 
by the following examples. Increased 
income is a commonly intended effect of 
crop microinsurance for insured farm-
ers, since theory suggests that allowing 
farmers to take riskier but higher return 
investment decisions will result in 
higher income. This effect can be mea-
sured with quantitative methods, such 
as a randomised controlled trial (RCT). 
But what if a quantitative study applied 
to a microinsurance scheme finds that 
there is no difference in income between 
treatment and control group? A possible 
explanation for this finding could be that 
there simply is no causal relationship 
between microinsurance and income. 
However, there exist various other 
potential and plausible explanations: 
for example, it could have been that no 
seeds were available for purchase other 
than the ones farmers used before. In 
this case, lack of options would be the 
reason for stagnant income rather than 
a  missing causal relationship between 
microinsurance and income under the 
right conditions. Hence, a  succeeding 
study would unpack the causal chain 
for the farmer’s investment choices and 
explain the lack of increase in income. 
And, so, the insurance scheme can 
be adapted accordingly, and has also 
generated learning effects for other 
schemes. 
However, qualitative methods alone 
can lead to unsatisfying results. Take, 
for example, a study with focus group 
discussions assessing the impact of 
a  health microinsurance scheme. The 
participants might report that—despite 
being insured and health-care costs 
being at least partially covered by 
insurance—they still cannot seek suf-
ficient treatment and that expenditures 
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on health remain very high. In this 
case, a  quantitative study would be 
useful to measure the spending (total 
and out-of-pocket) on health care both 
for a treatment and a control group. 
Both the above examples make the 
case for mixed methods: combining 
quantitative with qualitative analysis in 
order to assess the impact of microin-
surance schemes. 
8.2. What are mixed 
methods?
There are two parts to the definition of 
mixed methods: 1) methods, i.e., range of 
data collection processes, and 2) mixed, 
i.e., the combination of these diverse 
data into a  single analysis. For most 
research teams, achieving a  genuine 
mix of methods is a difficult challenge.
As Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) 
suggest in their definition of mixed 
methods research, it is not only the 
mix of methods, but also the under-
lying philosophical assumptions that 
determine this kind of research: 
Mixed methods research is 
a research design with philosophical 
assumptions as well as methods of 
inquiry. As a methodology, it involves 
philosophical assumptions that 
guide the direction of the collection 
and analysis of data and the mixture 
of qualitative and quantitative data 
in a  single study or series of stud-
ies. Its central premise is that the 
use of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in combination provides 
a  better understanding of research 
problems than either approach alone 
(Creswell and Plano Clark 2007, 5).
Whilst the examples above suggest 
combinations of quantitative and qual-
itative approaches and the term mixed 
methods is usually understood as this, 
the distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative can become difficult to 
maintain once engaged in actual field 
work. Participatory methods can gen-
erate numerical data while responses 
to quantitative surveys such as on sub-
jective perceptions or views on prior-
ity projects may enter the qualitative 
domain. A more useful definition of the 
term mixed methods is analysis using 
data generated from different data col-
lection processes (see table 1).1
1 See Bamberger et al. (2010, 3) for a discussion around this 
point.
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Table 1: Data from different kinds of data collection instruments
Data collection instrument Possible uses
Project documents Describing intervention and elaborating 
programme theory
Expert knowledge (academic papers or interviews 
with experts) 
Elaboration of programme theory
Academic literature on intervention type and 
region of intervention
Forming evaluation questions
Principal investigators exposure to ield (with 
some structured components)
Contextualisation for study, understanding of 
causal linkages
Beneiciary focus groups Identifying priority and possible unintended 
outcomes
Structured surveys Statistical analysis of the counterfactual
Statistically representative presentation of the 
factual
However, just using both qualitative 
and quantitative data collection instru-
ments is not sufficient to be considered 
a mixed methods approach. In the case 
of impact evaluation, a  further useful 
distinction is between factual and coun-
terfactual analysis. A  theory-based 
impact evaluation will mix (combine) 
both factual and counterfactual anal-
ysis. The counterfactual analysis is the 
analysis of attribution, that is, measur-
ing the impact by comparing treatment 
and comparison groups, using experi-
mental or quasi-experimental designs. 
In contrast, factual analysis does not 
rely on a comparison group, but is sim-
ply describing what happened in the 
treatment area. Such factual analysis 
is an important part of a theory-based 
impact evaluation. The factual anal-
ysis may be either quantitative, such 
as a targeting analysis of who benefits 
from the scheme, or qualitative, such 
as focus group discussions of alterna-
tive risk coping mechanisms to under-
stand the demand for microinsurance. 
Table 2 shows these categories. Many 
impact evaluations focus only on the 
categories described in the top right 
cell, which limits their ability to give 
policy relevant conclusions.
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8.3. What are the potential 
advantages of mixed 
methods?
Mixed methods strengthen impact 
evaluation designs in the following 
important ways:
• Studies should be driven by issues 
(questions), not methods. Having 
a range of methods at hand means 
that all questions can be addressed, 
not just those amenable to par-
ticular methods. Some evaluation 
questions need quantitative data, 
and some need qualitative data.
• Quantitative analysis can be 
strengthened in a  number of ways 
by using qualitative methods, such 
as data on context to inform survey 
design for quantitative data collec-
tion and casting light on the inter-
pretation of quantitative results (see 
examples in section 8.5).
• Vice versa, qualitative analysis can 
be strengthened in a  number of 
ways by using quantitative meth-
ods. This is true for both factual and 
counterfactual analysis, supporting 
qualitative results by quantitative 
measures. For example, unpacking 
the causal chain (as in theory-based 
impact evaluation) by qualitative 
analysis often requires answering 
a number of quantitative evaluation 
questions as well, or at least having 
numbers on hand helps to do this.
• Purely quantitative impact evalua-
tions are sometimes criticised as 
having strong internal validity but 
weak external validity (e.g., Leeuw 
and Vaessen 2009; Cartwright 
2007). Mixing methods provides 
more context for the intervention 
and so a better understanding as to 
which settings the results may be 
generalised. 
8.4. How mixed methods may 
be used
Mixed methods can be used in the fol-
lowing three ways, as described by 
Carvalho and White (1997):
1. Integrating methodologies. Com-
bining quantitative and qualita-
tive work in part of the evaluation, 
this can be both concomitant and 
sequential, and for the latter, both 
Table 2: Categories of analysis
Factual Counterfactual
Quantitative Analysis of impact questions in 
treatment group
Experimental or quasi-experimental 
analysis using comparison groups
Qualitative Understanding of working of the 
causal chain
Constructing of small n 
counterfactuals
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kinds of studies can succeed or 
precede each other. As in the exam-
ple given above, a qualitative study 
may succeed a  quantitative one in 
order to explain the results from 
the quantitative part and to unpack 
the causal chain, in particular if 
unexpected results occur. However, 
a  qualitative study may also pre-
cede a  quantitative one in order to 
explore potential impacts and out-
comes. Very often, microinsurance 
schemes are different in practice 
than planned on paper. Conducting 
quantitative and qualitative studies 
concomitant to each other can help 
with understanding the context and 
how the intervention works in prac-
tice at field level. Thus, they can 
strengthen each other’s results. 
Take, for example, a  health micro-
insurance scheme with insurance 
for outpatient treatment at partic-
ular local medical practitioner or 
in a  particular clinic. Quantitative 
methods may show no increase in 
health care utilisation for the treat-
ment group and, indeed, higher 
total costs of health care. However, 
qualitative methods, such as focus 
group discussions, might reveal 
dissatisfaction and lack of trust 
with the insurance’s practitioner. 
Hence, the insured go to other prac-
titioners, without making use of the 
insurance. In combination, these 
data reveal valuable insight into 
microinsurance in practice.
2. Confirming, refuting, enriching, 
and explaining the findings of one 
approach with those of the other. This 
is possible when applying the concept 
of triangulation, by which different 
methods support the same conclu-
sions (confirming), or do so whilst 
adding more understanding (enrich-
ing). Triangulation is an important and 
often used concept in mixed methods 
research. Such triangulation makes 
the study findings more convincing. 
However, there may be cases when 
data conflict with one another (refut-
ing), in which case further work is 
needed to resolve or understand this 
conflict. Take, for example, a  health 
microinsurance programme. Ask-
ing about different illnesses by using 
a quantitative, structured survey may 
show that health has increased within 
the treatment group. However, at the 
same time, results of focus group 
discussions of insured or of key infor-
mant interviews with physicians or 
hospital staff reveal that health has 
worsened. On the one hand, qualita-
tive samples might easily be biased 
in their coverage, with a more formal 
sample survey giving a more repre-
sentative view. On the other hand, 
quantitative surveys might neglect 
important issues of the causal chains. 
Hence, complementary studies are 
needed to explain this apparent con-
tradiction in findings.2
2 For more on this please see Pluye et al. 2009.
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3. Merging the findings of the two 
approaches into one set of policy 
recommendations. Whilst quali-
tative work can identify possible 
problems in an intervention, rep-
resentative structured surveys can 
better capture how widespread 
these problems are. But, the impor-
tance of storytelling in conveying 
policy messages is well known, 
with qualitative data being a  good 
source of stories on which to base 
proposed policies. Hence, it can be 
useful to draw on both approaches 
to make policy recommendations.
8.5. Examples of mixed 
methods in microinsurance
If understood and used in the way 
described above, mixed methods can 
be a useful approach providing insights 
into many issues related to the impact 
of microinsurance. The following 
examples show this usefulness: 
• Morsink (2012) applied mixed meth-
ods research in an empirical study 
to investigate and test the ques-
tion of why low-income households 
from rural Filipino communities 
demand natural disaster rehous-
ing microinsurance and whether 
microinsurance has an effect on 
poverty reduction for this socio-
economic group. For this analysis, 
focus group discussions (FGDs) to 
assess village characteristics were 
conducted with participants of dif-
ferent attributes such as gender, 
age, and social status. These FGDs 
preceded quantitative household 
surveys, whilst focus group discus-
sions with insured and  uninsured 
were conducted alongside the 
surveys. In addition, administra-
tive data was used to solve issues 
with causality. The results show, 
amongst other things, that micro-
insurance can reduce the negative 
influence that a shock has on future 
economic growth. 
• Although focusing on qualitative 
methods, Hintz (2010) comple-
mented his explorative study of 
a credit life microinsurance pilot in 
Indonesia by quantitative methods. 
Qualitative interviews with Muslim 
beneficiaries were complemented 
with additional baseline and end 
line surveys with customers, as 
well as with additional research 
with members of other (functional) 
groups, like credit group leaders or 
loan officers. The study reveals that 
the intended developmental impact 
was very low—labelled “micro-im-
pact”—but shows the complex 
interplay of the insurance prod-
uct with the sociocultural context, 
leading to extensive social impact. 
Amongst others, crowding-out 
effects regarding traditional forms 
of family assistance were identi-
fied, as well as a possible inflation 
of funeral costs. However, there 
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was also evidence that financial 
literacy, as well as peace of mind 
of the insured, was increased by 
microinsurance, although, for some 
insured, this feeling of security 
decreased on account of religion 
and superstition.
• The “Client Math” approach, designed 
within the framework of the Micro-
insurance Learning and Knowledge 
(MILK) project by the MicroInsurance 
Centre, is based on a  mixed meth-
ods approach, aimed at assessing 
the value of microinsurance for the 
poor.3 Based on a  carefully devel-
oped theory of change, focus group 
discussions are used for refining the 
hypothesis and for deepening the 
understanding of the functioning of 
the product and the according value 
chain. This qualitative study part is 
then the basis for developing a sam-
pling strategy (taking into account 
specific groups, e.g., by age or gen-
der) and subsequent quantitative 
interviews. One distinctive feature of 
the Client Math approach is that par-
ticipants for the treatment group are 
chosen after experiencing a  finan-
cial shock, rather than waiting for 
a shock to happen. This has certain 
advantages for assessing the value 
of the insurance scheme, in partic-
ular for schemes covering low-fre-
quency risks. However, because of 
this sampling approach, and the 
3 Compare Magnoni, McCord, and Zimmerman 2012 for this 
and the following section.
fact that the number of participants 
both for treatment and control group 
is relatively low (usually including 
up to 30 participants for each), the 
approach does not allow for statis-
tical evidence. Hence the approach 
cannot determine effects in a causal 
sense, but can rather be understood 
as complementary to statistical and, 
especially, experimental methods. By 
providing numbers, comparing them 
for claimants and non-insured, and 
taking into account contextual infor-
mation, the Client Math approach 
can provide valuable insight into 
potential gains that microinsurance 
can have for the poor. Therefore, it 
can help to deepen the understand-
ing of the value that microinsurance 
schemes may have. This does, in 
particular, hold for low-frequency 
risks for which impact of microin-
surance is difficult to achieve with 
statistical methods. This approach 
has, for example, been used for gain-
ing insight into the value of property 
microinsurance in coastal Colum-
bia or catastrophe microinsurance 
in Haiti (Magnoni and Poulton 2013; 
Magnoni and Budzyna 2013). 
8.6. Meeting the challenges 
to mixing methods in mixed 
methods studies
Mixed methods are frequently lauded 
in the social sciences, and the fathers 
of social science, such as Durkheim 
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and Marx, readily combined quanti-
tative and qualitative data. But as dif-
ferent disciplines have specialised, 
the use of methods has grown apart. 
Economics—and in the United States, 
political science and sociology—have 
taken the path of mathematical mod-
eling and advanced statistical analy-
sis. This divergence of paths creates 
problems for agencies wishing to 
commission rigorous impact stud-
ies of their programmes. Those with 
the necessary skills in counterfactual 
analysis do not generally have skills in 
qualitative analysis or mixed methods. 
Moreover, motivation to adopt mixed 
methods is not facilitated by the need 
to publish in high-ranked journals in 
their discipline, which mostly requires 
technical sophistry rather than practi-
cal insights.
Across both Europe—especially the 
UK—and South Asia, there is a strong 
tradition of development studies, which 
has always strived to achieve interdis-
ciplinary research. But the reality has 
been one of multidisciplinary research, 
with parallel studies. Achieving a true 
mixed methods impact evaluation 
design is thus a  serious challenge. 
Here are some pointers toward achiev-
ing that outcome.
• Establish very clear vocabulary on 
the evaluation questions, requiring 
an inception report which identifies 
the data to be used for answering 
those questions.
• Include a range of skills and expe-
rience in the evaluation team. Even 
more important is ensuring that 
the lead investigator is engaged 
in all aspects of the study and has 
the capacity to do so. Having other 
team members who can also bridge 
studies will help.
• Work with the whole team on the 
development of the causal chain and 
identification of underlying assump-
tions, requiring them to indicate 
what evidence they can bring to 
bear on which questions.
• Include a mix of skills in the external 
review panel. Ideally, the experts 
would have high professional stand-
ing combined with practical expe-
rience in the policy/programme 
domain.
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8.7. Conclusions
This chapter has discussed how differ-
ent methods can be mixed for impact 
assessments in microinsurance and 
how the application of mixed methods 
research can contribute to better insight 
and higher validity. Application of dif-
ferent methods—quantitative and qual-
itative, factual and counterfactual—in 
parallel and sequentially can be valu-
able. Often, qualitative studies are used 
in an exploratory way, being employed 
as preparation for quantitative, coun-
terfactual studies (i.e., experimental or 
quasi-experimental ones). The range of 
possible and valuable combinations of 
qualitative and quantitative methods is 
much wider. This range should be fully 
assessed in order to deepen the insight 
into potential impacts and outcomes 
of microinsurance to the welfare of 
the poor. By doing so, not only can 
insight be gained ex-post, but learning 
processes can be initiated in order to 
improve other schemes. Moreover, by 
combining different methods, insights 
regarding the generalisation of suc-
cessful schemes can be made, which 
is of particular importance in practice 
when conducting a pilot project, trans-
ferring schemes to another context, or 
when scaling-up. Therefore, applying 
mixed methods for impact assess-
ments in microinsurance is crucial in 
order to gain insight into how microin-
surance schemes can affect the lives of 
the poor. 
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9.1. Introduction
In recent years, extensive efforts have 
been made to improve and standardise 
the methods by which the impacts 
of microinsurance programmes are 
measured. In particular, the increased 
use of the scientifically rigorous ran-
domised controlled trial (RCT) tech-
nique in programme evaluations has 
led to a welcome increase in the accu-
racy of recorded impacts on many 
development interventions. This has 
raised the methodological bar against 
which evidence is judged. However, 
relatively little time has been spent 
considering what should be measured 
to assess impact. Indicators may be 
accurately measured under a  rigor-
ous methodology—but if a  poor met-
ric of the intended outcome is used, or 
important impacts are not examined, 
the evaluation may generate mislead-
ing evidence and malformed policy. 
This chapter provides guidance to eval-
uators on how to design a set of indi-
cators that will effectively and holis-
tically measure the impact of their 
microinsurance intervention. Section 
1 provides some background on how 
to determine the events to monitor 
and the types of indicators to use on 
a  microinsurance evaluation. Section 
2 provides guidance on formulating 
high-quality indicators, and provides 
a  list of the characteristics to which 
effective indicators should conform. 
Section 3 presents an overview and 
typology of the forms of indicators that 
have been commonly used to date in 
microinsurance evaluations. 
9.2. Choosing research areas 
and methods
A performance indicator is any metric 
used to measure or assess the effect 
of an intervention or some aspect of 
an intervention. Researchers look at 
performance indicators to answer 
key evaluation questions. An insur-
ance scheme, like any intervention, 
generates a  huge number of effects: 
processes run, opinions changed, 
behaviours affected. A  vast amount 
of data could potentially be captured. 
However, limits of time and cost dic-
tate that an evaluation can capture 
only a  sliver of this information. The 
key problem faced by the evaluator is 
choosing a set of indicators that illumi-
nate the most important elements of 
the intervention and will form a cohe-
sive story of the whole from a  limited 
number of pieces. This is like taking 
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pictures of a  family holiday: the holi-
day might be two weeks long, but you 
can only take snapshots of a  few key 
moments, and hope that you choose 
these in such a  way that they give 
a good outline of the course of events. 
Evaluators have the additional handi-
cap of having to decide much of what 
they are going to measure in advance; 
so, it is really like trying to decide on 
the photos you will take before your 
holiday begins! 
In order to make educated decisions 
in advance as to what areas and types 
of information are likely to be worth 
examining, the evaluator must be 
aware of the range and formats of 
indicators available. The following 
discussion outlines some key quali-
ties of indicators that evaluators can 
use to determine what to measure 
and how.
Processes, outcomes, and impacts
A first set of distinctions between indi-
cators refers to the level at which an 
indicator is measured. Indicators can 
usually be placed into one of three 
levels:
• Process indicators are metrics 
that examine the extent to which 
a  scheme has run in the man-
ner expected or the success of 
a  scheme in reaching operational 
targets. They examine the inputs 
made into the operation of the 
scheme, i.e., internal aspects of 
scheme administration that can 
be considered to be largely under 
the control of the staff working 
on and managing the insurance 
scheme. In the insurance context, 
process indicators might include: 
the proportion of a  local popula-
tion who have been contacted by 
an insurance education campaign, 
the proportion of insurance clients 
to whom claim forms have been 
pre-distributed, or the proportion 
of claims processed via correct 
formal channels.
• Outcome indicators examine the 
extent to which the operation of 
the scheme has been turned into 
a tangible and direct short- or mid-
term result. They often examine 
external changes in the behaviour 
or situation of those covered by 
the scheme that are a direct result 
of the scheme being in operation. 
In a  health insurance context, the 
average reduction in out-of-pocket 
(OOP) expenditures on inpatient (IP) 
care is a commonly-used indicator 
in the outcome category. 
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• Impact indicators examine the extent 
to which the scheme in question has 
led to long-term effects. These are 
often external effects of the scheme 
that are indirectly facilitated, but 
not directly caused by it. To return 
to the health insurance example, 
an impact indicator might be the 
reduction in the number of individ-
uals falling below the poverty line 
due to the costs of an inpatient care 
episode.
It should be apparent that these three 
levels of indicators are linked to each 
other: processes need to run in order 
to create an outcome, and outcomes 
need to happen in order to generate 
an impact. Figure 1 gives an example 
of the relationship between process, 
outcome, and impact indicators. Imag-
ine evaluators are examining a health 
microinsurance scheme in a develop-
ing country that provides cover in the 
case of high-cost health events. 
Figure 1: Example of a relationship between process, outcome, and impact 
indicators for households (HHs)
Process Outcome Impact
Pre-Insurance 
% of HHs 
falling below 
poverty line
% of 
HHs
 given
insurance
literacy 
training
% of 
HHs 
purchasing
insurance
% of claims 
processed 
within 
48 hours
% of HHs 
using asset 
sales / loans
Post-
Insurance % 
of HHs falling 
below poverty 
line
The ultimate development aim of the 
scheme is to reduce the incidence 
of poverty (percentage of house-
holds (HHs) falling below the poverty 
line) resulting from selling house-
hold assets or taking on high-inter-
est loans in order to finance high-cost 
health events. A  baseline survey is 
taken to measure the percentage of 
households that have fallen below the 
poverty line due to high-cost health 
events in recent months. Following 
this, five key indicators are defined. 
Evaluators begin by focusing on the 
operation of the scheme itself and the 
extent to which it has run as planned. 
They define three key process indi-
cators: firstly, the extent of an insur-
ance literacy training programme 
administered to the local population; 
secondly, the proportion of the popu-
lation convinced to take up insurance; 
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and, thirdly, the percentage of claims 
processed quickly enough that mem-
bers do not need to resort to alter-
nate sources of financing for inpa-
tient care (defined here as 48 hours). 
The cumulative effect of these pro-
cesses is expected to produce an out-
come. In this scheme, it is hoped that 
a  well-functioning insurance scheme 
will lead to a drop in the proportion of 
households that rely on methods such 
as asset sales or high-cost loans to 
finance health care, and this is explic-
itly defined as an indicator. Finally, the 
outcome can lead to an impact. In this 
case, it is hoped that the rate at which 
households are falling below the pov-
erty line is reduced as a result of the 
insurance scheme, and this figure is 
also explicitly defined as an indicator. 
When determining the set of indicators 
they will be monitoring, evaluators can 
improve the quality of their research 
by systematically selecting indicators 
from across the processes, outcome, 
and impact levels, following the the-
ory-based impact evaluation, or TBIE, 
approach (Weiss 1997a; White 2009). In 
TBIE, an underlying theory of change 
is postulated prior to the intervention, 
outlining the causal steps by which 
a programme is expected to generate 
an impact and the assumptions under-
lying each causal step. Indicators are 
then selected systematically such that 
the assumptions made at each step 
in the theory of change are tested. 
Essentially, the TBIE approach allows 
evaluators to audit the logic underlying 
their intervention. We can unpack the 
chain of events and examine not only 
what impact has been achieved, but 
also whether it has been achieved in the 
expected manner and, if not, why not. 
Applying TBIE methods also increases 
the ability of evaluators to suggest 
improvements in how an intervention is 
targeted or implemented and to exam-
ine the extent to which impacts might 
be replicated in different contexts. In 
addition, TBIE can improve to the abil-
ity of managers and funders to provide 
strategic oversight: failures that can 
be traced to a  process level may be 
solvable via specific management or 
business process interventions, whilst 
failures at an outcome or impact level 
can indicate changes in targeting or 
scheme design are required. As Rog-
ers (2009) notes, TBIE is an appropri-
ate evaluation strategy for every type 
of intervention. 
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Unintended consequences, missing 
indicators, and confirmation bias
Any intervention leads to multiple 
effects on the environment in which it 
is undertaken. These can be both posi-
tive and negative. However, evaluations 
are generally undertaken on the basis 
of a  theory that posits that a particu-
lar intervention will have a  beneficial 
effect on a  particular aspect of the 
participant’s environment. Thus, one 
common trap into which evaluators fall 
when selecting indicators is to choose 
only those that examine the intended 
positive consequences of the scheme. 
This is an example of the well-known 
problem of confirmation bias, an inher-
ent psychological tendency: 
…when testing an existing belief, 
to search for evidence which could 
confirm that belief, rather than for 
evidence which could disconfirm it 
(Jones and Sugden 2001, 59).
The evaluation sets out to test a theory, 
and chooses a set of indicators which 
will help elaborate upon the extent to 
which the expected impacts are gen-
erated or not. Indicators that capture 
other effects are often excluded from 
the evaluation design. This problem of 
missing indicators can have severely 
deleterious consequences on the find-
ings of an evaluation.
To demonstrate, let us take a  hypo-
thetical example of a health insurance 
scheme that generates an unintended 
adverse impact. Imagine a scheme has 
been set up by a  primary health-care 
clinic in a  developing country to cover 
its clients in the surrounding area. 
The scheme administrators hope that 
by using insurance as a  prepayment 
mechanism, they will increase the rate 
of primary care usage amongst the 
population they are serving. The indica-
tor they select to measure whether or 
not the scheme has met its targets is 
the total number of visits made to the 
clinic each month. In the months after 
the scheme is started, the total num-
ber of visits per month triples. By the 
indicator being measured, the scheme 
is adjudged to be a  great success. 
However, a  closer examination of the 
scheme reveals deep flaws. The clinic 
is in a remote rural area, and finds that 
it is not able to attract additional quali-
fied staff to meet the increased demand 
for services. With increasing numbers 
of patients each week, the existing doc-
tors have had to cut the average num-
ber of minutes they spend per consul-
tation. As a  result, there is a  higher 
rate of misdiagnosis and a  fall in the 
real quality of care provided. Moreover, 
as the rate of misdiagnosis rises, the 
number of unnecessary additional visits 
increases and this further drives up the 
visits-per-month indicator. In fact, the 
lower the quality of service becomes, 
the more successful the scheme is 
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adjudged to be! However, as neither 
visit times nor number of second visits 
are monitored indicators, these import-
ant negative effects go unrecorded, and 
a  scheme with substantially harmful 
effects is recorded as a major success.
To avoid generating erroneous conclu-
sions, evaluators should include some 
indicators that examine unintended 
consequences of the scheme. In the 
example, a careful evaluator could have 
easily included indicators of quality of 
care (e.g., average length of consul-
tation, rate of re-diagnosis on second 
visits, or patient satisfaction with care 
received) that would have led him/her 
to identify the problems experienced. 
The key problem remains: having to 
determine in advance what is import-
ant to monitor. One possible approach 
is to use negative program theory (Weiss 
1997b). This is essentially an extension 
of the TBIE approach, under which 
a causal framework is used to predict 
some of the broader consequences 
of an intervention, including potential 
adverse impacts, and indicators are 
inserted to capture these. However, 
this approach will not suffice to identify 
the truly unexpected or unpredictable 
effect. A second approach is to incor-
porate rounds of participatory quali-
tative research (Chambers 2009), both 
before and after an intervention, allow-
ing programme participants to divulge 
problems they expect to face, or have 
faced. Unintended consequences 
identified pre-intervention can either 
be corrected or quantified via addi-
tional indicators, whilst those identi-
fied post-intervention can be made the 
subject of new subevaluations. Obvi-
ously, unintended adverse effects are 
more serious than unintended bene-
ficial ones, and more care should be 
taken to search for them. 
Quantitative, qualitative, and hybrid 
indicators
Further salient features to be con-
sidered when choosing indicators are 
the differences between quantitative, 
qualitative, and hybrid indicators: 
• Quantitative indicators are those cap-
turing objective realities, i.e., veri-
fiable facts that are external to the 
views of those taking part in the 
research. These indicators can be 
expressed as numbers, directly or 
indirectly. For example, the num-
ber of individuals who have visited 
a hospital is a quantitative indicator: 
it is directly expressible as a  num-
ber, and that number is independent 
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of the opinion of the researcher or 
hospital manager. Whether or not an 
individual has joined an insurance 
scheme is also a  quantitative indi-
cator: it is an objective fact, and can 
indirectly be rendered as a number 
(e.g., 1=joined /0=not joined). 
• Qualitative indicators are those cap-
turing the subjective conceptions 
of those taking part in the research 
regarding the world around them. 
The hospital manager’s opinion as 
to why the number of individuals 
visiting his hospital has changed is 
a  qualitative indicator: it depends 
solely on this individual’s interpreta-
tion of the trends he/she has experi-
enced. Purely qualitative data is gen-
erally best expressible in the form of 
textual statements and descriptions.
• Hybrid indicators fall between the 
other two classes. These are indi-
cators in which people are asked to 
rank, scale, or codify their opinions 
and attitudes. Whilst the indica-
tors gained are based on individual 
respondents’ perceptions and are not 
subject to external confirmation or 
disconfirmation, they also code this 
information numerically into a num-
ber of pre-defined categories, allow-
ing opinions to be compared and 
aggregated across individuals. For 
example, the hospital administrator 
might be asked to rank the impor-
tance of a list of reasons as to why the 
number of patients has increased, 
thus organising primarily qualitative 
responses into a numeric (though not 
strictly “quantitative”) framework. 
The table below presents the relation-
ship between quantitative, qualitative, 
and hybrid indicators. Quantitative and 
qualitative indicators examine funda-
mentally different dimensions of infor-
mation. To the extent that this reflects 
potentially differing epistemological 
standpoints, academics have some-
times identified “paradigm wars” 
between adherents of the two schools 
of research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
2004) or even an implicit “incompatibil-
ity thesis” positing that these methods 
should not and cannot be mixed (Howe 
1988). As a practical matter, this should 
not be considered to be the case. As 
quantitative and qualitative methods 
examine differing types of information, 
they can often be applied together to 
generate a  significantly richer set of 
knowledge for interpreting the impact 
of an intervention. A  common simplifi-
cation used by evaluators is to say that 
quantitative research answers the ques-
tion of “what happened?”, whilst quali-
tative research answers the question of 
“why did it happen?” Choosing a set of 
indicators that utilises a mix of quanti-
tative, qualitative, and hybrid indicators 
designed to provide mutually support-
ive insights can potentially deepen the 
explanatory power of an evaluation.1 
1 This “mixed methods” approach to research is a develop-
ing stream within evaluation studies—see Pronyk et al. 
(2008) for an example in a developing country. 
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Evaluators should avoid the fallacy 
of assuming that either quantitative 
or qualitative indicators are inher-
ently more accurate than the other. 
Most indicators rely on the collection 
of information from a respondent and 
suffer from some common potential 
problems in the information reported 
to investigators. In any branch of 
research, questions that are incor-
rectly phrased (either on the survey 
sheet or orally by the investigator) 
can lead to incorrect responses being 
given. Alternately, questions may be 
phrased correctly, but understood 
incorrectly by respondents, again 
leading to inaccurate responses. Even 
when a  question is fully understood, 
respondents may recall the required 
information incorrectly or with some 
bias. Finally, respondents may feel 
some incentive or some pressure to 
misreport their answer. A combination 
of these factors may also apply. Whilst 
quantitative data is generally exact, 
and qualitative data is usually rich; nei-
ther is necessarily accurate. 
Combining indicators
The qualities of different types of indi-
cators, and the ways in which different 
types of indicators can be systemat-
ically combined to help increase the 
usefulness of the information gath-
ered, have been outlined to help guide 
the evaluator’s choices. The categori-
sations presented are intended to be: 
1)  mutually exclusive within them-
selves, and 2) unrelated among them-
selves. Thus, an indicator must be one 
Table: Relationship between quantitative, qualitative, and hybrid indicators
Quantitative Qualitative Hybrid
Amount of money spent on IP 
services
Patient’s feelings as to whether 
money was well spent
Patient’s rating of quality of care 
along a 5-point scale
Number of people who have 
visited a hospital
Administrator’s opinion as to why 
number of patients has changed
Ranking of a set list of reasons 
why number of patients might 
have changed
Number of individuals who have 
joined an insurance scheme
Member’s statement as to why 
he/she joined the insurance 
scheme
Ranking of a set list of reasons 
as to why a scheme has been 
joined
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of three types (process, outcome, or 
impact), and it must be one of three 
methods (quantitative, qualitative, or 
hybrid). However, any combination is 
possible: for example, a process indi-
cator could be quantitative, qualitative, 
or hybrid. 
9.3. Defining high-quality 
indicators 
The next task is to design the specific 
indicators to be used. This section 
looks at the finer points of calibrat-
ing and specifying performance indi-
cators. Having followed the advice of 
section 1, all indicators under consid-
eration should already possess two 
key characteristics. Firstly, they will 
be important, in the sense that they 
address issues of key concern to the 
evaluation at hand. Secondly, they will 
be consistent, in that they have a clear 
theoretical link to the insurance inter-
vention being applied. Specifying chan-
nels of impact in advance allows eval-
uators to avoid accusations of ad hoc 
data mining. What follows is a check-
list of additional qualities of well-de-
signed indicators: the more of these 
qualities your indicator has, the clearer 
and more useful the data yield on that 
indicator is. 
Specific 
In order to be usable, indicators must 
be defined in such a way that it is clear 
exactly what is to be measured, how, 
and when: that is, they must be made 
highly specific. Refer again to the key 
impact indicator used in figure 1, per-
centage of households falling below the 
poverty line. This may seem clear, but 
in order to become a usable indicator, 
several pieces of additional informa-
tion need to be specified: 
• Time period: The time period over 
which the value of the indicator 
is measured must be defined. In 
this example, the evaluators have 
a  range of choices: they could 
examine the percentage of house-
holds falling below the poverty line 
over the course of one year, five 
years—even a decade. Definitions of 
time period should generally be set 
so they are long enough to contain 
a sufficient number of observations 
to make meaningful measurements, 
but short enough to not overburden 
the capacity of survey respondents 
to accurately respond. For exam-
ple, a  common rule of thumb in 
health microinsurance evaluations 
is to examine inpatient care over the 
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last year: inpatient care is so infre-
quent that one year of observations 
is required to provide a reasonable 
number of occurrences, but extend-
ing the time period any further can 
impair accurate recall of details. 
• Unit of measurement: The units in 
which an indicator is to be measured 
must be defined. In this example, 
we must determine a  unit against 
which we can determine whether 
a  household is poor. A  number of 
options are available, for example: 
gross income in local currency, the 
average calories consumed per day, 
the respondent’s score on a  syn-
thetic index of housing conditions, 
and personal asset ownership.
• Unit of aggregation: When individual 
observations on an indicator are cal-
culated as an aggregate figure over 
a group of people (a unit of aggrega-
tion), standard definitions of group 
inclusion and exclusion need to be 
determined to avoid any inaccuracy 
in data collection and indicator cal-
culation. In this example, the unit of 
aggregation is the “household”, so, 
a  standard definition of household 
members is required. For example, 
evaluators must specify whether 
family members who are currently 
travelling are part of the household, 
and, whether a  group of relatives 
living in two separate houses, side-
by-side constitutes one household 
or two. 
• Other operational definitions: Indica-
tors may require further definitions 
of any specific terms used. In this 
example, the poverty line needs to 
be defined. Operational definitions 
should refer to commonly used stan-
dards to the extent possible. Impor-
tantly, the data source for an indicator 
should also be specified in advance. 
An actionably specific formulation of 
this indicator is presented in Schneider 
and Hanson (2006, 17), who examine 
microinsurance schemes in Rwanda. 
This indicator can be rendered as: 
Percentage of households in which per 
capita consumption expenditures in the 
last two weeks are above the govern-
ment standard poverty line of RWF 4920 
per adult per week, but drop below this 
line once OOP medical expenditures in 
the last two weeks are subtracted.
This indicator employs the following 
definitions: 
• Time period: last 2 weeks
• Unit of measurement: the local cur-
rency, Rwandan Francs (RWF)
• Unit of aggregation: household, i.e., 
all those people who live together in 
a dwelling for more than 6 months 
per annum, and eat from the same 
kitchen 
• Poverty line: Rwandan government 
defined standard of RWF 4920, per 
adult per month.
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• Consumption expenditure: house-
hold self-report of value in RWF 
of expenditures over last 1 month, 
including both food and non-food 
items, captured via a  standardised 
survey instrument
• Out-of-pocket medical expenditure: 
household self-report of value in 
RWF of expenditures in last month 
on inpatient care, outpatient diag-
nostic services, drugs, testing, 
transport and fee co-payments 
made to any medical provider. 
The outcome measure is now fully spec-
ified: the exact methodology by which it 
will be measured is made explicit, as 
are all necessary definitions, and the 
source of the data that will be used. 
Simple
Some indicators require less extensive 
or complex information to be used in 
their calculation than do others. Sim-
plicity in terms of information required 
to calculate an indicator has several 
benefits: it minimises the scope for 
errors at the data collection stage; it 
increases the transparency and com-
municability of measured outcomes; 
and, it may enhance the trust that 
external readers place in the accuracy 
of an evaluation’s results. It may also 
save time in data collection.
To demonstrate, consider first a com-
plex indicator, commonly used for 
evaluations of health microinsurance 
products covering inpatient care:
Incidence of annual inpatient hospi-
tal expenditure greater than 10% of 
annual income, after reimbursement 
This indicator is highly specific, 
important within the context of the 
trial, and theoretically consistent with 
the effects of an inpatient health insur-
ance product. However, calculating 
the value of the indicator for any one 
individual requires the input of a large 
amount of complex data, each piece of 
which is potentially subject to errors. 
Firstly, an estimate of each house-
hold’s income must be generated. 
This is a difficult and time consuming 
task (Tschirley and Rose 2000), espe-
cially in a developing country environ-
ment in which individuals have mul-
tiple, unpredictable income streams. 
An exact estimate requires multiple 
detailed questions on each income 
stream of each household member. An 
error or misreport in the answer to any 
one of these questions will make the 
calculated value of the indicator inac-
curate. Next, total hospital bills must 
be calculated. Again, this may require 
detailed questioning of individuals 
who have been hospitalised, subject to 
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potential recall errors, recall biases, 
and/or intentional misreporting. More-
over, the hospitalised individuals may 
not be available, in which case other 
people will report what they remem-
ber of the episode; this may intro-
duce further errors. Finally, details of 
insurance reimbursement need to be 
collected from the insurance provider. 
The final indicator is then calculated 
by dividing one potentially inexact and/
or misreported estimate (total HH 
income) by a second potentially inexact 
and/or misreported estimate (net hos-
pital expenditures). Evaluators would 
be right to be wary of the accuracy of 
this indicator.
In contrast, an indicator used on an 
evaluation by Rao et al. (2009, 6), pro-
vides a lesson in simplicity:
Percentage ill respondents who 
sought outpatient department (OPD) 
treatment outside the home, last one 
month
Again, the indicator is specific, import-
ant, and consistent. However, the room 
for error in the calculation of this indi-
cator is much lower. Calculating the 
value of the indicator requires asking 
only two basic questions: 1) have you 
been sick this month? and 2) did you 
visit any health-care provider to get 
help? The information asked for is sim-
ple to recall and easy to report. Even 
in cases where a survey respondent is 
answering for someone else, we can 
be fairly certain that he will report cor-
rectly. As a  result, both the evaluator 
and the external observer will be able 
to place a  high level of confidence in 
the accuracy of measurement of this 
indicator. 
Minimum coefficient of variance
This is a  characteristic that relates 
specifically to quantitative indicators. 
When examining a quantitative indica-
tor, evaluators generally want to know 
whether the average value of the indi-
cator has changed over the course of 
the intervention. Intuitively, if observa-
tions on an indicator are very spread 
out around the average, then the indi-
cator is likely affected by very many 
different forces and events. If we find 
a  change in the mean of the indicator 
post-insurance, it is difficult to say with 
confidence that this change is due to 
the insurance, and not some other ran-
dom event. Conversely, if an indicator is 
very tightly clustered around a certain 
value, insurance is introduced, and we 
then find that the indicator has moved 
a considerable amount, we can be fairly 
certain the insurance intervention and 
not any other factor caused this change. 
Different quantitative indicators have 
differing intrinsic levels of variabil-
ity. In order to maximise their ability 
to detect changes in an indicator, the 
evaluator should choose indicators that 
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are less dispersed. That is, amongst 
a  set of indicators that yield qualita-
tively equivalent information on the 
effect of an insurance package, the 
evaluator should choose the indicator 
with the lowest level of variability. This 
will increase his/her ability to detect 
changes in the average of the indicator 
caused by insurance. 
As an example, when evaluating an 
insurance product that covers inpa-
tient care in India, the average number 
of visits to hospital and the average 
amount spent on hospitalisation care 
might be considered equivalently good 
indicators of the amount of hospital 
care received. Formally, statisticians 
use a  metric called standard deviation 
to measure how dispersed observa-
tions are around the average.
The more spread out the observations 
are around the average, the higher the 
standard deviation. Indian national sta-
tistics show that, in rural households, 
the average number of hospitalisa-
tions per year is 1.17, with a  standard 
deviation of 0.53, and that the average 
amount of money spent per household 
on hospitalisations is rupees (Rs) 3,775, 
with a standard deviation of Rs 9,457. It 
is impossible to compare the standard 
deviations directly, as they are in differ-
ent units: it makes no logical sense to 
try to assess which is smaller: 0.53 visits 
or 9,457 rupees. To make the standard 
deviations comparable, we calculate the 
coefficient of variance (CV). This is sim-
ply the standard deviation divided by the 
average. The CV for number of hospital-
isations is 0.53/1.17 = 0.46. However, the 
CV for expenditures is 9457/3775 = 2.51. 
It will be to the evaluator’s advantage 
to choose number of hospitalisations 
as his key indicator: its smaller CV indi-
cates that it is less inherently variable 
and that it will be easier to discern sta-
tistically significant changes in its value. 
At the indicator design stage, evaluators 
should use secondary data to determine 
which of the indicators under consider-
ation have a  relatively lower CV. More 
advanced studies may wish to take on 
formal power calculations to ensure 
that changes in their key indicators are 
likely to be detected.
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Comparable
If an evaluator is interested in areas of 
scheme performance that have been 
investigated for other schemes, he/she 
should choose indicators that are com-
parable to those which have been used 
on these other schemes. The main 
advantage of choosing comparable 
indicators is that it enables the evalu-
ator to answer a broader set of ques-
tions about their scheme: not merely 
how well it has worked, but how well 
it has worked in comparison to simi-
lar schemes undertaken elsewhere. 
A  second benefit is that it increases 
the transparency and, potentially, the 
credibility of the evaluation. In the con-
text of quantitative indicators, compa-
rability means, at a  minimum, using 
indicators calculated in the same 
way as those used on other schemes. 
Strictly, comparability further implies 
that the data used for calculating the 
value of an indicator is collected in the 
same way across studies, by using the 
same survey instruments.
9.4. Commonly used 
indicators in microinsurance 
evaluations
This section outlines the classes of indi-
cators most commonly used in micro-
insurance evaluations. Seven broad 
classes of indicators are discussed: 
• Extensiveness of service usage
• Intensiveness of service usage
• Volume of service usage
• Needs-based usage
• Financial protection
• Household socioeconomic status 
(SES)
• Equity
The first three classes are the most 
studied aspects of microinsurance 
schemes and are related as shown in 
figure 2. Extensiveness measures look 
at how much of the population uses 
a service. This is graphed along the hor-
izontal axis. Intensiveness measures 
look at how much service is used by 
those availing of it. This is graphed along 
the vertical axis. Total volume indicators 
examine the total amount of service 
use by the population as a whole. Total 
usage is graphed by the orange box, and 
can be thought of as being the product 
of (extensiveness x  intensiveness). The 
other four classes of indicators are not 
related to each other.
For each class of indicator, a description 
of the general form of the indicator is 
provided along with some examples of 
how it has been used in practice. A dis-
cussion of the interpretation and limits 
of each class of indicator is provided, 
along with details on the complexity of 
the data that needs to be collected for 
calculation and the problems generally 
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found in data collection. The vast major-
ity of microinsurance schemes that 
have been subject to an impact evalu-
ation are health microinsurance (HMI) 
schemes. The review process for this 
chapter identified 36 papers examining 
the impact of health microinsurance 
schemes and only six papers examining 
non-health microinsurance schemes. 
The majority of examples discussed are 
drawn from health literature. However, 
many of the indicators discussed can 
be applied equally well to other types of 
insurance. As far as possible, descrip-
tions of how indicators might be applied 
to non-health microinsurance schemes 
are provided. 
Extensiveness of service usage
An indicator of extensiveness of ser-
vice usage measures the proportion of 
individuals who have used a  service. 
It quantifies how widespread usage of 
services has been rather than how deep 
usage has been. In its purest form, an 
extensiveness indicator is calculated as:
The result is expressed as a  percent-
age. To appreciate what is being mea-
sured, consider a  population in which 
the extent of outpatient (OP) service 
usage is being examined. Before insur-
ance, 30% of people go to the doctor 
each month, each making only one 
visit. Imagine that insurance causes 
an increase in the extent of usage, with 
90% of people now visiting the doctor 
once a month. The value of the indica-
tor will triple, fully capturing the three-
fold increase in extent of service usage. 
Now, alternately, imagine that after 
insurance is launched, the same 30% of 
people continue to visit the doctor each 
month, but increase the number of vis-
its they make from one to three. Even 
though the number of visits triples, the 
extent of usage does not increase: the 
percentage of people using OP services 
at least once remains at 30%.
There would be no change in the value 
of the indicator, and measuring impact 
using only an extensiveness indicator 
would lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that insurance had not had any effect. 
This is not to say extensiveness indi-
cators are poor measures; it is merely 
a warning that, like all of the indicators 
Figure 2: Relationship between 
extensiveness, intensiveness,  
volume of usage
Volume: total amount
of service used by population
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discussed in this section, they capture 
only one aspect of impact, and evalu-
ators should take care to understand 
the limits of the conclusions they can 
draw from a single measure.
Extensiveness indicators are the most 
studied form of indicator in microinsur-
ance evaluations. They have two great 
advantages. The first is the relative 
simplicity of the data needed for their 
calculation. Data on these indicators is 
typically gathered via a household sur-
vey. Only very simple information needs 
to be gathered to calculate the value of 
the indicator. Survey respondents of 
any age or education level can typically 
remember whether or not they have 
been to the doctor this month, or had 
any surgeries this year. Also, it is likely 
that even if the survey respondent is not 
the person who used the service, they 
will be able to accurately state whether 
other people in their household had 
used a particular service or not. Esti-
mates gained may be more reliable 
and contain less reporting errors than 
those requiring respondents to provide 
more detailed information. 
The second major advantage of exten-
siveness indicators is versatility. Exten-
siveness indicators can be tailored to 
provide an array of highly informative 
measures by appropriately varying the 
time period, subpopulation, and defini-
tion of “service” used in calculations. 
They are thus of broad application. 
Some examples of specific applica-
tions of extensiveness indicators from 
the HMI literature serve to illustrate 
the versatility of this class of indicator:
• Percentage of people using OP/IP 
services at least once. This is the sin-
gle most commonly applied indica-
tor in evaluations of microinsurance 
schemes, and the broadest possible 
measure of the extent of use of out-
patient and inpatient services. The 
time period over which usage of OP 
service is counted can be varied, 
e.g., last 3 months (Polonsky et al. 
2009), or last 12 months (Ranson 
2001). For IP services, it is typi-
cally set at one year (Thornton et al. 
2010; Diop et al. 2006). The follow-
ing indicators can be thought of as 
restricted versions of this indicator.
• Percentage of men/women aged 
16-59 using OP service, last one year. 
This indicator is used by Trujillo, 
Portillo, and Vernon (2005) to study 
the extent of service usage amongst 
non-elderly men and women. By 
defining and separately studying 
different subclasses of the insured 
people over which the indicator is 
measured, more detailed and spe-
cific results are generated than with 
a  more general formulation of the 
indicator.
• Percentage of people attending mod-
ern OP services for treatment of fever, 
last two weeks. In this indicator, used 
by Franco et al. (2008), the definition 
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of service is restricted, providing 
highly detailed information on the 
extent of usage of a  very specific 
service of interest.
• Percentage of deliveries in a modern 
facility. The most commonly used 
indicator of the extent of materni-
ty-care service usage is the per-
centage of all deliveries that have 
taken place in a  facility defined as 
modern (see Dror et al. 2005; Diop 
et al. 2006; Smith and Sulzbach 
2008). Calculations are restricted to 
the subgroup pregnant women.
• Percentage of pregnant women mak-
ing any prenatal care (PNC) visits. 
This is the second most commonly 
used indicator of extent of use of 
maternity care (see Diop, Sulzbach 
and Chankova 2006; Thornton et al. 
2010). Franco et al. (2008) and Smith 
and Sulzbach (2008) define service 
more strictly as having made four 
or more PNC visits.
As the examples demonstrate, these 
indicators have been widely applied 
within the HMI literature. Service 
usage is a  topic of primary concern 
on health insurance schemes, where 
insurance provides direct incen-
tives for using health services when 
an adverse event occurs. With other 
forms of insurance, it may also be use-
ful to examine extent of service usage 
where insurance provides incentives 
for using particular services in the 
recovery from an adverse event. For 
example, in crop insurance, evaluators 
might wish to examine the percentage 
of farmers repurchasing seeds from 
a commercial dealer after a failed har-
vest. In livestock insurance, evaluators 
might look at the percentage of house-
holds purchasing at least one replace-
ment animal after a  livestock disease 
outbreak. 
Intensiveness of service usage
Intensiveness indicators examine how 
deep or intensive usage of a  service 
has been amongst the insured, rather 
than how widespread usage has been. 
Intensiveness indictors are calculated 
using the formula:
The outcome is a  rate, expressed as 
number of usages per person. This 
is a  pure intensiveness indicator: it 
examines solely how much of a service 
is used by those availing of it. Return-
ing to the example of a  population in 
which 30% of people make one visit 
to the doctor per month before insur-
ance is introduced and three visits 
per month afterwards, this increase 
in intensiveness of care will be fully 
captured by this indicator, which will 
triple in value. However, a  change in 
extensiveness only will have no effect 
on this indicator: if insurance instead 
caused usage to expand so that 90% of 
people went to the doctor each month, 
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but all continued to make only one visit, 
there would be no change in the value 
of the indicator. Any change in the total 
number of service usages caused by 
a change in the extent of service usage 
(measured in the top half of the frac-
tion) is matched by an equal increase in 
the number of people using a service 
(measured in the bottom half of the 
fraction). These two changes automat-
ically cancel out each other, leaving an 
indicator that only changes in response 
to changes in the intensity of service 
usage. 
Intensiveness measures involve more 
complex reporting than do the exten-
siveness indicators discussed above. 
Survey respondents must remem-
ber, at a minimum, the exact number 
of times a  service was used rather 
than simply the fact that the service 
was used. This is especially difficult to 
accurately report when the respondent 
was not the person using the service. 
An intensiveness indicator may thus be 
more prone to errors caused by inac-
curate reporting than an extensive-
ness indicator. 
A  pure intensiveness indicator has 
been used only once in a  HMI eval-
uation: Criel, Van der Stuyft, and Van 
Lerberghe (1999) examined the num-
ber of days that people, admitted as 
inpatients, spent in hospital. As it is 
measured only over those people who 
are actually admitted as inpatients, it 
can be thought of as a  pure indicator 
of intensiveness in which each day rep-
resents one service usage.
Despite the reservations above, inten-
siveness indicators are of only middling 
complexity in terms of data required, 
and provide huge scope to define time 
period, subpopulation, and definition of 
service, making them as highly versa-
tile as extensiveness indicators. They 
are recommended as a  valuable and 
underexploited form of indicator, which 
evaluators should consider incorporat-
ing into their research designs.
Volume of service usage 
Indicators of the volume of service 
usage are based on a  count of the 
total number of visits made to, or uses 
made of, a certain service. Therefore, 
all such indicators respond to changes 
in both the extent and the intensity of 
service usage: whether more peo-
ple use a service, or the same people 
use a service more often, or both, the 
total count of how often the service is 
used will increase. Whilst primarily 
applied for counting visits to health-
care providers on HMI interventions, 
the concept of counting visits can be 
extended to usage of non-health ser-
vices: total number of visits to livestock 
or seed dealers might be useful mea-
sures of responses to livestock or crop 
insurance, for example. Usage rates 
can be applied to any microinsurance 
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evaluation in which the insurance may 
lead to a change in the intensity of use 
of some service. 
In its most raw form, a volume measure 
may simply be a count of how much of 
a service has been used as a whole. Two 
examples found in the literature are:
• Total admissions per health centre 
area. Used by Criel, Van der Stuyft, 
and Van Lerberghe (1999), this indi-
cator counts the total number of 
admissions in a number of different 
health centres.
• Number of deliveries at health centre, 
last one year. Utilised in Diop, Schnei-
der, and Butera (2000) in an evalu-
ation of microinsurance schemes 
in Rwanda, this indicator counts 
the total number of deliveries that 
had taken place in different health 
centres. The authors also counted 
the number of postnatal care visits 
made and the number of vaccina-
tions administered in the past year.
Much more common than simple 
counts are volume indicators that 
express usage in per person terms, i.e., 
measures that divide the total number 
of visits by the total number of insured 
people. This type of measure is often 
termed utilisation rate. As discussed, 
the time period over which visits are 
counted, the definition of service, and 
any subpopulations of interest can be 
defined by the investigator to suit his/
her needs. Examples of these indica-
tors in use include:
• Number of OP/IP visits per person. 
A  very commonly used indicator, 
e.g., Dror et al. (2009) and Schnei-
der and Hanson (2006) where eval-
uators simply count the number of 
visits made to OP or IP providers by 
insured people in a  certain period 
of time (respectively, two years and 
two weeks), and divide this by num-
ber of insured people. This is a very 
broad indicator, using a broad defi-
nition of services and not subdivid-
ing the population under examina-
tion into any groups. 
• Number of surgeries per person. 
There are two examples of how 
definitions can be tightened to give 
more detailed information on spe-
cific aspects of service usage from 
Aggarwal (2010) and Criel, Van der 
Stuyft, and Van Lerberghe (1999). 
Both looked at the rate of surgi-
cal procedures, or certain types of 
surgical procedures, amongst the 
insured population, thus restrict-
ing their definition of service to only 
a subset of all IP care. 
Collecting the information needed to 
calculate volume measures of service 
usage is of medium difficulty: the same 
caveats apply as those described for 
intensity measures. Evaluators should 
again be aware of the limitations of 
this class of indicators. Total usage 
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indicators provide a  potentially useful 
overview of the grand trends in service 
usage; by incorporating all information 
on extent and intensity of use, these 
indicators are able to provide a useful 
overview of how overall usage levels 
have evolved. However, the indicators 
are unsuited to detailed analysis of 
the drivers of changes in utilisation 
levels. With volume measures, a 10% 
increase in intensity of use is observa-
tionally equivalent to a 10% increase in 
the extent of use. Thus, evaluators will 
not be able to say which indicator has 
led to an observed change. Moreover, if 
changes in intensity and extent of use 
are in different directions, even large 
changes may have negligible effects 
on a volume indicator. A 90% increase 
in extent of usage, coupled with a 91% 
decrease in intensity of usage will lead 
to only a 1% change in a volume mea-
sure. In general, evaluators will need 
to examine all three classes of service 
usage indicators to build an integrated 
picture of how microinsurance has 
altered the usage pattern. 
Needs-based usage
Rather than examining usage over the 
population as a  whole, needs-based 
usage indicators are examined only 
for those people reporting that they 
had a need to use the service in ques-
tion. Either the extent or the volume of 
needs-based usage can be measured 
in this manner, using the formulae:
Extensiveness:
Volume: 
By allowing the number below the line 
to vary over time, this class of indica-
tor removes that part of variation in 
extensiveness of use, which is due to 
factors other than insurance. This is of 
particular importance for services that 
experience systematic variations in 
demand. Consider an HMI evaluation in 
South Asia that takes a baseline during 
dry season and an end line during mon-
soon. Monsoon season is associated 
with a seasonal uptick in vector borne 
disease, such as malaria, dengue, etc. 
With higher disease levels, imagine 
that the recorded number of people 
making an OP visit doubles. Standard 
extensiveness and volume indicators 
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will also double, and evaluators are 
at risk of erroneously assigning this 
effect to the insurance intervention. 
However, a needs-based usage indica-
tor removes this error, by allowing the 
demand level to vary over evaluations. 
That is, whilst the recorded number 
of people recording OP visits doubles, 
the recorded number of people stating 
they had a need for OP treatment will 
also at least double. Thus, the value of 
the needs-based indicator will remain 
unaffected by the change in back-
ground conditions between baseline 
and end line, and erroneous conclu-
sions will not be made.
This class of indicators is commonly 
used in both extensiveness measures 
(Rao et al. 2009; Gnawali et al. 2009), 
and volume measures (Gnawali et al. 
2009; Schneider and Hanson 2006). It 
can be extended to study non-health 
insurance schemes, as discussed, for 
other classes of usage indicator. How-
ever, it involves one complication at 
the data collection stage: respondents 
are required to report that there was 
a need to avail of a service, but that this 
step was not taken. This can involve 
a  difficult judgment call, which may 
be inconsistently made over different 
respondents.
Financial protection
The core purpose of insurance schemes 
is to reduce the expenditure a member 
must incur to remedy some expen-
sive adverse event. This is otherwise 
termed financial protection (FP). FP is 
the most intensively studied impact of 
microinsurance schemes after service 
usage patterns. The indicators used to 
study this area are readily extended to 
most forms of insurance: one might 
examine expenditures on funerals 
in the case of life/funeral insurance, 
expenditures on restocking a  farm 
after some problem in the case of crop 
or livestock insurance, or expenditure 
on replacing broken or stolen items in 
case of home insurance. The examples 
presented are drawn from the health 
insurance context common on micro-
insurance evaluations. 
Three forms of FP indicators are com-
monly used. The most basic and com-
monly applied are indicators based 
on out-of-pocket spending (OOPS). In 
health literature, OOPS is defined as, 
“direct outlay of households including 
gratuities and in-kind payments made 
to health practitioners, suppliers of 
pharmaceuticals, therapeutic appli-
ances, and other goods and services 
whose primary intent is to contribute 
to the restoration or enhancement of 
the health status of individuals” (Than 
Sein and Waheed 2003, 10-11). That 
is, OOPS is the total outlay that must 
be financed by a  household’s own 
resources to cope with the impact of 
the risk that is insured against net of 
any expenditure financed by insurance. 
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A  reduction in the average level of 
OOPS is often considered an import-
ant target of microinsurance schemes: 
those who are insured should find that 
when an adverse event occurs, they 
need to spend less money from their 
personal finances to cope with it. 
Indicators based on OOPS are easily 
applied to most insurance schemes, 
but are far less malleable than the ser-
vice-usage indicators described above. 
By definition, OOPS can only be cal-
culated over those people who expe-
rience the adverse event they insured 
themselves against. Other than in very 
large evaluations, this group will usu-
ally not include enough people to per-
form subgroup analysis. OOPS should 
also be calculated as a  total: it often 
makes little sense to look at subex-
penditures within OOPS. Only the time 
frame of measurement can be easily 
varied. Common indicators based on 
OOPS include:
• OOPS per visit to a  health-care pro-
vider. Average OOPS per visit to 
a  health-care provider is the most 
commonly used FP indicator. It has 
been applied to outpatient care vis-
its (Gumber and Kulkarni 2000), 
inpatient care visits (Jütting 2004), 
and deliveries (Smith and Sulzbach 
2008). 
• OOPS per illness/maternity episode. 
A less-used indicator is total OOPS 
over the course of a  particular 
episode of illness (see Gumber 
2001). OOPS is calculated as the 
sum of all expenditures over all vis-
its to all health-care providers to 
treat a particular ailment. The indi-
cator is sometimes defined as cov-
ering both OP and IP care (Diop, Sul-
zbach, and Chankova 2006). Whilst 
this measure gives a more rounded 
view of the level of financial protec-
tion insurance offers per event, it 
also requires survey respondents to 
report more information, relating to 
a longer time period, increasing the 
scope for inaccuracies. 
• OOPS per episode, within a  time 
frame. One potential midway point 
between OOPS per visit and OOPS 
per episode is OOPS per episode 
over a limited time frame. Respon-
dents may be asked to report all 
OOPS on an illness within the last 
one month (Rao et al. 2009) or over 
a  longer period (Wagstaff et al. 
2009). This approach balances the 
problem of recall issues in the per 
episode indicator against the limited 
insight of the per visit indicator. 
One issue with FP measures based 
purely on OOPS is that they are abso-
lute rather than relative. As an exam-
ple, imagine that two people have had 
an outpatient visit for exactly the same 
ailment—a twisted ankle—and both 
have been prescribed the same treat-
ment for this ailment: painkillers and 
an x-ray. One person has taken the 
210
full course of treatment; the other has 
skipped the x-ray. It may be that the 
person who skipped the x-ray has done 
so because he/she is much poorer 
than the person who did not. Although 
he/she has spent less money, this 
money may have been more critical to 
basic purchases like food. As a conse-
quence, the person with lower OOPS 
may now be both financially and phys-
ically worse off than the person with 
higher OOPS.
The second class of FP measures, cat-
astrophic expenditures (CE) indicators, 
offers a  partial solution to this prob-
lem. Expenditures on a given adverse 
event are considered catastrophic 
when the OOP payments incurred to 
deal with an adverse circumstance 
are of a level “at which a household is 
forced to sacrifice other basic needs, 
deplete productive assets, incur debt, 
or be impoverished” (O’Donnell et al. 
2005). In the microinsurance litera-
ture, this is generally proxied as 10% of 
household income. Evaluators proceed 
to calculate the proportion of adverse 
events on which catastrophic expen-
ditures are incurred, i.e., the propor-
tion of insurance claims on which total 
OOPS amounted to more than 10% of 
HH income (Ranson 2002 and Deva-
dasan et al. 2007). CE indicators thus 
provide some measure of the relative 
impact of expenditures on the over-
all welfare of those incurring them. 
However, this measure is partial only: 
a  household spending of 9.9% of its 
income on a hospitalisation is counted 
as non-catastrophic, whilst a  house-
hold spending 10.1% is included. More-
over, all expenditure levels above the 
10% threshold are considered equally 
catastrophic: no differentiation is 
made between a  household spending 
10% of its income on replanting failed 
crops and one spending, say, 60% of 
its income. A  simple indicator that 
would provide a fully relative measure 
of the extent of the impact of OOPS on 
HH welfare is OOPS per adverse event/
HH income. The only applied use of 
this indicator is in Ranson (2002), who 
examines costs per hospitalisation as 
a percentage of HH income. 
A  third class of FP indicators is total 
expenditures (TE) on all events that are 
insured against, including insurance 
premiums. That is, OOPS for all insured 
events + insurance premium. Assuming 
no change in background conditions, 
average TE would not be expected to 
decrease: a decrease in TE would indi-
cate that the insurance scheme is pay-
ing out more than has been paid into 
it. However, the variance of TE may be 
expected to decrease, as insurance 
decreases the incidence of extreme 
high-cost events amongst the insured. 
This potentially useful indicator has not 
been used in any evaluation to date. TE 
type indicators are generally calcu-
lated on a  per annum basis, i.e., the 
timeframe over which an insurance 
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policy is usually active. TE indicators 
are sometimes calculated in absolute 
terms (Gumber and Kulkarni 2000) and 
sometimes as a percentage of house-
hold income (Franco et al. 2008). They 
remain rarely used.
All forms of FP indicators discussed 
contain two inherent limitations: com-
plexity of reporting and limited scope. 
Regarding complexity of reporting, all 
FP indicators require, at a  minimum, 
that full data on OOPS be collected. 
Provider records often do not suffice, 
as OOPS covers all expenditures made 
by an individual over multiple provid-
ers. Individual insurance members/
households must usually be asked 
via a  household survey. Respondents 
are typically asked detailed questions 
on expenditures on a  variety of items 
over an extended period. For CE and 
TE measures, they may additionally 
be asked for details of their house-
hold income, a  further complex task 
requiring detailed questioning. The 
complex and difficult-to-remember 
data required to evaluate FP indicators 
makes them potentially more prone 
to reporting errors than most other 
classes of indicators.
Evaluators should also be aware of the 
limits of the interpretations that can 
be drawn from FP indicators, and spe-
cifically, that they examine monetary 
outcomes rather than welfare out-
comes. Returning to the example out-
lined above, the man who has skipped 
the x-ray would be found to be more 
financially secure on the basis of OOPS 
per visit. A  measure based on OOPS 
would, therefore, rank him as having 
had a  better result, even though he 
has skipped recommended treatment. 
Evaluators would need to combine 
OOPS data with separate health-seek-
ing behaviour data to determine this 
fact. In order to provide valid conclu-
sions on the impact of an insurance 
scheme, measures based on OOPS 
need to be carefully evaluated in con-
junction with other information on the 
income, status, and treatment needs of 
the individuals involved. 
Household socioeconomic status 
Theoretically, one of the key impacts 
offered by insurance is its potential to 
increase the socioeconomic status of 
the insured household. By mitigating 
the financial impact of adverse events, 
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insurance may directly allow house-
holds to avoid taking on loans, selling 
assets, or cutting back on investments 
when such events occur. This trans-
lates into potentially higher income lev-
els for the insured. Moreover, by miti-
gating the impact of adverse events, 
insurance may liberate households to 
undertake riskier but more profitable, 
production patterns. For example, 
farmers with crop insurance may be 
more likely to move into monoculture 
cultivation of profitable cash crops than 
uninsured farmers. For these reasons, 
the impact of insurance on measures 
of household socioeconomic status 
and income levels are an important 
topic in microinsurance impact. Whilst 
this is a  less studied area than ser-
vice utilisation or financial protection, 
a number of indicators have been used:
• Change in household income level, 
last one year. Two studies examine 
the impact of health microinsur-
ance on the income levels of partic-
ipants (Aggarwal 2010 and Hamid, 
Roberts, and Mosley 2010). Both 
studies used detailed questioning 
of households to establish esti-
mates of their gross income level, 
i.e., total income, ignoring money 
spent on inputs into the household’s 
farm and/or microenterprises. 
Aggarwal takes one survey prior 
to insurance being introduced and 
one survey after, and thus examines 
the effect of insurance on change in 
household income. Hamid, Roberts, 
and Mosley have only one observa-
tion, post-insurance, and thus look 
at the effect of microinsurance on 
the level of household income. One 
innovation in Hamid, Roberts, and 
Mosley is the use of an age-based 
weighting system to examine the 
impact of insurance on individual 
income levels, as opposed to house-
hold income levels. 
• Household asset levels. Hamid, Rob-
erts, and Mosley (2010) have fur-
ther examined two measures of 
household asset levels: the pres-
ent value of all non-land household 
assets and the present value of all 
non-land productive household 
assets. The rationale for examin-
ing non-land assets as an indicator 
of household socioeconomic status 
is that these represent the stock of 
assets available to finance expendi-
tures in case of adverse events. The 
productive assets were those sepa-
rately identified by the household as 
being used in one of the household’s 
microenterprises, and thus repre-
sent the stock of income generating 
assets. Land was excluded due to 
the different prices across the var-
ious study sites, perhaps indicating 
underlying non-compatibility. No 
time period is applied: assets that 
are held by the household at time of 
interview are recorded.
• Change in percentage of house-
holds falling below poverty line, last 
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two weeks. Schneider and Hanson 
(2006) pioneer the use of this indi-
cator in a  microinsurance context. 
Detailed information is separately 
collected on household non-med-
ical expenditure levels and house-
hold OOPS on health care, in the 
past two weeks. Total expenditure is 
calculated as the sum of these two 
components and taken as a  proxy 
for HH income. All households 
are then ranked by total expendi-
ture, from lowest to highest, and 
ordered along a  horizontal axis 
(see figure 3—this form of graph is 
sometimes called a Penn’s Parade). 
Both their total expenditures and 
total non-medical expenditures 
are graphed against a vertical axis. 
A poverty line is drawn. The evalu-
ators then measure the proportion 
of HHs above the line in terms of 
total expenditure, but below the line 
once medical OOPS are subtracted 
(in figure 3, it can be seen that two 
such cases exist). This percentage 
is compared across insured and 
non-insured groups. 
Figure 3: Demonstration of Schneider and Hanson’s (2006) percentage of 
households falling below poverty line
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These approaches, in particular the 
second and third, follow techniques 
widely applied outside the microin-
surance literature. Unfortunately, all 
existing indicators of HH socioeco-
nomic status rely on the collection of 
complex data from respondents who 
may suffer from recall issues. Con-
sider how difficult it would be to accu-
rately recall all of your expenditures 
in the last month, and you will have 
some idea of the potential that exists 
for errors to be introduced. Issues of 
deliberate misreporting affect these 
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types of indicators. For example, 
respondents may deliberately misstate 
income or health spending data in the 
hope of gaining some benefit from the 
party administering the survey, out of 
a  lack of trust in the surveyor, or in 
fear that their answers will be made 
public within their community. Unfor-
tunately, these indicators, whilst fol-
lowing current best practices, remain 
highly complex to calculate and prone 
to reporting error. 
Equity of impact
The final class of indicators used to 
evaluate the impact of microinsur-
ance is one that examines the equity 
of service usage, expenditure lev-
els, or other variables across insured 
individuals of differing socioeconomic 
status. Strictly, equity measures can 
be thought of not as a separate class 
of indicators, but as a different way of 
examining impact using the indicators 
already described. The indicators most 
commonly evaluated for equity across 
insured people are the extent and rate 
of OP/IP visits. Evaluators have also, 
on occasion, examined how equitable 
the distribution of deliveries is in mod-
ern facilities, probability of self-medi-
cation when ill, cost of consultations, 
and cost of drugs per illness episode. 
Three separate approaches have been 
previously applied. Each is technically 
rigorous. 
• Change in probability of care across 
income quartiles. Yip, Wang, and 
Hsiao (2009) apply this technique. 
They begin by measuring the levels 
of a  variety of health-care usage 
extensiveness indicators, including 
incidence of OP visits, incidence of 
visits to different OP providers, and 
incidence of self-medication. They 
measure before and after insurance 
is implemented. Measurements are 
taken across two groups: treatment 
and control. Next, they subtract the 
level of each variable pre-insurance 
from its level post-insurance, giving 
a  net change in the probability of 
utilising each health-care service. 
They then match each individual in 
the treatment group with similar 
individuals in the control group. The 
groups are then ranked in ascend-
ing order of income and divided into 
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four cohorts. Finally, the differ-
ence in net change in the probabil-
ity of utilising each service across 
treatment and control individuals 
is measured and averaged. Differ-
ences in the changes of utilisation 
patterns across income cohorts are 
then examined. This is a technically 
demanding approach, involving both 
double-difference estimation and 
propensity score matching.
• Concentration-curve based indica-
tors. This approach is followed by 
Dror et al. (2005), who also examine 
equity across a  number of health-
care usage extensiveness vari-
ables (incidence of hospitalisation, 
incidence of OP consultation, and 
attendance of professional staff at 
deliveries). A household survey cov-
ering these indicators and separate 
estimations of household income 
is conducted. Households are then 
ranked according to their reported 
income (on an X-axis), and their 
cumulative percentage usage of the 
care variable in question plotted 
along a  vertical axis (see figure 4). 
This plot is the concentration curve 
(CC).
If usage of care is entirely equitable 
(i.e., 10% of care is being used by the 
poorest 10% of the population, and so 
on), then the concentration curve lies 
exactly along the 45 degree line—or 
equality line—between these axes. 
If poorer people use proportionately 
less care, the concentration curve lies 
below the equality line (e.g., 5% of care 
is used by the poorest 10%, or CC1). 
If the opposite is the case, the curve 
lies above the equality line (e.g., 15% 
of care is used by the poorest 10%, 
or CC2). The concentration index is 
calculated as twice the area between 
the equality line and the concentra-
tion curve. It ranges from +1 to -1, with 
negative values indicating a  distribu-
tion of usage favouring the richer, and 
positive values indicating the oppo-
site. This approach is less technically 
demanding than that used in Yip, Wang, 
and Hsiao (2009). It can also be used 
to rank equity in expenditure levels, 
as in Dror et al. (2009), or many other 
variables. 
• Needs-based indicators. Finally, Wag-
staff and Van Doorslaer (1998) sug-
gest employing an approach in which 
Figure 4: Concentration curves and 
needs-based care curves
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the actual concentration curve for 
care is measured not against the 
equality line, but against a  “needs 
adjusted” concentration curve. This 
is a  statistically generated curve, 
which displays the amount of care 
each person in the sample would 
have received, had they received the 
same amount of care which others 
with the same needs received on 
average. The difference between this 
curve and the concentration curve 
then provides a measure of inequity 
in treatment levels. This approach 
is of specific application to health 
insurance evaluations. An example of 
its use in an HMI evaluation is found 
in Schneider and Hanson (2006).
9.5. Conclusions 
The problem of choosing indicators 
has been presented here as one of try-
ing to determine in advance which few 
pieces of information are most prof-
itable to collect from a  much larger 
set of potential choices. The qualities 
of different types of indicators and 
the ways in which different types of 
indicators can be systematically com-
bined to help increase the usefulness 
of the information gathered have been 
outlined to help guide the evaluator’s 
choices. From a practical point of view, 
indicators most common in microin-
surance impact evaluations together 
with their advantages and drawbacks 
have been discussed. 
However, fully evaluating the meaning 
of indicators requires the evaluator 
apply them in combination with other 
types of information. Rather than look-
ing at a  single indicator and trying to 
draw conclusions from this, it is more 
useful to assess a combination of dif-
ferent indicators and to take them into 
a broader context, applying other types 
of information.
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10.1. Introduction
A  lot of attention is focused on how to 
best measure impacts and outcomes in 
microinsurance (or other interventions). 
However, as important as deciding on 
how to measure impacts and outcomes, 
it is to decide on what exactly to measure. 
This chapter discusses the most useful 
indicators for an evaluation of microin-
surance schemes, as identified through 
a Delphi study amongst experts. 
The objective of this chapter is to 
enable practitioners, researchers, and 
others to correctly choose and define 
purposeful indicators.1 Quantitative 
and hybrid indicators, specifically, are 
taken into account, whilst purpose-
fully neglecting qualitative indicators 
since they differ substantially from 
one another. The chapter also touches 
upon creating research tools based 
on the indicators discussed in the first 
part of the chapter. 
10.2. Identifying core 
impacts, outcomes, and 
indicators
In an attempt to define core impacts and 
outcomes attributed to microinsurance, 
almost 30 scholars and practitioners 
1 This chapter is linked to appendix 1 “Guidelines for In-
dicators”, of this publication. The appendix provides de-
tailed guidelines on how to measure each of the indicators 
described here. Appendix 1 is not included in the printed 
version of this book, but it is available online at www.mi-
croinsurancenetwork.org.
from the microinsurance arena partic-
ipated in a Delphi study in 2012. In the 
study impacts are defined as long-term 
effects of microinsurance. This follows 
the definitions used by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) Working 
Party on Aid Evaluation from the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2002).
In contrast, outcomes are defined as 
short-term and medium-term effects. 
These outcomes are frequently caus-
ally related to the long-term impacts, 
since, in many cases, they lead to the 
long-term impacts and can be con-
sidered as the step before them in 
the causal—and chronological—chain. 
Impacts and outcomes can be positive 
or negative, i.e., desired or undesired. 
The Delphi study used a  three-step 
approach. In the first step, the partic-
ipating experts submitted suggestions 
for important outcomes and impacts. 
They then rated their suggestions 
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according to importance during the 
second round and further discussed 
and refined them in the third round. 
In the ranking a  five point scale was 
used. Impacts and outcomes which on 
average got at least the second high-
est ranking or for which at least half of 
the respondents attributed the highest 
ranking were considered “core” impact 
or outcome. 
Using this ranking, a  set of 12 core 
impacts and 17 core outcomes were 
identified. Out of the 17 core out-
comes, eight apply to all types of 
microinsurance, while nine specifically 
target health microinsurance. Core 
outcomes, particularly appropriate for 
other microinsurance types (for exam-
ple, agricultural, life or funeral micro-
insurance) could not be identified. The 
12 core impacts apply to all types of 
microinsurance and can be grouped 
into six thematic areas:
1. Financial protection
2. Living standards
3. Health
4. Education
5. Perceptions / psychological issues
6. Social life and community
Figure 1: Overview of core outcomes and impacts
Core outcomes lead to Core impacts
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• Risk taking behaviour
• Risk management strategies (ex-ante)
• Risk management strategies (ex-post) / 
coping strategies in case of shock
– sale of assets for managing expens-
es related to shock event
– reliance on informal risk sharing 
networks
• Variability of costs or proits with re-
spect to the coverage of the insurance 
scheme
• Total costs in case of shock
• Total out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) 
in case of shock
→
→
→
Dimension 1: financial protection
• Risk of poverty / inancial protection / inan-
cial vulnerability
Dimension 2: living standards
• Economic situation of the household
– level of assets
Dimension 3: health
• Nutrition 
– quality of nutritional intake
– quantity of nutritional intake / extent of 
hunger
• Physical health
Dimension 4: education
• Educational attainment of children
– child labour
– duration of school attendance of children 
Dimension 5: perceptions /  
psychological issues
• Peace of mind / perception of inancial 
vulnerability
Dimension 6: social life and community
• Social capital 
H
e
a
lt
h
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n
ce
• Health-care services
– quality of health-care providers
– quantity of health-care providers
• Receiving (appropriate) health care
– Health-care utilisation (needs 
based)
– delay in health-care seeking
• Equity regarding health and health 
care
– equity in health care regarding dif-
ferent socioeconomic groups
– equity (needs-adjusted) in health 
care regarding different household 
members 
222
Also identified were potential indica-
tors for all core outcomes and impacts. 
The measurement of the indicators 
depends on the particular setting and 
the particular situation of the inter-
vention and the microinsurance pro-
gramme. For this reason, two or more 
indicators are suggested for most of 
the effects.
10.3. Core indicators for 
microinsurance outcomes
As mentioned above, 17 core outcomes 
have been the result of the Delphi pro-
cess, eight of which are general in 
nature whilst nine are specifically for 
health microinsurance (see figure  1). 
For other types of microinsurance, 
there are no specific core outcomes 
suggested.
10.3.1. General core outcomes and 
corresponding indicators
For the general core outcomes, issues 
of risk taking and risk management 
are dominant (see table 1). Changes in 
risk taking behaviour has been rated as 
one of the core outcomes microinsur-
ance may have in general. The ratio-
nale behind this is that more income 
security (or smoothing of expendi-
tures) through insurance may increase 
the willingness of the insured to make 
investments that are more risky, but 
potentially have a  higher return, and 
hence can constitute a  more efficient 
allocation of resources. This does, in 
particular, apply to productive invest-
ments and corresponding loans. Due 
to the effects described, the insured 
may be willing to invest more and, 
furthermore, take more loans for 
investments. For this reason pro-
ductive investments as percentage of 
total income of the household and total 
amount of loans taken are being sug-
gested as indicators for risk taking 
behaviour (indicating a rise in risk tak-
ing behaviour by a  higher number of 
loans). Following the same argument, 
the total amount of savings is suggested 
as an indicator, indicating a rise in risk 
taking behaviour by a  lower amount 
of savings, since no money has to be 
put aside for financial consequences 
of shock events and hence savings are 
freed up for investments. However, 
another argument is that households 
are able to save more money and need 
fewer loans due to fewer financial 
shocks and higher income caused by 
higher productive investment. Addi-
tional information is needed as both 
the amount of loans and the amount 
of savings are indicators, which, if they 
stand alone, are ambiguous and diffi-
cult to interpret. Context information is 
hence needed. 
Additional qualitative impact assess-
ments studies are helpful for examining 
these effects in more detail. For exam-
ple, qualitative interviews with house-
hold members examining the reasons 
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they save money or for what they use 
loans can be useful for this. It also has 
to be noted that it depends on the type 
of insurance and on the particular risk 
that is taken whether increased risk 
taking behaviour is desirable or not 
with respect to an increase of welfare 
of household members. In the case of 
crop or weather insurance, increased 
risk taking behaviour (and decreased 
risk diversification) may lead to higher 
crop yields, a  desirable outcome. Yet 
more risk taking in the area of health, 
may lead to an adverse health shock 
that is not desirable.2 
Changes in ex-ante risk manage-
ment strategies have been ranked as 
core outcome. Similar to risk taking 
behaviour, here the rationale is also 
that lesser alternative risk manage-
ment strategies are necessary due to 
microinsurance. This refers to savings, 
as well as liquid assets, the number of 
income sources per household, and the 
number of saving networks per house-
hold (like Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs), Accumulated 
2 These explanations are based on input given by Xavier 
Giné for the Delphi study.
Savings and Credit Associations 
(ASCAs), etc.). But the opposite may 
also be possible: a  higher household 
income (or less expenditure) leads to 
more activities in this field. 
Ex-post risk management strategies 
have been scored as core outcomes for 
microinsurance, together with the two 
subordinated outcomes sale of assets 
for managing expenses related to shock 
event and reliance on informal risk shar-
ing networks.3 In this case, indicators 
are the amount of loan taken and the 
amount of savings used. It is important 
to note that in this case, loan amounts 
and savings taken or used in case of 
shock are suggested. This is different 
from risk taking behaviour and ex-ante 
risk management strategies where the 
total amount of savings or loans of the 
household is the indicator. For ex-post 
risk management strategies, the indi-
cators refer to financial behaviour 
closely related to the shock event 
itself. The difference in total household 
expenditures before and after shock 
events (not including paying back loans 
3 Additional subordinated outcomes exist, but have not 
been scored as core and are not included.
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taken for the shock event and paying 
back interest for those) can be used as 
an indicator, as well as changes in food 
intake, since, without microinsurance, 
households might be more required to 
reduce other expenditures than is the 
case with microinsurance. Moreover, 
without microinsurance, households 
might be required to take children out 
of school (in order to make them con-
tribute to the household’s income or to 
save money on school-related expen-
ditures, like school uniforms, books, 
transport, or tuitions). This action can 
serve as indicator as well. 
Regarding the subordinated outcome 
of sale of assets, both the total value 
of sold assets in case of shock as well 
as the percentage of those assets which 
have been replaced or recovered six 
months after the shock event can be 
useful as indicators. Whilst the for-
mer one shows the general need of 
the household to sell assets in case 
of shock events, the latter indicator 
takes into account that the payout of 
insurance claims may happen with 
time lags. Insured households may 
be forced—despite microinsurance—to 
first sell their assets in case of a shock 
event, but can later recover or replace 
them due to claim payouts. A  second 
subordinated outcome of ex-post risk 
management strategies, reliance on 
informal risk sharing networks, has been 
ranked as core. This refers to financial 
contributions (with or without interest, 
as loan or as gift) to be received from 
different sources like family, neigh-
bours, and institutions (i.e., churches).
Three other core outcomes are: 1) the 
variability of costs or profits, 2) the 
total costs in case of shock, and, 3) the 
total out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) in 
case of shock. In particular, smooth-
ing the variability of costs or profits is 
one of the central expected outcomes 
of microinsurance. For the particular 
case of health insurance, indicators for 
total out-of-pocket spending can refer 
to varying categories of treatment, like 
hospital stay, deliveries, self-treat-
ment, ambulatory care from formal 
providers, or inpatient care.
10.3.2. Core outcomes and 
corresponding indicators specific 
for health microinsurance
The nine core outcomes identified for 
health microinsurance refer to health-
care services in general, the receiving 
of health care, equity regarding health, 
and health-care utilisation (table 2). 
The first core outcome of health-
care services includes two subordi-
nated outcomes, which are quality 
and quantity of health-care providers. 
The rationale behind this is that due 
to health microinsurance, the demand 
for health-care services rises and may 
lead to an improvement in both quality 
and in quantity supply of health-care 
services. For quality of health-care 
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Table 1: General outcomes of microinsurance
General outcomes of  
microinsurance
Indicators
• Risk taking behaviour • Productive investment as percentage of total income of the 
household
• Total amount of loans taken
• Total amount of savings 
• Risk management strategies 
(ex-ante)
• Total amount of savings
• Amount of liquid assets
• Number of income sources per household
• Number of memberships in ROSCAs, ASCAs, and other in-
formal savings networks per household
• Risk management strategies (ex-
post) / coping strategies in case of 
shock
• Amount of (formal) loans taken in case of shock
• Amount of savings used in case of shock
• Difference of total household expenditures before and after 
shock events (without paying back of loans and interest)
• Food intake (quality and quantity, self-reported)
• Percentage of children taken out of school due to shock 
event
- Sale of assets for managing 
expenses related to shock event
• Total value of assets sold in case of shock
• Percentage of assets recovered/replaced after being sold in 
case of shock (i.e., some land/livestock may be repurchased 
after insurance payout, houses may be repaired) six months 
after shock event
- Reliance on informal risk sha-
ring networks
• Total amount of borrowing for shock-related expenditures 
from informal networks
• Total amount of borrowing for other expenditures from infor-
mal networks
• Total amount of contributions received from family in case of 
a shock (as loan)
• Total amount of contributions received from family in case of 
a shock (as gift)
• Total amount of contributions received from informal or 
semiformal organisations, (e.g., local church association, 
employer) in case of a shock (as loan)
• Total amount of loans (currently pending) given to family 
members and other community members
• Variability of costs or proits • Variability of net costs or net proits (including insurance 
premiums and claim payouts)
• Total costs in case of shock • Total costs in case of shock
• Total out-of-pocket spending 
(OOPS) in case of shock
• Net OOPS per shock event
In case of health:
• Net OOPS per full episode of illness
• Net OOPS on varying categories of treatment: hospital stay, 
deliveries, self-treatment, ambulatory care from formal pro-
viders, inpatient care
services, hospital mortality rates and 
scoring based on quality assessments 
can be used as indicators. For quantity 
of health-care providers, the number 
of modern health-care providers within 
a  defined area/radius is suggested as 
an indicator.
For the outcome of receiving (appro-
priate) health care, two subordinated 
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outcomes are also ranked as core and 
refer to health-care utilisation and 
the delay in health-care seeking. For 
these outcomes, the total number of 
treatments (regarding various types 
of health-care services), as well as the 
number of illness episodes involun-
tarily self-treated, can be used as indi-
cators. Furthermore, to assess health-
care utilisation of children, utilisation 
rates of children regarding different 
treatments, or prevention measures 
can be used as indicators (for example, 
for immunisations). For delay in treat-
ment, the number of days the symptoms 
persisted before treatment was sought 
can be a valuable indicator.
Of key concern is the third main out-
come that has been identified as core 
for health microinsurance: equity 
regarding health and health care. This 
does not refer to total numbers or 
results over all subgroups, like the 
other core outcomes and impacts, but 
refers to differences between various 
subgroups.
Particularly, equity between differ-
ent socioeconomic subgroups (such 
as extremely poor, poor and non-poor 
households, or different groups of pro-
fessions) and between different house-
hold members (e.g., the household 
head/main bread winner, daughter-
in-law, parents-in-law, boys, girls) are 
considered as core. This can basically 
be assessed by any of the indicators 
mentioned above for the outcome of 
receiving (appropriate) health care, 
split by the specific subgroups of inter-
est and comparison of potential differ-
ences (and the differences amongst 
subgroups in the control group). In 
addition, indicators measuring the 
total costs of health-care expendi-
tures (per illness episode or per time 
period, e.g., 6 months) can be used to 
assess equity regarding health care. 
Equity is important to assess since all 
other indicators give average numbers 
for all household members or socio-
economic groups. But it is import-
ant to examine whether, for instance, 
boys get on average six immunisa-
tions in their first year of life, whilst 
girls get only two, (i.e., leaving girls 
behind in terms of health), or whether 
both groups get a  similar number of 
immunisations. 
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Table 2: Outcomes specific for health microinsurance
Outcomes specific for health  
microinsurance
Indicators
• Health-care services
- Quality of health-care providers • Hospital mortality rate
• Scoring on quality assessments
- Quantity of health-care providers • Number of modern health-care providers within a de-
ined area/radius 
• Receiving (appropriate) health care
- Health-care utilisation 
(needs based)
• Total number of visits to outpatient services per house-
hold member within the last month
• Total number of visits to inpatient services (with at least 
24 hours of hospitalisation) per household member with-
in the last month/year
• Total number of illness episodes involuntarily self-treat-
ed per household member within the last month
Regarding children:
• Percentage of children (below age 5) seeking diarrhea 
treatment
• Percentage of children (below age 5) sleeping under 
a mosquito net
• Percentage of children (below age 5) getting vitamin 
A supplements
• Number of immunisations for children below age 1 (per 
child)
- Delay in health-care seeking • Number of days symptoms persisted before treatment 
was sought
• Equity regarding health and health 
care
• Use any of the indicator mentioned above for subgroups
- Equity in health care regarding 
different socioeconomic groups
• Use any of the indicator mentioned above for socioeco-
nomic subgroups
- Equity in health care regarding 
different household members
• Use any of the indicator mentioned above for subgroups 
of household members
10.4. Core indicators for 
microinsurance impacts
Unlike outcomes, impacts are long-
term changes, often taking place over 
five years or more after a programme 
has started. Pressure to prove positive 
impact is strong from all sides. Private 
and public financial supporters, donor 
organisations, local partner organi-
sations, and internal or political insti-
tutions are all looking for an imme-
diate positive impact. Unfortunately, 
the impact needs time to unfold; also, 
assessing it takes time. If early results 
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are needed due to external or inter-
nal forces, it might be better to mea-
sure indicators based on short-term 
outcomes or for social performance4. 
Using these indicators as proxies for 
impact is more advisable in this case 
than trying to measure impact and 
being disappointed by the final results. 
However, to apply outcome indicators 
and social performance indicators as 
proxies, a reliable theory of change is 
necessary.
The experts of the Delphi study iden-
tified twelve impacts as core impacts. 
Unlike the outcomes described above, 
these core impacts and their indicators 
can be applied for all types of microin-
surance. The dimensions and impacts 
discussed in this chapter are closely 
interrelated. For example, better health 
may lead to higher financial protection, 
and vice versa, and higher education 
may lead to better living standards, 
and vice versa. The impacts mentioned 
below, thus, cannot be understood as 
standalone effects, but are pieces of 
the same puzzle. This has implications 
when conducting impact assessments: 
if one is able to measure a  positive 
impact on financial protection, but at 
the same time cannot identify positive 
impact on living standards, health, or 
education, more research might be 
4 Appui au Développement Autonome (ADA), Belgische 
Raiffeisenstichting (BRS), and the Microinsurance Net-
work (2011) have provided a  set of social performance 
indicators for microinsurance that can be used.
necessary to examine these relations.5 
Moreover, impacts of microinsurance 
for different dimensions of life might 
have different directions: whilst the 
impact on health might be positive, 
impact on social life could be negative. 
The interdependencies of impacts have 
not yet been sufficiently understood in 
microinsurance, but, nevertheless, 
have to be taken into account when 
doing impact assessments.
10.4.1. Dimension 1: financial 
protection
Whilst most general core outcomes 
point to risk management and risk tak-
ing, only one impact related to financial 
protection was ranked as core, which is 
5 An example for this interrelation is described in Hintz 
(2010) regarding funeral microinsurance where the in-
surance payouts lead to more costly funerals, which, at 
the same time, lowers the amount of money left for the 
household to deal with the cut in income due to the loss of 
the breadwinner. The insurance payout does only partially 
affect the future welfare of the household.
229Core outcomes, impacts, and indicators for microinsurance
risk of poverty/financial protection/finan-
cial vulnerability (table 3). However, we 
are convinced that this impact is one of 
the most important that microinsur-
ance can have, which mirrors the fact 
that this relationship has been subject 
to many studies. 
The effect on financial protection is 
very closely related to the eight gen-
eral outcomes we have discussed. 
They come prior to financial protection 
in the causal chain and are often a pre-
requisite for financial protection. 
10.4.2. Dimension 2: living 
standards
Closely related to the dimension of 
financial protection described above 
is the dimension of living standards. 
Since microinsurance aims to target 
the poor, improvement of the economic 
situation of the household is a potential 
core impact of microinsurance. 
There are different approaches on 
how to best assess the economic sit-
uation of a household. We have men-
tioned level of assets, level of income, 
and level of liabilities as potential 
impacts identified by the participants 
of the Delphi process, but there are 
also expenditure related effects, like 
level of expenditures and change of 
expenditures patterns (i.e., a  shift in 
relative allocation of expenditures 
regarding food, non-food, leisure, 
savings, and other items). However, 
only level of assets has been rated as 
a core potential impact. As indicators 
for this, the experts suggest housing 
conditions, level of household assets, 
and consumer appliances, as well as 
savings and other working capital.6 As 
seen in the table below, housing con-
ditions and level of household assets / 
consumer appliances consist of groups 
of indicators rather than representing 
a  single indicator. We suggest using 
scores for the single indicators that 
can then be summed up in a  joint 
score. For some situations, a weight-
ing of scores might be useful. Simi-
larly, for the third indicator, savings 
and other working capital, we suggest 
adding up all sums of the different 
kinds of capital mentioned. 
6 These suggestions refer mainly to input from Rebecca 
Thornton, who has used similar indicators for assessing 
a FINCA programme. 
Table 3: Core impacts and indicators on financial protection
Impacts on financial protection Indicators
• Risk of poverty / inancial protec-
tion / inancial vulnerability
Percentage of households living below poverty line:
• Percentage of households living on less than US$1.25 (pur-
chasing power parity) per person
• Percentage of households living between US$1.25 and US$2 
(purchasing power parity) per person
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10.4.3. Dimension 3: health
The third dimension for core impacts 
is health (table 5). It is important to 
note that the related effects are not 
restricted to health microinsurance 
only (as are the health-related out-
comes we described previously). Since 
higher financial protection and better 
living standards may go hand in hand 
with better health, the latter should be 
considered as core potential effects for 
all types of microinsurance.
Firstly, nutrition is an issue. Both qual-
ity and quantity of nutrition (hunger) are 
concerns. For nutrition in general, we 
suggest using an indicator measuring 
the total expenditures on food per person 
per week. The impact of nutrition has 
two subordinated impacts, which are 
quality of nutritional intake and quantity 
of nutritional intake. In case of shocks, 
some households might reduce their 
spending on diversity and quality of 
Table 4: Core impacts and indicators on living standards
Impacts on living standards Indicators
• Economic situation of the  
household 
See indicators below in subcategory
o Level of assets • Housing conditions: 
- Number of rooms in the dwelling
- Main material of the loor of the dwelling
- Main material of the exterior walls in the dwelling
- Main material of the roof of the dwelling
- Percentage of households with access to tapped water with-
in 30-minute walk
- Percentage of households with tapped water at their home
- Percentage of households with a toilet in their home
- Percentage of households with electricity in their home
• Level of household assets / consumer appliances: 
- Number of pots and pans in dwelling 
- Existence of bicycle, motor bike, car (and number)
- Existence of television, refrigerator, washing machine, air 
condition, Hi-i)
- Existence of mobile phone(s)
• Savings and other working capital: amount of liquid savings 
(bank accounts, cash-on-hand, money in savings groups, gold, 
jewelry, etc.), illiquid savings (land ownership (irrigated/non-ir-
rigated), livestock, housing) and working capital (e.g., machin-
ery, ish boats, stocks of goods))
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food, while other households have to 
even reduce quantity. The picture is 
often not homogenous for all house-
holds included in the study and can 
depend on the socio-economic status 
of households. For quality of nutritional 
intake, the frequency of eating vegeta-
bles or fruits (number per week) and the 
frequency of eating meat (if people eat 
meat at all) (also number per week) are 
suggestions for indicators. These can 
be adapted to other eating or food hab-
its of the region where the study takes 
place. For quantity of nutritional intake, 
the average number of meals eaten per 
day in last month and the number of days 
when food was insufficient for household 
in last month are possible indicators. 
Secondly, besides nutrition, change in 
health itself (or morbidity) is a poten-
tial core effect of microinsurance that 
builds upon the assumption that better 
risk management and lower variability 
in expenditures will lead to being able 
to afford better and more food (as we 
have described) and, furthermore, to 
a better utilisation of health-care ser-
vices and, thus, to better health.7 The 
number of sick days in a household per 
person within last month or the number 
of days household members were unable 
to perform usual activities because of 
poor health per person within last month 
(which might be working or going to 
school) are suggested as indicators 
for this core effect, eventually per 
subgroups (such as children, women, 
main breadwinners, or elders). If one 
7 Outcomes regarding health-care utilisation have been 
rated as core for health microinsurance only, but are po-
tential outcomes for other types of microinsurance, too. 
The rationale is that by lowering the variability in expen-
ditures, households do not require as much savings as 
before (for financial shocks), freeing financial resources 
for other purposes. 
Table 5: Core impacts and indicators on health
Impacts on health Indicators
• Nutrition (in quantity and quality) • Total expenditures on food per person per week
o Quality of nutritional intake • Frequency of eating vegetables or fruits (number per 
week)
• Frequency of eating meat (if people eat meat at all) 
(number per week)
o Quantity of nutritional intake / extent of 
hunger
• Average number of meals eaten per day in last month
• Number of days when food was insuficient for house-
hold in last month
• Health / morbidity • Number of sick days in a household per person within 
last month (per subgroups, such as children, women, 
elders, etc.)
• Number of days household members were unable to 
perform usual activities because of poor health per 
person within last month
• Body mass index (for all)
• Percentage of children with anemia
• Percentage of women with anemia
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does have access to them, medical 
indicators like body mass index (per 
subgroups) or percentage of children 
or women with anemia would be useful 
indicators for this core impact as well. 
These data are difficult to assess on 
one’s own, however, but are useful in 
cases where they have been assessed 
by others already (e.g., through a health 
camp or in hospital or school). 
10.4.4. Dimension 4: education
The fourth dimension of impacts is 
education (table 6). Whilst education 
can refer to both the education of chil-
dren and adults and can take place in 
school or somewhere else, the focus 
here is on school education of children. 
Primary impact in the dimension of 
education is the educational attain-
ment of children. Two indicators, 
the percentage of children aged 6 - 16 
attending school and days missed in 
school per child within last month are 
recommended in order to measure this 
impact. These indicators need to be 
adapted with respect to the school age 
that is usual in the particular country 
(e.g., in some countries, school starts 
for children at age 5 and not age 6), 
and with respect to the particular time 
of the year the intervention is taking 
place. For example, if an intervention 
is taking place during or soon after key 
annual school holidays, days missed in 
school would not be a helpful indicator. 
The impact of educational attainment of 
children has two subordinated impacts 
which are child labour and duration of 
school attendance of children. Child 
labour refers to “work that deprives 
children of their childhood, their poten-
tial and their dignity, and that is harmful 
to physical and mental development” 
(International Labour Organization 
(ILO) 2012). This includes work that is 
“depriving children of the opportunity 
to attend school…, obliging them to 
leave school prematurely… [or] requir-
ing them to attempt to combine school 
attendance with excessively long and 
heavy work” (ILO 2012). Although the 
reduction of child labour is an objective 
in itself and cannot only be understood 
as a  measure for better education of 
children, it is described in this chapter 
within the dimension of education and 
has been classified as a  subcategory 
of educational attainment due to the 
very close relationship between edu-
cation or school attainment and child 
labour, as shown in the quote above. 
(However, child labour could well have 
been established a  dimension of its 
own.) Indicators like the percentage of 
children below a certain age engaged in 
income generation, housework, farming, 
or other economic activity as their main 
occupation (depending on the particular 
country or region), the average number 
of working hours per week for children 
(also below a certain age), days missed 
in school per child within last month, 
233Core outcomes, impacts, and indicators for microinsurance
or the percentage of children attending 
school can be applied here.
Whilst educational attainment of chil-
dren looks more at whether children 
of a certain age visit school regularly, 
the subordinated impact of duration 
of school attendance of children looks 
at the overall time and the education 
levels that children reach. As an indi-
cator, we suggest the measurement of 
highest education levels attained by chil-
dren and young adults (below age 20) in 
the household. This indicator is most 
likely not measurable on a short-term 
or even mid-term scale. It is, therefore, 
important to take this indicator into 
account only when looking at a  long-
term scale. 
10.4.5. Dimension 5: perceptions / 
psychological issues
Whilst the dimensions of impact 
described above have a  financial 
dimension, microinsurance might well 
have an impact on the perceptions and 
psychological state of the programme 
members and the corresponding 
household members (table 7). Due to 
changes in financial protection that 
microinsurance might cause, it can be 
expected that the household members 
change their perceptions about their 
financial vulnerability. In a  positive 
Table 6: Core impacts and indicators on education
Impacts on education Indicators
• Educational attainment of children • Percentage of children age 6 - 16 (or other age) at-
tending school 
• Days missed in school per child within last month
o Child labour • Percentage of children below age 15 (or other age) 
engaged in income generation, housework, farming, 
or other economic activity as their main occupation
• Average number of working hours per week for chil-
dren below age 15 (or other age)
• Days missed in school per child within last month 
due to labour
• Percentage of children age 6 - 16 (or other age) at-
tending school 
o Duration of school attendance of 
children
• Highest education levels attained by children and 
young adults in household (below age 20)
Table 7: Core impacts and indicators on perceptions / psychological issues
Impacts on perceptions /  
psychological impacts
Indicators
• Peace of mind effect/ perception of inan-
cial vulnerability 
• Changes in risk prioritisation through risk ranking 
exercise
• Perception about conidence in the future
• Perception about inancial vulnerability
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case, this might lead to what is often 
called the “peace of mind effect.” We 
suggest using changes in risk priori-
tisation, as well as perceptions about 
confidence in the future and financial 
vulnerability, as indicators that can all 
be assessed using scales. 
10.4.6. Dimension 6: social life and 
community
Microinsurance has the potential 
to affect the social life of both the 
insured and the uninsured (table 8). 
For example, microinsurance might 
help empower insured women with 
regard to their position in commu-
nity/society and in the household. The 
extent of out-migration might change, 
since the households face fewer finan-
cial shocks due to insurance. In con-
trast, particularly for the non-insured 
community members (but also for the 
insured), financial and social support 
after a shock event might be less due to 
crowding-out effects that microinsur-
ance may have. Of all these effects, the 
participants of the Delphi study scored 
only social capital as a  potential core 
impact, both for the insured and for the 
uninsured. Social capital is a complex 
construct that is difficult to measure. 
In the context of microinsurance, the 
amount of money borrowed from others 
without interest, as well as the amount 
of money lent to others without interest 
are suggested as indicators and seem 
to be helpful to assess social capital. 
10.5. Equity as impact 
Very often, microinsurance schemes do 
not aim only at welfare improvements 
of poor communities in general, but to 
impact those subgroups that seem to 
be particularly poor and vulnerable, 
i.e., they aspire to equity between sub-
groups. These target subgroups might, 
for example, include extremely poor 
households, children, women, elderly, 
or religion- or occupation-based sub-
groups. For example, a specific interest 
of a health microinsurance programme 
might be to improve the access of 
women to health-care services and to 
adapt it to that of men. It could also be 
to adapt the educational attainment of 
girls to that of boys. 
Furthermore, poorer and less poor 
households might participate differ-
ently in or benefit differently from 
a microinsurance scheme. Sometimes 
poorer households find it difficult to 
Table 8: Core impacts and indicators on social life and community
Impacts on social life and community Indicators
• Social capital • Total amount of money currently borrowed 
from others without interest
• Total amount of money currently lent to others 
without interest
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afford participation in the insurance 
scheme; sometimes more affluent 
households have potentially better risk 
management options. Also, obtaining 
benefits amongst the group of insured 
households can differ if, for instance, 
better-off households find it easier to 
obtain benefits for one reason or the 
other. Understanding such effects 
is helpful for designing insurance 
schemes that deliver their benefits 
regardless of the economic situation of 
the participating household. 
10.6. Transforming indicators 
into evaluation tools
All impacts, outcomes, and their indi-
cators given above are considered to be 
core and suggested for integration into 
any impact assessment in microinsur-
ance. However, measuring indicators 
requires a  research tool designed to 
include appropriate questions. More-
over, obtaining the right information 
usually requires conducting field-
work—although in some cases other 
data sources might be available—and 
asking the right questions in a way that 
can be understood and answered by 
the respondents. Whilst both aspects 
might seem straight forward initially, 
a number of aspects have to be consid-
ered: How many questions to include 
in the questionnaire? Who is the right 
respondent in a  household and what 
time of the day offers the highest like-
lihood of meeting her—and, potentially, 
what time of the year? How does one 
present questions in a way that inter-
viewer and respondent have a  com-
mon understanding of the underlying 
concept? 
All questions have then to be accom-
plished in a questionnaire. However, 
designing a questionnaire to yield high 
quality data is not as easy as it may at 
first appear. When a  questionnaire is 
administered, an intricate and subtle 
process starts, with the intent of pro-
viding useful and accurate informa-
tion transfer from the respondent to 
the inquirer, as Foddy (2008) explains 
in detail. A series of questions need to 
be posed in a  clear, comprehensive, 
and appropriate manner so that the 
respondent can formulate, articulate, 
and transmit the answers effectively. 
This section describes challenges and 
options when turning indicators into 
research tools and considerations for 
applying those tools in practice.
236
10.6.1. Formulating the right 
questions
Unfortunately, an indicator that is to be 
measured often does not match one 
single question in a  questionnaire. In 
fact, for measuring one indicator, one 
might need several questions to be 
answered, whilst, at the same time, 
questions might overlap for different 
indicators. Take, for example, the total 
number of visits to inpatient services 
(with at least 24 hours of hospitalisa-
tion) per household member within the 
last month, which has been proposed 
above as an indicator measuring the 
core outcome of health-care utilisation 
(needs-based) for health microinsur-
ance. Investigating this variable has 
direct implications for what a  survey 
will need to capture: for example, the 
total number of household members 
and the visits to inpatient services 
within the last month prior to the sur-
vey. To explain differences amongst 
the households covered in a  survey, 
the evaluator would additionally want 
to know the insurance status, probably 
some proxy for the household’s wealth 
or income, education levels, number of 
illness episodes, distance from provid-
ers, and so on. This includes basically 
everything that is likely to influence 
the variable under scrutiny. The num-
ber of aspects that should be covered 
in the survey quickly expands with 
this approach. Many aspects overlap 
for different indicators and have to be 
compressed into the minimum num-
ber of questions needed to answer the 
research questions of interest and to 
measure corresponding indicators. 
10.6.2. Defining the respondents 
and formulating the questions right
Once the set of “right questions” is 
identified, phrasing these questions is 
the next step, interlinked with defining 
the respondent(s). The type and phras-
ing of survey questions used in a survey 
will play a role in producing relevant or 
unbiased survey responses. Another 
consideration to take into account and 
define is whom the survey should ide-
ally address.
Responses to questions in a question-
naire might differ depending on the 
household member(s) replying to the 
questions. Some members of a house-
hold have better insights into certain 
aspects than others. For example, in 
developing country contexts, men often 
possess a  better overview over the 
household’s income, whilst women are 
said to have better knowledge about 
health problems in the household. This 
means that for questions referring to 
risk taking behaviour and financial pro-
tection, men might be the respondents 
of choice, whilst, in contrast, women 
might be able to give more accurate 
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and detailed answers on questions 
regarding impacts like health and edu-
cation. However, interviewing different 
people in the household on issues they 
might know best is challenging in the 
practical implementation of a survey in 
the field. Not all household members 
might be available at particular times 
of the day or year (e.g., those who work 
outside the home will not be available 
in the afternoon; those who migrate 
for work may be away for months at 
a  time). Deciding to only interview 
these particular persons will increase 
the logistical effort for the survey team 
by requiring them to make multiple 
visits to the same household. In such 
cases, it might be necessary to adapt 
the questionnaire and its questions 
to the persons available. Moreover, 
even if the required person is avail-
able, it is not always the case that the 
researcher will be able to talk to her. 
For example, in some cultural con-
texts, it might be difficult to talk to 
a household’s daughter-in-law without 
including the mother-in-law as well. 
In many countries, the latter is the more 
senior in the hierarchy of the family 
and she might not allow her daughter-
in-law to talk alone to strangers—or 
she may be convinced that she, as the 
elder woman and higher-ranking fam-
ily member, has more important things 
to say than her daughter-in-law and 
answers instead of her. 
In most studies, it will be more feasi-
ble to choose a preferred respondent 
for the entire questionnaire and record 
the characteristics of the respondent 
properly. This allows for later checking 
on differences in responses induced 
by different respondent groups. How-
ever, this is not necessarily required, 
and other approaches exist. As Col-
lins et al. (2009) show in their Portfo-
lios of the Poor, it can be excellent to 
talk to as many households members 
as possible, as they have done in their 
study.8
8 Compare Collins et al. 2009, 188. 
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Triangulation, i.e., seeking insights 
regarding the same question from dif-
ferent sources of information, can also 
be fruitful. For example, if you want 
to examine the percentage of children 
attending school in the community, as 
is proposed as an indicator to assess 
the impact of microinsurance on the 
educational attainment of children, it 
might be worthwhile talking to both 
parents and school teachers. If you 
want to examine indicators related 
to health-care utilisation, it might be 
insightful to not only talk to household 
members, but also to medical staff 
from the local health post and the dis-
trict hospital.
The way of formulating and phrasing 
a  question is strongly related to the 
kind of household members or com-
munity members identified as poten-
tial respondents. A questionnaire that 
addresses the mother-in-law of the 
household may look different than 
a  survey tool that is designed for the 
household head. It is important to 
ensure that the participants do, at 
least, understand the questions in 
the way that you want. This might be 
a  challenge and might have different 
dimensions like—amongst others—a 
cultural, an intellectual, as well as 
a  practical one. Take the following 
examples:
• How many people live in your 
household? This question is prob-
ably most basic for all potential 
questionnaires, since many indica-
tors do not look at the whole house-
hold, but at particular attributes per 
household member. For example, 
this does apply to the indicator men-
tioned above on total number of visits 
to inpatient services (with at least 24 
hours hospitalisation) per household 
member within the last month used to 
assess the outcomes of health-care 
utilisation for health microinsur-
ance. For this, it is crucial to know 
the number of household members. 
However, the concept of household 
might differ in different contexts, 
and often extended families living 
from various incomes might live 
under one roof. Are extended fam-
ilies to be considered a  single or 
separate household? Are families’ 
main breadwinners, who migrate 
for work most of the year, part of 
the household or not? And what 
about nephews from rural areas 
staying with their better-off uncles 
during their education? In order to 
yield more accurate replies, speci-
fication of the concept of household 
could be introduced in the ques-
tion. A  commonly used phrase for 
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clarifying the concept of household 
is people sleeping under the same 
roof and eating from the same pot, 
defining the economically relevant 
unit household better.
• Estimating the household’s income: 
Households in the informal economy 
often have fluctuating and seasonal 
incomes, originating from a  mix of 
income sources. Obtaining an over-
view can be difficult. For example, 
farm income is largely reinvested 
into agricultural inputs and, thus, 
not disposable income; seasonal 
income is difficult to capture, and so 
on. Therefore, for the core impacts 
and outcomes described above, 
income as an indicator is avoided as 
much as possible. Instead, an indi-
cator such as expenditure is used 
and can serve as proxy for income 
and to assess a household’s wealth. 
However, seasonality patterns 
also play a  role. Food expenses 
can vary depending on the avail-
ability of a  household’s own crops 
or spending on religious or social 
aspects might differ across sea-
sons. Regardless of the approach 
taken, it is important to define clear 
time-reference periods, which are, 
as little as possible, prone to recall 
bias, i.e., the human tendency to 
forget things that have taken place 
at some time in the past. Moreover, 
indicators assessing the house-
holds’ assets are recommended for 
evaluating its living standard, since 
these are usually more static over 
time and less subject to seasonal 
changes as the indicators described 
above. 
• Inquiring about illnesses in a house-
hold is also a challenge, as it depends 
on the household’s perception of an 
illness, and specifying what consti-
tutes an illness is difficult. A precise 
definition might not be too import-
ant, however, in the context of most 
surveys: the perception of being sick 
might provide the necessary infor-
mation about a household’s poten-
tial desire to see a  doctor or not 
and thus actually deliver relevant 
results for the specific survey focus. 
Inaccuracy in reporting by larger 
and smaller households might dif-
fer: a  respondent from a  two per-
son household is more likely to 
recall the various illness episodes 
than a  respondent of an eight per-
son household. This potential bias, 
however, is hard to avoid. In order 
to reduce recall bias, regardless of 
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household size, it is also important 
to choose a  reasonable reporting 
period, e.g., illnesses in the house-
hold within the last month. Recall-
ing health events longer back might 
actually work only for larger events 
like hospitalisation. Furthermore, 
there are some illnesses for which 
it is difficult to inquire due to social 
stigma. Information about the prev-
alence of human immunodeficiency 
virus / acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (HIV/AIDS) in a survey is 
certainly a challenge. 
In many parts of the world, people—
in particular in remote areas—do not 
speak the official main language of the 
country in their daily life, but rather 
a dialect or other local language. This 
should be considered when designing 
the survey tools. If questions need to 
be asked of the participants, or a dis-
cussion is moderated, this should 
always be done in the local language 
that the people speak. However, this 
language might change from village to 
village. Slight variations in meanings 
of words can induce unwanted con-
notations. For instance, a  translation 
of the word “community” into Oriya, 
a language mainly spoken in Orissa—a 
state in Eastern India—gave a different 
connotation to the respondents in one 
region of that state when it was trans-
lated by a  native speaker from a  dif-
ferent region. In previous civil unrests 
in that region, that specific translation 
carried the connotation of belonging 
to a  specific political community—a 
meaning not intended in the survey. 
However, it may be difficult to find local 
researchers who speak this language 
well and are suitable to conduct your 
study. So, this is, consequently, a prac-
tical challenge that has to be overcome 
for your study. Pretests might be help-
ful for this.
Also, under cultural and religious 
aspects, alignment of the survey tool 
is necessary. For example, fasting 
periods for different religious groups 
need to be taken into account when 
asking about the average number of 
meals eaten per day in the last month 
or the frequency of eating meat, as 
suggested as indicators for the quan-
tity and quality of food. Depending on 
the particular country and region and 
cultural and religious background, 
questions that are too direct might 
need to be avoided for particular top-
ics. In particular, if they are dealing 
with taboos (for example, abortion or 
contraception). There is also a need to 
adapt your language, or the language 
of your tools, to the education levels 
of respondents. In developing country 
contexts, most evaluators are signifi-
cantly better educated than the partic-
ipants in their trial, who often have no 
more than primary school education—
if any at all. Keeping your sentences 
and questions short and simple, and 
avoiding overly complex words and 
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concepts, will help avoid confusion at 
the other end. For example, the impact 
of microinsurance on peace of mind is 
suggested for assessment by indica-
tors like changes in risk prioritisation 
through risk ranking exercise, perception 
about confidence in the future, and per-
ception about financial vulnerability. For 
all three indicators, at a  first glance, 
rankings seem to be most appropri-
ate, as suggested in the tables above. 
However, sometimes the use of scales 
(such as a  Likert scale, requiring the 
respondents to choose one of five 
ranks) overburdens the respondents. 
Finding simple concepts or supporting 
visual aids is key. Using a language and 
approach that is understood is not only 
important for quality answers, but also 
for gaining trust.
10.6.3. Knowing the microinsurance 
scheme not only on paper but in 
practice
In order to best design surveys, it is also 
important to know the manner in which 
the microinsurance scheme works in 
reality and not only rely on how it works 
on paper or how it has been planned 
to work. Take, for example, a  health 
microinsurance scheme that initially 
required en bloc affiliation of the whole 
household. When examining equity of 
health and health care amongst differ-
ent household members, it is import-
ant to know whether this requirement 
has been put into practice without 
exceptions, or whether affiliation of 
single household members was pos-
sible, or other exceptions to the rule 
were made. This may not only influ-
ence the content of your questions, but 
also helps avoiding misunderstand-
ings on both sides. Therefore, to look 
at the scheme in practice and also at 
the context of the scheme is invalu-
able for interpreting results, drawing 
conclusions, and better identifying 
aspects which potentially influence the 
scheme’s impact. 
10.7. Conclusions 
Experts in the microinsurance arena 
consider the core impacts and out-
comes described in this chapter as crit-
ical for impact evaluations in microin-
surance. We hope that this set of core 
impacts, outcomes, and indicators 
can find their way into many impact 
assessments in microinsurance and 
242
help enrich our understanding on 
those issues quickly.
The set of standard indicators should 
remain dynamic and adaptive, devel-
oping over time. Moreover, we are con-
vinced that other core effects exist that 
have not yet been explored or identi-
fied, but are important. 
Such a  standard set of indicators, 
when turned into a  tool, needs to be 
adapted to cultural, religious, social, 
and intellectual circumstances of the 
respondents. A  survey tool assessing 
the impact of microinsurance should 
never be translated one-to-one from 
one study or one study site to the other, 
but needs to take into account the par-
ticular situation of the community, as 
well as the subgroups the scheme is 
targeting.
We believe that having a  set of stan-
dard indicators will help evaluators 
better design their studies and create 
improved comparability between dif-
ferent studies (e.g., for the purpose 
of meta-analysis). Both better studies 
and improved comparability can lead 
to gaining more and deeper insight into 
the change in welfare that microinsur-
ance can provide for the poor and the 
challenges related to this.
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11.1. Introduction 
Impact evaluations in the field of 
microinsurance can employ differ-
ent research designs. Impact evalu-
ation designs can be experimental, 
quasi-experimental and non-experi-
mental, qualitative, or a  combination 
of these. Increasingly, quantitative 
approaches, whether experimental or 
quasi-experimental, are often com-
bined with qualitative data collection 
and analysis processes. The resulting 
designs are described as mixed meth-
ods. Irrespective of the specific design 
adopted, the common objective across 
all impact evaluations is to assess the 
“causal” relationship between the pro-
gramme and a set outcome of interest. 
This objective clearly distinguishes 
impact evaluations from other forms of 
evaluations, like implementation eval-
uation, which focuses on how an inter-
vention is being implemented, or per-
formance evaluation, which focuses 
on assessing whether a  programme 
achieved the objectives it originally set 
to achieve. 
All research designs used to study 
impact evaluations have specific 
strengths and weaknesses. For exam-
ple, propensity score matching can only 
reduce selection bias on a limited set of 
selective measurable indicators used 
for matching the controls to the cases, 
whilst difference-in-difference (DID) 
designs can only control for selection 
bias due to time invariant indicators. 
Similarly, although randomisation is 
often considered to be the best avail-
able option to estimate impact, it may 
not always be the most appropriate 
design to apply in a particular situation 
(Shadish et al. 2002). For instance, it 
may not be politically feasible to offer 
microinsurance to some individuals 
whilst denying it to others who have 
similar needs and could equally ben-
efit from the intervention. The lesson 
we have learned over the years is that 
the most appropriate design balances 
theoretical considerations with field 
circumstances. 
Focusing now on the elements that 
ought to be considered when trans-
lating the theory of impact evaluation 
into practical fieldwork, this chapter 
unfolds over five sections. Each section 
covers one specific aspect relevant to 
designing, planning, or conducting an 
impact evaluation in the field of micro-
insurance. Firstly, we introduce and 
discuss the elements that need to be 
considered when choosing an adequate 
research design, depending on field 
circumstances. Secondly, we describe 
the resource requirements for con-
ducting an impact evaluation and how 
those requirements may reflect on the 
choice of the research design. Thirdly, 
we address pragmatic considerations 
on sample size, tool development, and 
actual data collection and analysis 
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processes. Fourthly, we address the 
ethical implications of the various 
designs and briefly review procedures 
for ethical clearance in impact evalu-
ation. Lastly, we address the interface 
and relationship between the research 
team and the concerned policy makers. 
Across sections, we draw from direct 
field experience to complement concep-
tual models with practical illustrations. 
11.2. Selecting an 
appropriate impact 
evaluation design 
Purpose of the impact evaluation 
The ultimate aim of any impact evalu-
ation is not only to determine whether, 
and by how much, the microinsur-
ance programme yields an impact on 
a defined outcome through the estima-
tion of causal relationships, but also to 
provide the necessary evidence base 
to inform further policy developments. 
If a microinsurance programme yields 
beneficial impacts, it is important to 
understand what factors in the environ-
ment enabled change to take place and 
to assess whether the programme can 
be scaled up or replicated elsewhere. 
Conversely, if the programme does not 
yield the expected impacts, it is import-
ant to identify potential bottlenecks and 
barriers to change that can be removed. 
Hence, good impact evaluations should 
employ mixed methods: experimental 
or quasi-experimental methods focus 
on capturing the impact, whilst quali-
tative methods can reveal how change 
took place (White 2009) in the light of 
the context in which the programme is 
embedded (Hintz 2010).
Besides its ultimate purpose to inform 
policy, there are several field-related 
factors that need to be considered when 
selecting an adequate impact evaluation 
design. The most important factors are 
briefly described and discussed below. 
These factors are not listed in terms 
of their relative priority or importance. 
They are also not mutually exclusive 
and, by and large, will depend on the 
same underlying conditions. Their role 
and the extent of their influence on the 
design of the impact evaluation largely 
depends on a case-by-case basis. 
The launch of the microinsurance pro-
gramme and its targeting strategies 
We start by looking at how the micro-
insurance programme is launched. 
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Two initial important elements to be 
considered: 
1) How the microinsurance pro-
gramme is launched: whether it is 
phased in over time, or launched 
everywhere at the same time 
2) How beneficiaries are targeted and 
enroled
The rollout strategy
Phasing the rollout of a  microinsur-
ance programme over time presents 
two advantages. On one side, it eases 
the early administrative burden on the 
programme management. On the other 
side, it offers those concerned with 
the impact evaluation the possibility 
of recruiting the control sample from 
areas/districts/subportions of the tar-
get population not yet affected by the 
insurance launch. In technical terms, 
the element of an impact evaluation 
that relies on a  phased implementa-
tion of the microinsurance programme 
is referred to as stepped wedge (Brown 
and Lilford 2006).
The robustness of the analysis 
increases substantially if the phasing 
can take place according to a  ran-
domised design, meaning that areas/
districts/subportions of the target 
population are randomly assigned to 
be included in the intervention at dif-
ferent time points. Stratified rando-
misation also represents a viable and, 
at the same time, analytically sound 
design option. In this case, areas/dis-
tricts/subportions of the target popu-
lation are first stratified on the basis of 
a variable (i.e., characteristic) thought 
to be important, for example literacy 
rates or level of urbanisation. Then 
areas/districts/subportions of the tar-
get population are randomly selected 
from the composed strata so that the 
final sample includes representatives 
of all strata. 
Selecting villages on the basis of polit-
ical decisions or feasibility concerns 
represents the least ideal scenario 
for a phased rollout strategy. The lack 
of random assignment to the inter-
vention, in fact, imposes an import-
ant threat to the validity of the overall 
study because it introduces a  source 
of bias in the estimation of the impact 
effect. In situations where no randomi-
sation is possible, however, a phased 
rollout of the intervention accord-
ing to political or feasibility criteria 
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is still preferred over a situation with 
no phased rollout at all. Even in the 
absence of randomisation, a  phased 
rollout strategy leaves open the pos-
sibility of identifying comparable con-
trols, whilst interventions that affect 
entire regions/districts/target pop-
ulations at once make it much more 
difficult for the researcher to identify 
comparable controls. 
Impact evaluations of microinsurance 
programmes often set the unit to be 
randomised at a group level (e.g., a vil-
lage, an agricultural cooperative, a loan 
group, etc.), rather than at an individual 
level. This randomisation strategy is 
known as cluster randomisation. There 
are two strong arguments that sup-
port cluster randomisation in the con-
text of microinsurance programmes. 
Firstly, although the benefits of the 
microinsurance are for those who buy 
the microinsurance, others may expe-
rience the impacts within that cluster. 
This may be because the programme 
“leaks”, contaminating those who are 
not supposed to receive it, thereby 
weakening any estimate of treatment 
difference (Flory 2011). This is par-
ticularly relevant for microinsurance 
programmes as they operate in areas 
where people are already commonly 
engaged in informal risk sharing. 
Randomising insurance access at the 
individual or household level may actu-
ally lead to underestimating the true 
effects of insurance due to the potential 
risk shifting from those without access 
to the microinsurance to those with 
access. Such a case was observed by 
Flory (2011) in Malawi, where the poor-
est benefitted from a  microinsurance 
programme—even though they had 
not enroled—because of interhouse-
hold transfer practices. Secondly, 
individual randomisation requires that 
the implementing organisations have 
a complete listing of all potential ben-
eficiaries and are able to manage and 
control the process of enroling single 
members in a  randomised manner 
over an extended period of time. These 
conditions can rarely be met by organ-
isations operating in low-income set-
tings, especially in rural areas, where 
much of the bookkeeping is still done 
exclusively manually. In addition, indi-
vidual randomisation does pose some 
ethical challenges since it diverts from 
the communal orientation of traditional 
societies. Conflict may arise when two 
neighbouring individuals or households 
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are enroled into the same programme 
at very different time points.
Cluster randomisation is better suited 
to reduce the risk of contamination 
across the intervention and the con-
trol arms, since it uses exiting barri-
ers (e.g., geographical, group, etc.) to 
define the very same allocation of the 
intervention (De Allegri et al. 2008). 
Continuous monitoring is required 
on the part of the impact evaluation 
team to ensure that the intervention 
is correctly allocated to the selected 
individuals or clusters. Mistakes in 
the allocation of the intervention can 
jeopardise the estimation of the impact 
at a  later stage. The implications that 
cluster randomisation bears on the 
sample size are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
A  stepped wedge cluster randomised 
design was applied to evaluate the 
impact on access to health-care 
services and financial protection of 
a  health microinsurance programme 
in the Nouna Health District in rural 
Burkina Faso. In this study, the 41 vil-
lages and seven urban sectors of the 
target region were formed into 33 
clusters. Small neighbouring villages 
that shared common ethnic and demo-
graphic characteristics were grouped 
together to form a single cluster. Health 
insurance was offered in a  phased 
manner, so that each year households 
in an additional randomly selected 11 
clusters received the offer to enrol in 
the scheme. By year three, the entire 
target region had received the offer to 
enter the health insurance programme 
(De Allegri et al. 2008). The design 
allowed for minimal contamination 
across clusters and a  robust estima-
tion of the impact of the scheme on 
the outcomes of interest. At the same 
time, the stepped wedge design facil-
itated the scheme implementation, by 
allowing the implementing agency to 
focus their social marketing campaign 
on a restricted number of villages per 
year. 
Targeting strategies
Another important feature of a micro-
insurance programme that needs to be 
considered when selecting an adequate 
impact evaluation design is the target-
ing of the beneficiaries. Programmes 
that target the beneficiaries according 
to an arbitrary cutoff point open the 
possibility for the impact evaluation 
team to apply regression discontinuity 
designs (RDD). For instance, this may 
be the case when implementing agen-
cies decide to offer microinsurance 
only to the poorest 20% of the entire 
population. For RDD, it is assumed 
that the households who marginally 
miss the cutoff (for instance, house-
holds that lie in the 22% poorest cat-
egory) are very similar to the targeted 
households and therefore can be used 
as controls. RDD represents a  viable 
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design option when enough people fall 
in the category just above the cutoff 
point. A commonly used approach is to 
look at clusters of settlements that are 
divided by administrative boundaries. 
The administrative boundary is seen 
as a  random cutoff, where seemingly 
similar households are offered micro-
insurance only if they fall on one side 
of the boundary. In such situations, 
the remaining households that stay 
close to the intervention households 
but are not offered the microinsur-
ance can be used as controls. There 
are not many examples where RDD 
has been used to evaluate microinsur-
ance programmes, but there are few 
examples from similar interventions, 
like the publically-funded health insur-
ance programme in Colombia called 
Régimen Subsidiado (Miller et al. 2009). 
In the programme, only people below 
a  certain threshold of the poverty 
index were eligible to receive full pub-
lic subsidy to purchase health insur-
ance. By comparing the eligible people 
with those that narrowly missed this 
threshold, impact of this programme 
was evaluated. 
DID methods can be applied if the micro-
insurance programme is launched 
according to a  cluster randomised 
design or if neighbouring areas are 
similar enough to the intervention area 
to be used as controls. Quimbo et al. 
(2010) applied a DID approach to eval-
uate the impact of a health insurance 
programme for poor children in Phil-
ippines. The evaluation study included 
30 public hospitals. These hospitals 
were divided into intervention and 
control groups, matched according 
to demand-and-supply characteris-
tics like household income, number of 
beds, average costs, etc. Both exit and 
follow-up home interviews were col-
lected at baseline (round one) and then 
again after the programme was imple-
mented for two years (round two). 
Identical baseline and round two data 
were collected from the intervention 
and control groups for the DID method. 
After the launch of the microinsurance 
programme, applying DID can be often 
impossible or tricky, as the researcher 
has to depend on existing surveys for 
baseline data. 
If all the beneficiaries are targeted at 
once, then propensity score matching 
(PSM), with all its limitations, may be 
the only available option left as DID 
or RDD will not be applicable. The 
researchers have to depend on the 
“eligible but not enroled” group to be 
potential controls for those that enrol 
for the microinsurance programme 
(Trujillo et al. 2005; Gnawali et al. 2009). 
An intrinsic challenge in the selection 
of the most appropriate study design 
rests in the difficulty of reconciling 
the highest research standards (to 
which a sound impact evaluation ought 
to abide) with field requirements and 
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conditions. Those directly concerned 
with the implementation of a  micro-
insurance scheme may be more con-
cerned with programme start-up and 
survival than with producing evidence 
on expected and unexpected impacts to 
inform the wider policy arena. There-
fore, they may be reluctant to agree 
to randomisation, stepped wedge 
designs, and RDD. 
In our experience, continuous and 
open dialogue with those in charge of 
implementation is the only strategy for 
reconciling implementation needs with 
those of a sound impact evaluation. At 
times, when this fails, research teams 
in charge of the impact evaluation have 
no other choice if not selecting the one 
study design that, although not per-
fect, best exploits existing field condi-
tions. The objective is always to select 
the design that presents the fewest 
threats to validity in the light of existing 
field conditions. During this process 
of negotiations between impact eval-
uators and implementing agencies, 
the former may often find themselves 
explaining over and over the concept 
of impact evaluation, as this is not so 
clearly differentiated from other forms 
of evaluation amongst people working 
away from research. Likewise, evalua-
tors have to be open to working within 
the framework of an emergent design, 
meaning they must be willing to read-
just design decisions as field condi-
tions unravel. Emerging designs are 
proper for qualitative studies. There-
fore, they do represent a fundamental 
epistemological challenge for the pos-
itivist impact evaluator, who learned to 
rely exclusively on experimental and 
semi-experimental models. Never-
theless, years of reconciling research 
rigor with field needs have convinced 
us that often no other way is possible 
than letting the mind be open to adjust 
design decisions, within the limits of 
rigorous research, to emerging field 
conditions. 
Who is commissioning and conducting 
the impact evaluation? 
The ability to negotiate with the imple-
menting agency the most robust study 
design largely depends on who is 
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commissioning and who is conducting 
the impact evaluation. Impact evalua-
tion teams may find the dialogue over 
research designs to proceed better 
when the need for an impact evalua-
tion has been identified by the agency 
implementing the microinsurance pro-
gram and/or when agency itself com-
missions the impact evaluation. In such 
cases, implementing agencies are very 
open to adjust their implementation 
design to allow for robust estimation 
procedures because they have a  pri-
mary interest in the use of the results 
that will emerge from the evaluation. 
Large international organisations, 
such as the International Labour Office 
(ILO) or the World Bank, often enjoy 
the privilege of commissioning, and, 
in some instances, even managing 
directly both the implementation and 
the impact evaluation of interventions. 
This allows them to shape the rollout 
of programmes in such a  way as to 
derive sound evidence on their impacts 
afterwards. 
Researchers from academic institu-
tions often find themselves facing the 
exact opposite scenario, being called in 
by a third party, frequently a ministry or 
another high governmental institution, 
to assess the impact of interventions 
run by local and international non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs) and/or 
consultancy groups. In such instances, 
the risk that the implementing agency 
perceives the impact evaluation, and, 
in turn, the research team conducting 
it, as a potential threat is great, since 
its reputation and its ability to acquire 
future contracts may be at stake. As 
mentioned above, continuous dialogue 
is the only means to overcome initial 
scepticism towards the impact evalu-
ation and the team conducting it. Still, 
at times this initial resistance cannot 
be fully overcome, the result being that 
the research team will have to find its 
analytical way around field conditions 
far from enabling an optimal impact 
evaluation design. 
The number of resources that can be 
mobilised to conduct an impact eval-
uation also plays an important role 
in shaping design decisions. Impact 
evaluations that can count on substan-
tial ad hoc funding can engage teams 
of expert researchers who can guide 
proper design decisions. This is often 
not the case when, due to lack of ade-
quate funding, the impact evaluation 
is planned and conducted directly by 
the implementing agency. At times, 
this may result in impact evaluations 
that rely almost exclusively on routine 
monitoring and evaluation data to esti-
mate effects. 
Timing of the impact evaluation 
Dialogue between the implementation 
team and the impact evaluation team 
should take place as early as possible, 
preferably during the conceptualisation 
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of the microinsurance programme. 
Early exchange allows for the impact 
evaluation to be factored into the 
implementation design from its very 
onset, ensuring that adequate condi-
tions are in place to allow for a robust 
estimation of the effects of the inter-
vention. A  sound impact evaluation is 
one that relies on data collection that 
takes place both in the intervention and 
control areas at both baseline and fol-
low-up (multiple follow-ups are possi-
ble). If the impact evaluation is not fac-
tored into the implementation design 
early enough, it may become impos-
sible to produce a  robust evaluation 
at a later point in time, either because 
the programme is launched in a  way 
that there are no appropriate controls 
(e.g., the microinsurance programme 
is launched in the entire target region 
simultaneously) or because relevant 
data has not been collected from rele-
vant controls already at baseline. 
Field circumstances are such that, at 
times, impact evaluations are decided 
only once a  programme is already in 
operation. In such situations, infor-
mation may be available on the areas/
districts/population targeted by the 
microinsurance programme, but most 
likely not on any comparable controls. 
To overcome the estimation prob-
lems resulting from the lack of data 
on controls, researchers are advised 
to search for alternative data sources 
(e.g., household surveys, census, 
demographic health surveys, facili-
ty-based data, and programme data) 
applicable to the control areas/dis-
tricts/population. If no alternative data 
source is available, then the researcher 
has to derive an estimation of the effect 
by relying on cross-sectional data col-
lected both from the intervention and 
control individuals and/or households. 
Propensity score matching, with all its 
limitations, is probably the only viable 
option in these situations (Gnawali et 
al. 2009). 
11.3. Resource consumption 
General remarks
The different impact evaluation designs 
all imply different resource consump-
tion requirements. Therefore, select-
ing the most appropriate design also 
requires an assessment of the specific 
resources available. Resources are 
usually more abundant when funds 
are made available from a third party, 
either in the form of a research grant 
or in the form of a contract established 
directly between the impact evaluation 
team and the agency commissioning 
the study. Such contracts, however, 
are very rarely directly managed by the 
agency implementing the microinsur-
ance programme, since such agencies 
usually operate in conditions of finan-
cial limitations and would be unlikely 
to divert funds from implementation 
towards research. Such contracts are 
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more common when the impact eval-
uation is commissioned by a  govern-
mental or supra-governmental insti-
tution to an external evaluation team 
(either a research institution or a con-
sulting agency). Therefore, if on one 
side, earmarked contracts increase the 
resources available for field research, 
on the other side, they limit ownership 
of the impact evaluation on the part of 
the implementing agency. The impli-
cations of having an ad hoc research 
team conduct an impact evaluation 
have already been discussed in detail 
earlier. 
Research team 
Team requirements vary substantially 
depending on the design and on the 
scope of the single impact evaluations. 
Experimental designs that rely on 
randomisation are very demanding 
on the organisations implementing 
microinsurance, as they require a con-
stant managerial and administrative 
engagement to ensure the correct 
allocation of the intervention. 
Quasi-experimental and non-experi-
mental designs are less burdensome 
from this point of view. Irrespective 
of the design that is applied, all quan-
titative impact evaluations require 
that people with specific expertise in 
statistics are an integral part of the 
research team. Decisions on design, 
randomisation, and sampling can only 
be achieved with the support of expert 
statisticians. This is especially import-
ant, as discussed in detail later, given 
the frequent absence of formal and 
complete population data to serve 
as a  sampling frame in most set-
tings where microinsurance is imple-
mented. Likewise, irrespective of the 
design, the support of statisticians and 
econometricians is essential during 
the analytical phases. The need for 
support during the analytical phases is 
greater in case of complex quasi- and 
non-experimental designs, combining 
multiple designs into one to compen-
sate for lack of randomisation and/or 
baseline data (Shadish et al. 2002). 
Impact evaluations applying mixed 
methods require an even larger set of 
expertise to come together in the design 
and analytical phases. Mixed methods 
designs, in fact, rely on the application 
of multiple methods at once and, as 
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such, multiple people have to engage 
in decision making throughout the 
length of the evaluation. This means 
that multiple traditions of conducting 
research are merged into one single 
study. The process can be extremely 
challenging, as it entails open dialogue 
across people with radically different 
scientific mind-sets. In the experience 
of the authors, the key success fac-
tor when conducting a  mixed meth-
ods impact evaluation is the mediating 
capacity of the team leader. Ideally, 
the team leader herself should be well 
acquainted with multiple scientific tra-
ditions and respect them all equally to 
be able to facilitate dialogue in teams 
where ethnographers and econometri-
cians need to reconcile diverging sci-
entific paradigms into a single study. 
Likewise, the scope of the impact eval-
uation determines the range of exper-
tise that will need to be brought into 
the research team. The scope of an 
evaluation is determined by the num-
ber and typology of outcome indicators 
that need to be assessed. Complex 
impact evaluations that aim to cap-
ture changes on multiple dimensions 
(e.g., agriculture, health, poverty) often 
require large multidisciplinary teams 
to be involved already at the stage of 
study design and tool development. 
We, the authors, have been involved in 
impact evaluations, bringing together 
fifteen scientists from at least ten 
different disciplines. Working on an 
impact evaluation with a broad scope of 
analysis may entail having to facilitate 
dialogue between clinicians, psycholo-
gists, economists, political scientists, 
geographers, and agricultural experts. 
In our experience, this dialogue is 
complex and not always easy, but very 
rewarding and enriching in the end. 
Field team and data collection 
processes 
The human resources needed to design 
and plan an impact evaluation and to 
analyse the data emerging from the 
field are only a minimal part of overall 
human resources needed to conduct 
such an effort successfully. The people 
actually in charge of data collection in 
the field are key to any impact evalu-
ation. Data collection teams vary sub-
stantially across impact evaluations. 
Much of the variation can be explained 
in relation to the nature and scope of 
the single evaluations. For instance, 
assessing the impact of a  health 
microinsurance scheme on health 
indicators may require that people 
with some clinical training handle the 
data collection processes, whilst this 
may be totally irrelevant when assess-
ing the impact on poverty reduction of 
crop microinsurance. Likewise, purely 
quantitative versus mixed methods 
designs imply reliance on very differ-
ent sets of expertise. 
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The overall educational levels in 
a  given country also influence the 
selection and composition of the field 
data collection team. We have worked 
in settings where field interviewers 
could, at the very best, be expected 
to hold a  high school degree, as well 
as in settings where a college degree 
was the minimum prerequisite to being 
enlisted as a potential field interviewer. 
It goes without saying that the initial 
educational level of the staff recruited 
to work on field data collection plays 
a  very important role in the overall 
process. Interviewers with lower edu-
cation may require longer training ses-
sions. Yet, these may be the people who 
really know the communities where 
data collection is taking place and 
may therefore be much better placed 
to engage their respondents than their 
better-educated, often urban, counter-
parts. In general, it is easier to iden-
tify and recruit interviewers to work on 
quantitative data collection tools than 
to identify interviewers with sufficient 
experience to be able to conduct quali-
tative in-depth interviews and/or facili-
tate focus group discussions (FGD). 
Field data collection often absorbs 
most of the financial resources avail-
able for an impact evaluation. In recent 
years, the use of digital devices to col-
lect data has shown potential to reduce 
quantitative data collection costs sub-
stantially, whilst also ensuring greater 
quality of the data being collected. Dig-
ital devices, in fact, allow the research 
team to insert very accurate filters and 
logical checks in the structure of the 
questionnaires being used, limiting 
the possibility of error by the single 
interviewers. In our experience, two 
rounds of data collection on a sample 
of approximately 1200 households are 
sufficient to recover the costs of pur-
chasing 15 tablets. 
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Through the use of mobile phone 
lines and digital devices also facilitate 
immediate data sharing between the 
field and the impact evaluation team. 
This process allows the impact evalu-
ation team to carry out constant quality 
checks and to feed preliminary results 
to the implementing and commis-
sioning agency much faster than tra-
ditional pen and paper surveys. Field 
data entry represents an alternative 
to digital data collection, which also 
allows using time more efficiently and 
controlling for completeness and qual-
ity of data. In this model, a data entry 
clerk accompanies the interviewers to 
the field to input data in the computer 
one day after the actual data collection 
activity has taken place, at the latest. 
This allows the data entry clerk to 
identify missing and inconsistent infor-
mation in time to be able to verify it 
directly in the field. 
Digital solutions to facilitate qualita-
tive data collection are, unfortunately, 
not as advanced as those supporting 
quantitative data collection. In-depth 
interviews and FGD are easily recorded 
on tape or using MP3 recorders, but 
skilled transcribers are still needed 
to report the recorded text on paper. 
A  number of software solutions are 
available to automate this process, but 
in our experience, none of this soft-
ware provides a valuable alternative to 
the traditional method of transcribing 
interviews. The available software, in 
fact, mostly operates only in few lan-
guages (English, French, and Spanish) 
and largely relies on voice recognition. 
Therefore, it is of little or no use at all 
to researchers working with commu-
nities in low-income settings where 
these languages are not spoken. Sim-
ilarly, automated translation devices 
are not sufficiently advanced to afford 
researchers a  faster, yet accurate, 
translation of transcribed text from 
a  local language into the language of 
analysis. 
Irrespective of whether digital devices 
or traditional pen and paper surveys 
are used for field data collection, 
interviewers are usually organised 
in microteams of two to three inter-
viewers and one supervisor. When the 
scope of the impact evaluation entails 
collecting data from multiple sources 
(for instance in a health facility and at 
the household level), it is usually more 
effective to create specialised micro-
teams than to train all interviewers 
on all relevant data collection tools. 
Microteams can be composed of quan-
titative and qualitative interviewers, 
targeting different respondent constit-
uencies and data collection needs at 
the same time. We have widely worked 
with this system of multiple specialised 
microteams, targeting communities at 
once (and thus keeping transport costs 
low) to maximise the amount and qual-
ity of data collected in a day from mul-
tiple sources. 
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Before embarking in the actual data 
collection, field interviewers receive 
training (normally two to seven days, 
depending on the complexity of the 
data collection tool) and assist the 
research team in piloting the tool. The 
pilot phase is essential for identifying 
potential pitfalls in the data collection 
tool in time for the research team to 
modify questions and adjust them to 
the specific setting where the impact 
evaluation will take place. Research 
teams wishing to rely on digital data 
collection may need to consider one 
to two additional days of training. The 
cost for these additional days of train-
ing is quickly recovered through faster 
field processes, higher-quality data 
(requiring minimal cleaning), and the 
absence of data entry at a later stage. 
Costs for field data collection vary dra-
matically across settings and it would 
be unfair for us to pretend that we can 
provide the reader with realistic price 
estimates applicable across settings. 
In general, in low- and middle-income 
countries, the cost of an interviewer 
(and similarly of a data entry clerk) var-
ies from US$5 to US$50 per day. In most 
countries, interviewers will expect to 
receive additional compensation if the 
data collection takes place in a  loca-
tion that does not allow them to return 
to their homes in the evening. Accom-
modation and per diem costs can, at 
times, be higher than the actual com-
pensation received as interviewers. 
On average, supervisors cost 20% to 
40% more than simple interviewers. In 
many resource-poor countries, trans-
port costs are an important cost driver 
when conducting an impact evaluation. 
This is due to the poor conditions of the 
roads which require data collection 
teams to hire high-quality vehicles, 
and to the extreme high price of fuel in 
some settings. 
Data requirements also tend to differ 
depending on the research design. 
Simple randomisation and RDD designs 
generally rely on cross-sectional data 
and data are collected from both the 
intervention and the control groups. 
PSM is generally applied to cross-sec-
tional data, but need larger sample of 
eligible but non-enrolees to ensure that 
researchers can find enough controls 
that closely match with the enrolees. 
Stepped wedge cluster randomisa-
tion, on the other hand, has the larg-
est data requirement, as data needs 
to be collected from the intervention 
and control groups at every step of the 
cluster randomisation. For example, if 
the phased rollout takes three years 
to implement, like the health microin-
surance programme in Nouna District 
discussed before, then data needs to 
be collected for at least three years. 
Whilst designing the impact evaluation 
study, data requirements and duration 
of the study need to be taken into con-
sideration. These factors will further 
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have financial implications for the 
impact evaluation study. 
11.4. Sampling 
Sampling is probably one of the most 
challenging operational aspects fac-
ing teams conducting an impact eval-
uation. Different elements ought to 
be considered and reconciled into one 
coherent, yet feasible, sampling strat-
egy. This process inevitably rests on 
an open dialogue between the imple-
menting agency that knows the pop-
ulation it serves with its microinsur-
ance programme, the commissioning 
agency that often defines the out-
comes of interest to be observed, the 
research team that operationalises the 
outcomes of interest into measurable 
variables, and specialized statisticians 
and econometricians. As mentioned 
earlier, a  rigorous impact evaluation 
always requires the contribution of 
experienced statisticians. Even in the 
absence of a comprehensive research 
team in situations where the imple-
menting agency conducts its own 
impact evaluation, the participation of 
a statistician is essential. This section 
identifies some of the key aspects to 
consider in the sampling process, but 
can by no means replace the contribu-
tion of a statistician in the field. 
The first step is getting agreement 
amongst the various stakeholders 
on which outcome of interest will be 
observed. Whilst this may appear to be 
a simple task to accomplish, in reality 
this is far from being the case. Imple-
menting and commissioning agencies 
often aim to produce changes that 
cannot so easily be observed and mea-
sured in the field within the timeframe 
of an impact evaluation (normally 
two to three years). Let us take, as 
an example, a  health microinsurance 
scheme that aspires to reduce mater-
nal mortality by including coverage 
of facility-based delivery amongst its 
services. Although maternal mortality 
rates are still very high in many low- 
and middle-income countries (LMICs), 
maternal mortality, per se, is a  rare 
event. This makes capturing differ-
ences in maternal mortality due to an 
intervention extremely difficult, unless 
the impact evaluation team works in 
a  setting where comprehensive pop-
ulation health surveillance data are 
available. Similarly, microinsurance 
targeting agricultural production ulti-
mately aims at reducing poverty, but 
measuring changes in poverty levels is 
a very challenging task, since the mere 
definition of what constitutes poverty in 
a given setting comes into question. 
In these situations, the responsibil-
ity of the research team is to engage 
the implementing and commission-
ing agencies in a dialogue that allows 
translating the ambitious objectives of 
the microinsurance programmes into 
observable and measurable outcome 
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indicators. For instance, increases in 
the utilisation of facility-based deliv-
ery can be taken as a proxy of expected 
reductions in maternal mortality. 
Changes in asset protection can be 
taken as a proxy of poverty reduction. 
In managing this dialogue, it is essen-
tial that the research team remains 
open to exploiting all opportunities for 
data collection available in a given set-
ting. For instance, in some settings, it 
may actually be possible to measure 
changes in maternal mortality even 
in the absence of formal population 
surveillance systems. In some African 
countries, due to pressure to achieve 
the United Nations’ Millennium Devel-
opment Goal 5 (MDG5), chiefs and 
community health workers have been 
prompted to keep record of all mater-
nal deaths, allowing research teams 
to access community-based data, 
which can be very helpful in assess-
ing the impact of those microinsur-
ance programmes that target women. 
Once the outcomes of interest have 
been identified and agreed upon by 
all stakeholders, the research team 
needs to determine at what level these 
can be observed: institutional level 
(e.g., health facility, microinsurance 
implementing agency, agricultural 
cooperative, etc.), community, house-
hold, or individual level. A  common 
mistake in sampling takes place at this 
stage, which we will illustrate with an 
example. Let us imagine that a health 
microinsurance programme seeks to 
improve access to care for children 
less than five years of age. Let us fur-
ther imagine that the outcome of inter-
est has been operationalised as pro-
portion of children less than five years 
of age with fever who report to a health 
facility. Then, at this stage, the research 
team incorrectly samples households 
or mothers instead of sampling chil-
dren with fever. The mistake derives 
from confusing the object of the sam-
ple itself (in this case, children less 
than five years of age with fever) with 
the strategy needed to identify and/
or to collect information on the actual 
sample (in this case, households or 
mothers). This mistake can easily jeop-
ardise the analysis of the entire impact 
evaluation, if, for instance, 400 moth-
ers instead of 400 children with fever 
were sampled for the interview. This 
indicates the need to clearly align the 
outcome of interest with the applied 
sampling strategy.
Parallel to identifying the level at 
which the outcomes of interest can 
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be observed, the research team also 
needs to define with the implement-
ing agency the size of the change that 
the microinsurance programme is 
expected to produce. Together with the 
size of the target population and the 
study design, the value of the expected 
change (i.e., the expected difference 
between treated microinsurance 
recipients and untreated microinsur-
ance non-recipients) is fundamental 
for the calculation of the relevant sam-
ple size. 
At this stage, the statisticians have all 
the information needed to assist the 
impact evaluation team in the calcu-
lation of an adequate sample size. In 
LMICs, although not always complete, 
the data compiled at the institutional 
level is often sufficient to identify an 
adequate sampling frame for samples 
drawn at this level (e.g., health facility, 
microinsurance implementing agency, 
agricultural cooperative, etc.). On the 
contrary, drawing community-based 
samples (at the household or individual 
levels) can be very challenging in the 
absence of a  comprehensive popula-
tion surveillance system. In these sit-
uations, researchers lack the needed 
sampling frame and may need to 
invest first in enlisting all households 
and individuals in a  given community 
before being able to draw a represen-
tative sample from the same. Alter-
natively, the impact evaluation team 
may opt for a more pragmatic strategy 
and identify the complete sample from 
a  number of selected communities 
using the “spin the bottle method” or 
“random walk” (Milligan et al. 2004). 
The trade-off between the two strate-
gies just described is in terms of accu-
racy and costs, with the former method 
being more accurate, but substantially 
more costly. Experimental designs 
can rely on smaller samples and can, 
therefore, substantially reduce data 
collection costs. In addition, although 
not ideal, experimental designs can 
lead to a valid estimation of the effect 
even in the absence of baseline data, 
offering yet another opportunity to 
curb field costs. Experimental designs 
that rely on cluster rather than individ-
ual randomisation, however, require 
larger samples to allow for analysis 
to account for intra-cluster correla-
tion (the probability that sampled units 
within a  cluster are more similar to 
one another than sampled units across 
clusters). In addition, impact evalua-
tions that rely on cluster randomisation 
design need to ensure that a sufficient 
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number of clusters are identified and 
factored into the design. The power of 
the estimation is directly proportional 
to the number of clusters included, as 
well as to the number of units sampled 
within each cluster. 
Compared to experimental designs, 
quasi- and non-experimental designs, 
such as RDD and DID, require larger 
samples and baseline data. The larger 
sample is justified by a need to rule out 
the possibility that factors external to 
the microinsurance programme are 
responsible for the observed change 
and this can only be done by controlling 
for a  large number of possible con-
founders. Propensity score matching 
can be applied on cross-sectional data, 
but due to its need to match interven-
tion and control units at the analytical 
level, it also requires larger samples. 
One last important element to con-
sider is potential attrition over time. 
Impact evaluations frequently rely on 
longitudinal data collection methods, 
interviewing the same communities, 
households, or individuals several 
times before and after the launch of 
the microinsurance programme. If 
resources are available, it is best to 
include in the original sample a larger 
number of communities/households/
individuals than the minimum num-
ber identified by the statisticians. This 
strategy safeguards the power of the 
estimation in case a  large number of 
sampled units should be lost to fol-
low-up. If this strategy is not feasible, 
the impact evaluation team should be 
ready to consider replacing house-
holds lost to follow-up in a  sam-
ple. Again, this process needs to be 
assisted by experienced statisticians 
and demographers. 
11.5. Ethical considerations 
In recent years, it has become impos-
sible to conduct an impact evaluation 
without first obtaining ethical clear-
ance from an ethics committee affil-
iated with an academic institution or 
institutional review board (IRB). IRBs 
are independent ethics committees 
or ethical review boards, designated 
to approve, monitor, and review bio-
medical and behavioural research 
involving humans. Requirements vary 
greatly across boards, but, generally, 
impact evaluation teams are required 
to compile documentation, including 
a detailed description of the research 
protocol, study tools, informed con-
sent forms, and the resumes of all 
concerned investigators. Most are also 
required to describe the process of 
selecting respondents and ensuring 
that consent is taken from the respon-
dents or from their legal representa-
tives. Depending on the complexity of 
the research protocol, ethical clear-
ance is obtained in a period of time that 
ranges from three to six months. Most 
IRBs charge for their services. Public 
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and academic IRBs generally charge 
a  nominal fee ranging from US$2000 
to US$3000 per submission. Commer-
cial IRBs can have substantially higher 
prices. 
Impact evaluation teams affiliated with 
academic institutions are normally 
required to obtain clearance from the 
ethical review board at the same insti-
tution for which they work. Most uni-
versities in Europe and in North Amer-
ica have developed internal structures 
that work very rigorously to comply 
with highest international ethical stan-
dards. Impact evaluation teams who 
are not affiliated with an academic 
institution normally obtain ethical 
clearance from commercial ethical 
review boards. This chapter purposely 
does not include any reference to any 
commercial IRBs because we do not 
wish to advertise one service provider 
over another. We leave it to the inter-
ested reader to look for such services 
online, making his/her own decisions 
on the rigour of the process proposed 
to obtain clearance. 
Most LMICs have also established 
their own independent IRB. Application 
procedures and payment conditions 
vary greatly across countries. Impact 
evaluations that are funded and con-
ducted exclusively at the local level can 
apply directly to country-specific IRBs. 
Impact evaluations that receive inter-
national funding and/or are supported 
by international teams normally have 
to apply for ethical clearance both in 
the country where the impact evalua-
tion team is based and in the country 
hosting the impact evaluation. 
It is often difficult to understand the 
need for ethical clearance in the case 
of studies that do not deal with medical 
products or otherwise potentially toxic 
substances. The implicit assumption 
of impact evaluation teams is that their 
work will result in no harm. Research 
teams involved in impact evaluation, 
however, need to reflect carefully on 
such assumptions to guarantee that 
their work results in no harm and 
that, if possible at all, their work yields 
benefits for those with greater needs. 
Even impact evaluation rooted in the 
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social sciences can raise a  number 
of justifiable ethical concerns, espe-
cially when some form of randomisa-
tion (whether at the community or at 
the individual level) and/or purposeful 
targeting takes place. Both randomi-
sation and purposeful targeting into 
microinsurance entail that a  selected 
group of communities/households/
individuals enjoys the benefits of a pro-
gramme, whilst others do not. Step 
wedge randomisation represents an 
effort to reduce potential sources of 
ethical conflict, since it ensures that 
the benefits accrued by one group will 
be shared with all others within a fore-
seeable period of time. Both randomi-
sation and purposeful targeting have 
to be communicated very clearly to the 
concerned communities. Risks and 
benefits of such designs have to be dis-
cussed openly and in simple terms to 
allow target populations to appreciate 
the long-term benefits and support the 
intervention (Marshall 2007). 
An additional ethical concern arises 
from the fact that, through the vari-
ous study components embedded in 
an impact evaluation, extensive data 
on socioeconomic profile, health, and 
economic behaviours of communi-
ties/households/individuals will be 
collected and stored in databases. To 
allow for the identification of the same 
sampled units over time, in the case of 
longitudinal studies, data needs to be 
stored so that it can be traced back to 
specific households and/or individuals. 
This creates a privacy protection con-
cern. To protect privacy, access to the 
full dataset containing actual names 
and/or otherwise identifiable ID codes 
is normally restricted to one or two 
people in each impact evaluation team. 
The dataset is then usually cleaned of 
all personal information before being 
used for analysis by the rest of the 
study team. A  small compensation, 
usually in-kind, is frequently offered to 
households or individuals who partici-
pate in long or repeated interviews. In 
traditional communities with a strong 
collective orientation, this compensa-
tion needs first to be discussed with 
the community leaders. If commu-
nity leaders are not consulted, com-
pensation can create conflicts in the 
community. 
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11.6. Dialogue with 
stakeholders and knowledge 
transfer 
At different points throughout our dis-
cussion, we have drawn the reader’s 
attention to the need to engage in an 
open dialogue with the implement-
ing and commissioning agencies as 
the only means to ensure a sound, yet 
feasible, impact evaluation. In the last 
section, we will draw attention to the 
overall sociopolitical context within 
which impact evaluation of microin-
surance programmes takes place. 
We explained at the very beginning 
that impact evaluations are not con-
ducted with the sole goal of assessing 
a causal relationship between a given 
intervention and a  set outcome of 
interest. Through the identification of 
this causal link, impact evaluations 
ultimately intend to influence and 
shape policies. Furthermore, sound 
impact evaluations respond to the 
ultimate single objective of improving 
the living conditions of the concerned 
communities. 
Striving to influence policy requires 
acknowledging that impact evalua-
tions do not happen in a sociopolitical 
vacuum and that impact evaluation 
teams need to engage with a number 
of politically relevant stakeholders, 
beyond those directly implementing 
and/or commissioning the evalua-
tion. Relevant stakeholders include 
policy makers, national and interna-
tional agencies involved in neighbour-
ing and overlapping programmes, and, 
last, but surely not least, the commu-
nities themselves. It is important that 
dialogue with all concerned stake-
holders is initiated before the impact 
evaluation even takes place and is 
maintained throughout the course of 
the fieldwork. Consensus can be cre-
ated by incorporating the concerns 
of all relevant stakeholders into the 
design of the impact evaluation and by 
ensuring that results are fed back at 
every stage of data collection. Effec-
tive knowledge transfer takes place 
only when communication strategies 
are adjusted to the specific constit-
uency being addressed at a  specific 
point in time. In addition, open dialogue 
allows the impact evaluation team to 
understand what other programmes 
may take place in the same region, 
accounting for potential confounding 
factors when estimating the effect of 
the microinsurance intervention. 
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Impact evaluation teams can rely on 
informal community gatherings to 
exchange with the communities them-
selves. For instance, in the Nouna 
Health District in rural Burkina Faso, 
the Centre de Recherche en Santé de 
Nouna (CRSN) holds regular meet-
ings with village chiefs and traditional 
authorities to ensure that the content of 
the research activities it leads is prop-
erly communicated to the communities 
and their concerns incorporated into 
future research. This constant, open 
dialogue empowers the population, who 
feel that the work of the CRSN is not 
only feeding the interest of the politi-
cal decision makers, but is addressing 
actual concerns at the community level. 
The health microinsurance programme, 
amongst others, was a  result of previ-
ous studies conducted by CRSN that 
identified lack of financial resources as 
one of the leading causes explaining low 
health-care utilisation. Empowerment 
translates into community support to 
research, opening the door to experi-
mental, quasi- and non-experimental 
designs that are appreciated for their 
potential to improve the living conditions 
of the population in the longer term. 
Policy briefs, official dissemination 
meetings, and other formal knowledge 
brokering activities are more often 
used to exchange information with pol-
icy makers and concerned national and 
international non-governmental agen-
cies. Scientific publications, either in 
the form of peer-reviewed articles 
or discussion papers, represent only 
a limited source of knowledge transfer 
from the academic to the policy mak-
ing community. Scientific publications 
are largely needed because they allow 
for information to be shared beyond 
the borders of the setting where the 
impact evaluation took place. As such, 
they may create interest in microinsur-
ance in other settings or countries, but 
the academic language they use may 
at times be inadequate to inform policy 
decisions directly at the local level. 
11.7. Conclusions 
Impact evaluations should be designed 
well in advance, ideally already whilst 
the microinsurance programme is 
being designed. Early planning allows 
the impact evaluation team to integrate 
the evaluation in the launch of the pro-
gramme and develop the best available 
methodology to measure impacts. It pro-
vides time to plan and collect baseline 
data prior to the start of the programme. 
A team best suited to evaluate impacts 
must consist of field experts and expe-
rienced statisticians. Regular consul-
tations with the microinsurance imple-
menting team will ensure that field 
realities are taken into consideration 
in the design of the evaluation. The 
implementing team should be con-
sulted when the research methodology 
and the sampling strategy are being 
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developed, as they should fit with the 
field setting whilst allowing for the best 
evaluation design to be implemented. 
When designing, conducting, analys-
ing, and disseminating the results of 
the impact evaluation, it is vital that the 
team adheres to all ethical guidelines 
and regulations. Impact evaluations 
not only provide evidence for the exis-
tence of impact, but also provide an 
opportunity to guide policy and influ-
ence the living conditions of the com-
munities. This requires that the impact 
evaluation results be disseminated to 
all stakeholders—not only policy mak-
ers and international organisations—
including communities that are at the 
centre of these programmes. 
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12.1. Introduction 
When writing up conclusions of 
research, one ought to always address 
at least the following three questions: 
1) What is the concrete answer to each 
of the research questions? 
2) What does this mean for the general 
objectives (contribution to science, 
policy, and practice)?
3) What are the strengths and limita-
tions of this study?
Therefore, we will start with a  dis-
cussion of research questions and 
objectives of studies. To draw conclu-
sions about impact, both the effect of 
the intervention on the studied impact 
measure should be understood, as 
well as the mechanisms through 
which the impact arises. It is import-
ant to understand not only the aver-
age impact the intervention has on the 
insured and non-insured, but also the 
impact on communities, households, 
or individuals with different character-
istics: that is, the distributional impact. 
These two aspects will be discussed 
as well. Finally, conclusions of studies 
should always be interpreted in terms 
of the strengths and limitations of the 
chosen research design. These can be 
expressed in terms of four validities: 
internal, external, construct, and sta-
tistical conclusion validity. Following 
a  discussion of these four types, we 
will discuss the implications a particu-
lar research design has on the validity 
of the conclusions.
When drawing conclusions from 
research that has investigated the 
impact of microinsurance, it is firstly 
necessary to define what is meant by 
impact. Here, impact is defined as the 
final result of an intervention on the 
wellbeing of a  community, household, 
or individual. 
12.2. Finding concrete 
answers to research 
questions
The first step in drawing conclusions 
is to refer to the research questions. 
Research questions can be descriptive 
and explanatory in nature. Descriptive 
questions aim to describe the variables 
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that are measured. They often start 
with phrases such as: 
• How many…? 
• What are…? 
• How often…? 
• What percentage...? 
Two sample descriptive questions 
from the area of microinsurance are 
as follows: 
1) What percentage of rural Filipino 
households received a microinsur-
ance claim payout? 
2) How many households with micro-
insurance have sold production 
assets to cope with a health shock 
compared to households without 
microinsurance?
Explanatory questions address the 
causal relation between variables. 
They start with phrases like: 
• What is the effect of…? 
• How does...? 
• Why...? 
In the case of microinsurance, two pos-
sible explanatory questions could be: 
1) How does agriculture insurance 
effect on-farm risk management 
activities by small farmers in 
Ethiopia?
2) Why does typhoon insurance 
change the consumption smoothing 
activities that households employ? 
(Morsink 2012) 
Research questions about impact 
always look at the impact, ceteris pari-
bus, of an intervention on a  certain 
impact indicator, measured through 
outcome measures and are, there-
fore, always explanatory. However, to 
provide a  valid answer to the explan-
atory question, it is often necessary to 
answer several descriptive questions 
in advance that describe all relevant 
variables in the specific domain of the 
study. For the explanatory questions 
described above, the following descrip-
tive questions need to be answered: 
1) What on-farm risk management 
activities do small farmers in Ethiopia 
undertake? 
2) Which consumption smoothing activi-
ties do households employ?
12.3. General objectives 
of impact assessments in 
microinsurance
Beyond the type of question, the objec-
tives of the study must be considered. 
Scientific studies generally address 
theoretical issues. However, in most 
cases, impact studies are more prac-
tice oriented and theory is applied 
to the practical problem addressing 
the impact of an intervention. Some 
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examples of objectives include inves-
tigating the effect of insurance on 
improvements in health (Lei and Lin 
2009), improvements in health out-
comes and economic well-being 
(Aggarwal 2010), and a  theoretical 
problem, such as the role of produc-
tion risk in determining the demand 
for credit (Giné and Yang 2009). These 
objectives can be broadly or narrowly 
defined, but are generally not at an 
operational level. When drawing con-
clusions, the translation from the oper-
ational results to the broader objec-
tives of the study is necessary. For 
example, when examining the effect 
of a  health microinsurance scheme 
on the health of the insured, observa-
tions regarding health-care treatment 
seeking behaviour might be relatively 
easy to receive (e.g., higher health-
care utilisation), but do not necessar-
ily give insight regarding the impact of 
the scheme on health, since there is 
no general correlation between health 
care and health.1 When relating results 
to the research objectives, it is import-
ant to realise that impact evaluations, 
especially for policy makers and prac-
titioners, are often about “what works”, 
focusing on results that imply “evi-
dence-based conclusions that will have 
immediate policy use” (Harrison 2011, 
1 Compare, for example, Jowett, Deolalikar, and Martinsson 
(2004, 855), who observe a positive effect of health insur-
ance on health treatment seeking behaviour, but come to 
the conclusion that this does not provide an answer re-
garding the effect of insurance on health outcomes, which 
was the objective of the study.
626). The implication is that not only is 
it important to understand which fac-
tors influence a  certain impact, but 
also which factors can be manipulated, 
and to what extent. Take, for example, 
a study that shows that age, insurance 
literacy, and trust in the insurance pro-
vider have an effect on the impact indi-
cator. Age is a concrete fact and cannot 
be manipulated, but age groups can 
be separately targeted, whilst insur-
ance literacy and trust can be directly 
manipulated. However, the question is: 
if one wants to achieve a higher impact, 
which one provides the more efficient 
and effective investment? 
12.4. Specification of theory 
matters for conclusions 
When investigating the impact of 
microinsurance, it is essential to apply 
theory about the change that the inter-
vention (microinsurance) can bring 
with respect to the relevant impact 
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indicators that fit with the objectives of 
the study. Using theory allows for the 
development of predictions/hypothe-
ses. On the contrary, lack of theory will 
lead to a haphazard choice of hypoth-
eses or a lack thereof. The theoretical 
predictions will allow for the inclusion 
of potentially confounding variables 
that may influence the treatment and 
impact. Even if the study design ran-
domly assigns the intervention to 
a  treatment and control group, the 
theory is necessary to develop hypoth-
eses about heterogeneous effects/
distributional impacts and interpret 
average effects that are assessed in 
randomised experiments. 
The following section describes an 
example that demonstrates the impor-
tance of using theory about potential 
microinsurance impacts to develop 
hypotheses, and to test these hypoth-
eses with the appropriate controls. 
Without theory, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the impact of 
microinsurance. 
Example: Protecting current  
consumption or future income?
Shocks lead to fluctuations in con-
sumption due to uncertain expenses 
incurred by households. This fluctua-
tion prevents households from max-
imising utility and, therefore, if they 
are risk averse and rational decision 
makers (who attempt to maximise 
utility), they are assumed to be will-
ing to insure in order to smooth con-
sumption (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965). In 
this way, microinsurance smoothed 
consumption by providing a  payout 
ex-post. One specification of this the-
ory is that an increase in the number 
of insured households increases wel-
fare (assuming that insurance leads to 
more consumption smoothing and this 
effect leads to more welfare). 
A  further refinement of this theory 
would not only consider the payout, 
but would also consider the effect of 
the payout on the protection of assets. 
Households generally own a variety of 
assets and, if they do not have insur-
ance, they may deplete these assets 
to smooth their consumption (Alder-
man and Paxson 1994; Morduch 1995). 
However, these assets are not equally 
important for the household’s future 
welfare. For example, production 
assets or human assets (knowledge) 
are needed for future income, whilst 
savings are more easily replaceable. 
Therefore, to create a more complete 
understanding of the impact of micro-
insurance on future welfare, the pay-
out should not only be included as 
a measure of microinsurance impact, 
but it is also necessary to assess the 
assets that the payout protects. This 
is markedly relevant if the objective 
of the study is to consider the impact 
on poverty. Dercon and Hoddinott 
(2004) show that the lowest income 
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households, in particular, may have 
to resort to the depletion of the most 
important assets for future welfare—
taking children out of school or selling 
productive assets—simply because 
they do not have access to other assets, 
such as savings or informal risk shar-
ing networks. 
12.5. Looking at 
distributional impacts
When investigating the impact of 
microinsurance on poverty and 
inequality, as is often the case for 
policy-oriented impact research, it is 
important to consider heterogeneous 
or distributional impacts. The distri-
butional impact is the impact of micro-
insurance on (groups of) households 
and individuals with certain charac-
teristics. It is important to use theory 
to develop hypotheses about hetero-
geneous impacts, chiefly because it 
can contribute to an advancement of 
scientific knowledge about mecha-
nisms leading to effects. In a  context 
of policy for poverty reduction, this 
is particularly relevant because pol-
icy objectives for microinsurance are 
often related to outreach of insurance 
to previously uninsured households. 
However, extremely poor households 
may also be households that refrain 
from taking up microinsurance. If 
statements are made about average 
effects of microinsurance, these may 
significantly overstate or understate 
the effect of microinsurance on the 
intended target group.
There is ample evidence that exist-
ing welfare distributions, by influenc-
ing access to financial services, may 
have consequences for the impacts of 
financial services on certain (groups 
of) households or different (groups 
of) household members. For exam-
ple, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
show that high-income households 
are better positioned to take advan-
tage of financial services than low-in-
come households are. They show that, 
after the introduction of the financial 
services, there is initially an increase 
in the inequality of impacts that then 
decreases over time. When drawing 
conclusions, it is important to con-
sider that average effects observed 
in the impact study may well hide 
inverse effects for different groups 
of households or household mem-
bers. The following examples illus-
trate potential distributional impacts of 
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microinsurance based on factors influ-
encing microinsurance demand.
• Microinsurance has the potential 
to stimulate investments in high-
er-risk, higher-return activities, 
which is especially needed for risk 
averse households. However, evi-
dence suggests that especially risk 
averse households (which are also 
the poorer households) are less 
likely to take up microinsurance 
(Giné et al. 2008; Clarke and Kalani 
2011; Cole et al. 2013). Even if poten-
tial impacts of microinsurance are 
high, expected demand for this par-
ticular group is notably low, which 
may imply relatively low impact of 
microinsurance on poverty reduc-
tion for this group.
• Credit constraints are another fac-
tor that may influence the impact of 
microinsurance. Households with 
credit constraints are already less 
likely to invest in economic oppor-
tunities because of lack of credit 
for investment. If these credit con-
straints also lead to less take-up of 
microinsurance (because of inabil-
ity to pay for insurance premiums), 
then the impacts of microinsurance 
may be relatively low for credit con-
strained households. 
• The ex-ante effect of insurance, 
which allows people to shift from 
income smoothing to consump-
tion smoothing (e.g., increased 
investment in agriculture under 
insurance), is assumed to arise 
from an increased feeling of secu-
rity (Dercon et al. 2008). Trust in 
the credibility of the insurer may 
impact the ex-ante effect of insur-
ance. Households with low trust in 
the insurer, even if they have insur-
ance, may not feel secure about the 
insurance paying out. In this case, 
the ex-ante effect of the insurance 
for households with low trust may 
be extremely low. 
• Distributional impacts are also 
important because of the appar-
ently strong effects of social capital 
and networks on insurance uptake 
(Jowett 2003; Cai 2012). However, 
there is no conclusive evidence 
about the mechanisms leading to 
these observed effects. Because 
social networks are also the vehicle 
for informal insurance, it is import-
ant to understand why these effects 
arise and whether they influence the 
impact of the insurance. For exam-
ple, it can be imagined that a house-
hold with a strong social network is 
more likely to get access to micro-
insurance. If certain households are 
excluded from these networks, the 
impact of microinsurance may be 
particularly low for these house-
holds. These effects may be even 
stronger if the exclusion from the 
networks also prevents the house-
holds from accessing informal 
risk sharing opportunities. The 
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households may then be left excep-
tionally vulnerable to shocks.
• Hintz (2010) points to the additional 
financial burden that microinsur-
ance may have for female mem-
bers in order to pay the premiums, 
whilst male members of the house-
hold are benefiting from the payout. 
In this example, the welfare effect 
of microinsurance on the overall 
household (average effect) may be 
positive or zero, hiding a  hetero-
geneous effect for the male and 
female household members (neg-
ative for women, positive for men). 
The above examples of the distri-
butional effects of microinsurance 
show that theoretically relevant fac-
tors about insurance are essential to 
interpret microinsurance impacts and 
increase our scientific knowledge. 
Furthermore, theory is important from 
a policy perspective (focusing on wel-
fare, poverty, and inequality) because 
theory allows for the investigation of 
distributional/heterogeneous impacts 
of interventions. 
12.6. Strengths and 
limitations of microinsurance 
impact assessments
When drawing conclusions, one 
needs to present a  discussion of the 
research design and its implications 
for the validity of the results. Imagine, 
for example, a  study that concludes, 
based on a  regression analysis, that 
health microinsurance adds 12% to the 
likelihood that female clients in rural 
Nigeria visit the doctor when they are 
sick. The confidence we have that the 
impact (visiting the doctor) is caused 
by the insurance and not by some other 
factor (e.g., those who enroled were 
generally more cautious about their 
health) is an example of internal valid-
ity. The extent to which the findings can 
be generalised to other areas, clients, 
and products (e.g., men in Latin Amer-
ican cities) is an example of external 
validity. The confidence we have that 
the indicator (the response to a  sur-
vey question about seeing the doctor) 
accurately represents the intended 
concept (seeking health treatment in 
case of illness) is an example of con-
struct validity. The confidence we have 
that the result—the statistical effect 
of 12%—is derived from the correct 
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application of the adequate statistical 
tools and techniques is an example of 
statistical conclusion validity. 
In other words, whilst internal valid-
ity refers to the causal relationship 
between variables, external valid-
ity is “the validity of inferences about 
whether the cause effect relationship 
holds over variation in persons, set-
tings, treatment variables and mea-
surement variables” (Shadish, Cook, 
and Campbell 2002, 38). Construct 
validity refers to “[e]nsuring that the 
variables measured adequately repre-
sent the underlying realities of…inter-
ventions linked to processes of change” 
(Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, XV), or 
ascertain that you measure what you 
intend to measure (as it is defined in 
theory). Statistical conclusion validity 
concerns the quantitative techniques to 
ensure the degree of confidence about 
the existence of a relationship between 
intervention and impact variable and 
the magnitude of change (Leeuw and 
Vaessen 2009, XV).
12.6.1. Four types of validity
When drawing conclusions from 
research as a whole, all four types of 
validities need to be optimized. How-
ever, focusing on one type of validity 
often implies relaxation of other valid-
ities. In this respect a trade-off has to 
be made.2 This implies that conclu-
sions should pay ample attention to the 
consequences of these trade-offs for 
the validity of the results. In the follow-
ing section, we will look more carefully 
into the four measures of validity and 
discuss them for different research 
designs.
Internal validity
As mentioned above, internal validity is 
“about proving causality, i.e., proving 
whether observed covariation between 
A (the presumed treatment) and B (the 
presumed  outcome) reflects a  causal 
relationship from A  to B” (Shadish, 
Cook and Campbell 2002, 38). Or, to 
make it simple, did A  cause B? Take, 
for instance, a  research question 
that addresses the impact of health 
microinsurance on health outcomes. 
Expected utility theory predicts that 
2 See also the discussion of using a  mixed-methods ap-
proach by Leeuw and Vaessen (2009).
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people with a  higher probability of 
experiencing a  loss (sick people) are 
more likely to take up insurance. If 
health is not included in the study as 
a  control variable (which in practice 
is difficult to do), the study may con-
clude that people with microinsurance 
are significantly more likely to get sick 
than people without insurance (reflect-
ing the fact that sick people are more 
likely to self-select into the insurance 
than healthy people). However, it would 
not be internally valid to conclude that 
take-up of microinsurance causes 
a  decrease of health status. Experi-
ments with random assignment can 
avoid this problem by randomly dis-
tributing sick and healthy people to 
treatment and control group.
As another example, empirical evi-
dence from developing countries sug-
gests that risk averse people are less 
likely to take up microinsurance (Cai et 
al. 2010; Clarke and Kalani 2011; Der-
con et al. 2011; Cole et al. 2013). Imag-
ine an observational study where the 
effect of microinsurance on reduction 
of out-of-pocket payments is studied on 
a sample of households with and with-
out insurance (self-selected). Failure 
to control for risk aversion may under-
state the effect of microinsurance on 
out-of-pocket payments because less 
risk averse households are more likely 
to take up microinsurance and less 
likely to take preventive measures. The 
lack of preventive activities may lead 
to a  higher demand for health care 
and higher out-of-pocket payments. 
In the observational study, this would 
not have led to problems with internal 
validity if risk aversion and prevention 
activities had been included as control 
factors. If they had not been included, 
however, observed effects would have 
been understated. Here again, in an 
experiment where microinsurance is 
randomly assigned, risk aversion and 
preventive activities would have been 
assumed to have been randomly dis-
tributed over the treatment and control 
group. Hence, their effects would have 
appeared in the error term, automati-
cally leading to an internally valid con-
clusion about the average effect in the 
sample.
External validity
With external validity, one considers 
the generalisability of results. Pol-
icy makers, donors, and practitioners 
who are interested in the impact of 
microinsurance on poverty and vul-
nerability are often interested in the 
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transferability of the scheme to other 
settings (e.g., other regions or other 
socioeconomic target groups). In many 
cases, they are not interested in the 
particular scheme under study, but in 
microinsurance as an intervention in 
general. For example, imagine a study 
of a  self-managed, community-based 
microinsurance scheme that con-
cludes the scheme hardly increases 
health-care utilisation. High levels of 
social control in the community pre-
vent sick people from visiting the doc-
tor because of the existing belief that 
using the health fund implies spending 
the money “of the others” or fleecing 
the other community members. This 
result is specific to the type of scheme 
(self-managed, community-based) and 
the specific community (high levels of 
social control). The results are, there-
fore, difficult to generalise to other 
schemes or communities with differ-
ent levels of social control and, hence, 
the external validity of the results is 
low.
Another limitation to external valid-
ity is variation in the treatment vari-
able: the insurance scheme. Let’s 
take a look at a few studies investigat-
ing the impact of health insurance on 
out-of-pocket expenditures. Wagstaff 
and Pradhan (2005) show a  Vietnam-
ese health insurance scheme reduces 
household out-of-pocket expenditure 
for health. Chankova et al. (2008) found 
that health insurance reduces out-of-
pocket expenditure for inpatient care. 
Finally, Jütting (2004) found reduced 
out-of-pocket expenditures for poor 
people who are members of commu-
nity-based health insurance schemes. 
However, contradictory evidence also 
exists. Wagstaff (2007) and Wagstaff 
et al. (2007) found no impact of insur-
ance on out-of-pocket expenditures 
and Chankova et al. (2008) found that 
health insurance does not reduce out-
of-pocket expenditure for outpatient 
care. Some of these authors, in their 
conclusions, provide explanations 
for findings which appear to contra-
dict theoretical predictions about the 
effect of insurance on out-of-pocket 
expenditure. For example, Chankova 
et al. (2008) assume that differences 
in impact of outpatient and inpatient 
care on out-of-pocket expenditures 
are caused by the benefit package and 
availability of co-payments. Wagstaff 
et al. (2007) think that out-of-pocket 
expenditures are not reduced because 
health care is sought more often by 
people who are insured, health care 
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provided by the health-care facility 
is more expensive since the insur-
ance has been introduced, and not all 
health-care costs are always fully cov-
ered by the insurance payout. These 
examples show that the specifics of 
the insurance product and context are 
essential for interpreting results. 
It should be noted that internal and 
external validity are often compet-
ing: a  high degree of internal validity 
can be achieved by highly controlled 
experiments. However, due to the 
relatively artificial setting required, 
it is difficult to generalise or transfer 
results to other settings, natural ones 
in particular. 
Construct validity
Construct validity refers to, “[e]nsuring 
that the variables measured adequately 
represent the underlying realities of… 
interventions linked to processes of 
change” (Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, XV). 
Drawing an internally valid conclusion 
about the wrong concept will only 
blur our understanding of the impact. 
For example, a  common measure 
for ex-post welfare effects is out-of-
pocket payments. Whilst the amount of 
out-of-pocket payment may be similar 
for two households, for one household, 
it may come from their savings, whilst 
another household may have sold 
a cow. In terms of the impact on pov-
erty reduction, the effect of the insur-
ance for these households may be dif-
ferent. Therefore, if one is interested in 
studying the impact of microinsurance 
on poverty reduction, out-of-pocket 
payment is an indicator with low con-
struct validity. 
Another example is where measure-
ment of direct welfare effects caused 
by microinsurance show a  positive 
effect. If, at the same time, microinsur-
ance crowds out other informal insur-
ance mechanisms, the overall welfare 
effect may be small, or even zero if 
microinsurance fully substitutes infor-
mal insurance. A valid construct would 
not be the effect of microinsurance on 
welfare, but the effect of all insurance 
mechanisms (formal and informal) on 
overall welfare. 
Statistical conclusion validity
Statistical conclusion validity concerns 
the application of correct quantita-
tive techniques to ensure the degree 
of confidence regarding the results, in 
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particular, the existence of a  relation-
ship between intervention and impact 
variable and the magnitude of change 
(Leeuw and Vaessen 2009, XV). For 
example, when ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimations are used, the statisti-
cal conclusion validity is low and poten-
tially leads to biased estimates when 
the dependent variable is a  dichotomy, 
often the case in impact studies (Harri-
son 2011). In this case, a causal analysis 
should be applied to take into account 
the dichotomy of dependent variable, 
e.g., a logistic regression. Other exam-
ples are studies which conduct regres-
sions (such as OLS, probit, and logistic 
regressions), but fail to address issues 
with self-selection and endogeneity 
leading to biased estimates. Another 
important element of statistical conclu-
sion validity is the consideration of the 
size of the effects in relation to other 
variables included in the model, and 
the contribution of the effect to the like-
lihood that a unit in the population, for 
example, a potential insured household 
experiences the studied impact. Since 
statistical validity refers to statistical 
methods only, this type of validity cannot 
be applied to qualitative methods, or to 
quantitative yet non-statistical methods.
12.6.2. Validity for different kinds of 
research designs
In the validity of a research design as 
a  whole, all four validities (in case of 
explanatory studies) or three validities 
(in case of qualitative studies or quan-
titative descriptive studies) need to be 
optimized. However, in reality, focus-
ing on one type of validity often implies 
relaxation of other validities. The man-
ner in which this is done depends on 
the question the study attempts to 
address and how state-of-the-art the 
existing theory used is. In any case, 
these choices and their implications 
for the validity of the study’s conclu-
sions need to be carefully discussed. 
In the following section we will discuss 
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the potential strengths and limita-
tions of the main research designs 
(experiments, quasi-experiments and 
observational studies, and qualitative 
approaches) that ought to be discussed 
when drawing conclusions. 
Experiments
Experiments are studies in which inter-
ventions are deliberately introduced to 
observe their effects. In impact studies 
of development interventions, a  spe-
cial kind of experiment is often applied, 
namely a  randomised controlled 
trial  (RCT). In an RCT design, firstly, 
a  population is selected from which 
subjects are sampled. This is followed 
by a random assignment of the sampled 
subjects to either experimental (treat-
ment) or control group conditions. The 
random assignment to either treat-
ment or control conditions is assumed 
to lead to a  random distribution of 
other omitted, potentially confounding 
factors over the treatment and con-
trol group, leading to an assumed zero 
effect of these factors on the outcome 
indicators. If potential threats to inter-
nal validity, such as spillover effects or 
contamination, have been accounted 
for in the research design, the internal 
validity for an RCT is high. High inter-
nal validity often comes at the expense 
of external validity, which is often low 
for an RCT. Low external validity can be 
problematic from a policy perspective 
because results cannot be generalised 
to other contexts. 
A comparison of the mean in the treat-
ment group and the mean in the control 
group will lead to the average treat-
ment effect for the population sample 
that has been selected before rando-
misation into the treatment and control 
condition. Therefore, the choice of the 
population and the method of sampling 
from this population will play a role in 
the size of the observed effect and, 
thus, merits a  critical discussion in 
the conclusions. For example, an RCT 
investigating the effect of randomly 
assigned crop insurance will lead to 
different results if the sample popula-
tion is drawn from villages where the 
predominant source of income comes 
from a  recently opened mine than 
when the sample population is drawn 
from a  village that has agriculture as 
the main income source. 
Although RCTs allow for high levels of 
internal validity with regards to aver-
age effects (hence their popularity), 
without an understanding of under-
lying mechanisms leading to these 
effects, they are unlikely to lead to 
advancements in scientific knowledge 
or contribute to policy development 
(Deaton 2010). In addition, the average 
effects are difficult to interpret if theory 
about the effect does not contain rele-
vant confounding factors (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009). This is certainly the 
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case for microinsurance, where there 
are many unresolved scientific chal-
lenges, such as the negative effect of 
increasing risk aversion on insurance 
demand (Giné et. al. 2008; Ito and Kono 
2010; Clarke and Kalani 2011; Dercon 
et al. 2011; Cole et al. 2013), a poten-
tial non-monotonic effect of risk aver-
sion on insurance demand (Clarke 
and Kalani 2011; Dercon et al. 2011) or 
compositional and interaction effects 
(Dercon et al. 2011; Morsink 2012).
Even though this does not change the 
result about the average effect from 
an RCT because the confounding vari-
ables are assumed to be randomly dis-
tributed over the treatment and control 
group, the average effect may be “hid-
ing” effects for specific groups of people 
with certain characteristics (the con-
founding factors). This is less of a prob-
lem if the effect is known (negative 
effect for women for paying a premium 
and positive effect for men who receive 
the payout) (Hintz 2010). The problem 
increases if effects of confounding vari-
ables and potential interactions are 
not understood (for example, observed 
negative effect of increasing risk aver-
sion on insurance demand).3 
Quasi-experiments and observational 
studies
In the case of rare risk events, 
resource constraints, or other limita-
tions, quasi-experiments may  be the 
most appropriate research design. 
Quasi-experiments are similar to 
experiments in that  they also take 
a sample from the population and have 
treatment and control groups, but are 
“quasi” because the treatment and 
control conditions are not randomly 
assigned. As a result, unknown, omit-
ted factors that are part of the control 
or treatment group may influence the 
observed effects of the treatment on 
the outcome, resulting in biased esti-
mates with potentially lower internal 
validity. Therefore, omitted variable 
bias ought to receive significant atten-
tion when discussing the sampling pro-
cedure in the conclusions of quasi-ex-
periments. For example, a  common 
method to select the treatment and 
control groups in quasi-experiments is 
to use procedures of matching, such as 
3 See, for a  discussion of the importance of theoretical 
models for interpreting RCT results, Pawson and Tilley 
(1997); Deaton (2010); and, for examples of RCTs with the-
oretical models underlying them, Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 
(2008); Todd and Wolpin (2006); Attanasio et al. (2010).
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propensity score  matching (PSM)4 on 
single or double differences (DD),5 or 
through stratified random sampling. 
For example, Lei and Lin (2009) and 
Aggarwal (2010) use PSM, and Jowett 
et al. (2004) use a  stratified random 
sample to investigate the impact of 
health insurance. When drawing con-
clusions, it is important to realise that 
the internal and external validity of the 
results of PSM and DD depend on the 
extent to which theory—supported by 
previous empirical evidence—is used 
to construct the treatment and control 
group. For example, neither Lei and 
Lin (2009) nor Aggarwal (2010) explain 
how matching criteria were derived 
from theory, potentially threatening the 
internal validity of the results (Shadish 
et al. 2002, 164). 
When drawing conclusions from qua-
si-experiments, reference should 
be made to the statistical checks for 
potential omitted variable bias such 
as econometric techniques of Heck-
mann (1978; 1979) or Altonji, Elder, and 
Taber (2000). When these problems 
4 In propensity score matching a  statistical comparison 
group is constructed based on a theoretical probability of 
participating in the treatment, using observed character-
istics. Respondents are then matched on the basis of this 
probability, or propensity score, to non-respondents. The 
average treatment effect of the programme is then cal-
culated as the mean difference in outcomes across these 
two groups (Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2010, 53). 
5 Double-difference (DD) methods, compared with PSM, 
assume that unobserved heterogeneity in participation is 
present, but that such factors are time-invariant. Data on 
project and control observations before and after the pro-
gramme intervention can cancel out this fixed component 
(Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2010, 71).
are adequately addressed, the study’s 
internal validity comes close to that of 
an RCT. Harrison (2011, 631) shows, 
based on Benson and Hartz (2000, 
1878) and Concato et al. (2000, 1887), 
that estimates of treatment effects 
in well-designed observational stud-
ies do not overestimate the treatment 
effects in comparison to RCTs. 
Quasi-experiments do  not rely on 
random assignment, implying that 
respondents have chosen insurance 
voluntarily or have decided to take 
it up, which leads to problems with 
self-selection. However, the fact that 
data is collected from a sample that is 
representative of the population in the 
natural setting implies that external 
validity is often higher. For example, 
the objective of the study conducted by 
Lei and Lin (2009), applying PSM, is to 
contribute to the question of whether 
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the Chinese health insurance scheme 
(NCMS) adds more service and better 
health, given China’s objectives to cre-
ate universal health coverage. In the 
selection of their sample, they cover 
nine provinces and four counties per 
province, which vary in terms of geog-
raphy, economic development, public 
resources, and health indicators, with 
the objective to create a representative 
sample of the target group of NCMS. 
This sampling strategy leads to poten-
tially high external validity, which is 
remarkably relevant in this study that 
has an objective of drawing conclu-
sions about the Chinese target popula-
tion (Lei and Lin 2009, S40). 
Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods, such as focus 
group discussions, participatory 
research, key-informant interviews, 
and case studies are well suited for 
exploring the measurement of vari-
ables and mechanisms and for hypoth-
eses development. Qualitative methods 
are valuable alone or as a supplement 
to quantitative research (Leeuw and 
Vaessen 2009, XIV). When drawing 
conclusions from qualitative research, 
these studies can provide high levels 
of construct validity. Furthermore, 
although internal validity is generally 
lower than with RCTs, it can be argued 
that their internal validity is high with 
respect to the single observation or 
case study. However, external validity 
is especially low because studies are 
not based on a probability sample. The 
low external validity also threatens the 
value of high internal validity because 
no statements can be made about how 
specific or general the internally valid 
observation is. Statistical conclusion 
validity does not apply to qualitative 
research. Despite the limitations of 
qualitative studies, they are, neverthe-
less, valuable for developing hypothe-
ses about impacts of microinsurance 
on the lives of the insured and unin-
sured households. Portfolios of the 
Poor (Collins et al. 2009) demonstrated 
the complexity of seemingly straight-
forward questions about the financial 
lives of the poor and the importance of 
gaining an in-depth understanding of 
these questions. Hintz (2010) already 
found evidence, in his evaluation of 
Payung Keluarga in Indonesia, of the 
fact that microinsurance can impact 
social and human assets. Hintz (2010) 
points to the impact of microinsurance 
on extra burden for female members 
to repay, whilst male members of the 
household are benefiting from the pay-
out. Another example is the potential 
of increased spending on social assets 
because payouts increase power of 
some households in communities rel-
ative to others (Hintz 2010). To be able 
to draw internally valid, generalisable 
conclusions about these effects, the 
impact of the insurance on these fac-
tors would have to be quantitatively 
investigated. 
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Triangulation
Triangulation is a  method in which 
information is gathered on the same 
concepts via different designs or 
observational methods. A  few exam-
ples of triangulation are: 1) combin-
ing laboratory experiments with field 
experiments or observational studies, 
2) combining interview data with archi-
val data, and 3) combining surveys with 
content analysis of written documents. 
These additional triangulations, when 
conducted properly, can increase 
internal, external, and construct valid-
ity in all research, but are notably com-
mon in qualitative research (Yin 2003). 
When drawing conclusions, one needs 
to specifically address how the tri-
angulation contributes to increasing 
a  specific validity. For example, Lei 
and Lin (2009) attempted to triangu-
late by conducting multiple estimation 
strategies combining different quan-
titative data sources: household data 
from a  household survey, information 
from a key-informant in the communi-
ty-level government, and county-level 
information. They estimated the impact 
of the health insurance programme 
on preventive health-care utilisation 
(Table IV, panel 3, Lei and Lin 2009, 
S37) and found a  positive, significant 
effect for all estimation techniques 
(OLS, individual Fixed Effects (FE) 
estimation, instrumental variables, 
and PSM). The fact that all estimates, 
despite using different data sources, 
showed similar and significant results 
increased the internal validity of this 
finding. However, if the different esti-
mations show contradictory results, 
this will reduce the internal validity of 
the findings. For example, Lei and Lin 
(2009) also estimated the impact of 
the health insurance on the probabil-
ity of visiting folk doctors. Although all 
estimations showed a negative effect, 
two out of five estimations were insig-
nificant (Table IV, panel 8, Lei and Lin 
2009, S37). The internal validity in the 
latter example is, thus, not as strong 
as the internal validity in the previous 
example. 
Morsink (2012) provides another exam-
ple of triangulation. She uses adminis-
trative data from an insurance company 
with local government data on typhoon 
experiences in villages to support the 
empirical analysis of survey data about 
the causal effect of peer experiences 
with insurance claim payments on 
demand for insurance. Internal validity 
of the results increased because the 
insurance and local data were used 
to confirm the fact that experiences of 
peers (of a household) with insurance 
claim payments preceded the house-
holds’ insurance purchase. 
12.7. Conclusion 
This chapter is intended for policy mak-
ers and practitioners to better under-
stand and assess the conclusions that 
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are drawn (or can be drawn) from 
impact studies. To do this, it is not only 
necessary to discuss results in terms 
of the four validities of the research 
design, but they should also be explic-
itly linked to the objectives, research 
question, and theoretical model or 
framework. 
Research conclusions need to address 
at least the following three questions:
1) What is the concrete answer to the 
research question? 
2) What does this mean for the general 
objectives (contribution to theory 
and practice)? 
3) What are the strengths and weak-
nesses of the study in terms of 
validities?
Research questions about microin-
surance are always explanatory, but 
descriptive studies (qualitative stud-
ies) are often necessary to explore 
measurement of variables and 
develop hypotheses. Research ques-
tions about impact are often defined 
in relatively broad terms and have to 
be put into practice before they can 
be measured. When drawing conclu-
sions, the results related to opera-
tional variables have to be translated 
back to more general concepts and 
objectives. Impact studies are about 
what works, which implies that the 
conclusions should not only pay atten-
tion to factors influencing a  certain 
impact, but also to which factors can 
be manipulated and to what extent.
Interpreting research results in terms 
of the theoretical model or framework 
(and potentially conflicting ones) is 
essential because similar observa-
tions, from different theoretical spec-
ifications, can imply different impacts. 
Furthermore, theory specifies poten-
tial confounding factors which are 
important for understanding mecha-
nisms underlying observed impacts 
and heterogeneous/distributional 
impacts for households with specific 
characteristics. The latter is very 
important from a  development pol-
icy perspective, where the interest is 
often about the impacts on the poor or 
previously uninsured. Seemingly posi-
tive average effects of insurance may 
hide contradictory effects for house-
holds with certain characteristics. 
Hence, distributional impacts deserve 
close attention when drawing conclu-
sions from studies. 
The validity of the results should be 
carefully discussed, both in relation to 
the research designs as well as in rela-
tion to theory. This discussion ought to 
address internal, external, construct, 
and statistical conclusion validity, tak-
ing the strengths and weaknesses of 
different designs into account. 
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13.1. Introduction
Microinsurance impact assessments—
and the lessons they impart—serve 
purposes ranging from fundraising 
to completing programmatic evalua-
tions and advancing the academic dis-
course. They cannot accomplish these 
objectives—or, by extension, influ-
ence the microinsurance community’s 
knowledge or practices—if they are not 
effectively reported or if information 
about their context, methodology, and 
results is not properly disseminated. 
To maximise stakeholders’ awareness 
and understanding of impact evalua-
tions and their implications, this chap-
ter presents techniques for creating 
comprehensible and engaging reports 
and cost-effective ways of promoting 
them. As such, it contains sections 
which discuss the following: 
1. The functions of microinsurance 
impact assessment reporting
2. Content and formatting options
3. Troubleshooting solutions for com-
mon issues
4. Methods for developing and imple-
menting successful dissemination 
strategies
13.2. Reporting functions
Three factors fundamentally shape the 
optimal content and formatting choices 
of a  microinsurance impact assess-
ment report: its intended purpose, 
target audience, and situation-specific 
requirements, like length restrictions.1 
Along with other aspects of conducting 
impact evaluations, these factors are 
best identified during a  study’s plan-
ning phases—because understand-
ing why and for whom assessments 
are performed constitutes the basis 
for doing everything effectively, from 
choosing the most relevant evaluation 
questions and metrics to completing 
fieldwork, undertaking analysis, and 
producing and disseminating infor-
mation about reports. Because multi-
ple stakeholders with different needs 
(including time constraints and famil-
iarity with research designs or analyti-
cal techniques) could often benefit from 
(or require) information about the same 
assessment, organisations typically 
produce several reports individually 
tailored for their particular consump-
tion. To avoid publication bias, however, 
evaluators must clearly note that each 
report refers to the same study. 2 
13.2.1. Purposes 
The purpose of a  microinsurance 
impact evaluation encompasses the 
objectives it seeks to achieve. Exam-
ples of purposes include: 
1 The term “report” denotes the numerous ways informa-
tion about microinsurance impact evaluations and their 
results can be communicated, including presentations, 
journal articles, online content, and even street theater. 
2 The term “evaluators” signifies people that produce and 
disseminate reports about microinsurance impact as-
sessments, regardless of their involvement with design-
ing or performing the studies in question. 
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• Determining resource allocation. 
Impact information about various 
(and potentially competing) inter-
ventions can help organisations 
apportion their money and staffing 
resources more effectively. 
• Influencing stakeholders. Impact 
assessments shape stakeholders’ 
perceptions and occasionally galvan-
ise them into action. 
• Improving products or scaling up cov-
erage. With impact results, micro-
insurers can improve policy design, 
marketing, sales, and servicing pro-
cesses—and, by extension, percep-
tions of client-value and take-up and 
renewal rates. 
• Educating current and prospective cli-
ents. When presented in accessible 
formats and comprehensible terms, 
microinsurance impact evaluations 
can educate existing and prospective 
policyholders about potential shocks, 
appropriate risk management tech-
niques, and ways that microin-
surance builds financial inclusion, 
amongst other insights. 
• Fundraising. Evaluations provide 
important support for fundraising 
purposes because they demonstrate 
organisations’ ability to design, 
implement, and administer microin-
surance schemes, achieve particular 
types of change, or even conceptual-
ise and conduct impact assessments 
themselves. 
• Furthering the academic discourse. 
Assessments impart information 
about whether and under what con-
ditions microinsurance interventions 
work, whilst advancing the field’s 
understanding of both study designs 
and analytical tools. 
Though not exhaustive, this list contains 
common and important reasons for per-
forming microinsurance impact assess-
ments. The degree of overlap between 
categories demonstrates the consider-
able interrelationships between them. 
Fundraising, for example, involves influ-
encing stakeholders to make decisions 
about resource allocation. Reports can 
therefore have singular or multiple 
purposes: an article which communi-
cates whether and how coverage offer-
ings enable clients to manage risks, for 
instance, can concurrently document 
best evaluation practices for the wider 
microinsurance sphere. 
Clearly articulating a commonly-under-
stood purpose is the first step to report-
ing successfully. Throughout the report 
production and dissemination process, 
this articulation entails making content 
and formatting choices accordingly, 
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subject to the target audience’s charac-
teristics and situation-specific require-
ments, as described below. 
13.2.2. Target audiences
Target audiences comprise the intended 
consumers of reports. Here, table 1 
enumerates some of this diverse spec-
trum of stakeholders, explains the sig-
nificance that each frequently attaches 
to microinsurance impact assessment 
reporting, and presents characteristics 
to consider when creating reports for 
their perusal. 
Like the purposes of evaluations, con-
sumer categories overlap to some 
extent (practitioner associations, for 
instance, include members of the 
other groups mentioned). Addition-
ally, because of considerable variation 
both across and within categories (and 
the fact that each target audience is 
unique), the entries are only gener-
alisations. Evaluators should always 
individually assess audiences’ charac-
teristics to determine which formatting 
and content choices would best facil-
itate accomplishing their reporting 
objectives. 
Table 1: Prospective consumers of microinsurance impact assessments
Target  
audience
Significance of microinsurance  
impact assessment reporting
Characteristics to consider
Microin-
surers and 
reinsurers
• Provides indicators of their products’ perfor-
mance and those of competitors and compa-
rable organisations elsewhere
• Supplies information helpful for improving or 
scaling up offerings, designing new coverage, 
obtaining inancing, (re-)allocating organi-
sational resources (for example, between 
different initiatives) and determining whether 
institutional goals were met
• Facilitates maintaining accountability to 
funders, clients, and members of clients’ 
communities
Understand microinsurance con-
cepts—though potentially less well 
in ield ofices or at community-run 
schemes—but probably not information 
about impact assessments; reinsurers’ 
actuarial training, however, might sim-
plify grasping some of these ideas. 
Technical 
assistance 
providers
• Determines the effectiveness of their recom-
mendations
• Apprises them of what products or related 
processes, like marketing, work or don’t 
work under speciic circumstances, thereby 
enabling them to offer more effective ser-
vices
Technical assistance providers offer 
a wide array of services that require 
diverse qualiications; hence—and 
whilst most probably understand the 
tenets of microinsurance—generalising 
about their knowledge of impact 
assessments is dificult.
Regulators 
and other 
policy mak-
ers
• Highlights the suficiency of existing microin-
surance-related laws and practices
• Indicates whether and what type of changes 
are necessary
Because the educational backgrounds, 
technical knowledge, and professional 
experience of these civil servants vary 
widely both amongst and within coun-
tries, generalising about their acquain-
tance with microinsurance or impact 
assessment is again problematic.
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Target  
audience
Significance of microinsurance  
impact assessment reporting
Characteristics to consider
Practitioner 
associations
• Conirms or refutes the accuracy of associa-
tions’ prevailing views
• Presents opportunities to develop and reine 
initiatives, like pursuing advocacy work
Most association members are familiar 
with microinsurance, but their familia-
rity with impact assessment designs 
and analytical techniques varies con-
siderably.
Donors and 
investors
• Helps to allocate resources
• Monitors the performance of—and indicates 
whether midcourse corrections are required 
for—ongoing projects 
• Evaluates the success and cost-effectiveness 
of completed projects
Some donors and investors specialise 
in microinsurance, impact assess-
ments, or both; others possess numer-
acy via project inancing expertise that 
would facilitate learning about mi-
croinsurance and impact assessment 
methodologies. 
Academics 
and 
students
• Provides information about microinsurance’s 
antipoverty affects—or lack thereof—and 
place amongst other economic development 
interventions
• Furthers their knowledge of assessment 
designs and analytical methodologies
Academics and students are amongst 
the best-acquainted with impact eval-
uations; whilst their knowledge of mi-
croinsurance might be less extensive, 
they have resources at their disposal 
to learn more. These resources, such 
as subscriptions to journals and index 
databases, additionally afford academ-
ics and students unparalleled access 
to published impact assessments. 
Clients and 
community 
members in 
existing and 
prospective 
microinsur-
ance 
markets
• Educates them about risk management, 
inancial literacy, and economic development 
more broadly
• Creates accountability and fosters trust 
by demonstrating microinsurers’ ability or 
inability to offer both quality coverage and 
candid communication with customers
Clients and community members are 
liable to have less educational expe-
rience, limited numeracy—and some-
times literacy—and, depending upon 
the local availability of coverage, no 
familiarity with impact assessment or 
microinsurance. 
General 
audiences
• Introduces the concept of shocks and their 
consequences for low-income people in de-
veloping countries
• Explains how—and how successfully—mi-
croinsurance and other risk management 
techniques militate against the ramiications 
of shocks
Members of this group are likely unac-
quainted with either impact evaluations 
or microinsurance. 
13.2.3. Situation-specific 
requirements
Situation-specific requirements con-
stitute restrictions to reports’ con-
tent and formatting options, includ-
ing stipulations about the medium or 
language of presentation, length, and 
the inclusion or arrangement of par-
ticular elements. These limits can be 
generated both internally (by organisa-
tional resource constraints) or exter-
nally (by target audiences or dissem-
ination channels like peer-reviewed 
journals). Regardless of what evalua-
tors deem important to communicate, 
reports might have to address certain 
questions, implement the potentially 
restrictive recommendations of style 
guides or stay within particular page 
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limits. Because these constraints 
are often non-negotiable they must 
be integrated into existing efforts to 
achieve reporting objectives. 
13.2.4. Content and formatting 
options
This section presents and explains 
a  variety of content and formatting 
choices and describes how to use 
them effectively. Whilst reports are 
generally produced at the conclu-
sion of impact assessments, finalis-
ing content and formatting decisions 
beforehand both simplifies the report 
creation process and circumvents the 
tendency to “cherry-pick” items for 
inclusion ex-post. Ultimately, com-
plete reports convey information about 
the microinsurance interventions in 
question, the assessment and analyti-
cal methodologies employed, the data 
obtained, and the results and their 
implications in ways that allow con-
sumers to determine the evaluation’s 
susceptibility to bias and generalis-
ability (or internal and external valid-
ity, respectively). As hallmarks of the 
scientific method, transparency and 
the ability to replicate the study are 
essential. Reports must provide the 
information and access to documen-
tation necessary to allow consumers 
to reproduce either the conclusions 
ascertained with the data collected or 
entire evaluations themselves. Whilst 
certain formats and target audiences 
preclude presenting in-depth techni-
cal material, evaluators can maintain 
inclusiveness, completeness, and uni-
formity by incorporating links to rel-
evant resources into reports where 
applicable. 
13.2.4.1. Format
Table 2 presents seven formats for 
microinsurance impact assessment 
reporting, lists key advantages and 
disadvantages of each, and references 
actual examples. The formats overlap 
to some extent (interviews can be tran-
scribed in magazines, for example), and 
more benefits and drawbacks addition-
ally exist than are stated (vulnerabil-
ity to hacking, for example, is a prob-
lem for websites), though the reasons 
provided are believed to be especially 
salient. Regardless, evaluators are 
encouraged to brainstorm other poten-
tial advantages and disadvantages of 
using the formats they choose within 
the contexts of their individual studies. 
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Besides presentations and audiovisual 
programming, these formats are note-
worthy for their potential inaccessibil-
ity to current and prospective micro-
insurance clients and members of 
their communities (who often lack the 
monetary, technological or educational 
wherewithal to obtain and interpret 
them). Because these stakeholders 
are arguably microinsurance’s most 
important, this chapter recommends 
distilling the essence of evaluations 
and their outcomes into novel formats 
that overcome such obstacles—includ-
ing posters, banners, comics, wall 
paintings, flip charts, street the-
ater, interactive games, and even text 
messages.
13.2.4.2. Content
Determining what to include in micro-
insurance impact assessment reports 
is complicated: distinct reporting 
purposes, target audiences, and sit-
uation-specific requirements each 
Table 2: Formats for microinsurance impact assessment reports
Format Benefits Drawbacks
Book Enables extended consideration of study Expensive to publish; more 
time-consuming to produce 
Peer-reviewed 
academic article
Provides prestige and scientiic imprimatur; 
meets standards of rigour
Generally requires special expertise 
to prepare; can be inaccessible/
incomprehensible to non-academic 
audiences; publication process is 
often lengthy and sometimes re-
quires relinquishing copyright 
Practice-oriented 
report
Comprehensible to a larger number of 
stakeholders than academic articles
Usually not indexed by databases 
and therefore more dificult to lo-
cate; corresponding assessment 
may be less robust or rigorously 
detailed; if in-house, may contain 
conidential information that cannot 
be widely shared 
Non-academic ar-
ticle, for example, 
published in print 
or online 
Widely accessible; more comprehensible to 
non-practitioners
Explaining impact assessment 
concepts in common language can 
be dificult
Presentation, in-
cluding interviews
In-person element; allows for interaction 
with audience or interviewer and use of 
multiple modes of communication, such as 
speaking and slides
Potential time limitations; often 
dependent upon electricity or tech-
nologies that aren’t universally 
available or reliable in developing 
country settings
Audiovisual pro-
gramming, like 
documentary or 
dramatisation
Provides potentially more engaging alterna-
tive to written formats; accessible to illiter-
ate audiences
Occasionally requires access to ex-
pensive or unreliable technologies; 
potentially costly and time-consum-
ing to produce 
Webpage Gives study a location in cyberspace; can 
provide links to related material; can capi-
talise on host site’s reputation/popularity
Vulnerability to hacking
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encourage the choice of diverse and 
sometimes incongruous elements. 
Because most reports created are 
academic or practice-oriented papers, 
this subsection provides a  step-by-
step guide for constructing them. Spe-
cifically, it combines recommendations 
from diverse sets of multidisciplinary 
guidelines for writing reports with 
suggestions unique to microinsurance 
and quantitative impact assessment 
methodologies to present a  checklist 
for producing comprehensive peer-re-
viewed articles.3 As necessary, the 
chapter provides modifications for 
reports oriented toward practice. 
Widely-implemented reporting crite-
ria encourage standardisation, which 
promotes transparency and simplifies 
the interpretation and comparabil-
ity of reports. This consistency facil-
itates the production of high-quality 
systematic reviews and meta-analy-
ses, which integrate information from 
multiple studies to ascertain the exis-
tence of patterns, contradictions, or 
other relationships that illuminate an 
intervention’s effects and avenues 
for additional investigation. Because 
microinsurance impact assessment 
reporting is relatively nascent, quickly 
establishing and formalising the use of 
guidelines will enable more studies to 
3 Whilst some of these recommendations apply to reporting 
on qualitative studies, Malterud (2001) and Tong, Sains-
bury and Craig (2007) provide more information in this 
regard. 
be reported accurately and completely 
going forward. 
This subsection derives its recom-
mendations from the Consolidated 
Standards for Reporting Trials (CON-
SORT) Statement, which suggests 25 
items for inclusion in reports about 
health-related randomised controlled 
trials (Schulz, Altman, and Moher 
2010). Since its debut in the 1990s, 
standards for reporting other types 
of studies have proliferated. This sub-
section also incorporates guidelines 
from Strengthening the Reporting of 
Observational Studies in Epidemiol-
ogy (STROBE),4 Transparent Report-
ing of Evaluations with Nonrandom-
ized Designs (TREND),5 International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors 
(ICMJE, formerly the Uniform Require-
ments for Manuscripts Submitted 
to Biomedical Journals, or URM),6 
together with information drawn from 
my own experience. From this consol-
idated material, six components are 
recommended for inclusion in peer-re-
viewed microinsurance impact assess-
ments. These components are: front 
matter, introduction, methods, results, 
discussion, and sources of complete 
evaluation-related information. 
4 See von Elm et al. (2007) for more details on STROBE.
5 See Des Jarlais et al. (2004) for more details on TREND.
6 http://www.icmje.org/.
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1. Front matter
Front matter comprises either a sepa-
rate cover page or the space before an 
article’s introduction. It includes: 
• The piece’s title
• The authors’ names, affiliations, 
and contact details
• Sources of funding and other 
non-monetary support
• Key words
• An abstract
An abstract enables readers to quickly 
grasp details about the design, con-
duct, and outcomes of evaluations, sit-
uate them in context, and understand 
their importance. As such, it contains: 
• The study’s main hypothesis or 
research question
• A synopsis of preceding research
• The primary variable of interest, 
defined clearly
• The evaluation’s location
• A description of the study’s subjects 
and how they were selected
• The interventions and analytical 
approaches employed
• Significant problems encountered
• The results and their interpretation
Despite this multiplicity of elements, 
an abstract is typically constrained to 
a small space (for example, by a jour-
nal’s limitation on word count) and 
otherwise meant to be succinct. As 
a result, authors should never include 
content extraneous to their reports. 
Besides these components, a  prac-
tice-oriented report also presents 
recommendations (sometimes with 
corresponding budgetary ramifica-
tions), often using a one page synopsis 
called an executive summary, which 
accommodates the additional material 
instead.
2. Introduction
An article’s introduction should explain 
the background and rationale (or 
objectives) for performing the study 
concerned. Besides establishing con-
text by providing a literature review of 
related research, this includes pre-
senting the main evaluation question 
and any pre-specified hypotheses. 
A general outline of the ensuing paper 
should follow. 
3. Methods
The methods section discusses how 
the corresponding study was concep-
tualised and conducted, together with 
its pre-specified analytical approach. 
It must contain enough information to 
facilitate the evaluation’s replication 
or enable readers to verify the results 
obtained with the original data col-
lected. As such, it includes the follow-
ing nine components: 
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• A description of the study’s design, 
with justifications for less com-
mon or unintuitive choices given the 
assessment’s circumstances. 
• Information about the study’s loca-
tion and implementation team, 
including the number and type of 
settings involved, a  description of 
those (for example, loan officers or 
survey enumerators) who adminis-
tered the evaluation, and the specif-
ics of any training given to them.7
• An explanation of participant enrol-
ment criteria and processes, includ-
ing a comprehensive description of 
the study’s eligibility requirements 
and methods and dates of recruit-
ment (for example, self-selection 
in response to radio advertising). 
Authors should additionally confirm 
whether and how subjects’ informed 
consent was obtained. 
• All determinants of sample size 
and structure, such as the desired 
significance level and statistical 
power. Besides the resulting tar-
get sample size and allocation type 
(such as cluster sampling), authors 
should also describe how and why 
stratification was implemented, if 
applicable. Every source of data (for 
example, census results or prelimi-
nary surveys) consulted to estimate 
these parameters should be listed. 
7 Many aspects of an assessment’s location, such as cli-
mate or prevailing cultural norms, can affect its applica-
bility to other contexts. To enable readers to effectively 
assess an evaluation’s relevance, authors must explain 
each of these features and their significance. 
• A  description of the interventions 
administered to each group, together 
with all follow-up conducted. This 
includes information about how and 
when each intervention was imple-
mented and all measures taken to 
minimise contamination, non-com-
pliance, and attrition.
• The definition of pre-specified pri-
mary and secondary variables of 
interest, including how, when, and 
by whom they were evaluated.
• Changes made to any aspect of the 
study after commencement, with 
reasons. These include alterations 
to the evaluation’s design, methods, 
eligibility criteria, interventions, 
variables of interest, data collection 
approaches, and analytical tech-
niques, together with a full account-
ing of all modifications introduced. 
Likewise, any occurrences that may 
have influenced the study’s results 
(such as floods which affected 
data collection efforts) should be 
reported.
• The methods used to estimate and 
compare primary and secondary 
variables of interest across groups. 
• Any methods of additional analysis 
with reasons for performing them 
and confirmation of whether they 
were pre-specified. 
4. Results
The results section describes the 
actual study participants, traces their 
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progression through the evaluation, 
and provides estimates of the vari-
ables of interest, other pre-specified 
metrics, and any unexpected effects 
detected. Accordingly, it contains the 
following five components: 
• Sample constitution.  Authors should 
provide the number of people 
assessed for eligibility and spec-
ify how many were rejected, how 
many were accepted but declined 
to participate, and how many were 
accepted and actually allocated. Any 
discrepancies between the origi-
nally planned and actual sample 
sizes (for example, due to the unan-
ticipated loss of funding) should be 
explained. 
• Participant progression. Description 
of the participants’ progression 
through the evaluation, with spe-
cific information about and reasons 
for losses (such as those deemed 
unreachable) and exclusions (such 
as those determined to be ineligible 
after allocation) during the imple-
mentation, follow-up, and data 
analysis phases. 
• Baseline data by participant group. 
Because not even randomisation 
guarantees similarity across allo-
cated groups (especially for smaller 
sample sizes), authors should 
include a  table that summarizes 
the demographic characteristics 
of groups at baseline. They should 
likewise briefly describe its con-
tents, paying particular attention 
to the more pertinent variables and 
salient features like unexpected 
values or noteworthy discrepancies 
between groups. 
• Estimated results. Estimated results 
for every planned primary and sec-
ondary variable of interest across 
all participant groups. An outcome 
summary including each measure-
ment’s mean and standard error 
should accompany every result 
where possible, together with the 
number of study subjects included 
in the corresponding analyses and 
information about whether they 
were evaluated with their original 
assigned groups. Effect sizes with 
confidence intervals (and, option-
ally, p-values) should also be pre-
sented. To avoid selective report-
ing, authors should provide results 
for all pre-specified variables of 
Reporting and disseminating findings
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interest and not just “interesting” or 
statistically significant ones. 
• Unexpected effects. Authors should 
define and quantify (by stating how 
many participants were impacted 
and to what extent) any unexpected 
effects observed. They should addi-
tionally explain how data concern-
ing these effects were collected and 
detail any analyses subsequently 
performed. 
5. Discussion
The discussion section evaluates 
a  study’s validity and explains and 
contextualises its results, with prac-
tice-oriented reports additionally 
providing policy or other recommen-
dations as appropriate. As such, it con-
tains the following three elements: 
• Strengths and weaknesses. An 
objective examination of the study’s 
strengths and weaknesses, includ-
ing a presentation of its limitations 
and the methods used to address 
them. Authors should further dis-
cuss the results’ precision (or lack 
thereof) and potential sources of 
ambiguity (such as inexact instru-
ments used to measure the vari-
ables in question). 
• Generalisability. An exploration of 
the evaluation’s generalisability. 
Once internal validity is established, 
authors should review determi-
nants of the study’s applicability to 
other contexts, including its recruit-
ment period and processes, eligi-
bility criteria, participants, location, 
interventions, implementation, fol-
low-up, and variables of inquiry. 
• Interpretation and contextualisation 
of results. After summarizing the 
evaluation’s key findings and poten-
tially exploring the mechanisms 
underscoring them, authors should 
compare them to the outcomes 
of similar studies (including those 
with opposing conclusions), and 
applicable systematic reviews or 
meta-analyses. Finally, they should 
describe the assessment’s overall 
implications in terms of research 
and practice. Practice-oriented 
reports can further provide pol-
icy suggestions, with or without 
accompanying budgets.
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6. Complete sources of information 
related to evaluation 
To assure transparency, authors must 
tell readers where and how to obtain 
the documentation pertaining to their 
assessments, subject to applicable 
policies. 
13.3. Troubleshooting
Creating reports can be difficult: 
besides decisions related to format and 
content, evaluators frequently confront 
a range of other choices on matters—
some sensitive—involving ethics and 
their evaluations. This section trou-
bleshoots five such problems, includ-
ing technical difficulties, disappointing 
results, conflicts of interest, issues 
involving privacy and proprietary infor-
mation, and insufficient resources. 
Whilst struggles with report prepara-
tion are commonplace, evaluators can 
militate against their effects to still 
produce high-quality outputs. 
13.3.1. Difficulties
Evaluations are routinely compro-
mised by factors—like higher-than-an-
ticipated attrition rates or incomplete 
enumerator training—that impact both 
the quality and quantity of data col-
lected and the analyses subsequently 
performed. Whilst concealing or 
whitewashing these events may prove 
tempting when preparing reports, 
evaluators are ethically obligated to 
themselves, their target audiences, 
and the overall research community to 
candidly present and discuss problems 
pertaining to their assessments. Fail-
ure to do so can have serious profes-
sional ramifications and—if left undis-
covered—repercussions for the field’s 
understanding of microinsurance and, 
by extension, subsequent research, 
teaching, and practice. Conversely, 
presenting and exploring the effect of 
difficulties cements evaluators’ cred-
ibility, provides potentially important 
insights into more effectively designing 
and conducting subsequent studies, 
and facilitates communicating whether 
and how microinsurance interventions 
actually work. 
13.3.2. Disappointing results 
Evaluations frequently demonstrate 
negative, insignificant, or non-existent 
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effects. Academic journals, however, 
are widely acknowledged to preferen-
tially publish papers with strong pos-
itive results—a phenomenon called 
publication bias.8 
Publication bias has two damaging 
repercussions, both of which impact 
the results of systematic reviews and 
meta-analyses. For example, by lead-
ing evaluators to shelve studies with 
other outcomes (a practice known as 
the “file drawer” problem), it prevents 
legitimate knowledge from reaching 
audiences that might benefit. Addition-
ally, it promotes professional miscon-
duct and the production of spurious 
reports by encouraging researchers 
to engage in inappropriate activities 
to obtain publishable results. Even 
reports in other formats are affected, 
albeit to a different degree. For exam-
ple, donors frequently strive to fund 
positively impactful projects; evalu-
ations that demonstrate otherwise 
can precipitate reduced or withdrawn 
support and damage to the recipient 
organisation’s reputation as an imple-
menter of effective interventions. 
8 A related problem is redundant publication, or the prac-
tice of illegitimately republishing the same results as 
original material.
Given this reality, it’s understandable 
that evaluators with negative, insig-
nificant, non-existent or even unex-
pected findings (vis-à-vis the existing 
literature or the assessment commu-
nity’s a priori perceptions) would with-
hold or “readjust” the studies involved. 
To promote good evaluation practice, 
facilitate the release of accurate infor-
mation, and enable the preparation 
of more accurate systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses, evaluators should 
disregard such impulses and promote 
their reports as written.
13.3.3. Privacy and proprietary 
information
Assessments routinely encounter 
and, through reporting, must occa-
sionally reveal private or proprietary 
information, including study partici-
pants’ personal details and confiden-
tial aspects of microinsurers’ prod-
ucts and processes. Such disclosures 
should only be made when absolutely 
essential, with the consent of the 
parties involved, according to appli-
cable laws and other policies, and 
after considering the potential conse-
quences (such as competitors appro-
priating divulged business practices). 
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Evaluators should additionally only 
release the minimum amount of infor-
mation necessary (though never sub-
jects’ actual names) and exclusively 
to those who must know it (for exam-
ple, by producing separate reports 
or using redaction). Where cultural 
norms or legal protections are more 
lenient or non-existent, evaluators 
must uphold global best practices—
not least to facilitate the performance 
of subsequent research. 
13.3.4. Conflicts of interest
Conflicts of interest can arise when 
a  study’s researchers or writers (or 
their respective employers) have 
financial or other relationships with 
individuals or organisations that might 
improperly influence their work. In 
the microinsurance realm, examples 
include researchers with ownership 
stakes (for instance, through stocks) 
in microinsurers or reinsurers whose 
products are being evaluated, or rel-
atives that could benefit materially 
(for instance, by obtaining business) 
through the selection of particular 
study sites or populations. Whilst 
potential and existing conflicts do 
not necessarily presage impropriety, 
they must be handled appropriately 
to assure the integrity of a  report’s 
conclusions. 
All actual and prospective conflicts 
of interest must be identified during 
a study’s planning phases. In response, 
evaluators can preemptively elimi-
nate them, decide to disclose them, 
or exclude the parties involved from 
participating in the evaluation. If dis-
closure is chosen, several ways exist 
for divulging the information. Most 
academic journals, for example, have 
specific policies (usually provided on 
their websites) governing how conflicts 
must be reported. Without explicit 
requirements, evaluators should 
describe remaining conflicts in a sep-
arate notification section at the end of 
their reports. Given the ramifications 
for assessments’ integrity, eliminating 
and then properly reporting remain-
ing conflicts of interest is particularly 
important. 
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13.3.5. Documentation and 
plagiarism
Properly attributing ideas is a  fun-
damental aspect of good reporting: 
besides delineating the record upon 
which assessments are based, it 
reflects evaluators’ integrity and, thus, 
credibility. Unfortunately, confusion 
about how and when to cite sources is 
widespread. Whilst journals and other 
publishers often require the use of 
specific style manuals (which provide 
standardised citation techniques and 
instructions, as listed on the websites 
of the publications concerned), eval-
uators are not always bound by these 
restrictions. In such cases, the Publica-
tion Manual of the American Psycholog-
ical Association (APA) describes when 
and how to create citations (APA 2010). 
Plagiarism, on the other hand, is 
the act of knowingly or inadvertently 
appropriating or closely approximating 
other people’s words or ideas without 
attribution. Whilst attitudes towards 
plagiarism vary across cultures, the 
practice is considered a serious intel-
lectual offense, with potentially steep 
consequences (such as the loss of 
employment and professional stand-
ing). As such, evaluators should prop-
erly cite (for example, using the Pub-
lication Manual described above) all 
influences on their work. 
13.3.6. Insufficient resources
The lack of money, time, techni-
cal expertise, and technology can 
make preparing and disseminating 
high-quality reports difficult. Whilst 
these issues should be anticipated 
and addressed during an evaluation’s 
planning process, several resources 
are available for unanticipated com-
plications of this nature. For problems 
involving technical expertise, the con-
sultant rosters, advisory services, and 
small grants (for purchasing external 
capabilities) offered by the International 
Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) 
and the ILO’s Microinsurance Innova-
tion Facility may prove helpful. Simi-
larly, numerous local and international 
organisations that focus on evaluation, 
like the Evaluation Cooperation Group, 
provide links to resources, including 
funding opportunities, available con-
sultants, and instruction in assess-
ment and analytical techniques. Finally, 
both Bamberger (2006) and Bamberger 
et al. (2004) provide suggestions and 
case studies for conducting faster and 
lower-cost evaluations that preserve 
resources for subsequent report-writ-
ing and dissemination activities. 
13.4. Dissemination
Dissemination strategies facilitate 
publishing and publicising information 
about microinsurance impact assess-
ment reports. As such, they contain 
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three components, all discussed below: 
making arrangements for publish-
ing and archiving, conducting promo-
tional activities, and completing related 
organisational tasks (including cre-
ating dissemination work plans and 
budgets). Like other aspects of evalua-
tions, they should be developed during 
a study’s planning phases. 
13.4.1. Publishing and archiving
Optimal publishing and archiving 
arrangements depend upon several 
factors, including a  report’s format, 
purpose, target audience, and the 
strength and uniqueness of its meth-
odology and findings. Consistent with 
this chapter’s focus, this section pres-
ents options relevant to peer-reviewed 
journal articles and practice-oriented 
reports below.
13.4.1.1. Academic journals 
When selecting journals for article 
submission, considerations beyond the 
scope and history of each publication 
include reputation, turnaround time, 
and policies regarding issues like 
copyrights and reader accessibility. 
This information is available through 
journals’ own websites and Ulrich’s 
Periodicals Directory.9 Editage’s How 
to Choose Journals for Submitting Your 
9 http://www.serialssolutions.com/en/services/ulrichs/.
Paper,10 Wikipedia’s Journal ranking 
entry,11 and Suber’s Open Access Over-
view12 provide the details necessary to 
make informed choices in this regard.
The following, non-exhaustive list of 
journals have previously published 
microinsurance impact assessment 
reports (Magnoni and Zimmerman 2011): 
Applied Economics
Journal of Health 
Economics
BMC Health Services 
Research 
Journal of Risk and 
Insurance
British Medical Journal Pediatrics
Health Affairs PLoS ONE
Health Economics 
Social Science and 
Medicine
Health Policy
World Bank Economic 
Review
Health Policy and 
Planning 
World Development
Though these titles reflect the predom-
inance of quantitative evaluations and 
assessments of health-related microin-
surance plans, the wide variety of cur-
rent pipeline studies indicates that more 
diverse publications will print microin-
surance impact assessment articles 
going forward (Radermacher et al. 2012; 
Magnoni and Zimmerman 2011). 
Before submitting to journals, some 
evaluators present their articles at 
10 http://www.editage.com.
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journal_ranking.
12 http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.htm.
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academic conferences or release them 
as “working papers” to obtain feedback 
and increase their chances of weather-
ing peer review. Academic conferences 
are refereed venues to which schol-
ars submit generally shorter papers. 
Because some publish articles in pro-
ceedings that preclude authors from 
subsequently submitting to journals, 
evaluators should check conferences’ 
individual policies before proceeding. 
Likewise, the term working papers 
refers to preliminary reports that are 
posted online or circulated informally.
When ready to apply for publication, 
evaluators should follow the manu-
script preparation and submission 
guidelines on their chosen journal’s 
website. The potential outcomes 
(following publications’ sometimes 
lengthy turnaround times) are typi-
cally accepted, “revise and resubmit” 
(through which comments from edi-
tors or referees are addressed), or 
rejected. To avoid the serious profes-
sional breach of redundant publication, 
evaluators should never simultane-
ously submit to multiple journals.
13.4.1.2. Practice-oriented papers
Practice-oriented papers are published 
by the organisations which conduct or 
fund evaluations, sometimes as part of 
an existing series (like the Microinsur-
ance Innovation Facility’s Microinsur-
ance Papers series) and nearly always 
online. Whilst larger establishments 
often have in-house publishing depart-
ments with submission requirements 
and standardised outputs, smaller 
organisations can exercise leeway in 
this respect. 
13.4.1.3. Archiving
Online archives or databases provide 
reports with external visibility and 
a permanent internet presence, situate 
them alongside similar studies, make 
papers published informally easier 
to locate and offer the administering 
institution’s imprimatur. OpenDOAR 
provides a  searchable list of aca-
demic depositories, though authors 
should clarify copyright issues before 
contributing.13 In the microinsurance 
and impact assessment realms, the 
13 http://opendoar.org.
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Microinsurance Network, 3ie, Micro-
Insurance Centre, and the World Bank 
also maintain databases or publication 
lists; please see the organisations’ 
websites for submission guidelines.
13.4.2. Promotional activities
Beyond publishing and archiving, pro-
motional activities facilitate effec-
tively disseminating information about 
reports. After describing how to 
select them, this subsection presents 
a  diverse array under the following 
four broad and sometimes overlapping 
categories: events, audiovisual pro-
gramming, written communications, 
and networking. For evaluators whose 
reports have policy making implica-
tions, it additionally provides informa-
tion about toolkits and case studies for 
influencing decision makers.
Two important considerations are cen-
tral to selecting suitable promotional 
activities: what information to dissem-
inate and how to communicate it suc-
cessfully. Deciding whether to enlist 
partners like donors or practitioner 
networks is also important because 
additional organisations can be bet-
ter placed to reach certain audiences 
or contribute resources like labour. 
However, collaboration may also have 
drawbacks, including sometimes 
relinquishing creative control. For 
more information about choosing suit-
able dissemination activities, please 
see Carpenter et al. (2005). With these 
concerns in focus, prospective promo-
tional activities are listed below. 
13.4.2.1. Events
Evaluators can organise their own 
events including everything from 
 conferences and seminars to work-
shops, trainings, discussions, perfor-
mances, launches, and fundraisers—
or participate in established ones. 
Regarding the former (and especially 
for producing large, complex, or costly 
events), those without access to plan-
ning expertise can consult guides like 
Kilkenny’s (2011). In contrast, existing 
events related to microinsurance are 
listed on the Microinsurance Network’s 
online calendar; of these, the most 
prominent is the International Micro-
insurance Conference, hosted annually 
by the Microinsurance Network and 
Munich Re Foundation. 
13.4.2.2. Audiovisual programming
Audiovisual formats include inter-
views, news briefs, dramatisations, 
and sound or video recordings of actual 
events. Because producing them occa-
sionally requires access to specialised 
and potentially expensive equipment or 
expertise, evaluators can economise by 
generating interest from organisations 
like radio stations that incur the costs of 
using production capacity themselves 
(though this approach sometimes 
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necessitates relinquishing control over 
how reports are portrayed). Working 
with the media: A  best practice guide, 
by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) (n.d.), describes how 
to develop broadcasting contacts and 
provides tips for presenting research 
findings through television and radio. 
Whilst audiovisual materials can be 
disseminated via offline conduits like 
television or theater, the most com-
mon and (depending upon the target 
audience) widely-accessible method 
is online. Organisations frequently 
post productions to their websites 
and external platforms like the sites 
of partner organisations, professional 
associations, and even networking and 
entertainment venues. For example, 
the ILO’s Microinsurance Innovation 
Facility provides dozens of video inter-
views in its Knowledge Centre, whilst 
the Micro Insurance Academy main-
tains a YouTube channel. 
13.4.2.3. Written communication (both 
online and in print)
Magazine and newspaper articles, 
website and blog postings, press 
releases, newsletter features, bro-
chures, and factsheets are some of 
the many diverse (and comparatively 
cheap) ways of disseminating infor-
mation through written communica-
tions. In this domain, two widely-read 
newsletters are the Microinsurance 
Network’s Microinsurance Trilogy and 
the Microinsurance Innovation Facil-
ity’s Knowledge Flash.14 For access to 
the larger microfinance community, 
evaluators can post content on the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor’s 
Microfinance Gateway. 
13.4.2.4. Networking
Social networking, electronic mailing 
lists, and interpersonal communica-
tions comprise the final group of pro-
motional activities discussed. Regard-
ing the former, table 3 lists major 
groups on LinkedIn, Twitter, and Pinter-
est that are specific to microinsurance. 
Because social networking platforms 
are dynamic, evaluators should verify 
the status of existing ones and search 
for others before proceeding.15 In the 
microinsurance and impact evaluation 
spaces, most organisations (including 
the ILO’s Microinsurance Innovation 
Facility, Microinsurance Network, and 
3ie) also maintain their own e-mail 
lists. E-mail lists independent of insti-
tutions abound as well, with India’s 
Development Creative being a  good 
example.16 
14 A  list of other microinsurance-related newsletters is 
available through the More resources section of the Mi-
croinsurance Network’s website (http://www.microinsur-
ancenetwork.org/links.php).
15 Whilst many microinsurance organisations have Face-
book pages, Facebook has not yet gained traction among 
practitioners for disseminating information; neither have 
Mendeley or Zotero, which provide “academic social net-
working” services. 
16 Compare http://groups.google.com/group/dev-creative.
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Interpersonal communications, includ-
ing physical and virtual meetings, 
calls, and private e-mails, texts, and 
instant messages are additional—and 
more personalised—ways of spread-
ing information about reports. For 
example, they can be used to comple-
ment or reinforce other dissemination 
activities by targeting influential or 
well-connected people. Two strate-
gies for communicating effectively in 
this respect include customisation and 
having recipients indicate “implemen-
tation intentions”, like committing to 
distribute reports to colleagues, which 
researchers have found increases 
their likelihood of following through 
(Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006).
13.4.2.5. Impact toolkits and case 
studies
For evaluators whose reporting and 
dissemination strategies include 
influencing policy makers, 3ie and 
the Overseas Development Institute’s 
step-by-step Policy impact toolkit and 
accompanying case studies provide the 
instructions and insights necessary to 
successfully reach and persuade deci-
sion makers in developing countries 
worldwide. Similarly, the World Bank’s 
Making smart policy paper presents 
case studies of 12 impact evaluations 
that were leveraged for policy making 
purposes (Bamberger and Kirk 2009). 
Because influencing policy sometimes 
also requires cultivating and channel-
ing public engagement, the Participa-
tion Compass17 describes methods for 
involving people to achieve a wide vari-
ety of objectives and provides links to 
research and case studies. 
13.4.3. Work plans and budgets 
Work plans and budgets can help eval-
uators successfully coordinate and 
allocate funding for the activities men-
tioned above. For example, a good work 
plan specifically and incrementally 
delineates each of the tasks involved in 
a publishing or promotional endeavor, 
names the individuals responsible for 
completing them, and provides cor-
responding timeframes and dates 
17 http://participationcompass.org.
Table 3: Major groups in social networks that are specific to microinsurance
Social network Microinsurance-related groups/hashtags/boards
LinkedIn Access to Insurance Initiative; Centre for Insurance and Risk Management; 
International Microinsurance Conference—Experts and Feedback Group; Micro-
insurance (operated by the ILO’s Microinsurance Innovation Facility)
Twitter #microinsurance @MIFacility; @MILKnowledge; @CGAP; @ICMIFMicroinsur-
ance; @NetworkFlash
Pinterest Microinsurance Network (microinsurance)
314
that include leeway for delays or any 
retrenchment that might occur. Simi-
larly, effective budgets apportion fund-
ing—including both direct and over-
head expenses—for each of these line 
items, with a margin added for unantic-
ipated costs. If inflation is problematic, 
and the sums and time spans involved 
warrant, evaluators should adjust their 
estimates accordingly or perform the 
computations in a foreign—but poten-
tially more stable—currency.
Work plans and budgets also func-
tion as yardsticks for evaluating dis-
semination strategies themselves, for 
instance by indicating whether planned 
activities were completed in a  timely 
and cost-effective manner. Quick and 
inexpensive ways of appraising dis-
semination activities abound and can 
provide implementing organisations 
with valuable insights for future efforts 
or indications that retrenchment is 
necessary. For example, evaluators 
can survey event attendees to gauge 
what they learned; similarly, after 
issuing press releases, evaluators can 
track related news coverage through 
services like Google News (ESRC, n.d.). 
By monitoring dissemination efforts in 
this way, organisations can gather the 
information necessary to ensure that 
reports are impactful. 
Together, these dissemination strat-
egies will enable evaluators to pub-
lish and promote reports effectively 
and efficiently. Combined with the 
report writing and troubleshooting 
approaches described above, they com-
prise a  comprehensive guide for suc-
cessfully imparting information about 
microinsurance impact assessments 
to diverse target audiences and for 
wide-ranging purposes. Over time, this 
information will increase the micro-
insurance and wider economic devel-
opment communities’ understanding 
of risk management practices and, 
by extension, their ability to empower 
low-income people in developing coun-
tries to more capably militate against 
life’s uncertainties. 
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14.1. Introduction
Systematic reviewing is a  rigorous 
methodological approach for synthe-
sising evidence. It is different from 
a  traditional literature review as it is 
systematic in identifying which litera-
ture is to be included and how the data 
are synthesised. 
Systematic reviews are an important 
part of evidence-based development. 
Every single impact study has limited 
external validity. We should not draw 
global policy conclusions based on 
findings about one specific interven-
tion carried out in a  particular time 
and place in a particular way. System-
atic reviews pull together all available 
high-quality evidence related to a par-
ticular question, and so provide more 
general answers to the policy ques-
tions of interest.
This chapter goes through the stages 
of conducting a systematic review: 
• setting the question
• the search strategy
• quality assessment 
• data extraction 
• synthesis
14.2. Setting the question
The main issue in setting the ques-
tion is the breadth of the question. We 
would all like to know the answer to 
the question, “Does microinsurance 
work?” But this question is rather 
broad, does not define what work 
means nor does it answer the question 
works for whom? A good review ques-
tion is more specific.
A useful way to break down the com-
ponent parts of the review question is 
through Cochrane’s acronym, PICO: 
• Population, which may well be low- 
and middle-income countries
• Intervention, which may be microin-
surance, but is most usually more 
specific, such as health insurance or 
even catastrophic health insurance
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• Comparator, what is the compari-
son group, which will usually be “no 
insurance”
• Outcome, the outcome to be anal-
ysed such as health status (Higgins 
and Green 2011)
So, a suitable question might be, “How do 
health microinsurance schemes in low- 
and middle-income countries affect 
out-of-pocket expenditures, utilisation 
of health services, and health status?” 
An example of this is the systematic 
review on client-value of microinsur-
ance by Microinsurance Learning and 
Knowledge (MILK)1, which asked, “Do 
clients get value from microinsurance?” 
(Magnoni and Zimmerman 2011) 
Some may still consider this question 
too broad. Several existing reviews 
are more specific with respect to pop-
ulation or intervention. For example: 
Social health insurance for improving 
access to care for disabled and elderly 
people in developing countries (Okebu-
kola and Ogunsakin 2009) and Commu-
nity-based health insurance in low-in-
come countries: A  systematic review of 
the evidence (Ekman 2004). 
The question of how specific to 
make a  review question is the choice 
between lumping and splitting 
(Gøtzsche 2000, cited in Grimshaw et 
1 MILK is a project of the MicroInsurance Centre.   See 
http://ohg.cochrane.org/sites/ohg.cochrane.org/files/ 
uploads/Risk%20of%20bias%20assessment%20tool.pdf
al. 2003). “Splitters” argue we should 
only compare studies that are very 
similar in terms of design, population, 
intervention characteristics, and out-
come. “Lumpers” argue that broader 
reviews allow policy relevance since 
they compare a range of interventions 
to attain a common goal, allowing pol-
icy makers to select the most (cost-) 
effective intervention relevant to their 
context. Moreover, broadening review 
scope also enables generalisability to 
be assessed across a  wider range of 
contexts and study populations (Shad-
ish et al. 2002; Grimshaw et al. 2003).
Primary impact studies are still thin 
on the ground for many interventions 
in low- and middle-income countries. 
This fact tends to support lumping 
over splitting, as questions that are too 
tightly defined will result in empty, or 
near-empty, reviews. Better to cover 
a  larger range of interventions and 
outcomes, even if most of those are 
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empty, since at least more terrain has 
been mapped. When there is more evi-
dence, the case for splitting is stronger. 
14.3. The search strategy
The search for a  systematic review 
attempts to locate all potentially rele-
vant literature. The search should be 
clearly documented, and include both 
published and unpublished literature.
Five main approaches are used: 
• electronic database searches
• screening websites of key agencies
• handsearches
• snowballing
• contacting leading experts
Electronic searches should cover key 
bibliographic databases, which are:
• multidisciplinary, such as Web of 
Science and Google Scholar
• specific to international develop-
ment and microinsurance, includ-
ing the Joint Libraries (JOLIS) data-
base of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) , 
the British Library of Development 
Studies (BLDS), and Eldis (hosted by 
the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS)), the database of impact evalu-
ations and systematic reviews of the 
International Initiative for Impact 
Evaluations (3ie), and the stocktak-
ing initiative of the Microinsurance 
Network’s Impact Working Group 
(IWG)
• specific to social sciences, both 
general and discipline-specific, 
such as Social Science Research 
Network (SSRN), and IDEAS/RePEc 
and Econlit for economics 
• subject-specific, specifying the 
search string to use in querying 
these databases is a  task requir-
ing some experience, so the assis-
tance of a search specialist should 
be sought.
Language bias should be avoided. 
The exclusion criteria cannot rule out 
studies on grounds of the language in 
which they were written. A truly com-
prehensive search would include also 
search terms in other languages, nota-
bly Spanish, Portuguese, and French in 
international development, because of 
the sizeable body of primary studies in 
Latin America and Africa.
Many studies are identified via the 
screening of websites of key devel-
opment and research agencies, such 
as the World Bank’s Documents and 
Reports database, databases of inde-
pendent evaluation departments of 
multilateral development banks, 3ie’s 
impact evaluation database, and the 
websites of the Abdul Latif Jameel Pov-
erty Action Lab (J-PAL), Innovations for 
Poverty Action (IPA), the World Bank’s 
Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) 
database, and so on. The team should 
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be sure to include the websites of 
agencies specialized in the field, such 
as the Microinsurance Network, the 
Microinsurance Innovation Facility of 
the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), the MicroInsurance Centre and 
the Micro Insurance Academy (MIA), in 
the search.
Handsearching in libraries identifies 
studies that are poorly indexed. This 
step involves the handsearching of 
key journals—though this is becom-
ing redundant as electronic searches 
include the capacity to search on key 
phrases and full blocks of text—and of 
library shelves. 
Snowballing includes both bib-
liographic back-referencing (review-
ing references of included studies) and 
citation tracking (reviewing references 
in which the included study has been 
cited). For example, Web of Science, 
Google Scholar, and IDEAS all allow 
citation tracking. 
Given publication delays in the social 
sciences, the search should also 
include contacting key experts in the 
field for information on recent or ongo-
ing studies. 
14.4. Quality assessment
Properly conducted research will 
identify a lot of studies. The challenge 
is to identify, from these thousands 
of studies, those to be included in the 
review. A  systematic review requires 
clear inclusion criteria. Aside from 
being on the topic of the review, these 
criteria specify the range of accept-
able analytic methods used in included 
studies. 
Acceptable methods vary with the 
review question. Many reviews are 
“effectiveness reviews”, that is they 
wish to review evidence of the impact 
of the intervention. In that case, only 
studies with valid identification strat-
egies, that is, experimental and qua-
si-experimental designs, should be 
included. The search will turn up many 
papers and reports that have the key 
words but, clearly, are not microin-
surance impact evaluations. Exam-
ples would include advocacy material, 
process evaluations, and other project 
reports. 
But reviews may also address ques-
tions such as, “Who buys insurance?”—
what is sometimes called an analysis 
of barriers and facilitators. Such an 
analysis will draw on a broader range 
of evidence, both quantitative and qual-
itative. The methods inclusion criteria 
relate to how reliable this evidence is. 
This includes, for example, whether 
the data collection methods are clearly 
documented.
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In all cases, a  decision needs to be 
made on how high to set the bar for 
inclusion. Setting it too high can result 
in empty reviews. But setting the bar 
too low means that conclusions may be 
based on unreliable evidence.
This process has two steps:
1) Screening of titles, which usually 
allows for disposal of the large 
majority of the identified titles, as 
they clearly are not primary studies 
in the area of interest or they clearly 
will not satisfy the methods inclu-
sion criteria.
2) Abstract or full text review of those 
titles which pass the screening 
stage. The number of papers subject 
to this closer scrutiny is usually in 
the hundreds. The number of stud-
ies ultimately included is usually in 
the range zero to one hundred, the 
larger giving the broader the scope 
of the review. This step is under-
taken by two (or more) research-
ers working independently from 
one another, with a  third to adjudi-
cate in cases of disagreement. The 
results are summarized in a  flow 
chart, which states how many stud-
ies were considered at each stage, 
from the initial thousands down to 
the dozens or fewer finally included. 
Figure 1 provides an example from 
a study of national health insurance in 
developing countries. An initial 4,759 
studies were identified, reduced to 
3,697 after removing duplicates all of 
which were screened. Full text review 
was conducted for 64, of which 34 were 
included in the narrative synthesis, 
but none for statistical meta-analysis 
(Acharya et al. 2012).
The included studies are subject to 
a more rigorous quality assessment to 
assess their risk of bias. There are sev-
eral toolkits available to assist in ana-
lysing the risk of bias. These tools do 
vary in their assessment. For example, 
the medically-based Cochrane Col-
laboration only assesses randomised 
controlled trials as having a low risk of 
bias.2 Taking into account the methods 
more commonly used in development 
impact evaluations, 3ie is working on 
a risk of bias tool.3
 
2 See http://ohg.cochrane.org/sites/ohg.cochrane.org/files/
uploads/Risk%20of%20bias%20assessment%20tool.pdf
3 See http://www.3ieimpact.org/media/filer/2012/12/26/
jorge_hombrados_and_hugh_waddington_conference-
session12-b_3ie_dhaka_colloquium.pdf
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14.5. Data extraction
Reviews should collect extensive data 
from each study on populations, inter-
ventions and co-interventions, compar-
ison conditions, outcomes, contextual 
factors, and other effect moderators. 
These data should be collected in a sys-
tematic study from every study using 
pre-defined codes. A  good systematic 
review will code information about inter-
vention design, beneficiary population, 
and so on. The codebook for data col-
lection should be presented in the study 
protocol. Coding can sometimes be con-
ducted using text analysis software such 
as Atlas.ti.
Some qualitative data may not be so 
amenable to coding. One possibility is 
to capture these data in matrices, with 
each row corresponding to a study and 
each column to an issue being exam-
ined. A short narrative summary should 
be entered into each cell.
For effectiveness review data, extraction 
involves “extracting effect sizes” into 
a standard form. An effect size is a sta-
tistical measure of the change in out-
comes in the intervention group, over 
the comparison group. A good effect size 
estimate should be comparable across 
studies—that is, independent of units of 
measurement—and only reflect effect 
magnitude for each study, not other fac-
tors, such as sample size. The type of 
metric used depends on the outcome 
variable being measured. For contin-
uous outcomes, like income or out-of-
pocket health expenditures, we usually 
calculate the standardised mean differ-
ence (SMD), which measures the size of 
the intervention effect in terms of the 
number of standard deviations in the 
outcome variable. In the case of dichot-
omous outcomes—that is, when the out-
come of interest is a  categorical value 
Figure 1: Search results for review on 
national health insurance in developing 
countries
Unique records found 
through database 
searching (n = 4756)
Records after duplicates removed (n = 3697)
Full text articles reporting on 
insurance schemes assessed 
for eligibility (n = 64)
Studies included in 
quantitative synthesis 
(meta-analysis) (n = 0)
Studies addressing
impact included in
narrative synthesis (n = 34)
Records screened
(n = 3697)
Records excluded
(n = 3643)
Full text articles 
excluded (n = 36)
Articles found from 
other sources
(n = 6)
Additional unique 
records found through 
other sources (n = 3)
Source: Acharya et al. 2012, 22.
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that can only take the value of 0 or 1—we 
calculate the risk ratio (RR) or odds ratio 
(OR), which measures the ratio between 
two proportions. In the case of using 
health care, it would measure the ratio 
between the outcome level in the treat-
ment group (say, 23 percent = 0.23) and 
the outcome level in the control group 
(say, 16 percent = 0.16). However, for 
a variety of reasons, it is not always easy 
to extract effect sizes from quasi-exper-
imental designs (Waddington et al. 2012).
14.6. Synthesizing the 
evidence
Synthesis of evidence on effects may be 
either quantitative, using meta-analy-
sis, or narrative. 
Meta-analyses
The traditional and, in international 
development, still most common, 
method of quantitative synthesis is 
vote-counting or goal-scoring—that is, 
adding up the number of studies find-
ing positive, negative, and no impact. 
Simply put, vote-counting is inap-
propriate and can lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
Consider two studies. One has a 95 per-
cent confidence interval of the impact 
of microinsurance on health status of 
0.98 to 1.22. The coefficient is an odds 
ratio, so the interval contains one. 
Hence, the finding is of no significant 
impact at the 5 percent level. A second 
study has a confidence interval of 1.05 
to 1.15, which is thus significant. Both 
studies have a  point estimate of 1.10, 
and their confidence intervals substan-
tially overlap. But goal scoring would 
say that the two studies together give 
“mixed findings” with one study saying 
the intervention works, and another 
that it doesn’t. Suppose further that 
the former study has a sample size of 
just 78, and the latter study 3,216. Per-
haps the lack of significance in the first 
study is simply because of small sam-
ple size (hence the large confidence 
interval).
The problem with vote counting is that 
it relies upon “one study, one vote”. 
taking account of neither the magni-
tude of the effect size nor its precision. 
And whilst vote counting by statistical 
significance may account for precision, 
it still fails to take into account the 
magnitude of effect (Littell et al. 2008). 
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Instead, meta-analysis should be con-
ducted, which does allow for these 
factors. The general aim of meta-anal-
ysis is to combine data from several 
studies into one aggregated measure, 
using statistical methods for this. As 
Glass puts it in his paper coining the 
term meta-analysis, meta-analysis 
is the “[...] analysis of analyses. I  use 
it to refer to the statistical analysis of 
a  large collection of analysis results 
from individual studies for the purpose 
of integrating the findings” (1976, 3).4
In the example above, meta-analysis 
combines these two sets of results into 
a single point estimate with a new con-
fidence interval. This confidence inter-
val may be, for example, 1.07 to 1.13. 
The correct way of combining the evi-
dence shows that the intervention does 
have a significant impact.
The assumption behind meta-analysis 
is that all studies are drawing samples 
from the same underlying population 
and exposing them to the same treat-
ment. This assumption may be a  bit 
of a  stretch for the range of microin-
surance interventions implemented 
by different agencies in very differ-
ent settings in different countries; so, 
there is disagreement as to whether 
meta-analysis is justified.
4 Although Glass has introduced the term meta-analysis, 
the methodological approach was conducted and de-
scribed long before, for example by Pearson (1904).
The answer is surely to proceed with 
caution. We likely do want to know the 
answer to the question, “Does microin-
surance work?” Any review contribut-
ing to that answer can helpfully sum-
marise the evidence with the broad 
generalisations which meta-analysis 
allows. As for any data analysis, the 
reviewer has to be on the lookout for 
heterogeneity. Even if it can be shown 
that, overall, microinsurance “works”, 
that does not mean that all types of 
microinsurance work everywhere for 
everyone. Analysis of heterogeneity 
allows for a more nuanced analysis. 
Results of a meta-analysis can be dis-
played in a forest plot (a type of graphi-
cal display). In a forest plot, a horizontal 
line depicts the confidence interval from 
one study. A  vertical line represents 
either zero or one, depending how the 
dependent variable is defined. If the 
confidence interval crosses that line, 
the study finds no significant impact. 
At the bottom of the plot is the confi-
dence interval from the meta-analysis, 
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represented as a diamond shape. Even 
if a  meta-analysis is not conducted, it 
can be useful to present a visual syn-
thesis of different studies in a  forest 
plot.
The example in figure 2 looks at the 
impact of limiting the duration of unem-
ployment benefits for people re-en-
tering the work force. The data illus-
trate the point made above, as three of 
the eight studies find no effect, which 
may be called mixed evidence. But, the 
meta-analysis shows that people are 
nearly twice as likely to re-enter the 
work force in the week or month unem-
ployment benefit ends (Filges et al. 
2013). 5
5 This effect is also present the month before it ends, 
though not two months before. It has disappeared one 
month after the benefit ends, i.e., those who did not take 
up a job as the benefit was ending are not more likely to, 
once it has ended, if they were not able to do so in the 
month it ended (Filges et al. 2013).
Narratives
When statistical meta-analysis is not 
sensible or possible, then a  narrative 
synthesis should be used. Narrative 
synthesis aims to arrive at some “over-
arching theory that reconciles the find-
ings” (Hunter and Schmidt 2004, 445). 
Littell et al. (2008) describe some of 
the approaches, cautioning that the 
intended objectivity of the systematic 
review approach should be retained 
through transparent decision rules, 
including how to weight studies in the 
synthesis. Moreover, narrative reviews 
should always distinguish between null 
findings that result from low power 
and null findings that reflect a  gen-
uine absence of treatment effects of 
policy relevant magnitudes. Unfortu-
nately, many narrative syntheses pro-
duce no more than a summary of each 
included study, and the resulting lack 
Figure 2: Forest plot for impact of limited unemployment benefit duration on 
employment
 Study or Subgroup Iog[Hazard Ratio] SE Weight Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
    IV, Random, 95% CI IV, Random, 95% CI
 Addison et. al. 2004 1.265 0.231 10.2% 3.54 [2.25, 5.57]
 Boeri et. al. 1998 0.13 0.2303 10.2% 1.14 [0.73, 1.790
 Card et. al. 2007 0.138 0.062 13.3% 1.15 [1.02, 1.30]
 Katz et. al. 1990 0.928 0.235 10.1% 2.53 [1.60, 4.01]
 Sanz. 2010 0.5183 0.1657 11.6% 1.68 [1.21, 2.32]
 Schmitz et. al. 2007 0.7073 0.2665 9.4% 2.03 [1.20, 3.42]
 Terrell et. al. 1999 0.712 0.3025 8.7% 2.04 [1.13, 3.69]
 van Ours et. al. 2004 0.825 0.0456 13.4% 2.28 [2.09, 2.50]
 Vodopivec. 1995 0.155 0.08 13.1% 1.17 [1.00, 1.37]
 Total (95% CI)   100.0% 1.78 [1.33, 2.38]
Heterogeneity: Tau2=0.16; Chi2=120.62, df=8(P<0.00001); F=93%
Test for overall effect: Z=3.87 (P=0.0001)
Source: Filges et al. 2013, 35.
0.2
Favours non-treated Favours treated
0.5 1 2 5
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of actual synthesis is of limited use to 
practitioners. 
A good narrative synthesis is that, a syn-
thesis. There are two ways in which this 
is done. The first is by coding of inter-
vention design etc. Hence reviews can 
make statements such as “X percent of 
microinsurance schemes are explicitly 
targeted at poor households,” which 
is useful in understanding the results. 
Coding may also pick up implementa-
tion issues related to impact, for exam-
ple, “X percent of studies reported that 
focus groups provided evidence that 
people found the insurance premiums 
too high.” Note that being systematic 
means not “cherry picking” specific 
study findings from one or two studies.
The second approach relies on matri-
ces described above. Having prepared 
a  matrix, it is possible to read down 
the column to summarise the narrative 
findings related to that specific issue.
14.7. Conclusion:  
conducting reviews
Evidence-based policy requires draw-
ing on all available evidence. Just as 
policy should not be based on anecdotal 
evidence, global policy should not be 
based on a single study of a single inter-
vention. Systematic reviews provide the 
methodology to ensure that all relevant 
evidence is captured and considered for 
inclusion in an objective manner. 
Tackling a  systematic review should 
not be taken lightly. They differ from 
traditional literature reviews in several 
ways, and most usually are conducted 
by teams combining sector knowledge, 
expertise on statistical meta-analysis 
as well as qualitative synthesis, and 
a  search specialist. Review titles and 
protocols can be registered with one 
of several international bodies, such as 
the Cochrane and Campbell Collabo-
rations and the Evidence for Policy and 
Practice Information and Co-ordinat-
ing Centre (EPPI-Centre) at the Insti-
tute of Education, University of London, 
which will review the various stages of 
the systematic review, publishing the 
resulting review in their library.
References
Acharya, A., S. Vellakkal, F. Taylor, E. Masset, A. 
Satija, M. Burke, and S. Ebrahim. 2012. Impact of 
national health insurance for the poor and the in-
formal sector in developing countries: A system-
atic review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science 
Research Unit, Institute of Education, University 
of London. http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/LinkClick.
aspx?fileticket=gGjtFFBPX7U%3d&tabid=3346
Ekman, B. 2004. Community-based health in-
surance in low-income countries: A systematic 
review of the evidence. Health Policy and Plan-
ning 19(5):249-270.
Filges, T., L. P. Geerdsen, A. D. Knudsen, A. K. 
Jørgensen, and K. Kowalski. 2013. Unemploy-
ment benefit exhaustion: Incentive effects on 
job finding rates: A systematic review. Campbell 
Collaboration 2013:4. www.campbellcollabora-
tion.org/lib/download/2579/.
Glass, G. V. 1976. Primary, secondary and me-
ta-analysis of research. Educational Researcher 
5:3-8.
328
Gøtzsche, P.C. 2000. Why we need a broad per-
spective on meta-analysis. British Medical Jour-
nal 321:585-6.
Grimshaw, J., L. M. McAuley, L. A. Bero, R. 
Grilli, A. D. Oxman, C. Ramsay, L. Vale, and M. 
Zwarenstein. 2003. Systematic reviews of the 
effectiveness of quality improvement strategies 
and programmes. Quality and Safety in Health 
Care 12:298-303. 
Higgins, J. P. T. and S. Green, eds. 2011. 
Cochrane handbook for systematic reviews 
of interventions version 5.1.0 (updated March 
2011). The Cochrane Collaboration. http://www.
cochrane-handbook.org/
Hunter, J. E. and F. L. Schmidt. 2004. Methods 
of Meta-Analysis: Correcting error and bias in re-
search findings. London: Sage.
Littell, J., J. Corcoran, and V. Pillai. 2008. Sys-
tematic reviews and meta-analysis. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Magnoni, B. and E. Zimmerman. 2011. Do cli-
ents get value from microinsurance? A system-
atic review of recent and current research. Mi-
croinsurance, Learning and Knowledge (MILK) 
project, MicroInsurance Centre. http://www.mi-
croinsurancecentre.org/resources/documents/
doc_details/811-do-clients-get-value-from-mi-
croinsurance-a-systematic-review-of-recent-
and-current-research.html
Okebukola, O. P. and J. O. Ogunsakin. 2009. 
Social health insurance for improving access to 
care for disabled and elderly people in develop-
ing countries. Title registration form, the Camp-
bell Collaboration. http://campbellcollabora-
tion.org/lib/pr
Pearson, K. 1904. Report on certain enteric fe-
ver inoculation statistics. British Medical Journal 
3:1243-1246.
Shadish W. R., T. D. Cook, and D. T. Campbell. 
2002. Experimental and quasi-experimental de-
signs for generalized causal inference. Boston: 
Houghton-Mifflin. 
Waddington, H., H. White, B. Snilstveit, J. G. 
Hombrados, M. Vojtkova, P. Davies, A. Bhavsar, 
et al. 2012. How to do a  good systematic re-
view of effects in international development: 
a  tool kit. Journal of Development Effectiveness 
4(3):359-387.
Appendix 1: 
Guidelines for indicators
Karla Henning and Andreas Landmann
2Introduction
These guidelines are intended as 
a helpful tool for readers of The Prac-
tical Guide to Impact Assessments in 
Microinsurance who are evaluating 
microinsurance products based on the 
core indicators described in chapter 10 
of the Practical Guide. The main focus 
of the guidelines is on generating data 
for quantitative methods, as they are 
described in chapters 5 and 6 of the 
Practical Guide. However, this is not 
meant to exclude other ways to define, 
measure, and analyse data. Rather, we 
want to present possibilities when ana-
lysing questions related to microinsur-
ance. In general, this work is a collec-
tion of illustrations, research ideas, 
hints, and warnings. As such, it might 
(hopefully) be helpful for some without 
being misleading for others.
Initially, we always present a  defini-
tion of the indicator, using intuitive 
language. Alternative definitions may 
exist, and we leave it to the readers 
to choose what is appropriate in their 
context. Next, we lay out potential 
reasons explaining why the indicator 
could be affected by microinsurance. 
Thinking about explanations can help 
to form expectations about which type 
of insurance should affect the indica-
tor most. We list all plausible candi-
dates (emphasising the most obvious 
in bold font) from the following list of 
insurance types: health insurance, 
life insurance, livestock insurance 
(indemnity or index), crop insurance 
(indemnity or index), property insur-
ance, and other. We provide examples 
of how to measure these indicators 
quantitatively, mostly drawn from well-
established global surveys such as the 
Living Standards Measurement Sur-
vey (LSMS) and the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) from the World 
Bank. This ensures comparability with 
other data sets and applicability of 
items in a  wide range of geographic 
settings. For the analysis, we propose 
details, such as subgroup analysis 
to identify heterogeneous treatment 
effects, whenever our theoretical con-
siderations lead us to suspect such 
effects. We finally hint at combinations 
between the indicator and other meas-
ures that might be interesting to ana-
lyse jointly.
3Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk taking behaviour
Indicator:  Productive investment as percentage of total 
income of the household
Definition of the indicator
The indicator measures the share of 
total income of a household that is not 
saved or consumed but invested for 
future production and income gen-
eration. Productive investment usually 
takes place in the context of entrepre-
neurial activity, and typically consists 
of investment in more sophisticated 
productive assets, yielding higher 
returns.
Theory of expected effects
In theory, high consumption risk deters 
households from investing in riskier 
but more profitable activities (Rosenz-
weig and Binswanger 1993; Dercon and 
Cristiaensen 2011). Following this argu-
ment, microinsurance should enable 
those with insurance coverage to make 
higher return investment decisions. In 
this case, insurance can enhance the 
productivity and total household income 
in the long term as a  consequence of 
the change in risk taking behaviour. Cai 
et al. (2009) state that clients of a Chi-
nese government livestock insurance 
scheme significantly increase their 
acquisition of sows, both regarding 
quantity and quality of the seeds.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
As productive investment is strongly 
connected to entrepreneurship, and 
agricultural production is the main 
entrepreneurial activity in developing 
countries, risk coverage by livestock 
or crop insurance are obvious candi-
dates for creating impact on produc-
tive investment. Of course, other types 
of insurance could also affect the will-
ingness to invest, but their effect chan-
nels are less salient.
Measurement
• How much did you spend last week/
month to buy tools, equipment, 
buildings, land, vehicles, fertiliser, 
seeds, livestock, etc., for your busi-
ness or agricultural production?
Note: For more precise results, sepa-
rate question for every input of pro-
ductive investment, ask for different 
4periods of the year (cropping seasons): 
e.g., How much did you spent in total 
for [include roster with options] during 
the last cropping season?
Analysis
As this indicator is strongly connected 
to entrepreneurship and agricultural 
production, the analysis should mainly 
focus on economically active individu-
als. It also may be interesting to analyse 
heterogeneous effects by risk aversion 
because the decisions of risk averse 
individuals should be more affected by 
insurance. Furthermore, in the analy-
sis of this indicator, income and wealth 
differences should be controlled for 
because these differences could be 
prevalent factors in higher productive 
investment. For instance, farmers with 
more land may be more inclined to buy 
insurance and also invest more in pro-
ductive inputs as they are likely to be 
more affluent and may lose more. As 
their higher investment in productive 
inputs could be due to their affluence 
and not to insurance, it could be inter-
esting to control for the size of land-
holding or the number of livestock (or 
business size in case of non-agricul-
tural entrepreneurship).
Combine with
• Total amount of loans taken
• Total amount of saving
5Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk taking behaviour
Indicator: Total amount of loans taken
Definition of the indicator
The total amount of loans taken cap-
tures the current indebtedness of the 
individual. Loans can be taken from 
various formal and informal sources 
(different sources should be clearly 
identified in the analysis). The indicator 
refers to the total monetary amount of 
the loans as well as to the number of 
outstanding loans.
Theory of expected effects
As a  direct effect it is expected that 
in the context of ex-post risk mitiga-
tion, fewer loans are taken up to cush-
ion the shock. As microinsurance is 
intended to encourage riskier but also 
potentially more profitable production 
decisions, a  higher amount of loans 
taken for productive investment in the 
(agricultural) business could be an 
indirect effect of microinsurance. Nev-
ertheless, in contrast to this assump-
tion, Gine and Yang (2007) found that 
rainfall indexed insurance reduced 
farmer’s take-up of loans for purchas-
ing more productive, higher-yielding 
hybrid maize and better groundnut 
seeds. As a  potential explanation for 
this unexpected observation, it can be 
argued that the effects of microinsur-
ance might take longer to materialise 
for low-income and more risk averse 
households, and why more risk seek-
ing or wealthier households may 
adapt their risk taking behaviour in 
a shorter period of time (Radermacher 
et al. 2012).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Livestock and crop insurance can lead 
to a  change in risk taking behaviour 
and a  higher take-up rate of loans to 
invest in riskier, but also more effi-
cient, production. On the other hand, 
a decrease of loan take-up, a method 
formerly used to compensate losses 
in agricultural production, can be 
expected as the risk is then covered by 
the insurance. Health and life insur-
ance are expected to lead to higher 
take-up rates of loans, as in case of 
illness or death, the debt is not trans-
ferred to other family members and 
installments can still be covered due 
to the insurance pay out, compensat-
ing a loss in household income.
6Measurement
• How many loans do you currently 
have (from informal lenders/formal 
lenders)?
• What is the total amount of your 
current debts?
• What was the amount of your loan 
repayments last week/month?
• For what purpose did you obtain the 
loan (esp. distinguish between busi-
ness/farm use and personal use)?
Analysis
In the analysis of this indicator, it should 
be well identified for what purpose the 
loans are taken up. If they are taken as 
an insurance substitute (particularly 
in case of illness, death, crop failure, 
death of livestock, etc.), it is expected 
that the take-up of microinsurance 
leads to a decrease on the total amount 
of loans taken. In the direct context of 
risk taking though, it is expected that 
insured individuals take up more and 
higher loans as uninsured individu-
als as insurance encourages them to 
engage in riskier and presumably more 
profitable production. The analysis 
should take account of a differentiation 
of contexts in which the loan was taken 
up. An important distinction has to be 
drawn between borrowing under stress 
(ex-post shock) and borrowing preemp-
tively as part of an investment decision 
(Radermacher et al. 2012). Similar to 
instances of productive investment, it 
can be interesting to analyse heteroge-
neous effects by risk aversion.
Combine with
• Total amount of savings
• Productive investment as percent-
age of total household income
7Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk taking behaviour
Indicator: Total amount of savings
Definition of the indicator
The total amount of savings is the 
amount of household income not spent 
on consumption or investment but put 
aside for future use to cover recurring 
costs, unexpected expenditures, or 
consumption planned ahead (wedding, 
dowry, funeral, health costs, education 
expenses, farming inputs, etc.).
Theory of expected effects
Savings are an important risk mitiga-
tion tool for low-income households to 
protect themselves against shocks and 
stabilise cash flow. With insurance, 
precautionary savings are expected to 
decrease, whilst funds are expected to 
be preserved by insurance if a  shock 
happens.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of insurances listed are appli-
cable in this case as savings can be 
intended to decrease a  household’s 
risk of suffering a  financial shock in 
many dimensions (health, agriculture, 
property, etc.).
Measurement
• How much of weekly/monthly house-
hold income do you not consume or 
invest but put aside and save for 
future use? Provide roster with type 
of saving (private, institutional, sav-
ings group, etc.) and amount and 
purpose of savings (National Bureau 
of Statistics, Nigeria 2010).
• What is the amount of your current 
savings stocks?
Analysis
Due to the expected change in risk tak-
ing behaviour it may be interesting to 
analyse heterogeneous effects by risk 
aversion. Furthermore, different pur-
poses and intentions behind the saving 
behaviour should be taken into consid-
eration in the analysis as well as the 
form of saving (informal, institutional, 
savings group, etc.,).
8Combine with
• Total amount of loans taken
• Productive investment as percent-
age of total household income
• Total amount of savings (ex-ante 
risk management strategy)
• Total amount of savings (ex-post 
risk management strategy)
9Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk management strategies (ex-ante)
Indicator: Total amount of savings
Definition of the indicator
The total amount of saving is the 
amount of household income not spent 
on consumption or investment but put 
aside for future use to cover recurring 
costs, unexpected expenditures, or 
consumption planned ahead (wedding, 
dowry, funeral, health costs, education 
expenses, farming inputs, etc.).
Theory of expected effects
Because vulnerable households 
are often reluctant to invest excess 
income productively, they often accu-
mulate funds that can be accessed in 
the event of a  shock. Savings are an 
important tool for low-income house-
holds to mitigate risk. With money set 
aside, households protect themselves 
against shocks and stabilise cash 
flow. Nevertheless, these precaution-
ary savings yield only limited returns 
compared to savings that are invested 
on productive physical capital. With 
insurance, precautionary savings are 
expected to decrease, whilst funds are 
expected to be preserved by insurance 
if a shock happens.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of insurances listed are appli-
cable in this case as savings can be 
intended to decrease a  household’s 
risk of suffering a  financial shock in 
many dimensions (health, agriculture, 
property, etc.).
Measurement
• How much of weekly/monthly 
household income do you not con-
sume or invest but put aside and 
save for future use? Provide roster 
with type of saving (private, insti-
tutional, savings group, etc.) and 
amount and purpose of savings and 
aggregate amounts.
• What is the total stock of savings you 
currently have? (National Bureau of 
Statistics, Nigeria 2010).
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Analysis
Due to the expected change in risk tak-
ing behaviour, it may be interesting to 
analyse heterogeneous effects by risk 
aversion. Furthermore, different pur-
poses and intentions behind the saving 
behaviour should be taken into consid-
eration in the analysis as well as the 
form of saving (informal, institutional, 
savings group, etc.).
Combine with
• Amount of liquid assets
• Number of income sources per 
household
• Number of memberships in Rotat-
ing Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs), Accumulating Savings 
and Credit Associations (ASCAs) 
and other informal savings net-
works per household
11Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk management strategies (ex-ante)
Indicator: Amount of liquid assets
Definition of the indicator
Liquid assets are either cash or assets 
that can be converted into cash in a very 
short time period and with a minimum 
loss of value. They can also be con-
sidered as a  form of saving, which is 
rapidly disposable. For a  facilitated 
conversion into cash an important pre-
requisite is the relative ease in transfer 
between different ownerships.
Theory of expected effects
Liquid assets are an important tool of 
low-income households’ risk-mitiga-
tion – to protect themselves against 
shocks and stabilise cash flow. With 
insurance, liquid assets intended 
for risk mitigation are expected to 
decrease, whilst funds are expected to 
be preserved by insurance if a  shock 
happens.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All forms of formal risk coverage via 
insurance can be applicable in this 
case if liquid assets are seen as an 
ex-ante risk management strategy. As 
they are by definition easily and quickly 
transferable into cash, they can com-
pensate shocks that occurred due to 
all sorts of risks such as health, life, 
agriculture, or property.
Measurement
• Provide a  roster with types of liq-
uid assets, such as cash, bonds, 
deposits, gold, silver, minerals, etc., 
and consider culturally specific liq-
uid assets, the current value of the 
[ITEM] the household owns, value of 
[ITEM] a year ago.
• How much has the household 
received from [ITEM] in the past 12 
months (interest, dividends, profit, 
payments, etc.)? (National Bureau 
of Statistics, Nigeria 2010).
Analysis
One effect could be that insured indi-
viduals hold fewer liquid assets and 
use them for productive investment, 
savings, or other, more future related 
financial activities. In this context, it 
could be interesting to analyse hetero-
geneous effects by risk aversion, as the 
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risk averse might still hold on to infor-
mal ex-ante risk management strate-
gies. Furthermore, it could be interest-
ing to analyse heterogeneous effects 
with regards to the purpose of liquid 
assets, i.e., the intended use within 
a household for insured and uninsured 
(ex-ante risk management, funds of 
out-of-pocket expenses, savings, etc.).
Combine with
• Total amount of savings
• Number of income sources per 
household
• Number of memberships in ROSCAs, 
ASCAs, and other informal savings 
networks per household
13Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk management strategies (ex-ante)
Indicator: Number of income sources per household
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures all sources 
of income in the household. These 
sources can be of both formal and 
informal nature. Potential sources 
could be jobs with regular or irregular 
wages, income from farming and live-
stock or from asset ownership (rent-
ing, borrowing, etc.).
Theory of expected effects
A common ex-ante risk management 
strategy of households is to diversify 
the risk of income shocks by increas-
ing the number of income sources of 
the household. Thus, deficiency of one 
income source does not have cata-
strophic consequences for household 
income and the income shock remains 
rather small. Insurance should make 
income diversification less necessary.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All forms of formal risk coverage 
via insurance can be applicable in 
this case if a  high number of income 
sources is seen as ex-ante risk man-
agement strategy. The highest appli-
cability is given for those insurance 
types which cover risks that occur on 
a  frequent basis with high probability 
(health insurance, crop and livestock 
insurance) rather than as a  onetime 
future event (life insurance, funeral 
insurance, etc.).
Measurement
• Please list all sources of income of 
this household [provide roster by 
household members and sources 
of income] (National Statics Direc-
torate Caicoli, Dili, Timor Leste and 
World Bank 2001).
Analysis
Under the assumption that informal 
ex-ante risk management strategies 
become crowded out by formal insur-
ance, it might be that insured indi-
viduals reduce the number of income 
sources and focus on the most effi-
cient ones with the highest revenue. 
Furthermore it can be expected that 
individuals are more willing to focus 
on rather risky and unstable jobs, 
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promising higher earnings rather 
than diversifying the risk of income 
loss by numerous jobs. Heterogene-
ous effects regarding the type of jobs 
could, thus, be an interesting issue 
for analysis. The number of income 
sources may, however, also depend 
on the characteristics and capabili-
ties of the local labour market and the 
type of jobs available. In this regard, 
households displaying a  particularly 
high or low degree of income source 
diversification may also do this as 
a  reaction to the structure of the job 
market and not due to their risk taking 
behaviour.
Combine with
• Total amount of savings
• Total amount of liquid assets
• Number of memberships in ROSCAs, 
ASCAs and other informal savings 
networks per household
15Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Risk management strategies (ex-ante)
Indicator:  Number of membership in ROSCAs, ASCAs and 
other informal savings networks per household
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the number 
of memberships in different forms 
of savings networks per household. 
An informal savings group is a  social 
organisation formed to help commu-
nity members save money for spe-
cific purposes (either individual or 
community-level). The two most com-
mon examples are Rotating Savings 
and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) or 
Accumulated Savings and Credit Asso-
ciations (ASCAs). ROSCAs function 
by taking monthly deposits from each 
member of a group and then giving the 
whole monthly sum to one member of 
the group. The recipient of the monthly 
sum is based on a  predetermined 
rotation, ensuring each participant 
will eventually receive a  large payout. 
ASCAs also require group members to 
make regular contributions. Instead of 
rotating payouts, the ASCA group fund 
is used to make loans that are paid 
back with interest. Loans are made 
either to group members or trusted 
third parties. After a certain period of 
time, the group fund and its interest 
are paid back to the original members 
(Anderson and Baland 2002).
Theory of expected effects
Informal savings networks are an 
important tool of low-income house-
holds’ risk-mitigation – to protect 
themselves against shocks and to sta-
bilise cash flow. With insurance, mem-
bership in these informal networks 
becomes less important in the context 
of risk management. Nevertheless, if 
membership is based on other inten-
tions than risk mitigation, the number 
of memberships will rather remain 
stable.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All forms of formal risk coverage via 
insurance can be applicable in this 
case if (numerous) membership(s) in 
informal savings association is seen as 
ex-ante risk management strategy.
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Measurement
• Is anyone in your household mem-
ber of an informal savings group? 
If yes, who and in which savings 
groups? Consider providing a roster 
with locally prevalent options.
Analysis
It could be interesting to analyse 
a potential change of purpose of mem-
berships in informal savings networks 
under insurance as the savings left 
with the group may not be a  part of 
an ex-ante risk management strategy, 
anymore but rather a  form of invest-
ment and financial diversification. In 
this context, it could be also interesting 
to control for heterogeneous effects 
regarding the amount of money put in 
the savings group.
Combine with
• Total amount of savings
• Total amount of liquid assets
• Number of income sources per 
household
17Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Risk management strategies (ex-post)/coping strategies  
in case of shocks
Indicator:  Amount of formal loans taken in case of shock 
events
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures the amount 
of formal loans taken up to mitigate 
a  household shock. It, thus, refers to 
actions households take in order to 
cope with shocks after they have actu-
ally materialised. The indicator can 
refer to the monetary amount of the 
loans taken up in the context of a shock 
as well as to the quantity of loans.
Theory of expected effects
Alternative ex-post responses to 
shocks, like borrowing, can drain 
households of existing resources and 
place demands beyond the cash flow 
and savings capacity. Coping strate-
gies involving borrowing and, thus, 
often exacerbate the pressures of 
debt. As a direct effect it is expected 
that, in the context of ex-post risk 
mitigation, fewer loans are taken up 
to cushion the shock under insurance. 
This assumption is due to the fact that 
loans are no longer needed (at least to 
the same extent) as a  risk mitigation 
mechanism if the income shock can 
be cushioned by insurance. Thus, the 
intent of microinsurance here is to turn 
reactive ex-post risk management 
practices into a  proactive strategy of 
risk mitigation.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage listed can be 
applicable here as the indicator refers 
to ex-post risk management based on 
various risks. The take-up of loans 
after a  shock occurred is a  particu-
larly relevant indicator in situations 
requiring relatively quick and high 
coverage of involved costs (health-
care services, funeral costs, recovery 
of property, buying new agricultural 
inputs for the next cropping season, 
etc.).
Measurement
• Remember the last shocks that 
occurred to your household. What 
kind of loans did you take up after 
the shock happened? Provide 
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a roster with shock event, source of 
loan, amount of loan.
Analysis
The analysis should focus on house-
holds that experienced a shock. Ex-post 
borrowing in case of a  shock is also 
referred to in the literature as “bor-
rowing under stress” (Radermacher et 
al. 2012). In contrast to ex-ante borrow-
ing, the purpose of ex-post borrowing 
is quite straight forward—the coverage 
of incurred costs. It is expected that 
the take-up of microinsurance leads 
to a  decrease of the total amount of 
loans in both amount and quantity. As 
the decision to take up a loan and under 
which conditions can vary with regard 
to the particularities of the shock event 
and its severity, the analysis should 
take account of the particular contexts 
in which the loans are taken up.
Combine with
• Amount of savings used in case of 
shock
• Amount of informal loans used in 
case of schock event
• Difference of total household 
expenditures before and after shock 
events (without paying back of loans 
and interest)
• Food intake (self-reported quality 
and quantity)
• Percentage of children taken out of 
school due to shock event
19Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Risk management strategies (ex-post)/coping strategies  
in case of shocks
Indicator: Amount of savings used in case of shock
Definition of the indicator
The amount of savings used in 
case of shocks refers to the part of 
total savings used to cope with the 
incurred expenses of the shock after it 
materialised.
Theory of expected effects
Alternative ex-post responses to 
shocks, like the use of savings, can 
drain households of existing resources 
and place demands beyond the cash 
flow and savings capacity. Savings are 
an important tool of low-income house-
holds’ risk mitigation – to protect them-
selves against shocks and to stabilise 
cash flow. With insurance, savings are 
expected to be preserved if a shock hap-
pens. Thus, savings can be stabilised 
and used for more productive purposes.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurance are 
applicable as savings and can be 
intended to decrease the severity of 
a  financial shock in many dimensions 
(health, agriculture, property, etc.).
Measurement
• How much of your savings did you 
use to fund the shock?
• What is the amount of your current 
savings stocks? (National Bureau of 
Statistics, Nigeria 2010).
Analysis
Due to the expected change in risk tak-
ing behaviour, it might be interesting to 
analyse heterogeneous effects by risk 
aversion. Furthermore, different pur-
poses and intentions behind the saving 
behaviour should be taken into consid-
eration in the analysis as well as the 
form of savings (informal, institutional, 
savings group, etc.).
Combine with
• Amount of (formal) loans taken in 
case of shock
• Difference of total household 
expenditures before and after shock 
events (without paying back of loans 
and interest)
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• Food intake (quality and quantity, 
self-reported)
• Percentage of children taken out of 
school due to shock event
21Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Risk management strategies (ex-post)/coping strategies  
in case of shocks
Indicator:  Difference of total household expenditures before 
and after shock events (without paying back of 
loans and interest)
Definition of the Indicator
The indicator captures changes in total 
household expenditures due to a shock 
event. The difference between house-
hold expenditures before and after 
a shock event also sheds light on the 
intensity of the incident. Expenses for 
paying back loans and interest are not 
included.
Theory of expected effects
Consumption-smoothing is a  typical 
household coping strategy in a  house-
hold shock event. With insurance, expen-
ditures are expected to remain stable if 
a shock happens, as there is no longer 
a need to reduce them as part of a risk 
management strategy. Absorbing the 
major costs of the shock events, micro-
insurance avoids a  sharp decrease of 
household expenditures, which could 
lead to a descent into (deeper) poverty.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
This indicator is applicable to all insur-
able risks and types of risk coverage as 
a change in expenditure can be a reac-
tion to all sorts of shocks in order to 
compensate for the costs incurred.
Measurement
To measure this indicator, it would be 
ideal to compare data collected before, 
as well as after, the occurrence of the 
shock event. As this is rather an ideal 
setting, it may be more feasible to rely 
on precise memorisation of house-
hold expenditure before and after the 
shock by providing a  roster with rel-
evant options for expenditures in order 
to reach the highest level of accuracy 
possible.
Analysis
As changes in household expendi-
tures are expected to vary according 
to the severity of the shock event and 
the amount of incurred costs, it could 
be advisable to control for and cluster 
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different types of shocks. Further-
more, it could be interesting to take 
a  more detailed look into subcatego-
ries of total expenditures in order to 
retrieve relevant information about 
which types of expenditures/consump-
tion change in particular.
Combine with
• Amount of formal loans taken in 
case of shock
• Amount of savings used in case of 
shocks
• Food intake (quality and quantity, 
self-reported)
• Percentage of children taken out of 
school due to shock event
23Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Risk management strategies (ex-post)/coping strategies  
in case of shocks
Indicator: Food intake (quality and quantity, self-reported)
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the households’ 
self-reported food intake in both qual-
ity and quantity.
Theory of expected effects
As consumption-smoothing is a  com-
mon mechanism of household risk 
mitigation in cases of income or health 
shocks, food security is a closely con-
nected issue. As a  consequence of 
a household shock, individuals have to 
cope with the expenses related to the 
respective event and continue to meet 
ongoing household needs of which 
expenditure for food ranks on the top. 
This double burden can easily lead to 
the decision to eat fewer meals or eat 
less nutritious food. This effect is par-
ticularly relevant for poor households 
that do not make use of any other cop-
ing mechanisms, and, thus, would need 
to reduce their consumption and their 
food expenditures in a  shock event. 
As microinsurance aims at stabilising 
household income in a  shock event, 
food intake in quantity and quality is 
expected to stay stable ex-post shock.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Health insurance can be an applicable 
type of risk management here, particu-
larly if the insurance product encom-
passes additional interventions related 
to nutrition. Furthermore, in the case 
of self-subsistence of the household, 
agricultural insurance schemes such 
as crop or livestock insurance could 
be applicable. Agricultural schemes 
mitigate the risk of crop failure and/or 
livestock death, both which could have 
a negative impact on nutrition.
Measurement
Because self-reported and aggregated 
information of quantity and quality of 
food can be inaccurate, it is common 
practice to measure food consump-
tion in the form of an extensive roster, 
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covering each food item separately by 
amount/quantity and price.
Example questions:
• I want to ask about all food con-
sumed by your household, regard-
less of which person ate it. Has your 
household consumed [FOOD] dur-
ing the past 7 days? Please exclude 
from your answer any [FOOD] pur-
chased for processing or resale 
(National Statics Directorate Cai-
coli, Dili, Timor Leste and World 
Bank 2001).
• In the past year, was there any 
month when your household food 
needs were not met?
Analysis
As consumption-smoothing, particu-
larly smoothing of food expenses, is 
a mechanism usually only applied when 
there are no other alternatives, it mostly 
affects poor households. Thus, it could 
be interesting to analyse across differ-
ent levels of poverty. It could be also 
interesting to analyse heterogeneous 
effects for different types of household 
members, assuming that, in a  shock 
event, a poor household would smooth 
food expenditures differently for its 
members, depending on their particular 
needs (especially for those household 
members with increased health risks 
such as pregnant women, children, 
elderly people, and sick individuals). 
Additionally, the analysis should differ-
entiate between food quality and quan-
tity, as these subindicators can lead to 
different assumptions.
Combine with
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
• Total expenditures on food per per-
son per week
• Frequency of eating vegetables or 
fruit (number per week)
• Frequency of eating meat (if people 
eat meat at all) (number per week)
• Average number of meals eaten per 
day in last month
• Number of days when food was 
insufficient for the household in last 
month
25Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Risk management strategies (ex-post)/coping strategies  
in case of shocks
Indicator:  Percentage of children taken out of school due to 
shock event
Definition of the indicator
The indicator measures the percent-
age of children who have been taken 
out of school by their family in order 
to cope with the consequences and 
expenses of the shock event.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a  lack of alternatives to 
cope with a  shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their finan-
cial but also physical assets to cope with 
the corresponding consequences. Tak-
ing children out of school can be based 
on two intentions. One is to save money, 
if school fees and other expenses are 
needed to keep the children in school; 
the other intention is to take children out 
of school in order to put them to work 
in order to cope with the consequences 
of the shock. Seen from a  long term 
perspective this coping mechanism 
is inefficient, as it impedes the educa-
tional and skill development of the chil-
dren, which are essential for the future 
socioeconomic situation of a household. 
Under insurance, it is expected that 
children remain in school after a shock 
event as educational expenses can still 
be covered and no additional manpower 
and support is needed in the household.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurance are appli-
cable in this case as taking children out 
of school can be a reaction to all sorts 
of shock events, placing the household 
in a difficult economic situation.
Measurement
The indicator can be measured both 
on the household level by survey ques-
tions as well as on the community/
school level by using official statistics 
of school dropout rates after shock 
events took place.
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Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typi-
cal coping mechanism used by poor 
to very poor households which lack 
alternative coping mechanisms. This 
indicator implies not only financial 
but also physical coping in the form of 
putting the children to work. Further-
more, it could be interesting to con-
trol for the age and sex of the children 
taken out of school. Taking children out 
of primary school, for example, can be 
more devastating for their educational 
development than at a  later stage of 
school. For some countries, studies 
show that girls are more likely than 
boys to be taken out of school to sup-
port the household, as the girls’ edu-
cational prospects are less valued.
Combine with
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
• Child labour measures
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Outcome: Sale of assets for managing expenses related to shock event
Indicator: Total value of sold assets in case of shocks
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the total value 
of all assets sold in the event of shocks. 
All sorts of assets are relevant for this 
indicator.
Theory of expected effects
In order to cope with the corre-
sponding effects and consequence of 
a  household shock, selling assets is 
a common strategy. These assets can 
be both liquid and illiquid assets. Par-
ticularly high importance in this con-
text can be attributed to productive 
assets (such as machinery, livestock, 
etc.) as the sale of these kind of assets 
has direct negative consequences for 
the households income opportunities. 
As the poorer have fewer (and only 
essential) assets that can be sold in 
order to cope with a shock, they suf-
fer from a  particularly high degree 
of vulnerability. Under insurance it is 
expected that the total value of sold 
assets is lower, as less or no assets 
need to be sold to cover the expenses 
incurred.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case as the sale of 
assets can be a reaction to all sorts of 
shock events, placing the household in 
a difficult economic situation.
Measurement
• Which assets did you sell after the 
last shocks? (Provide a roster with 
column for different shock events, 
assets sold and their values)
Analysis
For the analysis of this indicator, it can 
be interesting to compare the actual 
value of the assets and the received 
price during sale in the context of the 
shock, as this is expected to be much 
lower than the normal market price. 
Furthermore, it is advisable to dis-
tinguish between rather liquid assets 
and productive assets, as the sale of 
the latter can have extensive conse-
quences for the household regarding 
its productive and, thus, future income 
potential.
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Combine with
• Percentage of assets recovered/
replaced after being sold in case of 
shock six months after shock event
• Amount of liquid assets
• Level of assets—housing conditions
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Outcome: Sale of assets for managing expenses related to shock event
Indicator:  Percentage of assets recovered/replaced after 
being sold in case of shock six months after shock 
event
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to the part of sold 
assets after the shock event that are 
recovered or replaced six months after 
the incident i.e., some land/livestock 
may be repurchased after insurance 
pay out, houses may be repaired.
Theory of expected effects
In order to cope with the corresponding 
effects and consequences of a house-
hold shock, selling assets is a common 
strategy. These assets can be both 
liquid and illiquid assets. Particularly 
high importance in this context can be 
attributed to productive assets (such 
as machinery, livestock, etc.) as the 
sale of these kind of assets has direct 
negative consequences for a  house-
hold’s income opportunities. As poorer 
households have fewer assets (or only 
essentials) that can be sold in order 
to cope with a shock, they suffer from 
a  particularly high degree of vulner-
ability. The ability to recover or replace 
these (productive) assets within a cer-
tain time frame after a  shock event 
occurred is thus an interesting indi-
cator of the household’s ability to 
recover and its degree of vulnerability. 
Assuming that fewer assets have to be 
sold in a shock event to cover incurred 
costs under insurance, fewer assets 
might need to be recovered as, selling 
them in the first place had been pre-
vented. If assets had to be sold despite 
insurance, it is expected that a higher 
percentage of those assets can be 
recovered or replaced as insurance 
decreases the degree of vulnerability 
and supports a  household’s ability to 
recover from the shock within a short 
time period. This effect could be even 
stronger if fewer productive assets 
need to be sold, so a household’s pro-
duction and income potential remains 
stable.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case as the sale 
of assets and their recovery can be 
a reaction to all sorts of shock events, 
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placing the household in a  difficult 
economic situation.
Measurement
• Of the assets you sold after the 
shock, how many have you been 
able to replace/recover within six- 
months of the shock event?
Analysis
For the analysis of this indicator, it can 
be interesting to compare the actual 
value of the assets and the received 
price during sale in the context of the 
shock, as this is expected to be much 
lower than the normal market price. 
Furthermore, it is advisable to distin-
guish between the replacement (or 
recovery) of rather liquid assets and 
productive assets, as the recovery of 
the latter can have extensive conse-
quences for a household regarding its 
productive and, thus, future income 
potential.
Combine with
• Total value of sold assetson case of 
shock
• Level of assets—housing conditions
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Outcome: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of borrowing for shock-related 
expenditures from informal networks
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the total 
amount of loans that are taken from 
informal networks and directly related 
to expenditures of the shock event. 
Thus, by definition, it only refers to 
borrowing conducted after the shock 
event and not before the respective 
incident. Informal networks can be 
self-help groups, saving networks 
such as ROSCAs or ASCAs, or fam-
ily, friends, and other acquaintances. 
In many cases, informal risk sharing 
networks entail only partial risk pro-
tection as default of group members 
can occur if they are not able to repay 
into the risk sharing pool (Besley and 
Coate 1995).
Theory of expected effects
Borrowing from informal networks 
in a  shock event might create social 
obligations and expectations. It may, 
in fact, result in costs for a household 
depending on the specific characteris-
tics of an informal network. Informal 
networks composed of family and/or 
close friends are often rather altru-
istic and do not contain any strings 
attached. However, risk management 
via informal networks may be more 
unreliable than formal mechanisms, 
as they depend on the liquidity and 
willingness to pay of the other network 
partners, who could suffer from a sim-
ilar financial shock. Under insurance, 
a direct effect expected is that, in the 
context of ex-post risk mitigation, less 
borrowing from informal networks is 
conducted to cushion the shock (Der-
con et al. 2012). However, not only 
a demand side effect can be expected 
but also a  decrease in the supply of 
informal support for risk mitigation as 
with insurance in place, other individu-
als might be generally less willing to 
help (Hintz 2010).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage listed are 
applicable in this case as borrowing 
from informal networks can be a reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, placing 
the household in a  difficult economic 
situation.
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Measurement
• How much did you borrow in total 
from informal networks (relatives, 
friends, local groups) in order 
to cover expenses related to the 
shock event? Provide a roster cov-
ering shock events, source of loan, 
amount of loan, and additional costs 
involved (interest or other obliga-
tions and expectations).
• The measurement of this indicator 
could also be conducted in a roster 
covering all forms of coping mech-
anisms used in informal risk man-
agement networks.
Analysis
It could be interesting to control for dif-
ferent informal sources of borrowing 
(could be more than one) and, if possi-
ble, the particular risk of default of the 
underlying networks. Furthermore, 
controlling for formal lending could 
also be of interest to find out more 
about the lending practice of a house-
hold (informal or formal) and whether 
the choice is due to independent pref-
erences or lack of access to formal 
mechanisms.
Combine with
• Loans given to others
• Other indicators for reliance on 
informal risk sharing networks
• Total amount of loans taken (risk 
taking behaviour)
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Outcome: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of borrowing for other expenditures 
from informal networks
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the total 
amount of loans taken from informal 
networks that are not directly related 
to expenditures of the shock event, but 
are intended for other purposes. Thus, 
by definition the indicator can refer to 
borrowing from informal networks at 
any point in time, ex-ante or ex-post 
shock. Informal networks can be self-
help groups, saving networks such as 
ROSCAs or ASCAs or family, friends, 
and other acquaintances. Particularly, 
informal risk sharing networks entail 
only partial risk protection as default of 
group members can occur if they are 
not able to repay into the risk sharing 
pool (Besley and Coate 1995).
Theory of expected effects
As mentioned in the description of the 
indicator, due to borrowing for shock 
related expenses from informal net-
works, a  shift in purpose of borrow-
ing could be expected for insured 
households. Borrowing from informal 
networks for other expenditures is 
expected to rise relatively to borrow-
ing for shock-related expenses as the 
latter is crowded out by the insurance 
coverage. Borrowing from informal 
networks is, thus, expected to shift 
from an ex-post risk management 
coping to a  financial mechanism for 
other purposes such as consumption, 
productive investment, etc.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage listed are 
applicable in this case as borrowing 
from informal networks can be a reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, placing 
the household in a  difficult economic 
situation.
Measurement
• How much did you borrow in total 
from informal networks (relatives, 
friends, local groups) in order to 
cover expenses other than those 
related to the shock event? Pro-
vide a  roster covering the purpose 
of loan, source of loan, amount of 
loan, and additional costs involved 
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(interest or other obligations and 
expectations).
• The measurement of this indicator 
could also be conducted in a roster 
covering all forms of coping mecha-
nisms used in informal risk man-
agement networks.
Analysis
It could be interesting to control for 
different informal sources (could be 
more than one) of borrowing and if 
possible the particular risk of default 
of the underlying networks. Further-
more, controlling for formal lending 
could be also of interest in order to 
find out more about the lending prac-
tice of the household (rather informal 
or formal) and whether the choice is 
due to independent preferences or 
lack of access to formal mechanisms.
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning reli-
ance on informal risk sharing net-
works, especially total amount of 
borrowing for shock-related expen-
ditures from informal networks
• Total amount of loans taken (risk 
taking behaviour)
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Outcome: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of contributions received from family 
in case of a shock (as loan)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator encompasses all finan-
cial contributions received by family 
members in a  shock event, given as 
loans to be repaid. The contributions 
as defined here refer to financial con-
tributions which could be provided 
by family members living nearby or 
abroad (remittances).
Theory of expected effects
Contributions received by family in 
a  shock event are common practice 
in many societies that make use of 
a  particularly high degree of intra-
family commitment and solidarity. 
Borrowing from informal networks 
in a  shock event might create social 
obligations and expectations. It may, 
in fact, result in costs for a household 
depending on the specific character-
istics of such informal network. Infor-
mal networks composed by family are 
often rather altruistic and do not con-
tain any strings attached. However, 
risk management via informal net-
works may be more unreliable than 
formal mechanisms as they depend 
on the liquidity and willingness to pay 
of the other family members, who 
could suffer from a  similar financial 
shock. Under microinsurance, it is 
expected that fewer contributions by 
family are received as an insurance 
substitute intended to cushion the 
shock.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage listed are 
applicable in this case as contributions 
by family can be intended to decrease 
a household’s risk of suffering a finan-
cial shock in many dimensions (health, 
agriculture, property, life, etc.).
Measurement
• What is the total amount of con-
tributions you received from fam-
ily members after the shock event 
as a  loan? Include a  roster with 
shock event, contributing family 
member, type of contribution (cash, 
other financial contributions), the 
total amount per contribution, and 
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conditions bound to the loan (inter-
est rate or other obligations).
Analysis
The amount of contributions received 
by family in the case of a shock event, 
should be distinguished in the analy-
sis from contributions received on 
a  permanent or regular basis (i.e., 
remittances from family members 
living abroad, etc.). Furthermore, the 
indicator should be analysed together 
with the related indicator capturing 
family contributions that are a gift and 
do not need to be repaid.
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning reli-
ance on informal risk sharing net-
works, particularly total amount of 
contributions received by family in 
case of a shock (as gift)
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Outcome: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of contributions received by family in 
case of a shock (as gift)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator encompasses all financial 
contributions received by family mem-
bers in a shock event, which are given as 
a gift and thus do not need to be repaid.
Theory of expected effects
Contributions received by family in 
a shock event are common practice in 
many societies that make use of a par-
ticularly high degree of intra-family 
commitment and solidarity. Receiving 
a contribution as a gift from an informal 
network in a shock event might create 
social obligations and expectations. 
It may result in costs for a household 
depending on the specific characteris-
tics of the informal network. Informal 
networks composed of family are often 
rather altruistic and do not contain any 
strings attached. However, these con-
tributions may be more unreliable than 
formal mechanisms as they depend 
on the liquidity and willingness to pay 
of the other network partners, who 
could suffer from a  similar financial 
shock. Under insurance, it is expected 
that fewer contributions by family are 
received as an insurance substitute 
intended to cushion the shock.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage listed are 
applicable in this case as contributions 
by family can be intended to decrease 
a household’s risk of suffering a finan-
cial shock in many dimensions (health, 
agriculture, property, life, etc.).
Measurement
• What is the total amount of con-
tributions you received by family 
members after the shock event as 
a  gift? Include a  roster with shock 
event, contributing family member, 
type of contribution (cash, other 
financial contributions), the total 
amount per contribution, and condi-
tions bound to the loan (interest rate 
or other obligations).
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Analysis
The amount of contributions received 
by family particularly in the case 
of a  shock event, should be distin-
guished in the analysis from contri-
butions received on a  permanent or 
regular basis (i.e., remittances from 
family members living abroad, etc.). 
Furthermore, the indicator should be 
analysed together with the related 
indicator capturing family contribu-
tions that are a  loan and need to be 
repaid.
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning reli-
ance on informal risk sharing net-
works, particularly total amount of 
contributions received by family in 
case of a shock (as loan)
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Outcome: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of contributions received from 
informal or semiformal organisations, e.g. local 
church association, employer, etc. in case of shock 
(as loan)
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures contributions 
from informal and semiformal organi-
sations in cases of shock. These con-
tributions could be cash or in-kind and 
are provided after the occurrence of 
the shock, most likely in the form of 
a  onetime transfer. The contributions 
are given as a  loan and need to be 
repaid within a certain time frame.
Theory of expected effects
In the absence of formal social secu-
rity schemes, contributions from infor-
mal and semiformal organisations 
in the case of a  shock are common 
practice. This is particularly evident 
in contexts where community ties are 
strong. Under insurance, it is expected 
that the amount of these contributions 
decreases as individuals can cope with 
the shock incurred expenses autono-
mously and are less dependent on infor-
mal or semiformal support and funds.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case as formal 
and semiformal contributions can 
be intended to cover a  household’s 
expenses after all kind of shocks 
affecting household income and 
funds.
Measurement
• What is the total amount of contri-
butions (loans) you received from 
informal and semiformal organisa-
tions after the shock? (This could be 
local church, employer, community 
organisations, etc.)
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Analysis
Analysis and measurement should 
account for the different informal and 
semiformal sources for contributions 
and the respective conditions attached 
to the contributions given as a  loan 
(repayment conditions, other obliga-
tions, or expectations attached).
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning reli-
ance on informal risk sharing 
networks
41Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of loans (currently pending) given to 
family members and other community members
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to outstanding 
loans given to family and other commu-
nity members. The indicator refers to 
the total monetary amount of the loans 
as well as to the number of outstand-
ing loans. These loans are, thus, part 
of the financial assets of a household 
or individual invested, with or without 
interest rate attached.
Theory of expected effects
Loans given to family members and 
other community members are the flip 
side of the coin of informal risk sharing. 
The provision of loans to other family or 
community members is often a  deep-
rooted characteristic of community 
and family structures in context, where 
there is a  lack of formal alternatives. 
Under insurance, the willingness and 
ability to provide more loans to fam-
ily and community members might 
increase becausethe funds are less 
needed as precautionary assets for 
people’s own purposes. Or, it could be 
that insured individuals might be less 
willing to help those who did not behave 
cautiously and refused insurance.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage listed are 
applicable in this case as contribu-
tions given to family and community 
members can be intended to cushion 
a  financial shock in many dimensions 
(health, agriculture, property, life, etc.).
Measurement
• What is the total amount currently 
pending of loans you provided to 
family and/or community members? 
Provide a roster with the beneficiary 
of the loan, amount of loan, and 
conditions attached (interest, other 
obligations, or expectations).
Analysis
It could be interesting to analyse this 
indicator by different subgroups of 
recipients. Furthermore, details of the 
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loan arrangement (repayment arrange-
ments, interest rates, variability 
regarding income of provider, etc.) are 
interesting to consider in the analysis.
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning reli-
ance on informal risk sharing 
networks
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Outcome: Variability of costs or profits
Indicator: Variability of costs or profits
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the variability 
of costs or—depending on the insur-
ance type—profits for a  household in 
a certain category. It can, for example, 
consist of health costs or profits from 
agricultural activity over time.
Theory of expected effects
The primary expected effect of micro-
insurance is to reduce the costs that 
need to be covered by households 
in a  shock event. At the same time, 
households have to pay an insurance 
premium constantly whilst being cov-
ered. As a  consequence, variability of 
costs incurred (e.g., for health) should 
decrease. For insurance covering pro-
ductivity shocks (such as crop insur-
ance), a similar effect occurs for prof-
its. During good times, whilst profits 
are high, a  household pays an insur-
ance premium. If a shock happens (e.g. 
a flood) and profits are low, the insur-
ance should pay out. In sum, variability 
of profits over time is decreased.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
This indicator refers to all kinds of 
shocks that can incur costs, thus all 
types of risk coverage are applicable.
Measurement
This indicator is best measured over 
time, covering pre- and post-shock 
periods. It should ask for effective 
costs incurred (including insurance 
premiums) or profits made for certain 
expenditure or profit types related to 
the risk covered. As an alternative to fol-
lowing clients over time, a survey could 
also ask for cost or profit histories.
Analysis
Given the theory of expected effects, it 
is likely that the variability decreases 
mainly if a  shock of considerable size 
happens. Hence, it may be advisable to 
focus the analysis on those households 
with considerable shock events during 
the time frame covered or to conduct 
separate analyses for households having 
experienced different shock exposure.
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Combine with
• Total costs in case of shock
• Subindicators involving costs of the 
shock event
45Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Total costs in case of shock
Indicator: Total costs in case of shock
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures all costs and 
expenses involved for a  household in 
a  shock event. It is, thus, composed 
of numerous indicators mentioned 
above and can among others encom-
pass direct out-of-pocket spending, 
expenses for recovery and reconstruc-
tion, costs incurred for taking up loans 
or borrowing and also opportunity 
costs if a  change in labour supply is 
necessary.
Theory of expected effects
The primary expected effect of micro-
insurance is to reduce the total costs 
that need to be covered by households 
in a shock event . For other related indi-
cators, such as out-of-pocket spending 
(OOPS), taking-up of loans, or costs 
for reconstruction and recovery, it is 
expected that a  significant amount of 
these costs will be directly covered by 
insurance and not strain the economic 
situation of a  household. However, 
seen from the perspective of insured 
individuals with potentially increased 
risk taking behaviour, total costs of 
the damage after a shock may be even 
higher as the initial (business) invest-
ment was higher.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
This indicator refers to all kinds of 
shocks that can incur costs, thus all 
types of risk coverage are applicable.
Measurement
This indicator can be measured by ask-
ing for an accumulated estimation of all 
costs involved in the case of a shock. 
For the sake of higher accuracy, it is, 
however, advisable to provide a roster 
with plausible options/categories of 
costs and ask the questions separately.
Analysis
As this indicator accumulates all costs 
involved with a shock event, it provides 
a good overview of the total economic 
damage for a  household due to the 
shock. For more detailed analysis, it 
may be advisable to control for rel-
evant subindicators and subcategories 
in the analysis.
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Combine with
• Variability of costs or profits
• Subindicators involving costs of the 
shock event
47Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Total out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) in case of shock
Indicator: Net OOPS per shock event
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to the direct out-
lay of cash or immediately available 
liquid assets needed to cover expenses 
incurred due to a  shock event. OOPS 
can also encompass deductibles paid 
to access goods and services covered 
by the insurance. Furthermore, bribes, 
transport fees, drugs, and medical 
procedures not covered by the insur-
ance are often covered by OOPS.
Theory of expected effects
Out-of-pocket spending in the case of 
a shock event is an important risk miti-
gation tool for low-income households. 
If it absorbs a considerable amount of 
household income, OOPS can have crit-
ically negative implications for a house-
hold’s economic situation. Without 
insurance, costs that are due immedi-
ately—a situation particularly relevant 
in the case of health shocks—are often 
paid from private cash funds. Also, with 
insurance, some OOPS is still expected 
as referred to in the definition of the 
indicator. Nevertheless, it is expected 
that OOPS decreases when the costs of 
the shock event are absorbed by micro-
insurance and the incidence and depth 
of monetary outlays diminish. Existing 
studies on the effect of microinsurance 
on OOPS, however, ambiguously depict 
this expected effect. Whilst Jütting 
(2004) found a  45-51% decrease in 
OOPS spending for members of a Sen-
egalese community-based health 
insurance scheme compared to non-
members, Wagstaff et al. (2009) did 
not depict any statistically significant 
changes in OOPS for China’s New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Whilst most frequently used in the con-
text of expenses for hospitalisation and 
other medical treatments, this indica-
tor is relevant for all insurable risks 
and types of risk coverage that require 
immediate expenses and/or recovery 
action.
Measurement
• How much did you spend out-of-
pocket for [SHOCK EVENT]?
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Analysis
Existing studies on the effect of micro-
insurance on OOPS show ambiguous 
results, ranging from a clear reduction 
in OOPS to no indications of change. 
This leads to the assumption that the 
effect of microinsurance on OOPS is 
strongly bound to the type of insurance 
policy at stake. Thus, the particulari-
ties of the insurance scheme should 
be taken into account in the analy-
sis as well as other forms of informal 
and coinsurance held by a household. 
Furthermore, the specific use of the 
OOPS for insured and uninsured 
should be taken into account.
Combine with
• Risk management strategies 
(ex-post)
• Net OOPS per full episode of illness
• Net OOPS on varying categories of 
treatment: hospital stay, deliveries, 
self-treatment, ambulatory care 
from formal providers, inpatient 
care
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Outcome: Total out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) in case of shock
Indicator:  In case of health: Net OOPS per full episode of 
illness
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to the direct outlay 
of cash or immediately available liquid 
assets needed to cover the expenses 
incurred per full episode of illness. 
Thus, all OOPS from the first signs of 
illness until full recovery is captured in 
this indicator. OOPS can also encom-
pass deductibles paid to access goods 
and services covered by the insurance. 
Furthermore, bribes, transport fees, 
drugs, and medical procedures not cov-
ered by the insurance are often covered 
by OOPS.
Theory of expected effects
Out-of-pocket spending in instances of 
illness is an important risk mitigation 
tool for low-income households to cover 
health expenses. If it absorbs a consid-
erable amount of household income, 
OOPS can have critically negative impli-
cations for a  household’s economic 
situation. Without insurance, costs that 
are due immediately—a situation par-
ticularly relevant in the case of health 
shocks—are often paid from private 
cash funds. Also, with insurance, some 
OOPS is still expected as referred to in 
the definition of the indicator. Neverthe-
less, it is expected that OOPS decreases 
when the costs of the shock event are 
absorbed by microinsurance and the 
incidence and depth of monetary outlays 
diminish. Existing studies on the effect 
of microinsurance on OOPS, however, 
ambiguously depict this expected effect. 
Whilst Jütting (2004) found a  45-51% 
decrease in OOPS spending for mem-
bers of a Senegalese community-based 
health insurance scheme compared to 
non-members, Wagstaff et al. (2009) 
did not depict any statistically signifi-
cant changes in OOPS for China’s New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme. Chankova 
et al. (2008) found that, whilst inpatient 
expenses were reduced, out-of-pocket 
(OOP) expenses for outpatient care were 
not reduced by the investigated mutu-
elles and insurance schemes. This find-
ing is attributed by the authors to the 
coinsurance rates of 25-50% per visit.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• How much did you pay out-of-
pocket for [PARTICULAR EPISODE 
OF ILLNESS]?
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Analysis
Existing studies on the effect of micro-
insurance on OOPS in the case of 
health show ambiguous results rang-
ing from a  clear reduction in OOPS 
to no indications of change. This lead 
to the assumption that the effect of 
microinsurance on OOPS is strongly 
bound to the type of insurance policy 
at stake. Thus, the particularities of the 
insurance scheme should be taken into 
account in the analysis as well as other 
forms of informal and coinsurance held 
by a household. Furthermore, the spe-
cific use of the OOPS for insured and 
uninsured should be taken into account.
Combine with
• Risk management strategies 
(ex-post)
• Net OOPS per shock event
• Net OOPS on varying categories of 
treatment: hospital stay, deliveries, 
self-treatment, ambulatory care 
from formal providers, inpatient 
care
51Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Total out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) in case of shock
Indicator:  Net OOPS on varying categories of treatment: 
hospital stay, deliveries, self-treatment, ambulatory 
care from formal providers, inpatient care
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to the direct outlay 
of cash or immediately available liquid 
assets needed to cover the expenses 
incurred for varying categories of 
medical treatment such as hospital 
stay, deliveries, self-treatment, ambu-
latory care from formal providers and 
inpatient care.
Theory of expected effects
Out-of-pocket spending in the case 
of illness is an important risk mitiga-
tion tool for low-income households 
to cover health expenses. If it absorbs 
a  considerable amount of household 
income, OOPS can have critically neg-
ative implications for a  household’s 
economic situation. Without insurance, 
costs that are due immediately—a situ-
ation particularly relevant in the case 
of health shocks—are often paid from 
private cash funds. Also, with insur-
ance, some OOPS are still expected as 
referred to in the definition of the indi-
cator. Nevertheless, it is expected that 
OOPS decreases when the costs of the 
shock event are absorbed by microin-
surance and the incidence and depth 
of monetary outlays diminish. Existing 
studies about the effect of microinsur-
ance on OOPS, however, ambiguously 
depict this expected effect. Whilst Jüt-
ting (2004) found a  45-51% decrease 
in OOPS spending for members of 
a  Senegalese community-based 
health insurance scheme compared to 
non-members, Wagstaff et al. (2009) 
did not depict any statistically signifi-
cant changes in OOPS for China’s New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme. Chank-
ova et al. (2008) found that, whilst 
inpatient expenses were reduced, OOP 
expenses for outpatient care were not 
reduced by the investigated mutuelles 
and insurance schemes. This find-
ing is attributed by the authors to the 
coinsurance rates of 25-50% per visit. 
Thus, the expected effects seems to 
depend on the particular insurance 
scheme and the form of treatment, 
which need to be analysed separately.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
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Measurement
• How much did you pay out-of-pocket 
for [MEDICAL TREATMENT] during 
the past month?
Analysis
Existing studies on the effect of micro-
insurance on OOPS in the case of 
health show ambiguous results, rang-
ing from a clear reduction in OOPS to 
no indications of change. This leads 
to the assumption that the effect of 
microinsurance on OOPS is strongly 
bound to the type of insurance policy 
at stake. Thus, the particularities of the 
insurance scheme should be taken into 
account in the analysis as well as other 
forms of informal and coinsurance held 
by a household. Furthermore, the spe-
cific use of the OOPS for insured and 
uninsured should be taken into account 
and the different treatments should be 
analysed separately for each case.
Combine with
• Risk management strategies 
(ex-post)
• Net OOPS per shock event
• Net OOPS per episode of illness
53Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Quality of health-care providers
Indicator: Hospital mortality rate
Definition of the indicator
This indicator for the quality of health-
care providers refers to the percent-
age of patients who die whilst they are 
in hospital.
Theory of expected effects
Microinsurance could lead to a lower-
ing of hospital mortality rates. On the 
one hand, this is due to the expectation 
that insured individuals already benefit 
from more comprehensive and higher 
quality medical treatment prior to hos-
pitalisation, improving their general 
health condition and their individual 
risk factors. On the other hand, empiri-
cal evidence shows significant effects 
of microinsurance lowering hospital 
mortality rates by offering products 
tailored to the situation of high risk 
patients such as pregnant women and/
or children. In these cases, insurers 
often directly contract with hospitals 
to ensure better services. In Guinea, 
Centre International de Développe-
ment et de Recherche (CIDR) launched 
a  “safe motherhood” health microin-
surance product to cover deliveries at 
hospitals. The product also included 
emergency evacuation by ambulance 
and value-added services such as 
antenatal visits. After the launch of the 
product, the maternal mortality rate 
was about 4% lower than before the 
launch (non-randomised evaluation). 
Evidence of obligatory health insur-
ance for school children shows simi-
larly positive results (Radermacher et 
al. 2012).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
Measurement
For measurement, data should be 
retrieved directly from hospitals or 
statistical agencies. For a more accu-
rate analysis, information about the 
health status of the individuals who 
died in hospital at the time of their hos-
pitalisation should be obtained as well.
Analysis
In the analysis, the mortality rate 
should be clustered by different risk 
factors, prevalent at the time of hos-
pitalisation. Heterogeneous effects 
are expected here. Thus, the mortality 
rates should be calculated by dividing 
the number of deaths amongst hos-
pital patients with a  specific medical 
condition or procedure by the total 
number of patients admitted for that 
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same medical condition or procedure. 
This risk adjustment method accounts 
for the impact of individual risk factors, 
such as age, severity of illness, and 
other medical problems, that can put 
some patients at greater risk of death 
than others.
Combine with
• Scoring on quality assessments
55Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Quality of health-care providers
Indicator: Scoring on quality assessments
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the quality of 
health-care providers by their scoring 
on quality assessments. The quality 
assessment of health-care providers 
is generally a difficult endeavor since it 
can be measured both objectively and 
subjectively using different indicators. 
The most critical question here is, who 
conducts the quality assessment? This 
could be the health-care provider itself, 
the government, an insurance provider, 
a non-governmental organisation, etc.
Theory of expected effects
If the health insurance provider has 
a direct influence on the quality moni-
toring of contracted health-care pro-
viders, it is expected that insurance 
holders benefit from health services 
with higher quality and higher scor-
ings in quality assessments. By setting 
standards for quality of the insured 
patients, an equal treatment of insured 
and uninsured patients should be pro-
vided. This could occur if the insured 
patient is not paying directly out-of-
pocket and could, thus, be perceived 
as less solvent. Under the supervision 
of a  health insurance medical advi-
sor, working within the framework of 
the contractual collaboration between 
insurance and health-care provider, 
quality is generally expected to improve 
(LeRoy and Holtz 2012).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
For measurement, data should be 
retrieved directly from the organi-
sation/agency that conducted the 
assessment (preferably independent 
assessments). Furthermore, it could 
be useful to retrieve additional data 
directly from hospitals and other rele-
vant health-care providers, if available, 
in order to reconstruct the assessment 
and better understand subcategories. 
If clinical outcome data is not available 
it can be also useful to further inves-
tigate subjective measures of quality 
based on patients’ experiences and 
perceptions of quality.
Analysis
As there is no universal standard for 
health-care quality assessments, the 
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scoring system at stake should be 
taken into account in the analysis. It 
may be advisable to not only use the 
final scoring, but to take a deeper look 
at the composition of indicators of the 
assessments and the respective scor-
ing in subcategories.
Combine with
• Hospital mortality rate
57Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Quantity of health-care providers
Indicator: Number of modern health-care providers within 
a defined area/radius
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the number of 
modern health-care providers within 
a  defined area or radius. In order to 
use this indicator efficiently, the crite-
ria for a  modern health-care provider 
should be predefined.
Theory of expected effects
As modern (allopathic) medicine is 
widely believed to lead to better health 
outcomes than many traditional or 
alternative approaches, this indicator 
combines quality and quantity aspects 
of health care. If the health insurance 
provider has a  direct influence on 
the quality monitoring of contracted 
health-care providers, it is expected 
that modern standards are a prerequi-
site. Under the supervision of a health 
insurance medical advisor, working 
within the framework of the contrac-
tual collaboration between insurance 
and health-care provider, quality is 
generally expected to improve, and, 
thus, more modern health-care pro-
viders are expected to evolve within 
a  certain radius (LeRoy and Holtz 
2012). Nevertheless, as the number 
of modern health-care providers in 
certain areas depends on various other 
criteria— infrastructural conditions, 
governmental support, availability of 
skilled human resources, etc.—no 
direct effect is expected here, at least 
in the short- and medium-term or for 
large-scale interventions. Long-term 
effects can be expected based on the 
assumptions mentioned, particularly if 
the introduction of insurance in large-
scale interventions displays a  form 
of organised demand, encouraging 
providers to extend their services. 
Existing studies focus on the relation-
ship between distance and enrolment 
rate. It is found that the presence of 
health facilities within a  small radius 
increases the likeliness of enrolment 
(Chankova et al. 2008; Wagstaff et al. 
2009). Regarding utilisation, distance 
is perceived as a clear indicator of less 
utilisation due to the access barriers 
(Franco et al. 2008; Schneider and Diop 
2001).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
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Measurement
For measurement, data should be 
retrieved directly from statistical 
agencies and agencies conducting 
quality assessments of health facili-
ties, thus providing evidence of the 
state of their modern equipment. 
Furthermore, individual accessibility 
of modern health-care facilities can 
be inquired by survey questions. For 
example,in many remote regions with 
poor infrastructure, distance is not 
a  sufficient indicator of accessibility, 
but real-time accessibility should be 
measured (How long does it take to 
reach the facility by available means of 
transport? etc.).
Analysis
The analysis could take into account dif-
ferent categories of “modernity” as well 
as different radiuses or other measures 
of accessibility. Furthermore, consid-
eration should be given as to whether 
or not the insurance scheme being 
analysed covers medical treatment at 
these health-care providers, and which 
is the closest one providing treatment 
for insured/uninsured individuals.
Combine with
• Indicators concerning quality of 
health-care providers to define cri-
teria of modernity
59Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Total number of visits to outpatient services per 
household member within the last month
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the number 
of visits household members make to 
outpatient services. It refers to health-
care services conducted ambulantly, in 
a walk-in manner, and does not include 
hospitalisation of a patient.
Theory of expected effects
There are robust empirical findings that 
microinsurance generally increases 
the use of health-care services.
It is expected that existing barriers to 
healthcare utilisation, which are par-
ticularly its costs and accessibility, 
will be reduced by microinsurance, 
leading to a higher utilisation rate. The 
impact of microinsurance on health-
care utilisation rates is one of the most 
well-researched topics in microinsur-
ance so far. Most studies published 
found positive or mixed results, in line 
with the theoretical expectations. For 
example, Msuya et al. (2004) found 
that members of the United Repub-
lic of Tanzania’s Community Health 
Fund used formal health service with 
an increased likeliness of 15%. Like-
wise, Polonsky et al. (2009) found that 
members of Oxfam-operated insur-
ance schemes in Armenia had a signif-
icantly higher frequency of utilisation 
at 3.5% compared to non-members.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• How many times did [NAME] use 
health-care services within the last 
month without staying overnight? 
(ICF 2011)
Analysis
Even though most existing studies 
show a positive impact of microinsur-
ance on utilisation rates, expected 
effects depend on the particularities of 
the insurance policy and its facilitated 
benefits. Outpatient and inpatient ser-
vices used should be clearly differenti-
ated in the analysis as well as the suit-
ability of the treatment chosen for the 
underlying health problem.
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Combine with
• Other indicators of health-care 
utilisation
61Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Total number of visits to inpatient services (with 
at least 24 hours hospitalisation) per household 
member within the last month/year
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the number 
of visits household members make for 
inpatient services. It refers to health-
care services that include inpatient 
treatment of the patient for at least 24 
hours.
Theory of expected effects
There are robust empirical findings that 
microinsurance generally increases 
the use of health-care services.
It is expected that existing barriers to 
healthcare utilisation, which are par-
ticularly its costs and accessibility, will 
be reduced by microinsurance, leading 
to a higher utilisation rate. The impact 
of microinsurance on health-care uti-
lisation rates is one of the most well-
researched topics in microinsurance 
so far. Most studies published found 
positive or mixed results in line with the 
theoretical expectations. For example, 
Msuya et al. (2004) found that members 
of the United Republic of Tanzania’s 
Community Health Fund used formal 
health service with an increased likeli-
ness of 15%. Likewise, Polonsky et al. 
(2009) found that members of Oxfam-
operated insurance schemes in Arme-
nia had a significantly higher frequency 
of utilisation at 3.5 per cent compared 
to non-members.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• How many times did [NAME] make 
use of health-care services, stay-
ing overnight within the last month/
year?
• How many nights did [NAME] spend 
at the health-care facility? (ICF 2011)
Analysis
Even though most existing studies 
show a positive impact of microinsur-
ance on utilisation rates, expected 
effects depend on the particularities 
of the insurance policy and its facili-
tated benefits. Outpatient and inpatient 
62
services utilised should be clearly dif-
ferentiated in the analysis as well as 
the suitability of the treatment chosen 
for the underlying health problem.
Combine with
• Other indicators of healthcare 
utilisation
63Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Total number of illness episodes involuntarily 
self-treated per household member within the 
last month
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the number 
of illness episodes which were self-
treated involuntarily. Thus, the indica-
tor captures cases in which the use of 
health care would have been the pre-
ferred treatment, but was not feasible 
due to certain barriers.
Theory of expected effects
Self-treatment can cause medical 
complications such as progression of 
an untreated or misdiagnosed illness, 
complications from self-prescribed 
drugs, or public health problems in the 
case of infectious disease (Derriennic 
et al. 2005). There are robust empirical 
findings, that microinsurance gener-
ally increases the use of health-care 
services.
It is expected that existing barriers to 
healthcare utilisation, which are par-
ticularly its costs and accessibility will 
be reduced by microinsurance, leading 
to a higher utilisation rate. If no suffi-
cient funds and/or transport options are 
available, involuntary self-treatment 
can be the consequence, even if the 
person is aware of the need for formal 
professional health care. The impact of 
microinsurance on health-care utilisa-
tion rates is one of the best researched 
topics in microinsurance so far. Most 
studies published found positive or 
mixed results in line with the theoreti-
cal expectations. For example, Msuya 
et al. (2004) found that members of the 
United Republic of Tanzania’s Commu-
nity Health Fund used formal health 
service with an increased likeliness of 
15%. Likewise, Polonsky et al. (2009) 
found that members of Oxfam-oper-
ated insurance schemes in Armenia 
had a significantly higher frequency of 
utilisation at 3.5% compared to non-
members. Wang et al. (2009) found that 
membership in China’s Rural Mutual 
Health Care reduced self-treatment by 
about two-thirds.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
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Measurement
• Within the last month, how many 
times has [NAME] been ill and una-
ble to see a doctor even though he 
(or she) wanted to? (ICF 2011)
Analysis
Even though most existing studies 
show a positive impact of microinsur-
ance on utilisation rates, expected 
effects depend on the particularities of 
the insurance policy and its facilitated 
benefits. Outpatient and inpatient ser-
vices, as well as self-treatment used, 
should be clearly differentiated in the 
analysis as well as the suitability of the 
treatment chosen for the underlying 
health problem.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health-care 
utilisation
65Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Regarding children: percentage of children 
(below age five) seeking diarrhea treatment
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children below the age of five 
seeking diarrhea treatment. This indi-
cator, thus, focuses on a  particular 
health-care treatment that is expected 
to have a  positive influence on the 
health status of the beneficiary.
Theory of expected effects
As health status is difficult to measure 
objectively, proxies are often used to 
approach this issue. In medical research 
there is a widespread opinion that cer-
tain treatments and health-promoting 
behaviour of children have an important 
long-term effect on their health status, 
which can, in some cases, even influ-
ence their adult health conditions. Diar-
rhea, in most cases, is an illness that 
requires only simple outpatient treat-
ment, but it is still one of the highest 
ranking causes of mortality in children 
under five. There are robust empirical 
findings that microinsurance generally 
increases the use of health-care ser-
vices. It is expected that existing barri-
ers to healthcare utilisation, which are 
particularly its costs and accessibil-
ity, will be reduced by microinsurance, 
leading to a  higher utilisation rate. 
Thus, it is also expected that the rate 
of treatment of children with diarrhea 
will increase, especially if the insur-
ance is tied to educational interventions 
or regular health checkups. Educa-
tional interventions, promoting hygenic 
habits, preventive measures, and Oral 
rehydration therapy (ORS) can also 
lead to high rates of self-treatment or 
efficient direct prevention of diarrhea, 
leading to a decrease in the useage rate 
of health-care services.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• Did [NAME OF CHILD] have treat-
ment the last time they suffered 
from diarrhea?
• Did you seek advise for the diar-
rhea treatment or did you treat it at 
home?
• What kind of treatment was pro-
vided? (Provide roster with options, 
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e.g., ORS liquid, specific diet, drugs) 
(ICF 2011)
Analysis
As diarrhea treatment is only one of 
several health-care interventions 
believed to significantly decrease the 
mortality rate for children under-
five and improve their general health 
status, other interventions should 
be considered in the analysis. Fur-
thermore, frequency and quality of 
the treatment should also be taken 
into account as well as the degree 
of severity of the diarrhea episode. It 
could also be interesting to control for 
participation in educational units for 
child health and diarrhea treatment 
in particular.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health-care 
utilisation, particularly regarding 
children
67Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Regarding children: percentage of children (below 
age five) sleeping under a mosquito net
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children below the age of five 
sleeping under a mosquito net, a com-
mon precautionary measure to prevent 
infection with malaria.
Theory of expected effects
As health status is difficult to meas-
ure objectively, proxies are often used 
to approach this issue. In medical 
research there is the widespread opin-
ion that certain treatments and health-
promoting behaviour of children have 
an important long-term effect on their 
health status, which can, in some 
cases even influence their adult health 
conditions. Malaria ranks amongst the 
most prevalent reasons for mortality 
in children under five. Several studies 
show that sleeping under a  mosquito 
net reduces the risk of infection with 
malaria drastically. There are robust 
empirical findings that microinsurance 
generally increases the use of health-
care services. For instance, Franco 
et al. (2008) found that members of 
four Equity Initiative policies in Mali 
increased the use of mosquito nets 
for children and pregnant women. The 
effects expected are also dependent 
on the kind of distribution of mosquito 
nets. Empirical evidence found that 
mosquito nets provided as a gift have 
a  rather low utilisation rate, as they 
are valued less. According to this line 
of argument, insurance could lead to 
a  lower utilisation rate than expected 
if the provision of mosquito nets is part 
of the insurance scheme.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• Does your household have any mos-
quito nets that can be used whilst 
sleeping? Who slept under this 
mosquito net last night? (ICF 2011)
Note: The surveyor should observe 
whether mosquito nets exist in the 
household and if they seem to be in 
use.
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Analysis
As sleeping under a  mosquito net 
is only one of several health-care 
interventions believed to significantly 
decrease the mortality rate for chil-
dren under-five and improve their gen-
eral health status, other interventions 
should be considered in the analysis. 
Furthermore, frequency and quality 
of the treatment should also be taken 
into account (is the net always used, is 
it in good order etc.). It could also be 
interesting to control specifically for 
participation in educational sessions 
on child health and malaria prevention.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health-care 
utilisation, particularly regarding 
children
69Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Regarding children: percentage of children 
(below age five) getting vitamin A supplements
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children below the age of five 
getting vitamin A  supplements. This 
indicator, thus, focuses on a particular 
health-care treatment health-care that 
is expected to have a positive influence 
on the health status of the beneficiary.
Theory of expected effects
As health status is difficult to meas-
ure objectively, proxies are often 
used to approach this issue. In medi-
cal research there is the widespread 
opinion that certain treatments and 
health promoting behaviour of children 
have an important long-term effect on 
their health status, which can, in some 
cases even influence their adult health 
conditions. Randomised medical tri-
als show that vitamin A  supplemen-
tation is associated with large reduc-
tions in mortality, morbidity, and vision 
problems in a  range of setting. Thus, 
vitamin A supplementation is strongly 
recommended for children between 
six-months and five years of age. It is 
expected that, under microinsurance, 
pre-existing barriers to this treatment 
will be removed and access facilitated.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• Within the last six months, was 
[NAME] given a vitamin A dose like 
(this/any of these)? Show common 
types of ampoules/capsules/syrups 
(ICF 2011).
Analysis
As vitamin A  supplementation is only 
one of several health-care interven-
tions believed to decrease the under-
five-mortality rate for children sig-
nificantly and to improve their general 
health status, other interventions 
should be considered in the analysis. 
Furthermore, frequency and quality of 
the treatment should also be taken into 
account. It could also be interesting to 
control for participation in educational 
sessions on child health and diet in 
particular.
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Combine with
• Other indicators of health-care 
utilisation, particularly regarding 
children
71Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — health-care utilisation 
(needs-based)
Indicator:  Regarding children: number of immunisations for 
children below age one (per child)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age number of immunisations of chil-
dren from birth to 12 months.
Theory of expected effects
This indicator focuses on a particular 
treatment of healthcare utilisation that 
is expected to have a positive influence 
on the health status of the beneficiary 
child. As health status is difficult to 
measure objectively, proxies are often 
used to approach this issue. In medi-
cal research, there is the widespread 
opinion that certain treatments and 
health-promoting behaviour of children 
have an important long-term effect on 
their health status, which can, in some 
cases, even influence their adult health 
conditions. Immunisation is of particu-
lar importance during the first months 
after birth. For many preventable dis-
eases, the first shot of immunisation 
is recommended by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) between month 
0 and 12. There are robust empirical 
findings that microinsurance generally 
increases the utilisation of health-care 
services. It is expected that existing 
barriers to healthcare utilisation, which 
are particularly its costs and accessi-
bility, will be reduced by microinsur-
ance, leading to a  higher utilisation 
rate. Thus, it is also expected that the 
number of immunisations for children 
will increase, particularly if the insur-
ance is bound to educational interven-
tions or regular health checkups.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
Provide a roster with names of children 
below age one and the most prominent 
and important immunisations, as rec-
ommended by the WHO and adapted 
to the local context, as immunisation 
practices may vary from country to 
country.
Analysis
As immunisation is only one of several 
health-care interventions believed to 
decrease the under-five mortality rate 
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for children significantly and improve 
their general health status, other inter-
ventions should be considered in the 
analysis. Furthermore, frequency and 
quality of the treatment should also be 
taken into account as well as the type 
of immunisation and whether they are 
followed up if further shots are needed 
within a certain time period. In general, 
the effect should strongly depend on 
whether immunisations are paid by the 
insurance.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health-care 
utilisation, particularly regarding 
children
73Guidelines for indicators
Outcome:  Receiving (appropriate) health care — delay in health care 
seeking
Indicator:  Number of days symptoms persisted before 
treatment was sought
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to delay in health 
care seeking, measured by the num-
ber of days the symptoms of the illness 
persisted before treatment was sought.
Theory of expected effects
There are empirical findings that delays 
in obtaining health care can lead to 
increased morbidity and mortality in 
many cases (Derriennic et al. 2005; 
Msuya et al. 2004). The number of days 
that symptoms of an illness persisted 
before treatment was sought is a  con-
venient indicator of whether appropri-
ate health care is easily accessible. It is 
expected that existing barriers to health-
care utilisation, which are particularly its 
costs and accessibility will be reduced 
by microinsurance, leading to a  higher 
utilisation rate. Thus, it is also expected 
that the number of days symptoms per-
sist before professional consultation 
decrease, as barriers are lower.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage is health insurance.
Measurement
• How many days did the illness 
persist before [NAME] sought 
treatment?
• What was the reason why treatment 
was not sought immediately?
Analysis
As delay in health care seeking can 
also have other reasons than typical 
barriers, such as cost and infrastruc-
ture, it is advisable to find out more 
about the specific reasons for a delay. 
Furthermore, whilst a delay can have 
dramatic consequences for some ill-
nesses, for others it may not be that 
urgent. Thus, this indicator should be 
seen in its specific context.
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning health-
care utilisation
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Outcome: Equity regarding health and health care
Indicator: Use any of the indicators mentioned for subgroups
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to equity in the 
context of health and health care by 
focusing on subgroups for any indica-
tor specific to health microinsurance. 
Subgroups can be defined based on 
numerous categories: socioeconomic, 
spatial, ethnic or religious, gender 
based or referring to different house-
hold members. In general, equity in 
health care is established if people 
who do not have access to and utilise 
health-care services receive these 
services at the same level of those who 
have access already.
Theory of expected effects
The in-depth analysis of subgroups 
is a  suitable indicator to examine the 
degree of equity in access to and use of 
health-care services. Equity in access 
to health care is one hypothesised 
impact of microinsurance based on 
the assumption that access to insur-
ance can be provided to members of 
excluded groups. By focusing on sub-
groups, detailed analysis can be con-
ducted, addressing the questions of 
who has access to insurance and who 
actually receives the benefits. In the 
ideal case, access to insurance should 
be egalitarian across subgroups.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
For measurement, the same ques-
tions/methods mentioned for the rel-
evant indicators should be applied to 
the specific subgroups.
Analysis
The analysis should be conducted in 
the way advised for the respective 
indicators, focusing on the specific 
subgroup.
Combine with
• Relevant indicators used, not 
divided by subgroups
• Use of any of the indicators men-
tioned for socioeconomic subgroups
• Use of any of the indicators men-
tioned for subgroups of household 
members
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Outcome: Equity regarding health and health care
Indicator:  Use any of the indicators mentioned for 
socioeconomic subgroups
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to equity in the 
context of health and health care by 
focusing on any indicator specific to 
health microinsurance for socioeco-
nomic subgroups. Major characteris-
tics of these socioeconomic subgroups 
could be their income and other meas-
ures of wealth, employment status, etc.
Theory of expected effects
The in-depth analysis of subgroups 
is a  suitable indicator to examine the 
degree of equity in access to and use of 
health-care services. Equity in access 
to health care is one hypothesised 
impact of microinsurance based on 
the assumption that access to insur-
ance can be provided to members of 
excluded groups. By focusing on sub-
groups, detailed analysis can be con-
ducted, addressing the questions of 
who has access to insurance and who 
actually receives the benefits. In the 
ideal case, access to insurance should 
be egalitarian across socioeconomic 
subgroups. In the analysis of 27 Senega-
lese mutuelles, four Malian Equity Ini-
tiative Policies, and Ghana’s Nkoranza 
scheme, Chankova et al. (2008) found 
that enrolment was significantly higher 
for the top quintile, whilst there was no 
significant difference in the enrolment 
of the poorest quintile or the remaining 
four quintiles grouped together. Msuya 
et al. (2004) showed that a 1% increase 
in income raised the probability of join-
ing the United Republic of Tanzania’s 
Community Health Fund by 12.5%. 
Regarding the use of health-care ser-
vices by subgroups, there is mixed 
empirical evidence. Whilst Jowett et al. 
(2004) found in Vietnam that insurance 
members of the lowest quintile make 
more use of the accessible health-care 
services, Schneider and Diop (2001) do 
not find a significant change in health-
care utilisation by income quartile if 
other factors are taken into account. 
Wagstaff et al. (2009) did not even find 
any positive change in behaviour with 
regards to inpatient and outpatient 
health-care services for the lowest 
10% of the income distribution, com-
pared to the other income groups.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to 
the case of health, the applicable 
type of risk coverage here is health 
insurance.
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Measurement
For measurement, the same ques-
tions/methods mentioned for the rel-
evant indicators should be applied to 
the specific subgroups.
Analysis
The analysis should be conducted in 
the way advised for the respective 
indicators, focusing on the specific 
subgroup.
Combine with
• Relevant indicators used, not 
divided by subgroups
• Use of any of the indicators men-
tioned for subgroups (general)
• Use of any of the indicators men-
tioned for subgroups of household 
members
77Guidelines for indicators
Outcome: Equity regarding health and health care
Indicator:  Use any of the indicators mentioned for subgroups 
of household members
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to equity in the 
context of health and health care by 
focusing on specific indicators for 
health microinsurance of the sub-
groups within households. These 
subgroups could be clustered by age, 
gender, status within the household, 
educational level, etc.
Theory of expected effects
The in-depth analysis of subgroups 
is a  suitable indicator to examine the 
degree of equity in access to and use of 
health-care services. Equity in access 
to health care is one hypothesised 
impact of microinsurance based on 
the assumption that access to insur-
ance can be provided to members of 
excluded groups. This hypothesis can 
also be adopted for household sub-
group structures. By focusing on sub-
groups detailed analysis of the ques-
tions of who has access to insurance 
and who actually receives the benefits 
can be conducted. Regarding sub-
groups of household members, exist-
ing studies predominantly focused on 
gender differences and female headed 
households. In this context, Chankova 
et al. (2008) found that female headed 
households in Ghana, Mali, and Senegal 
were more likely to enrol in insurance 
schemes than maleheaded households. 
The authors associated these find-
ings with traditional roles for women 
as caregivers in households. Wagstaff 
et al. (2009), in contrast, did not find an 
increased likeliness of joining China’s 
NCMS in female headed households. 
Schneider and Diop (2001) disaggre-
gated the utilisation rate by gender and 
found that the probability for utilisation 
did not vary by gender in Rwanda.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
For measurement, the same ques-
tions/methods mentioned for the rel-
evant indicators should be applied to 
the specific subgroups.
Analysis
The analysis should be conducted in 
the way advised for the respective 
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indicators, focusing on the specific 
subgroup.
Combine with
• Relevant indicators used, not 
divided by subgroups
• Use of any of the indicators men-
tioned for subgroups (general)
• Use of any of the indicators men-
tioned for socioeconomic subgroups
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Impact: Risk of poverty/financial protection/financial vulnerability
Indicator:  Percentage of households living below the poverty 
line: percentage of households living on less than 
USD 1.25 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per 
person per day
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures the percentage 
of households in the sample living on 
less than USD 1.25 a day. The interna-
tional line of $1.25 a  day is the aver-
age of the national poverty lines in the 
poorest 10-20 countries and defines 
those living under this estimate as 
extremely poor. It is the recalculated 
measure of the initially $1 a  day per 
person line, the World Bank published 
in 1999, based on 2005 PPP prices.
Theory of expected effects
Microinsurance is mostly promoted as 
a tool aimed at the prevention of unan-
ticipated and undesirable events that 
could exacerbate or deepen the pov-
erty level of affected individuals. Peo-
ple living with an income around the 
poverty line are considered particu-
larly financially vulnerable and need 
efficient financial protection. Financial 
protection aims at providing a  viable 
alternative to inefficient coping mech-
anisms often applied by low-income 
households in shock and stress situ-
ations. These informal coping mecha-
nisms can include numerous sorts of 
actions such as depletion of savings, 
selling of goods (including livestock 
and food), consumption-smoothing, 
change in labor supply, withdrawing 
children from school, and engaging 
in mutual self-help arrangements. 
Under microinsurance, it is expected 
that financial vulnerability and the 
risk of falling (back) into poverty 
decreases, particularly after a shock 
event.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Property insurance
• Other
This indicator is applicable to all insur-
able risks and types of risk coverage.
Measurement
For measurement, all sources of 
income have to be considered in 
order to calculate a daily average and 
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determine whether it lies below or 
above the poverty line.
Analysis
This general indicator of household 
wealth and income and its degree of 
vulnerability is essential to analysing 
the impact of microinsurance on pov-
erty reduction. It is, however, unlikely 
that a direct short-term effect will be 
found here. The indicator is rather 
interesting to analyse in the context 
of income variability as it is expected 
that, under insurance, individuals are 
less likely to fall under the poverty 
threshold. It may take a  longer time 
period until significant effects can be 
identified since shocks may only occur 
occassionally. Furthermore, it could 
be interesting to study whether income 
level is significantly correlated with the 
access to insurance and/or the take-up 
rate.
Combine with
• Percentage of households living 
between USD 1.25 and USD 2.00 
PPP per person
• Indicators for general outcomes of 
microinsurance
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Impact: Risk of poverty/financial protection/financial vulnerability
Indicator:  Percentage of households living below the poverty 
line: percentage of households living on between 
USD 1.25 and USD 2.00 purchasing power parity 
(PPP) a day per person
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures the percent-
age of households in the sample liv-
ing between USD 1.25 and US D2.00 
(normalised as PPP) a day per person. 
The international line of USD1.25 a day 
is the average of the national poverty 
lines in the poorest 10-20 countries and 
defines those living under this estimate 
as extremely poor. It is the recalcu-
lated measure of the initially USD1.00 
a day per person line, the World Bank 
published in 1999, based on 2005 PPP 
prices. The range between USD 1.25 
and USD 2.00 is a  commonly-used 
measure for people who are particu-
larly vulnerable to falling (back) into 
extreme poverty.
Theory of expected effects
Microinsurance is mostly promoted as 
a tool aimed at the prevention of unan-
ticipated and undesirable events that 
could exacerbate or deepen the pov-
erty level of affected individuals. Peo-
ple living with an income around the 
poverty line are considered particu-
larly financially vulnerable and need 
efficient financial protection. Financial 
protection aims at providing a  viable 
alternative to inefficient coping mech-
anisms often applied by low-income 
households in shock and stress situ-
ations. These informal coping mecha-
nisms can include numerous sorts of 
actions such as depletion of savings, 
selling of goods (including livestock 
and food), consumption-smoothing, 
change in labor supply, withdrawing 
children from school, and engaging 
in mutual self-help arrangements. 
Under microinsurance, it is expected 
that financial vulnerability and the 
risk of falling (back) into poverty 
decreases, particularly after a shock 
event.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
This indicator is applicable to all insur-
able risks and types of risk coverage.
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Measurement
For measurement, all sources of 
income have to be considered in order 
to calculate a daily average and deter-
mine if it lies below or above the pov-
erty line.
Analysis
This general indicator of household 
wealth and income and its degree of 
vulnerability is essential for the analy-
sis of the impact of microinsurance 
on poverty reduction. It is, however, 
unlikely to find a  direct effect here. 
Consequently, the analysis should 
include various related wealth and 
income indicators. Furthermore, it 
could be interesting to study whether 
the income level is significantly corre-
lated with the access to insurance and/
or the take-up rate.
Combine with
• Percentage of households living on 
less than USD 1.25 PPP per person
• Indicators for general outcomes of 
microinsurance
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Impact: Economic situation of the household
Indicator: Level of assets—housing conditions
Definition of the indicator
Housing conditions are an important 
indicator for measuring the living 
standard of a household. Living in sat-
isfactory housing conditions is a highly 
important factor determining peo-
ple’s lives and their satisfaction level. 
Housing is essential for meeting basic 
needs, such as shelter, but, in addition, 
it should offer a  place to sleep and 
rest where people feel safe and have 
privacy and personal space; it should 
be somewhere they can raise a  fam-
ily. All of these elements help make 
a house a home (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 2013)1. In economic analysis, 
housing conditions are often used as 
a  proxy for the economic situation of 
a household and its wealth status.
Theory of expected effects
Under insurance, more resources can 
be invested for improving the housing 
conditions ex-ante in the occurrence 
of a  household shock. This could be 
particularly valid in a  regional context, 
which is highly affected by devastat-
ing weather and natural events such as 
typhoons, floods, earthquakes, fire, etc. 
1 See the OECD Better Life Index at http://www.
oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/housing/.
In such a  context, insured households 
could be more willing to put resources 
into their housing conditions, as they 
fear destruction less. In the ex-post situ-
ation, it is expected that the housing con-
ditions remain more or less stable under 
insurance as housing assets do not need 
to be used as a tool to mitigate risk.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Measurement
Measurement of housing conditions 
is usually conducted on the basis of 
the interviewer’s observations and/or 
available data on the community level. 
Additionally, questions about the hous-
ing conditions can be directly included 
in the survey. This is also a way to pro-
vide valuable information about peo-
ples’ satisfaction with their housing 
conditions, which is an important fac-
tor of living standards.
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Examples for subindicators: 2
• Number of rooms in the dwelling
• Main material of the floor of the 
dwelling
• Main material of the exterior walls 
in the dwelling
• Main material of the roof of the 
dwelling
• Percentage of households with 
access to tapped water within 30 
minutes (walking)
• Percentage of households with 
tapped water at their home
• Percentage of households with 
a toilet in their home
• Percentage of households with 
electricity in their home
Analysis
Housing conditions should be ana-
lysed with consideration of general 
2 For more subindicators and sample questions 
consult the World Bank Living Standards Mea-
surement Study surveys at http://econ.worldbank.
org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch/extlsms/0
,contentmdk:21610833~pagepk:64168427~pipk:64
168435~thesitepk:3358997,00.html
community/neighbour housing con-
ditions. This will help exclude local 
external effects (there may be no run-
ning water, electricity supply, etc., for 
the whole community, irrespective of 
a  household’s willingness to improve 
their housing conditions in this regard). 
The information on housing conditions 
can also serve as the basis for the con-
struction of an index.
Combine with
• Total value of sold assets in case of 
shocks
• Percentage of assets recovered/
replaced after being sold in case of 
shock six months after shock event
• Amount of liquid assets
• Other indicators measuring the 
economic situation of the household
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Impact: Economic situation of the household
Indicator: Level of household assets / consumer appliances
Definition of the indicator
The level of household assets and con-
sumer appliances is a  suitable indi-
cator to measure the living standard 
of a  household. Living in satisfactory 
housing conditions is a  highly impor-
tant factor determining people’s lives 
and their satisfaction level. In econo-
mic analysis, housing conditions and 
the level of household assets are often 
used as a proxy for the economic situ-
ation of a household and its wealth sta-
tus. For this purpose, household assets 
and consumer appliances are used for 
the construction of a comparable index.
Theory of expected effects
This indicator is particularly relevant 
for the analysis of an ex-post shock sit-
uation. Under insurance, it is expected 
that the economic situation of a house-
hold, displayed by the level of assets and 
consumer appliances, remains more or 
less stable as assets do not need to be 
used or sold as a tool to mitigate risk.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Measurement
Measurement of household assets can 
be conducted on the basis of the inter-
viewer’s observations and/or questions 
about the housing conditions, directly 
included in the survey. This is also 
a  way to provide valuable information 
about peoples’ satisfaction with their 
housing conditions and level of house-
hold assets, which is an important fac-
tor of living standards.
Examples for subindicators:
• Number of pots and pans in dwelling
• Existence of bicycle, motor bike, car 
(and number)
• Existence of TV, refrigerator, wash-
ing machine, AC, Hifi
• Existence of mobile phone(s)
(For more subindicators and sample 
questions consult the LSMS World 
Bank surveys.)
Analysis
For the analysis of the level of assets 
and consumer appliances, local and 
cultural particularities should be 
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taken into account as some assets 
may have a higher or lower (subjective) 
value. Furthermore, general commu-
nity/neighbour conditions should be 
considered in order to exclude local 
external effects (there may be no run-
ning water, electricity supply, etc. for 
the whole community, irrespective of 
a  household’s willingness to invest 
in certain assets/appliances such as 
TV, AC, washing machine, etc.). The 
information gathered for this indicator 
can be used for the construction of an 
asset index, functioning as a proxy for 
household wealth and the economic 
situation of a household.
Combine with
• Total value of sold assets in case of 
shocks
• Percentage of assets recovered/
replaced after being sold in cases 
of shock six months after a  shock 
event
• Amount of liquid assets
• Other indicators measuring the 
economic situation of the household
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Impact: Economic situation of the household
Indicator:  Level of household assets—savings and other 
working capital
Definition of the indicator
Savings refer to the amount of house-
hold income not spent on consump-
tion or investment, but put aside for 
future use to cover recurring costs, 
unexpected expenditures, or planned 
consumption (wedding, dowry, funeral, 
health costs, education expenses, 
farming inputs, etc.). The indicator 
includes liquid savings (bank accounts, 
cash-on-hand, money in savings 
groups, gold, jewelery, etc.) as well 
as illiquid savings (land ownership 
irrigated or non-irrigated—livestock, 
housing, etc). Working capital refers 
to operating liquidity available for 
business and other income-generat-
ing activities (e.g., machinery, fishing 
boats, stock of goods).
Theory of expected effects
Liquid and illiquid savings, as well as 
working capital, are important risk miti-
gation tools for low-income households 
to protect themselves against shocks 
and stabilise cash flow. With insurance, 
precautionary savings are expected to 
decrease, whilst funds and working 
capital are expected to be preserved 
by insurance. If a shock occurs, assets 
do not need to be sold or used for other 
purposes such as liability for a loan.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Measurement
Besides measurement via survey 
questions, direct observations of the 
surveyor can be a  valuable source of 
information, particularly with regards 
to illiquid assets and working capital.
Analysis
Due to the expected change in risk tak-
ing behaviour, it might be interesting to 
analyse heterogeneous effects by risk 
aversion. Furthermore, different pur-
poses and intentions behind the saving 
behaviour should be taken into consid-
eration in the analysis.
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Combine with
• Total value of sold assets in a shock 
event
• Percentage of assets recovered/
replaced after being sold in cases of 
shock six months after shock event
• Amount of liquid assets
• Other indicators measuring the 
economic situation of a household
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Impact: Nutrition (in quantity and quality)
Indicator: Total expenditures on food per person per week
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures each house-
hold’s per person expenditure on food 
in the time frame of a week. A differen-
tiation should be made between food 
bought for immediateversus future 
consumption. Quantity and quality of 
food are not taken into consideration in 
this indicator (see following indicators 
on quality and quantity of nutritional 
intake).
Theory of expected effects
As consumption-smoothing is a  com-
mon mechanism of household risk 
mitigation in cases of income or health 
shocks, food security is a closely con-
nected issue. As a  consequence of 
a  household shock, individuals have 
to cope with the expenses related to 
the respective event and continue to 
meet ongoing household needs, of 
which expenditure for food ranks on 
top. This double burden can easily lead 
to the decision to eat fewer meals or 
eat less nutritious food. This effect is 
particularly relevant for poor house-
holds, who would need to reduce their 
consumption and their food expen-
ditures in the case of a  shock. As 
microinsurance aims at stabilising, 
expenditures on food are expected to 
stay stable or even increase if it comes 
to a shift in consumption preferences 
due to the change in risk mitigation. 
In this context, Wagstaff and Pradhan 
(2005) found that the Vietnam Health 
Insurance increased households’ 
non-health related expenditures, i.e., 
non-medical goods such as food and 
education.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Health insurance can be an applicable 
type of risk management here, particu-
larly if the insurance product encom-
passes additional interventions related 
to nutrition. Furthermore, in the case 
of self-subsistence of the household, 
agricultural insurance schemes, such 
as crop or livestock insurance, could 
be applicable as well. They mitigate 
the risk of crop failure and/or livestock 
death, both of which could have a neg-
ative impact on nutrition.
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Measurement
Because self-reported and aggregated 
information of quantity and quality of 
food can be inaccurate, it is common 
practice to measure food consump-
tion in the form of an extensive roster, 
covering each food item separately by 
amount/quantity and price for each 
person of a household.
Example question: I want to ask about 
all food consumed per person in 
this household. Have you consumed 
[FOOD] during the past 7 days? Please 
exclude from your answer any [FOOD] 
purchased for processing or resale 
(National Statics Directorate Caicoli, 
Dili, Timor Leste and World Bank 2001).
Analysis
Smoothing of food expenses is a con-
sumption-smoothing mechanism typi-
cally employed only when other alter-
natives are lacking, it mostly affects 
poor households. It could be interest-
ing to analyse its use across differ-
ent levels of poverty. Analysing the 
heterogeneous effects on different 
types of household members could 
also be interesting, assuming that, in 
the case of a shock, a poor household 
would smooth food expenditures dif-
ferently for its members, depending 
on their particular needs (especially 
for those household members with 
increased health risks such as preg-
nant women, children, elderly people, 
or sick individuals).
Combine with
• Indicators of quantity and quality of 
nutritional intake
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Impact:  Nutrition (in quantity and quality) — quality of nutritional 
intake
Indicator:  Frequency of eating vegetables or fruit (number 
per week)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures the quality of 
weekly nutritional intake by the fre-
quency of vegetables or fruit consumed.
Theory of expected effects
As consumption-smoothing is a  com-
mon mechanism of household risk 
mitigation, in cases of income or health 
shock, food security is a  closely con-
nected issue. As a  consequence of 
a  household shock, individuals have to 
cope with the expenses related to the 
respective event and continue to meet 
ongoing household needs, for which 
expenditure for food ranks on top. This 
double burden can easily lead to the 
decision to eat fewer meals or eat less 
nutritious food. This effect is particu-
larly relevant for poor households, who 
would need to reduce their consump-
tion and their food expenditures less in 
a shock event. As microinsurance aims 
at stabilising, expenditures on food are 
expected to stay stable or even increase 
if it comes to a  shift in consumption 
preferences due to the change in risk 
mitigation. In this context, Wagstaff and 
Pradhan (2005) found that the Vietnam 
Health Insurance increased households’ 
non-health related expenditures, i.e., 
non-medical goods such as food and 
education.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Health insurance can be an applicable 
type of risk management here, particu-
larly if the insurance product encom-
passes additional interventions related 
to nutrition. Furthermore, in the case 
of self-subsistence of a  household, 
agricultural insurance schemes, such 
as crop or livestock insurance, could 
be applicable as well. These schemes 
mitigate the risk of crop failure and/
or livestock death, both of which could 
have a negative impact on nutrition.
Measurement
Because self-reported and aggregated 
information of quantity and quality of 
food can be inaccurate, it is common 
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practice to measure food consumption 
in the form of an extensive roster, cov-
ering each food item (fruit, vegetables) 
separately by amount/quantity and 
price.
Example question: I want to ask about 
fruit and vegetables consumed by your 
household, regardless of which person 
ate it. Has your household consumed 
[FOOD] during the past 7 days? Please 
exclude from your answer any [FOOD] 
purchased for processing or resale 
(National Statics Directorate Caicoli, 
Dili, Timor Leste and World Bank 2001).
Analysis
Smoothing of food expenses is a  con-
sumption-smoothing mechanism typi-
cally employed only when other alterna-
tives are lacking, it mostly affects poor 
households.It could be interesting to 
analyse its use across different levels of 
poverty. Analysing the heterogeneous 
effects on different types of household 
members could also be interesting, 
assuming that, in the case of a shock, 
a  poor household would smooth food 
expenditures differently for its mem-
bers, depending on their particular 
needs (especially for those household 
members with increased health risks 
such as pregnant women, children, 
elderly people, or sick individuals).
Combine with
• Indicators of quantity and quality of 
nutritional intake
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Impact:  Nutrition (in quantity and quality) — quality of nutritional 
intake
Indicator:  Frequency of eating meat (if people eat meat at 
all) (number per week)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures a  household’s 
weekly consumption of meat for non-
vegetarian household members.
The measure is frequency, not the 
actual amount or type of meat.
Theory of expected effects
As consumption-smoothing is a  com-
mon mechanism of household risk 
mitigation, in cases of income or health 
shock, food security is a  closely con-
nected issue. As a  consequence of 
a household shock, individuals have to 
cope with the expenses related to the 
respective event and continue to meet 
ongoing household needs of which 
expenditure for food ranks on top. This 
double burden can easily lead to the 
decision to eat fewer meals or eat less 
nutritious food and/or less expensive 
food. As meat ranks amongst the most 
expensive foods, whilst its nutritional 
value can be substituted by other types 
of food, its consumption is often cut 
down first during financial constraints 
to food consumption. This effect is 
particularly relevant for poor house-
holds, who would need to reduce their 
consumption and their food expendi-
tures less in the case of a  shock. As 
microinsurance aims at stabilising 
households, expenditures on food are 
expected to stay stable or even increase 
if it comes to a  shift in consumption 
preferences due to the change in risk 
mitigation. In this context Wagstaff and 
Pradhan (2005) found that the Vietnam 
Health Insurance increased house-
holds’ non-health related expendi-
tures, i.e., non-medical goods such as 
food and education.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Health insurance can be an applicable 
type of risk management here particu-
larly if the insurance product encom-
passes additional interventions related 
to nutrition. Furthermore, in the case 
of self-subsistence of the household 
agricultural insurance schemes such 
as crop or livestock insurance could 
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be applicable as well as they mitigate 
the risk of crop failure and/or livestock 
death, which could both have a nega-
tive impact on nutrition.
Measurement
Because self-reported and aggregated 
information of quantity and quality of 
food can be inaccurate, it is common 
practice to measure food consumption 
in the form of an extensive roster, cov-
ering each food item (different forms 
of meat) separately by amount/quantity 
and price. In the case of this indicator, 
interview questions should be pre-
ceded by the question, “Are there any 
people in the household who do not eat 
meat?”
Example question: I want to ask about 
meat consumed by your household, 
regardless of which person ate it. Has 
your household consumed [FOOD] dur-
ing the past 7 days? Please exclude from 
your answer any [FOOD] purchased for 
processing or resale (National Statics 
Directorate Caicoli, Dili, Timor Leste 
and World Bank 2001).
Analysis
Smoothing of food expenses is a  con-
sumption-smoothing mechanism typi-
cally employed only when other alterna-
tives are lacking, thus, it mostly affects 
poor households. It could be interest-
ing to analyse its use across different 
levels of poverty. Analysing the het-
erogeneous effects on different types 
of household members could be also 
interesting, assuming that, in a  shock 
event, a poor household would smooth 
food expenditures differently for its 
members, depending on their particu-
lar needs (especially for those house-
hold members with higher health risks 
such as pregnant women, children, 
elderly people, or sick individuals).
Combine with
• Indicators of quantity and quality of 
nutritional intake
95Guidelines for indicators
Impact:  Nutrition (in quantity and quality) — quantity of nutritional 
intake/extent of hunger
Indicator:  Average number of meals eaten per day in last 
month
Definition of the indicator
This indicator captures the quantity of 
nutritional intake by the average num-
ber of meals eaten per day in the last 
month.
Theory of expected effects
As consumption-smoothing is a  com-
mon mechanism of household risk 
mitigation in cases of income or health 
shock, food security is a  closely con-
nected issue. As a  consequence of 
a household shock, individuals have to 
cope with the expenses related to the 
respective event and continue to meet 
ongoing household needs, of which 
expenditure for food ranks on top. This 
double burden can easily lead to the 
decision to eat fewer meals or eat less 
nutritious food. This effect is particu-
larly relevant for poor households, who 
would need to reduce their consump-
tion and their food expenditures less in 
a shock event. As microinsurance aims 
at stabilising, expenditures on food are 
expected to stay stable or even increase 
if it comes to a  shift in consumption 
preferences due to the change in risk 
mitigation. In this context, Wagstaff and 
Pradhan (2005) found that the Vietnam 
Health Insurance increased house-
holds’ non-health related expenditures, 
i.e., non-medical goods such as food 
and education. It is, thus, expected that 
the number of meals taken remains 
stable after a shock under microinsur-
ance since the reduction of food quan-
tity is not needed as a  consumption-
smoothing mechanism.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Health insurance can be an applicable 
type of risk management here, particu-
larly if the insurance product encom-
passes additional interventions related 
to nutrition. Furthermore, in the case 
of self-subsistence of the household 
agricultural insurance schemes such 
as crop or livestock insurance could 
be applicable as well as they mitigate 
the risk of crop failure and/or livestock 
death, which could both have a nega-
tive impact on nutrition.
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Measurement
• What was the average number of 
meals eaten per day on average 
during the past month?
Analysis
Smoothing of food expenses is a  con-
sumption-smoothing mechanism typi-
cally employed only when other alterna-
tives are lacking, thus, it mostly affects 
poor households. It could be interesting 
to analyse its use across different levels 
of poverty. Analysing the heterogeneous 
effects on different types of household 
members could also be interesting, 
assuming that, in a shock event a poor 
household, would smooth food expen-
ditures differently for its members, 
depending on their particular needs 
(especially for those household mem-
bers with increased health risks such 
as pregnant women, children, elderly 
people, or sick individuals).
Combine with
• Indicators of quantity and quality of 
nutritional intake
97Guidelines for indicators
Impact:  Nutrition (in quantity and quality) — quantity of nutritional 
intake/extent of hunger
Indicator: Number of days when food was insufficient for the 
household in last month
Definition of the indicator
This indicator refers to the number of 
days when food was insufficient for 
a  household in the last month. This 
is a  subjective measure, capturing 
the extent of hunger that is suffered 
amongst household members.
Theory of expected effects
As consumption-smoothing is a  com-
mon mechanism of household risk 
mitigation in cases of income or health 
shock, food security is a  closely con-
nected issue. As a  consequence of 
a household shock, individuals have to 
cope with the expenses related to the 
respective event and continue to meet 
ongoing household needs, of which 
expenditure for food ranks on top. This 
double burden can easily lead to the 
decision to eat fewer meals or eat less 
nutritious food. This effect is particu-
larly relevant for poor households, who 
would need to reduce their consump-
tion and their food expenditures in the 
case of a shock event. As microinsur-
ance aims at stabilising households, 
expenditures on food are expected to 
stay stable or even increase if it comes 
to a shift in consumption preferences 
due to the change in risk mitigation. 
In this context Wagstaff and Pradhan 
(2005) found that the Vietnam Health 
Insurance increased households’ 
non-health related expenditures, i.e., 
non-medical goods such as food and 
education. Thus, it is expected that the 
number of days with insufficient supply 
of food will decrease under microin-
surance, since consumption-smooth-
ing is no longer necessary to mitigate 
the consequences of the shock. This is 
particularly true for an ex-post shock 
context.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Health insurance can be an applicable 
type of risk management here particu-
larly if the insurance product encom-
passes additional interventions related 
to nutrition. Furthermore, in the case 
of subsistence farming of the house-
hold, agricultural insurance schemes 
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such as crop or livestock insurance 
could be applicable as well as they 
mitigate the risk of crop failure and/or 
livestock death, which could both have 
a negative impact on nutrition.
Measurement
The insufficiency of food in a household 
can be treated as a fully subjective indi-
cator, based on the self-assessment of 
survey respondents and their feeling 
of hunger. A  further option of meas-
urement is to take the caloric intake, 
officially recommended by the WHO 
as a  reference for sufficient/insuf-
ficient consumption of food, and use 
the collected information about food 
consumption.
Analysis
Smoothing of food expenses is a  con-
sumption-smoothing mechanism typi-
cally employed only when other alterna-
tives are lacking, thus, it mostly affects 
poor households. It could be interesting 
to analyse its use across different levels 
of poverty. Analysing the heterogeneous 
effects on different types of household 
members could also be interesting, 
assuming that, in a shock event, a poor 
household would smooth food expen-
ditures differently for its members, 
depending on their particular needs 
(especially for those household mem-
bers with increased health risks such 
as pregnant women, children, elderly 
people, or sick individuals).
Combine with
• Indicators of quantity and quality of 
nutritional intake
99Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Health/Morbidity
Indicator:  Number of sick days in the household per 
person within last month (per subgroups such as 
children, women, elderly, etc.)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the number of 
illness episodes per subgrouped indi-
viduals in a household within the last 
month.
Theory of expected effects
Microinsurance is intended to pro-
vide a  reliable, adequate level of 
affordable health care (Leatherman 
et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the direct 
impact of a  microinsurance scheme 
on health outcomes is a  particularly 
difficult target to measure and most 
valid outcome data existing use prox-
ies for health outcomes and focus on 
specific aspects of health care such 
as health-care utilisation or access. 
The number of sick days in a house-
hold per person could be such a proxy 
for health status/morbidity. If micro-
insurance provides access to health-
care services that are inaccessible 
without insurance, one would expect 
that, in the medium- to long-term, the 
number of sick days would decrease. 
At a  minimum, this decrease would 
be expected for illnesses that are 
easily treatable in most cases, such 
as diarrhea. Due to the difficulties of 
measuring direct health outcomes, 
empirical studies focused instead on 
subjective self-reports of health sta-
tus. In this context, Lei and Lin (2009) 
estimated that members of China’s 
NCMS, were 2.8% less likely to report 
that they were feeling ill.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
Regarding the measurement of illness, 
DHS distinguishes between different 
degrees of severity of illness. Thus, 
it can be useful to cover both general 
illnesses and illnesses considered as 
rather severe, including fever and/or 
coughing as indicators.
• How many days has [NAME] been ill 
in the last month?
• How many days has [NAME] been 
ill with a  fever/cough in the last 
month? (ICF 2011)
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Analysis
Because it is expected that the number 
of sick days in a household per person 
is primarily influenced by general liv-
ing conditions and numerous external 
factors, such as epidemics and local 
infection rates, number of sick people 
in close surroundings, water and sani-
tation, food quality and accessibility, 
etc., it is very difficult to analyse a direct 
impact of microinsurance on health 
status and morbidity. The analysis 
should, thus, include as many other 
factors and indicators as possible.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health/morbidity
• Indicators of living standards
101Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Health/Morbidity
Indicator:  Number of days household members were unable 
to perform usual activities because of poor health 
per person within last month
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the number 
of days household members could not 
carry out their usual activities due to 
poor health.
Theory of expected effects
Microinsurance is intended to provide 
a  reliable, adequate level of afford-
able health care (Leatherman et al. 
2012). Nevertheless, the direct impact 
of a microinsurance scheme on health 
outcomes is a particularly difficult tar-
get to measure. Most of the valid, exist-
ing outcome data are based on prox-
ies for health outcomes and focuse on 
specific aspects of health care such as 
health-care utilisation or access. The 
number of days household members 
could not carry out their usual activi-
ties due to poor health conditions could 
be such a proxy for health status/mor-
bidity. The discontinuation of usual 
activities is an appropriate indicator for 
health status, as low-income house-
holds cannot afford to forgo any regular 
income source and discontinuation is 
often a decision of last resort. If micro-
insurance provided access to health-
care servicesthat are inaccessible 
without insurance, one would expect 
that, in the medium- to long-term, the 
number of sick days would decrease 
and, thus, usual activities of household 
members could continue. Due to the 
difficulties of measuring direct health 
outcomes, empirical studies focused 
instead on subjective self-reports of 
health status. In this context, Lei and 
Lin (2009) estimated that members of 
China’s NCMS, were 2.8% less likely to 
report that they were feeling ill.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
• How many days has [NAME] been 
unable to perform her/his usual 
activities because of poor health 
within the last month?
Analysis
As it is expected that the number of 
sick days in a household per person 
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is primarily influenced by general liv-
ing conditions and numerous external 
factors, such as epidemics and local 
infection rates, number of sick peo-
ple in close surroundings, water and 
sanitation, food quality and accessi-
bility, etc., it is very difficult to analyse 
a  direct impact of microinsurance 
on this health status and morbidity. 
The analysis should, thus, include as 
many other factors and indicators as 
possible. Furthermore, the indicator 
should be seen in the context of the 
prevalent illness and its severity. This 
could provide important information 
about the long-term impact of an ill-
ness, as for instance in the case of 
a chronic disease where usual activi-
ties are likely to be stopped for a long 
period of time.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health/morbidity
• Indicators of household income of 
the relevant activities
103Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Health/Morbidity
Indicator: Body Mass Index (BMI)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the Body Mass 
Index (BMI) for all household members. 
The BMI is a simple index of weight-for-
height that is commonly used to clas-
sify underweight, overweight and obe-
sity in adults. It is defined as the weight 
in kilograms divided by the square of 
the height in metres (kg/m2). BMI val-
ues are age-independent and the same 
for both sexes. However, BMI may not 
correspond to the same degree of 
obesity in different populations due, in 
part, to different body proportions. The 
health risks associated with increas-
ing or very low BMI are continuous and 
the interpretation of BMI gradings in 
relation to risk may differ for differ-
ent populations. In recent years, there 
has been a growing debate on whether 
there are possible needs for developing 
different BMI cut-off points for differ-
ent ethnic groups due to the increasing 
evidence that the associations between 
BMI, percentage of body fat, and body 
fat distribution differ across popula-
tions (World Health Organization 2013).
Theory of expected effects
Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005) con-
ducted one of the rare studies, 
examining direct health outcomes of 
microinsurance. Based on data from 
the Living Standards Measurement 
Survey, they found that the Vietnam-
nese Health Insurance significantly 
influences the BMI of adults and height 
and weight of young children.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
The BMI can be calculated by the 
formula:
BMI = weight (kg) / (height (m))2
If possible, measurement of weight 
and height is directly conducted by 
the surveyor, and not based on self-
reporting, in order to retrieve the most 
exact information possible.
Analysis
As pointed out for the previous indi-
cators for health outcomes, it is very 
difficult to analyse a  direct impact of 
microinsurance on this health status 
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and morbidity. The analysis should, 
thus, include as many other factors 
and indicators as possible. The ongo-
ing discussion about the BMIs gener-
alisability across ethnic groups also 
points to the importance of seeing this 
indicator in the local context.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health/morbidity
• Nutrition-related variables
105Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Health/Morbidity
Indicator: Percentage of children with anemia
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children within a  household 
who are anemic. Anemia is consid-
ered as a public health problem in both 
rich and poor countries by the WHO. 
However, its prevalence in develop-
ing countries is particularly high, with 
nearly half of all women and children 
being anemic. Iron deficiency has 
been identified as a widespread cause 
of anemia. Nevertheless, there are 
numerous other factors associated 
with anemia such as malaria, parasitic 
infections, nutritional deficiencies, and 
hemoglobinopathies. Overall, anemia 
is perceived as an indicator of poor 
health and poor nutrition. Anemia can 
occur at all stages of the life cycle but 
is more prevalent in pregnant women 
and young children, on whom it has 
the most devastating health effects. 
Severe forms of anemia are directly 
related to an increased maternal and 
child mortality. The most prevalent 
form of anemia—Iron Deficiency Ane-
mia (IDA)—is associated with negative 
consequences for the cognitive and 
physical development of children and 
on the physical performance of adults 
(Benoist et al. 2005). Particularly in 
children, anemia has been associated 
with impaired cognitive performance, 
motor development, coordination, lan-
guage development, and scholastic 
achievement (ICF 2011).
Theory of expected effects
Anemia is a very good example of a dis-
ease that is relatively easy to prevent 
and treat but still very prevalent and 
associated with acutely negative health 
outcomes, particularly in young chil-
dren and pregnant women. Increased 
access to and use of health-care ser-
vices, including educational advise on 
nutrition, is expected to decrease the 
percentage of children with anemia.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
Data on anemia could be retrieved 
from local health agenicies or, if pos-
sible, directly by a blood test. The DHS 
contains a  large section on anemia, 
for which women (15-49 years) and 
children (usually six-months up to 
five years) are tested for the disease 
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through finger prick or, in the case of 
young children, heel prick blood test-
ing using the HemoCue blood hemo-
globin testing system. In the case of 
DHS, testing is voluntary and respond-
ents receive the results of their anemia 
test immediately as well as informa-
tion about how to prevent anemia (ICF 
2011).
Analysis
The analysis should take into account 
whether the microinsurance scheme 
in focus encompasses any comple-
mentary educational or active inter-
ventions with regards to appropriate 
nutrition of children, particularly 
regarding the supplementation of iron. 
or whether the individuals are subject 
to such an intervention independent 
of their membership in a  microinsur-
ance scheme. Due to the correlation 
between maternal nutrition and health 
status and the prevalence of anemia for 
young children, it could also be inter-
esting to control for the prevalence of 
anemia in children by anemia status of 
the mother.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health/morbidity
• Nutrition-related variables
107Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Health/Morbidity
Indicator: Percentage of women with anemia
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percentage 
of women within a household, who are 
anemic. Anemia is considered as a pub-
lic health problem in both rich and poor 
countries by the WHO. Iron deficiency 
has been identified as a  widespread 
cause of anemia. Nevertheless, there 
are numerous other factors associated 
with anemia such as malaria, parasitic 
infections, nutritional deficiencies, and 
hemoglobinopathies. Overall, anemia is 
perceived as an indicator of poor health 
and poor nutrition. Anemia can occur at 
all stages of the life cycle but is more 
common in pregnant women and young 
children, on whom it has the most dev-
astating health effects. Severe forms 
of anemia are directly related to an 
increased maternal and child mortality. 
The most prevalent form of anemia— 
Iron Deficiency Anemia (IDA)—is asso-
ciated with negative consequences for 
the cognitive and physical development 
of children and on the physical perfor-
mance of adults (Benoist et al. 2005). 
For women, anemia reduces their work 
productivity and places them at risk for 
poor pregnancy outcomes, including 
increased risk of maternal mortality, 
prenatal mortality, premature births, 
and low birth weight (ICF 2011).
Theory of expected effects
Anemia is a very good example of a dis-
ease that is relatively easy to prevent 
and treat but still very prevalent and 
associated with very negative health 
outcomes, particularly in young chil-
dren and pregnant women. Increased 
access to and use of services, includ-
ing educational advise on nutrition, is 
expected to decrease the percentage 
of women with anemia.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
As this indicator explicitly refers to the 
case of health, the applicable type of 
risk coverage here is health insurance.
Measurement
Data on anemia could be retrieved 
from local health agenicies or, if pos-
sible, directly by a blood test. The DHS 
contains a large section on anemia, for 
which women (15-49 years) and children 
(usually six-months up to five-years) 
are tested for the disease through fin-
ger prick or, in the case of young chil-
dren, heel prick blood testing using the 
HemoCue blood hemoglobin testing 
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system. In the case of DHS, testing is 
voluntary and respondents receive the 
results of their anemia test immedi-
ately, as well as information about how 
to prevent anemia (ICF 2011).
Analysis
The analysis should take into account 
whether the microinsurance scheme 
at stake encompasses any com-
plementary educational or active 
interventions with regards to appro-
priate nutrition, particularly regard-
ing the supplementation of iron, or 
whether the individuals are subject 
to such an intervention independent 
of their membership in a microinsur-
ance scheme. Due to the correlation 
between maternal nutrition and health 
status and the prevalence of anemia 
for young children, it could also be 
interesting to control for the preva-
lence of anemia in children by anemia 
status of the mother.
Combine with
• Other indicators of health/morbidity
• Nutrition-related variables
109Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Educational attainment of children
Indicator:  Percentage of children age 6-16 (or other age) 
attending school
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children between the ages of six 
and 16 attending school. The indicator, 
thus, focuses on primary, middle and 
high school (until approximately 10th 
grade) education.
Theory of expected effects
When a  household lacks alternatives 
for coping with a shock event, they may 
be forced to not only use their finan-
cial assets, but also their physical ones 
to handle the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
can be based on two intentions. One is 
to save money, if school fees and other 
expenses are needed to keep the chil-
dren in school; the other intention is to 
take children out of school in order to 
put them to work in order to cope with 
the consequences of the shock. Seen 
from a long term perspective, this cop-
ing mechanism is inefficient. It impedes 
the educational and skills develop-
ment of children, which is essential 
for the future socioeconomic situation 
of a household. Under insurance, it is 
expected that children will remain in 
school after a  shock event as educa-
tional expenses can still be covered 
and no additional man power or sup-
port are needed in their household.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking 
children out of school can be a  reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, plac-
ing households in a difficult economic 
situations.
Measurement
The indicator can be measured both on 
a household level as well as on a com-
munity/school level by using official 
statistics of school attendance rates.
Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typi-
cal coping mechanism of poor to very 
poor households who lack of alterna-
tive coping mechanisms. However, as 
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this indicator implies not only finan-
cial but also physical coping in the 
form of putting the children to work, 
the focus should be taken on house-
holds involved in agricultural produc-
tion or small business, as additional 
man power is most likely to be needed 
here. Furthermore, it could be inter-
esting to control for the age and sex 
of the children taken out of school. 
Taking children out of primary school 
for example can be more devastating 
for the educational development than 
at a  later stage of school. For some 
country contexts, studies show that 
girls are more likely to be taken out 
of school to support a household than 
boys, as their educational prospects 
are valued less. In this context, it could 
be interesting to combine the indica-
tor with a  question about how much 
a household spent for education dur-
ing the past 12 months.
Combine with
• Other indicators of educational 
attainment of children
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
• Child labour measures
111Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Educational attainment of children
Indicator: Days missed in school per child within last month
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the days of 
absence from school per child within 
the last month.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a lack of alternatives to 
cope with a  shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their 
financial but also physical assets to 
cope with the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
can be based on two intentions. One is 
to save money, if school fees and other 
expenses are needed to keep the chil-
dren in school; the other intention is to 
take children out of school in order to 
put them to work in order to cope with 
the consequences of the shock. Under 
insurance, it is expected that children 
will remain in school after a  shock 
event as a result of the financial pro-
tection of the insurance scheme, mak-
ing additional income less necessary 
for a  household. In addition to these 
economic aspects, school days may 
be missed if a child is too weak or sick 
to go to attend. In this context, experi-
mental evidence on deworming inter-
ventions demonstrated that a  better 
health status significantly increases 
the ability to attend school (J-PAL 
2012). Seen from a long term perspec-
tive this coping mechanism is inef-
ficient, as it impedes the educational 
and skills development of the children, 
which are essential for the future soci-
oeconomic situation of the household. 
Under insurance it is expected that 
children remain in school after a shock 
event, due to the financial protection of 
the insurance scheme, making addi-
tional income of the household less 
needed. Furthermore, a  potentially 
enhanced health status may increase 
a child’s physical and mental ability to 
attend school.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking 
children out of school can be a  reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, plac-
ing households in difficult economic 
situations.
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Measurement
• How many days did [CHILD] miss 
school during the past month?
The indicator can be measured both 
on the household level as well as on 
the community/school level by using 
official statistics of school attendance 
rates.
Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typical 
coping mechanism of poor to very poor 
households who lack alternative coping 
mechanisms. However, as this indica-
tor implies not only financial but also 
physical coping in the form of putting 
the children to work, the focus should 
be taken on households involved in 
agricultural production or small busi-
ness, as additional manpower is most 
likely to be needed here. Furthermore, 
it could be interesting to control for the 
age and sex of the children taken out of 
school. Taking children out of primary 
school, for example, can be more dev-
astating for the educational develop-
ment than at a  later stage of school. 
For some country contexts, studies 
show that girls are more likely to be 
taken out of school to support a house-
hold than boys, as their educational 
prospects are valued less. Following 
the argument that health problems 
are a  potential impediment to regular 
school attendance, the analysis should 
take into account whether children 
benefit from any health interventions, 
such as deworming programmes, that 
would make absences due to prevent-
able diseases and health problems 
less likely. As the indicator refers to the 
days missed in school during the pre-
ceding month, the analysis should take 
into account whether there was a shock 
event during this month or recently or 
a particular occasion, such as harvest 
season, which often requires increased 
labor supply within the family.
Combine with
• Other indicators of educational 
attainment of children
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in shock event
• Child labour measures
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Impact: Educational attainment of children — child labour
Indicator:  Percentage of children below age 15 (or other 
age) engaged in income generation, housework, 
farming, or other economic activity as their main 
occupation
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children below the age of 15 (or 
other age), who are engaged in income 
generation for a household.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a lack of alternatives to 
cope with a  shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their 
financial but also physical assets to 
cope with the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
and engaging them in household 
income generation can be based on 
two intentions. One is to save money, 
if school fees and other expenses are 
needed to keep the children in school; 
the other intention is to take children 
out of school in order to put them to 
work in order to cope with the con-
sequences of the shock. Seen from 
a  long term perspective this coping 
mechanism is inefficient, as it impedes 
the educational and skills development 
of the children, which are essential for 
the future socioeconomic situation 
of the household. Under insurance it 
is expected that children remain in 
school after a  shock event as educa-
tional expenses can still be covered 
and no additional manpower and sup-
port is needed in the household.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking 
children out of school can be a  reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, plac-
ing households in difficult economic 
situations.
Measurement
For the measurement of this indica-
tor, official statistics of school attend-
ance rates below the age of 15 could 
be used. Directly asked to a household, 
this question could be considered as 
very sensitive, particularly in contexts 
where school attendance is obligatory 
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up until a  certain level/age and child 
labour prohibited. Thus, consider 
obtaining the information via indirect 
questions about the engagement of 
children in work for the household.
Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typi-
cal coping mechanism of poor to very 
poor households who lack alterna-
tive coping mechanisms. However, as 
this indicator implies not only finan-
cial but also physical coping in the 
form of putting the children to work, 
the focus should be taken on house-
holds involved in agricultural produc-
tion or small business, as additional 
man power is most likely to be needed 
here. The indicator should be seen in 
the light of seasonal or other context 
particularities and analysed regarding 
its duration, i.e., whether the income 
generated by a  child is of short-term 
or long-term duration. Furthermore, it 
could be interesting to control for the 
age and sex of the children taken out 
of school. Taking children out of pri-
mary school, for example, can be more 
devastating for the educational devel-
opment than at a later stage of school. 
For some country contexts, studies 
show that girls are more likely to be 
taken out of school to support a house-
hold than boys, as their educational 
prospects are valued less.
Combine with
• Other indicators of educational 
attainment of children
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
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Impact: Educational attainment of children—child labour
Indicator:  Average number of working hours per week for 
children below age 15
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the working 
hours of children below the age of 15.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a lack of alternatives to 
cope with a  shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their 
financial but also physical assets to 
cope with the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
and engaging them in household 
income generation can be based on 
two intentions. One is to save money, 
if school fees and other expenses are 
needed to keep the children in school; 
the other intention is to take children 
out of school in order to put them to 
work in order to cope with the con-
sequences of the shock. Seen from 
a  long term perspective this coping 
mechanism is inefficient, as it impedes 
the educational and skills development 
of the children, which are essential for 
the future socioeconomic situation 
of the household. Under insurance it 
is expected that children remain in 
school after a  shock event as educa-
tional expenses can still be covered 
and no additional manpower and sup-
port is needed in the household.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking 
children out of school can be a  reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, plac-
ing households in difficult economic 
situations.
Measurement
• How many hours a  week does 
[CHILD] work per week for the 
household?
Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typical 
coping mechanism of poor to very poor 
households who lack alternative cop-
ing mechanisms. However, as this indi-
cator implies not only financial but also 
physical coping in the form of putting 
the children to work, the focus should 
be taken on households involved in 
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agricultural production or small busi-
ness, as additional man power is most 
likely to be needed here. The indica-
tor should be seen in the light of sea-
sonal or other context particularities 
and analysed regarding its duration, 
i.e., whether the income generated by 
a  child is of short-term or long-term 
duration. Furthermore, it could be 
interesting to control for the age and 
sex of the children taken out of school. 
Taking children out of primary school, 
for example, can be more devastating 
for the educational development than 
at a  later stage of school. For some 
country contexts, studies show that 
girls are more likely to be taken out 
of school to support a household than 
boys, as their educational prospects 
are less valued.
Combine with
• Other indicators of educational 
attainment of children
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
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Impact: Educational attainment of children — child labour
Indicator:  Percentage of children age 6-16 (or other age) 
attending school
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the percent-
age of children at the age of 6 to 16 
attending school. The indicator, thus, 
focuses on primary as well as middle 
or high school (until approximately 10th 
grade) education.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a lack of alternatives to 
cope with a  shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their 
financial but also physical assets to 
cope with the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
can be based on two intentions. One is 
to save money, if school fees and other 
expenses are needed to keep the chil-
dren in school; the other intention is 
to take children out of school in order 
to put them to work in order to cope 
with the consequences of the shock. 
Seen from a long term perspective this 
coping mechanism is inefficient, as it 
impedes the educational and skills 
development of the children, which 
are essential for the future socio-
economic situation of the household. 
Under insurance it is expected that 
children remain in school after a shock 
event as educational expenses can 
still be covered and no additional man 
power and support is needed in the 
household.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking 
children out of school can be a  reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, plac-
ing households in difficult economic 
situations.
Measurement
The indicator can be measured both on 
the household level as well as on the 
community/school level by using official 
statistics of school attendance rates.
Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typi-
cal coping mechanism of poor to 
very poor households, who lack of 
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alternative coping mechanisms. How-
ever, as this indicator implies not only 
financial but also physical coping in the 
form of putting the children to work, 
the focus should be taken on house-
holds involved in agricultural produc-
tion or small business, as additional 
manpower is most likely to be needed 
here. Furthermore, it could be inter-
esting to control for the age and sex 
of the children taken out of school. 
Taking children out of primary school, 
for example, can be more devastating 
for the educational development than 
at a  later stage of school. For some 
country contexts, studies show that 
girls are more likely to be taken out 
of school to support a household than 
boys, as their educational prospects 
are valued less.
Combine with
• Other indicators of educational 
attainment of children
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
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Impact: Educational attainment of children — child labour
Indicator:  Days missed in school per child within last month 
due to labour
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the days of 
absence from school per child within 
the last month, which were particu-
larly due to labour of the child.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a lack of alternatives to 
cope with a shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their 
financial but also physical assets to 
cope with the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
can be based on two intentions. One 
is to save money, if school fees and 
other expenses are needed to keep 
the children in school; the other 
intention is to take children out of 
school in order to put them to work in 
order to cope with the consequences 
of the shock. Seen from a long term 
perspective this coping mechanism 
is inefficient, as it impedes the edu-
cational and skills development of 
the children, which are essential for 
the future socioeconomic situation 
of the household. Under insurance it 
is expected that children remain in 
school after a  shock event as edu-
cational expenses can still be cov-
ered and no additional man power 
and support is needed in the house-
hold and, thus, days of absence will 
decrease for these periods.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking 
children out of school can be a  reac-
tion to all sorts of shock events, plac-
ing households in difficult economic 
situations.
Measurement
• How many days did [CHILD] miss 
school during the past month to 
support the family with work?
Note: This question may be sensitive 
in contexts where school attendance 
is obligatory by law. In this case, the 
question may be restricted to the days 
missed at school without mentioning 
the particular reason.
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Analysis
Taking children out of school is a typi-
cal coping mechanism of poor to very 
poor households, who lack alterna-
tive coping mechanisms. However, as 
this indicator implies not only finan-
cial but also physical coping in the 
form of putting the children to work, 
the focus should be taken on house-
holds involved in agricultural produc-
tion or small business, as additional 
man power is most likely to be needed 
here. Furthermore, it could be inter-
esting to control for the age and sex 
of the children taken out of school. 
Taking children out of primary school, 
for example, can be more devastat-
ing for the educational development 
than at a  later stage of school. For 
some country contexts, studies show 
that girls are more likely to be taken 
out of school to support a  household 
than boys, as their educational pros-
pects are valued less. As the indica-
tor refers to the days missed in school 
during the preceding month, the anal-
ysis should take into account whether 
there was a  shock event during this 
month, recently, or during a  particu-
lar occasion, such as harvest season, 
which often requires increased labor 
supply within the family.
Combine with
• Other indicators of educational 
attainment of children
• Other indicators of risk manage-
ment strategies (ex-post)/coping 
strategies in case of shock
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Outcome: Educational attainment of children — child labour
Indicator:  Highest education levels attained by children and 
young adults in household (below age 20)
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the highest 
education levels attained by household 
members below the age of 20.
Theory of expected effects
In the case of a lack of alternatives to 
cope with a shock event, households 
may be forced to not only use their 
financial but also physical assets to 
cope with the corresponding conse-
quences. Taking children out of school 
can be based on two intentions. One 
is to save money, if school fees and 
other expenses are needed to keep 
the children in school; the other 
intention is to take children out of 
school in order to put them to work in 
order to cope with the consequences 
of the shock. Seen from a long term 
perspective this coping mechanism 
is inefficient, as it impedes the edu-
cational and skills development of 
the children, which are essential for 
the future socioeconomic situation 
of the household. Under insurance it 
is expected that children remain in 
school after a shock event as educa-
tional expenses can still be covered 
and no additional man power and 
support is needed in the household 
and, thus, the likeliness of higher 
educational levels attained by house-
hold members below the age of 20 is 
expected to increase in the long run.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since taking chil-
dren out of school can be a reaction to 
all sorts of shock events, placing house-
holds in difficult economic situations.
Measurement
The measurement of the highest edu-
cational levels attained can be focused 
on the highest level completed or the 
highest degree obtained.
• What is the highest educational 
level you completed?
• What is the highest degree you 
attained? (National Bureau of Sta-
tistics, Nigeria 2010)
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Analysis
This indicator has to be analysed in 
a long-term perspective as short-term 
changes are unlikely to occur after the 
take-up of insurance.
Combine with
• Other indicators concerning the 
educational attainment of children
• Other indicators about risk man-
agement strategies (ex-post)/cop-
ing strategies in shock event
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Impact: Peace of mind/perception of financial vulnerability
Indicator:  Changes in risk prioritisation through risk ranking 
exercise
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures changes in 
risk prioritisation through a risk rank-
ing exercise. Risk ranking exercises 
can be conducted in various manners, 
with the basic principle that partici-
pants are asked to rank all risks that 
are applicable to their situation.
Theory of expected effects
Under the assumption that risk prior-
itisation is based on both recent actual 
shock events and subjective percep-
tions about prevalent risk, it is expected 
that a change in risk prioritisation can 
be found for insured individuals, down-
ranking insured risks. This is primarily 
due to a reduction of fear and worries 
about consequences associated with 
the insured risks.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
All types of risk coverage are relevant 
for this indicator as the risk ranking 
exercise includes all risks applicable 
for the studied context.
Measurement
For measurement, risk ranking exer-
cises should be conducted with treat-
ment and control groups. The exercise 
can be carried out in many different 
ways. Morsink and Geurts (2012) con-
ducted a  classical risk ranking exer-
cise with three steps. In the first step, 
participants viewed all cards indicating 
risks and were asked for any amend-
ments necessary. In the second step, 
they were asked to collect all cards 
with risks that are applicable to them. 
In the third step, they were asked to 
select the risk they worried about 
most. This card was put away and the 
procedure continued until a  complete 
rank-order was reached.
Analysis
Because risk prioritisation is not only 
influenced by risk coverage available, 
but also—and most importantly—by 
the actual risks people are exposed to 
and have been exposed to in the past, 
these incidents should be considered in 
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the analysis. It might also be interest-
ing to analyse heterogeneous effects 
by risk aversion because the decisions 
of risk averse individuals should be 
more affected by insurance.
Combine with
• Perception about confidence in the 
future
• Perception about financial vulner-
ability
125Guidelines for indicators
Impact: Peace of mind/perception of financial vulnerability
Indicator: Level of confidence about the future
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the level of 
confidence an individual has about the 
future. It refers to the strong belief 
that the socioeconomic situation will 
develop in a positive way in the future. 
Faith and trust in the future can be 
used synonomously in this context.
Theory of expected effects
Microinsurance is intended to increase 
individual empowerment and mental 
peace of mind by reducing fears and 
worries about the future through an 
increased feeling of security. A  con-
fident perception about the future is 
essential for risk taking behaviour and 
decisions about productive investment. 
Karlan et al. (2012) show this “peace of 
mind effect”, implying that insurance 
can have both a  protective and pro-
ductive effect for clients. They found 
that farmers provided with insurance 
against weather-related risk increase 
productive expenditures on their 
farms, and their demand for insurance 
increases as they, or an acquaintance, 
experience an insurance payout.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Because levels of confidence about 
the future are primarily based on the 
perception and assessment of the pre-
sent situation, the types of risk cover-
age most applicable are those related 
to productive investment (livestock 
and crop insurance) as well as health 
insurance.
Measurement
• How confident are you about the 
future? (rank on scale from not con-
fident to very confident)
Analysis
It could be interesting to analyse whether 
increased confidence in the future has 
a  noticeable impact on productive and 
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investment decisions. It might also 
be interesting to analyse heterogene-
ous effects by risk aversion because 
the decisions of risk averse individuals 
should be more affected by insurance.
Combine with
• Changes in risk prioritisation 
through risk ranking exercise
• Perception of financial vulnerability
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Impact: Peace of mind/perception of financial vulnerability
Indicator: Perception of financial vulnerability
Definition of the indicator
This indicator measures the individu-
al’s perception of financial vulnerabil-
ity: the subjective assessment by indi-
viduals of their economic situation and 
its vulnerability.
Theory of expected effects
The ultimate proclaimed role of micro-
insurance is to reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of people living on low incomes by 
enabling them to manage their risks 
more efficiently. Consequently, it is 
expected that microinsurance also 
evokes a subjective change in percep-
tion about financial vulnerability.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Because levels of confidence about 
the future are primarily based on the 
perception and assessment of the pre-
sent situation, the types of risk cover-
age most applicable are those related 
to productive investment (livestock 
and crop insurance) as well as health 
insurance.
Measurement
• How much do you worry that 
a severe financial shock could occur 
to your household?
Analysis
It could be interesting to compare the 
perception of financial vulnerability 
with the actual financial vulnerability 
retrieved from indicators of wealth and 
income.
Combine with
• Changes in risk prioritisation 
through risk ranking exercise
• Perception about confidence in the 
future
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Impact: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of money currently borrowed from 
others without interest
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures the total amount 
of money borrowed from others (fam-
ily, friends, informal networks, etc.) 
without interest.
Theory of expected effects
Borrowing from others in the commu-
nity without interest is a positive sign for 
strong social capital within a commu-
nity. However, informal borrowing from 
others in the community can involve 
putting pressure on the borrower other 
than interest such as social pressure, 
expectations of reciprocity, etc. Under 
insurance, a  direct effect expected is 
that, in the context of ex-post risk miti-
gation, less borrowing from informal 
networks is conducted to cushion the 
shock (Dercon et al. 2012).
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are appli-
cable in this case as borrowing from 
informal networks can be a reaction to all 
sorts of shock events placing the house-
hold in a  difficult economic situation or 
other non-shock related occasions.
Measurement
• How much do you currently borrow 
from others without paying interest?
Analysis
Here, it could be interesting to control 
for different informal sources (could be 
more than one) of borrowing. Further-
more, it could be interesting to inves-
tigate whether the borrowing is bound 
to any other kind of obligation than 
interest (expectations of reciprocity, 
etc). Furthermore, controlling for for-
mal lending could be also of interest in 
order to find out more about the lend-
ing practices of a  household (rather 
informal or formal) and whether the 
choice to borrow informally is due to 
independent preferences or lack of 
access to formal mechanisms.
Combine with
• Total amount of money currently 
lent to others without interest
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Impact: Reliance on informal risk sharing networks
Indicator:  Total amount of money currently lent to others 
without interest
Definition of the indicator
The indicator captures social capital by 
the total amount of money lent to oth-
ers (family, friends, informal networks, 
etc.) without interest.
Theory of expected effects
Borrowing from and lending to others 
in the community without interest is 
a positive sign for strong social capital 
within a  community and intrinsically 
desirable. However, informal lend-
ing to others in the community can 
involve features that put pressure on 
the borrower other than interest such 
as social pressure and expectations 
of reciprocity. When microinsurance 
is available and taken-up, a  direct 
effect expected is that, in the context 
of ex-post risk mitigation, less lending 
needs to be conducted to cushion the 
shock (Dercon et al. 2012). Also, the 
willingness and ability to provide more 
loans to family and community mem-
bers might increase, as the funds are 
less needed as precautionary assets 
for people’s own purposes. Otherwise, 
insured individuals might be less will-
ing to help those who did not behave 
cautiously and refused insurance.
Applicable type of risk coverage
• Health insurance
• Life insurance
• Livestock insurance (indemnity or 
index)
• Crop insurance (indemnity or index)
• Property insurance
• Other
Numerous types of insurances are 
applicable in this case since lending to 
informal networks can be a  reaction 
to all sorts of shock events or other 
non-shock related occasions, plac-
ing households in difficult economic 
situations.
Measurement
• How much do you currently lend to 
others without taking interest?
Analysis
It could be interesting to investigate 
whether the lending is bound to any 
other kind of obligation than inter-
est (expectations of reciprocity, in-
kind compensations, or services, 
etc.). Furthermore, details of the loan 
arrangement, such as repayment 
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policies, are interesting to consider in 
the analysis.
Combine with
• Total amount of money currently 
borrowed from others without 
interest
• Total amount of loans (currently 
pending) given to family members 
and other community members
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